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
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DARSHANA
INTERNATIONAL

AN
INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY
OF
Philosophy, Psychology,
Psychical Research, Religion,
Mysticism & Sociology

129



MORADABAD
(India)

DEDICATION

*This 129th issue of the Darshana International
is most respectfully dedicated to*

DR. BASANT KUMAR LAL

*Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy,
Magadh University. Bodh Gaya. He was the author of
several books of Philosophy both in Hindi and English
language,. His contributions in the field of Philosophy will
always be rembered with great honour.*

ANURAG ATREYA

Managing Editor

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Research, Religion, Mysticism
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JANUARY 1993

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Editorial :

Religious Philosophy of Kalidasa

R. N. Vyas

Dharma, which has been popularly translated as religion, occupies a significant position in Indian culture. Indeed, it has been accepted that religion alone can lead a person to the portals of progress and perfection. Even Indian philosophy aims at giving correct guidance in the domain of religion because mere speculations about the ultimate Truth are not sufficient. They must be aimed at the realisation of practical solutions of the problems of pain and unhappiness which burden our day-to-day life. Religion aims at a qualitative transformation of human conduct, because this is the only way of making one's life free from the traces of worldly miseries and misfortunes.

Kalidasa was not only one of the greatest poets and dramatists of India, he was well-versed in the study of philosophy, religion, Vedic lore etc. Though the main aim of Kalidasa was to depict human emotions sentiments, he did try to express his religious philosophy whenever he could find an opportunity to do so in his works. We should not forget that Kalidasa had his own views about religion. Of course, these views emerged to certain extent due to the influence of the lofty philosophical teachings of the Upanishads and the Puranas; but these belonged to Kalidasa as he accepted them after cool thinking and gave them an expression in his literary language. Kalidasa himself held the view that only a foolish person is led by the opinion of others; and as Kalidasa was an intelligent man, his views cannot be called totally borrowed.

The religious scene of India at the time of Kalidasa was not very heartening. Two powerful anti-Vedic thoughts in the forms of Jainism and Buddhism had become strong. These anti-Vedic thoughts gained strength as they were accorded royal patronage, and as was the custom in those days, the people accepted the religion followed by their kings. Specially Buddhism had become very dominant, because it attacked casteism and the violence associated with sacrificial rites. An additional factor that helped Buddhism in the swelling the number of its adherents was the rich donation it received from the rich and influential section of society, which enabled the Buddhistic viharas to become asylums of easy and comfortable life. Who

does not like an easy-going and respectful life ? Hence, people accepted Buddhism in thousands. The Brahmanas who accepted Buddhism also tried to prepare profound commentaries on the Buddhist teachings. Thus the attraction of high learning too became associated with Buddhism.

Hindu religion itself had at least two important sects viz. Vaishnavism and Shaivism at that time. Even if these sects did not quarrel open it, there existed a thin but perceptible line of disagreement between them. It is queer that the land of the lofty Upanishadic thought had become flooded with currents of religious disharmony and disagreements. While it cannot be logically established that God created men, it can be proved beyond any shadow of doubt that man does create God. Hindu religion demonstrates this very fact by accepting the principle of a favourite to god or Ishta devata. If every person does not create any god, he at least selects a god of his choice out of the crowd of various gods existing in a society. This selection implies that a person is free to accept a particular type of deity. It is a remarkable feat of Indian mind that out of this very crowd of deities the cult of the Vedanta or non-dualism was produced. It can also be argued that because of the Vedantic insight, people were made free to conceive Truth in the light of their own propensities and temperaments.

What is to be noted is the fact that Kalidasa did not decry the different concepts of God, because he knew that people possess different and divergent likings or aptitudes. So far as Kalidasa was concerned he liked to worship Lord Shiva. attracted Kalidasa's heart that was filled with love for art and literature. Lord Shiva Himself is known as Nataraja. That is why Kalidasa invoked Shiva at the beginning of his plays. For example, he prays Lord Shiva in the following words in the prologue to the *Malavikagnimitra*: "Though occupying the position of undivided sovereignty over the whole universe—a position which is fruitful of several blessings to the humble and the devout he is himself clad in elephant's skin; although his body is integrated with that of his beloved spouse into one single whole, he stands far above the self-restrained ascetics in the matter of keeping the mind completely aloof from sensual desires; though sustaining the entire creation with his eight forms, he has not a trace of pride in Him. May that Lord dispel the element of darkness from your nature, so that you may perceive the right path in the light of pure knowledge".

But no, it will be wrong to presume that Kalidasa was a blind follower of the Shaiva sect. When he prays in the *Shakuntala* war

Religious Philosophy of Kalidasa

"May the self-existent, purple-throated God, whose power pervades every where, release me from the interminable chain of birth and death." he does not mean that his Lord is a petty god.

Kalidasa makes it clear in the *Kumarasambhava* (VI canto) that his Shiva is the supreme God who is the author of the creation, preservation and the dissolution of the universe and who governs the creatures internally. In the second canto, Brahma states :

"That God is the self-luminous Supreme Spirit itself that abides permanently beyond all darkness and is outside all illusive appearances. The extent of his power can neither be measured by me, nor by Vishnu."

For Kalidasa, there is no distinction between Shiva and Vishnu. in the *Kumarasambhava* he writes :

"Manifesting thy exalted power through three successive states of thine existence, O Lord, Thou alone art the cause of creation, preservation and destruction." and in the *Reghuvamsha* he states :

"Salutation to Thee, O Lord, who abidest in three different forms-being at first the creator of the universe, afterwards the upholder of it, and lastly the destoryer of it."

What is implied through these descriptions is that the Supreme God is one although sometimes he is thought to be Shiva and sometimes as Vishnu. This is made amply clear in the *Kumarasambhava* :

"It is essentially the same Being who splits Itself into three different deities (for the performance of three different functions of creation, protection and destruction of the universe), each of whom is prior or posterior to the others by turns. Sometimes Shiva precedes Vishnu, sometimes Vishnu precedes Shiva, sometimes Brahma precedes either of the two, and they both precede him."

For Kalidasa Rama, Vishnu, Shiva, Brahma all are essentially one viz. the sole Supreme God (*Purusham puratanam*). It is in fact the imperceptible truth (*avyak to*), one appearing in manifold forms (*sarva rupa-bhak*). It is the same Truth which the yogis seek for liberation. No-body can know its real nature. It is, really speaking beyond the reach of speech and mind. In one word, we can say that it is the Brahman of the *Udanishads*. Who can find out the secret of God, the supreme ?

Kalidasa, moreover, accepts the authority of the Vedas. Without faith, no religion can flourish. There is no end to argumentation. Undue argumentation shall lead us no where.

As the aptitudes and likings of persons differ, One Supreme Truth is conceived in different forms and ways. But Kalidasa is sure that

all the paths, if followed sincerely, lead to the same ultimate Truth, as all rivers ultimately meet in the ocean. Hence, what is needed is a real understanding of the Truth and the consequent tolerance towards other seekers of Truth.

Kalidasa accepts of the theory of incarnation. The Supreme incarnates in the form of Rama, Krishna etc. for the protection of righteousness. As can be expected from a warm-hearted poet, Kalidasa favours the path of devotion as compared with the path of knowledge and ascetic tendencies. He states that body should never be neglected, as it is an instrument of religious attainments. One can never get freedom from cravings and desires for worldly objects through ascetic means because our impulses cannot be curbed in this manner. Only through devotion they can be sublimated. Similarly, he condemns renunciation of actions. One should never abandon one's duties. The world should not be discarded. Even God assumes incarnations to favour smooth working of the universe.

Kalidasa thus accepts the basic teaching of the Bhagavadgita that one should never shun one's duties. He indirectly condemned intolerance, ascetic tendencies and other-worldliness prevalent at his time.

He reaffirmed the basic philosophy of the Upanishads and preached the gospel of proper discharge of one's duties and devotional attachment towards God. He gives due importance even to religious celebrations, because by nature man likes celebrations.

Kalidasa has thus advocated a very sensible religious philosophy that can be accepted even by an average person. However, he has rightly pointed out that religion to be worthwhile must equip its followers to face the temptations of the world with equanimity. It should never inspire its adherents to flee away from the world. He is really religious who develops right attitude towards life and the duties. Kalidasa's philosophy of religion can be accepted even by the modern man because of its positive character, catholic nature and simplicity.

I

An Eastern Psychotherapist in the Western World

Prabha Knanna

East Meets West

A Psychotherapist Looks at Her Experiences

I should explain a little about myself as a Psychotherapist. In any definition of who I am, my experience as a psychotherapist, both in dealing with clients directly and indirectly through supervision of trainees, has major salience. I enjoy the activity very much and am committed to it. My definition of what my orientation is may best be described as eclectic existential. What I intend to connote by that term is my sense of freedom in utilizing whatever technique I assume is likely to be most beneficial and appropriate for the client at any given time. The title existential underlies some of the basic assumptions regarding the human condition made by most of the existential writers.

I have been in the process of being a Psychotherapist in my own capacity since 1957 when I received my degree from Boulder, Colorado. I am clearly not a "regular American". I discovered a long time ago that I was frequently mistaken as a Mexican/South American. However, I have managed to retain my identity, namely that of an Asian American. One detail I should mention. Since I came to the United States as a graduate student in 1954, I have never really felt an "alien" and have felt "at home" in every sense of the world. I do not intend to go into detail about my speculations for this phenomenon. However, I have also always recognized my roots in India.

My first therapy contact occurred in institutional settings. During my training, this occurred at the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital, then at a state hospital in Kansas and subsequently at the outpatient and inpatient services offered by the Department of Psychiatry in Mempo-

his, Tennessee. I now have a limited private practice. Each of these locales had its unique characteristics that may have had some implications with regard to my acceptance as a psychotherapist. I have made a cursory rather than a thorough search of the literature and do not find any account of experiences of other female therapists of Indian background who have spent their lifetime in the United States. I must therefore examine my experiences as a study of an of one. It is obvious, however, that there is no dearth of psychotherapists who have been transplanted from one culture to another though the external disparity between these cultures may not have been as pronounced as in my case.


The kinds of clients that I have worked with have ranged from psychotic, state hospital chronic patients to outpatient services in a range of settings. The obvious consequences of the institutional settings were that the clients did not actively choose me as their therapist; they were assigned to me because I had an opening. Such was the case with the chronic hospitalized patients and also the outpatients within the Department of Psychiatry. Since about 1970, I have had a limited private practice which has involved a more active choice on the part of the client who comes to see me. The context in which they "apperceive" me has therefore changed and has had somewhat different implications for the expectations with which they enter the therapeutic relationship.

I thought that I would examine the current status of the role of the therapist before discussing my own interpretations of my experiences. The most scholarly review of the therapist variables in the psychotherapy process and outcome has been most recently carried out by Beutler, Crago and Arizmendi in the third edition of the Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change edited by Garfield and Bergin (1986).

The authors approach the problem by making a two axes schema where the extra-therapy characteristics and the therapy specific characteristics represents one dimension and the externally observed characteristics as opposed to the inferred internal characteristics represent the other dimension. This crossing of the two dimensions leads to four quadrants, each dealing with somewhat different aspects. The first quadrant deals with age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status. The second quadrant deals with personality patterns, emotional well-being, attitudes and values. The third quadrant deals with relationship attitudes, social influence attributes, expectations and the fourth quadrant deals with professional background, therapeutic style and therapeutic interventions. This scheme is used as a way of or-

An Eastern Psychotherapist in the Western World

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ganizing the research on therapist characteristics. The authors come up with a series of tables which summarize the findings of the studies under review and may best be described as showing trends. As all of you may anticipate, none of the findings are clear-cut conclusions. For example, under age, one study favors age similarity for younger patients, three favor age similarity, but four involving analog studies favor age dissimilarity. In a similar way, in the gender column two studies favor female therapists, four are non-significant, three favor similarity to show interaction with other variables, and so on. There is a section on ethnicity. Three studies are not significant for outcome and four favor similarity reducing drop out. In most instances, the issue of ethnicity is regarded in terms of black/white or white and non-white categories. Exactly how I have been perceived along the black/white dimensions in the various settings that I have described

above, remains unknown. Since I do not have all the relevant data about my "therapist characteristics" along these dimensions, I can only make a few observations. The best I can do is not try to define these characteristics as I think they may have "objectively" been defined but as I have perceived them to be. There is no question that some of the clients have come to me because I am a female and have felt comfortable in dealing with a female. On the other hand, at least two clients whom I transferred, for varying reasons to male therapists distinctly stand in my memory as having thanked me profusely for my recommendations.

The fact that the client now exerts a very clear choice in coming to see me has underlined the importance of their expectations. It is difficult for me to know exactly how I have been defined to them, by the referring agent and which set of expectations we are dealing with. By that I mean that I am a professor at a local university, I am a licensed clinical psychologist, I have an ABPP in clinical psychology, I have been active in the local, regional, and national professional associations, etc. Which of these characteristics has been the dominant one in the client's mind in choosing to come remains unknown. In noting the source of referral, I find that the vast majority of the clients are referred by ex-clients. Again, there is no way for me to explore the nature of the relationship between the current client and my ex-clients. Naturally, I have assumed that this is a recommendation and that the ex-client is expressing indirect satisfaction with our mutual experience. It is possible that in some instances, that assumption has not been valid and that I have received the "proverbial enemies".

My first contact with the client becomes fairly significant. All of my stimulus characteristics including my peculiar accent and the client's reactions to these characteristics are, I presume, a fairly major determinant of how they perceived the relationship. I "launch myself into the relationship" a-la Rogers not because I am aware of the possible negative expectations that the client may have but because that is my style of therapy. It also becomes apparent to me that as the therapy continues, the importance of the nature of the relationship becomes more dominant rather than my external characteristics.

At some level, I have dealt with my "foreignness" by using it as a means of exploring whatever negative thoughts the client may have had either at the initial stage or in any continuing process. Some of the statements have been fairly interesting. One of the clients who I saw for a period of about five years and who had a few psycho-

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tic episodes eventhough I continued to see her as an outpatient, told me that than when she first met me, she thought to herself, "By God, they must have gone to the bottom of the barrel to come up with this". Another client who was also assigned to me said that since her major problem had been her relationship with her mother, she was glad that I was not a "typical American female". As far as the male clients have been concerned, some of the characteristics in terms of the early negative expectations were not conveyed to me in spite of my attempts at dislodging them in a direct fashion. Can I assume that they were not there or that the male clients felt less free in saying the negative thoughts to me? As a counter-argument against the latter explanation, I can refer to instances where the client has said, "You sounded just like my father!" These examples however, seemed to have occured not because of my stimulus characteristics but as an unfolding process in the therapeutic relationship.

My own view of psychotherapy places a great deal of importance on the nature of the relationship between the client and the therapist. I therefore, as I said above, "launch myself" into the relationship. I have used my stimulus characteristics as a means of exploring whatever negative thoughts and feelings the clients may have. Quite routinely, I refer to their natural disinclination to talk about themselves that might exist because of my peculiar looks, accent, way of talking, etc. I feel that this has allowed me to invite more negative comments than has always been the case with other dyads. It also seems to me and is definitely my hope, that as the relationship develops, the importance of my stimulus characteristics reduces.

In other aspects of the relationship, I have consciously tried to balance between conveying the empathic response to asking the client to explain to me in greater detail the unique phenomenological perception. For example, in recent years, the number of self help books in the market has grown tremendously. I have truthfully, stated to the client in response to inquiries about my knowledge of a particular book that I have not read the book. In fact I have found that to be a useful policy since it gives the clients an opportunity to explain what the book meant to him/her. The phenomological prospective gets clarified and made more explicit in this process of explaining things to me. I have sometime used the same technique if the client is stuck with some other from of self-judgement or "a label". For example, a client who has been through the holocaust preceeds to explain 'what the holocaust was'. In reality, I have read a tremendous amount of literature on the holocaust but I have utilized my assumed ignorance to enhance my empathic understanding rather than reduce the self-exploration that results in the client's defining himself/herself

as a survivor of the holocaust. It sometimes seems to me that my "foreignness" has led to a greater acceptance by the client of the self-exploration without their assuming that I already have preconceived ideas about survivors of holocaust or for that matter any other self defined group. For example, the black client has been able to experiences of a negative character to me and in the process explore the full extent of his/her reactions.

The same kind of conscious utilization of my "foreignness" has occurred with a few clients whom I have seen without pay. One that is currently seeing me, has been in therapy for the last four years. After the first few visits, it became apparent that the economic resources of the client could not maintain a long-term therapeutic undertaking. I explained to the client that I would continue to see her without any economic remuneration and explained my attitude towards money. She was eventually able to accept the therapy without any subsequent devaluation of it by stating to me that it seemed to her that my attitude towards money was obviously not typically American and was rather peculiar. The client in question is a borderline who has had several crises which we have managed to successfully survive.

Occasionally, my stimulus characteristic and particularly the fact that I am from India has evoked certain assumptions that my best be described as of a "mystique". In such instances, there may have been a disappointment that I was not this mystical all-knowing, all-wise character but a very concrete, direct and open person. I have come across those kinds of criticisms more from "friends" than from my clients. I firmly believe that I have been able to experience Rogers' "Necessary and essential conditions for therapy", namely, congruence unconditional positive regard and empathy. It seems likely, in retrospect, that occasionally my emphasis of these characteristics have been perceived as such by the client because of my "mystique" and peculiarities. I have no way of exploring this or knowing fully what may be implied by it.

To what extent can one say that these are instances of East meeting the West and that they are any different from any other therapy situation where the uniqueness of the therapist meets the uniqueness of the client? I do not necessarily feel that they are. Abramowitz and Murray (1983) have observed that the conclusions reached in any review of the literature may reflect the race of the reviewer. White reviewers tend to minimize the effect of ethnic differences while black reviewers emphasize findings in which differences are found; A similar conclusion is discussed by Beutler, Crago and Arizono (1988)

mentioned above. In this regard, I have felt that since the preponderance of clients that I have seen have been whites both male, female, young, old, very disturbed to moderately uncomfortable, I have been in a position of being externally dissimilar to them. However, my own reading of my "batting average" is that my efforts have been fairly successful. Thus, even though I have consciously "exploited" if such a term can be utilized the "differences", particularly in the initial stages of the therapeutic relationship, I have not experienced them as significant. It is also possible that my existential orientation has helped me to transcend more readily the differences that have existed. The existential perspective while emphasizing the phenomenological, the unique, the elements of choice, freedom, mortality and responsibility have perhaps allowed me to go beyond the differences to *the common aspects of the human condition*.

The relevant data about my client's perception of me has come in direct and indirect ways e.g. referring others to me, occasionally letting me know their views of me after therapy has been completed, etc. So we function in the unknown. I have managed to survive well by selectively highlighting some of the information. I, for one, have been a very vigorous participant of this endeavor.

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2

The Concept of Ananda in Tagore's Lyrics

M. Adhikari

It is impossible to conceive of a creative mind that has blossomed in void. A complete disregard of one's culture and traditions, may lead a person towards utter chaos. Man is a product of his heredity, environment and consistent personal endeavour. No matter how astounding is the genius, the role and the impact of the age cannot be minimized. The *samskaras* planted in a child may remain dormant but are likely to sprout up at opportune moments. Rabindranath Tagore, the illustrious son of Devarshi Devendranath Tagore, consciously and unconsciously had absorbed the very essence of our traditional Indian thoughts. Thus, what he became later, was the effect of the inherent qualities in the man and his upbringing in a family that enjoyed the quintessence of our culture.

Rabindranath had repeatedly acknowledged his indebtedness to the *Upanishads*. He was initiated into its mysteries by his renowned father. This was his most valued patrimony. In the Preface to his book *Shadhana*, he wrote, 'The writer has been brought up in a family where the texts of the *Upanishads* are used in daily worship; and he has had before him the example of his father, who lived his long life in the closest communion with God... (p. vii).

An attempt to isolate Tagore's very personal views from the thoughts of the *Upanishads*, would prove a futile exercise. The wealth of ideas found in Tagore-literature, is a result of an amalgamation of four streams of thought that reached him through the text of the *Upanishad*, the *Vaishnava* literature, the pagan faith, its sensuousness and the scientific thinking of the modern age. It is a case of mustering a whole civilization in one's own person.

It is indeed a paradox, that a man constantly tortured by the agonies of life should have his faith firmly entrenched in the belief

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that the infinite is *Anandaswarup*, pure bliss. The concept of *Ananda* abstract in essence, expresses a psychological condition that denotes a commingling of inner feelings of happiness, sublimation and peace. One may safely assert that brought up in an atmosphere surcharged with the ideals of the *Upanishads*, Tagore had inherited and imbibed the meaning of the concept. The ideologies of the *Upanishads* were not only restored by the poet but were actively practised also, that ultimately enabled him to formulate his Religion of Man. Impregnated by the ideas of the Sufi and the medieval poets like Kabir, Raidas, Rajjab, Mirabai, Jnaneshwara, he came to believe that one could experience pure bliss through love that has two variations: devotion and love between the finite and the infinite. He never derided the path of the Vaishnava poets who from the worldly sensuous plane of love moved to the higher spiritual love that ultimately, brought the experience of *Ananda*. Tagore's love-lyrics, often rooted in the mundane world, invariably give intimations of the spiritual experience. In his celebrated song, "Mahavishve Mahakashe" the poet sings:

I wander, the sole human amidst your boundless world,
boundless sky and boundless time

... ..

You the father of the universe, live in your illuminated world,
You gaze towards me, I gaze towards you.

... ..

You are one and I live alone in you without fear.

(Tr. by the writer. *Gītobitan*, Puja, Song 337)

If there is no fear in the finite, then, a profound intimacy can develop with the Infinite. There is no reason why pure bliss cannot be experienced by the finite through this relationship. According to Tagore, this world is the *Brahmavihar* where joys and sorrows coexist. Misinterpretation of the Infinite's wish, leads man to the quagmire of sorrow. One could perceive the true meaning of *Brahmavihar* only when an intimate relationship is established first with nature and then with man. These two relationships are also essential for a true comprehension of the concept of *Ananda*, an attribute of the Infinite. The realization of pure bliss to Tagore was a continuous process that came with constant striving. The concept of life as a journey, as an endless movement recurs in his lyrics (*Gītobitan*, Swadesh, Song 13).

In conformity with the spiritual rebels of ancient India, Tagore had moved forward without rest. The hymn of onward march, repeated in his song (if no one comes with your call) (ibidem song 3) is the call of *Aitareya Brahmana*. Indian thought had never advocated the cause of stagnation and Tagore tutored by the ancient philoso-

phers of India, sincerely believed in the philosophy of movement. His *Anandaswarup Brahman* ever remained active and so His ardent devotee. *Ananda* the soul of every object, flitted from flower to flower, sprang from branch to branch, as a manifestation of the Beings presence. Tagore never claimed to be a philosopher. He only wished to be known as a poet. When questioned about his religion he had answered, "My religion is essentially a poet's religion" (Tagore 1961b: 10) and thus he had viewed the teachings of the *Upanishads* with a poet's eye. He was convinced that the 'freshness of meaning' of the text could never be exhausted. He interpreted the religious text in a different manner. Mr. Nihar Ranjan Ray in his revealing essay, 'Ravindranath Tagore and the Indian Tradition', has remarked, "...it is important in this connection to state that Tagore's interpretation of the *Upanishads* did not follow those of any of his illustrious predecessors from Shankara down wards". But he was impressed by the attitude of the sages towards 'life and death, peace and bliss'. (Ray, 1961a; 228) Radhakrishnan in his *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*, voicing similar thoughts had remarked:

The impression that Rabindranath's views are different from those of Hinduism is due to the fact that Hinduism is identical with the peculiar aspects of *Shankara Vedanta* ... which turned out a world negating doctrine. Rabindranath's religion is identical with the ancient wisdom of the *Upanishads*, the *Bhagvatgita*, and the theistic system of a later day. (p. 119).

The *Upanishads* had left its indelible mark on the poet's mind. Its essence was so thoroughly assimilated by the poet that even during his tender years he had realised that the Infinite existed in the finite. Edward Thomson records a conversation with the poet in *Rabindranath Tagore*:

'It is strange', he (Tagore) said to me many years later, 'that even so young I had the idea, which was to grow with me all along, realising the Infinite in the finite and not as some of our Indian metaphysicians do of eliminating the finite'.

(quoted in Sayeed: 80)

In *Naivedya* the poet sings, "In You exists many suns and moons, yet neither an atom nor a molecule is lost. Will not my insignificant possessions remain near thy feet?" (Song 17). God concern for man, was a conviction with the poet that never deserted him. The intimate relationship between the finite and the Infinite was reiterated by Tagore in many of his lyrics. "Thou has made me endless, such is thy pleasure. This frail vessel thou emptiest again and again, and fillest it ever with fresh life... At the immortal touch of thy hands my heart loses its limits in joy and gives birth to utterances ineffable" (*Gitanjali*, song I). "He came and sat by my side but I woke not"

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(ibidem: Song XXVI). Since Tagore felt the presence of *Satyasunder* intimately and repeatedly through the objects of life and nature, he never wished to lead a life of negation or a life of an ascetic. He refused to search for deliverance. In *Gitanjali* he sings:

Deliverance? Where is this deliverance to be found? Our master himself has joyfully taken upon him the bonds of creation; he is bound with us all for ever (Song 11).

In another lyric, in the same collection, he has voiced similar sentiments:

Deliverance is not for me in renunciation. I feel the embrace of freedom in thousand bonds of delight... No I will never shut the doors of my senses. The delights of sight and hearing and touch will bear thy delight. (Song LXXIII).

It is interesting to note that the poet feels 'freedom' though the 'bonds of delight'. The implications of sensual delight usually goes against the idea of salvation, but it is not so for the poet, as the delights of sights and hearing led him to His delight. According to Tagore, God's delight is the ultimate state of joy that man craves for and it comes through the sensuous appreciation of Almighty's creation.

In Tagore's matured poems, Upanishadic ideas are reflected repeatedly. The *Gayatrimantra* had a deep significance for the poet. Other mantras that dealt with the praise of the *Anandaswarup Brahman*, were his great favourites. He believed whole-heartedly in. The idea that God exists in the most insignificant objects was his staunch belief. He was conscious of the fact that the Infinite never ignored even the most trivial objects of nature. The idea is reflected in a poem titled 'Udarocharitanam' collected in *Kanika*. To an insignificant flower in the garden, disdained by all, the sun asks, "My dear, are you well"? The lines clearly reflect the poet's conviction of the Supreme Being's unalloyed affection for the lowly and the common. In *Shantiniketan*, he had spoken of the eternal wish (God) that moves the world. 'Everything responds to His wish, to the light of His *Ananda*. Observe that *Ananda*... The stream of bliss is flowing through the branches (tr. by the writer, Tagore 1909 : 416). He believed that Divine joy manifested itself through the varied expressions of love.

The *mantra* that had a special impact on the poet's mind is, Tagore's *Brahman* is not an abstract concept, and thus through the ever changing process of creation, *Brahman* continues to reveal Himself. His expression is through knowledge, strength, action and *Ananda*. This realisation helped the poet to immerse himself in the sea of pure bliss. Tagore's poetry flows from the concept of God as being total joy. Thus, he could sing in *Gitanjali*, I have had my in-

vation to this worlds festival' (song XVI). In the Bengali version of the text the poet uses the term *Ananda-yagna* for 'festival'. The Bengali expression, naturally, reveals more adequately, the poet's concept of the world. He was satisfied in experiencing an atom of Heavenly joy. He repeatedly illustrates the *Upanishadic* thought, Thus he felt that our actions could never act as shackles, if we could reveal through our actions an atom of the joy of *Brahman*. In *Shan-tineketan* he wrote, 'And joy is everywhere; it is in the earth's green covering of grass; in the blue serenity of the sky; ... in the severs abstinence of grey winter; ... in the perfect poise of the human figure, noble, upright; in living; ... in the acquisition of knowledge; in fighting evils...' (tr. by the writer, Tagore 1909 : 43) His joy, the true reflection of God existed in the aminate and in the inaminate, in the abstract and the concrete. In other words God's joy was reflected in every object of this world, be it winter or spring, birth or death, joy or sorrow.

Tagore was convinced that God could not be realised only through intellect (*Gyanmarga*). The role of emotion in this process was also very significant. This experiences is. The poet has remarked, The *Upanishads* has said that everything is born from *Ananda*. From *Ananda* the journey begins and everything returns to that. The waves of joy are flowing in this world. Every human being should immerse himself in its flow and only this can give meaning to human life' (tr. by the writer, Tagore 1909 : 27). Thus Tagore felt that *Upanishads* demanded not asceticism but advocated strongly the idea of God, being all pervading. Man must work for his salvation as the poet sings in *Gitanjali* 'Oh grant me my prayer that I may never lose the bliss of the touch of the one in the play of the many' (song LXII).

Tagore's God is *Satchidananda*. The concepts of truth, knowledge and pure bliss are insaperably interlinked in this. His pure joy illuminates the whole universe. Many felt that such an ideology was a manifestation of the poet's romantic spirit and it had overwhelmed him to overlook the evils and sorrows of life. But this is a distortion of the poet's view-point. In the many evils, sorrows, bereavements, he sincerely felt the presence of God. Very few could have passed through the dark alleys of sorrow as Tagore did, But his inherent faith motivated him to break the walls that stood between him and his Master. There is no hypocrisy when he sings, There is sorrow, there is death, there are the pangs of separation and yet there is peace, there is joy and the wakeful Eternity (tr. by the writer, *Gitobitan*, Puja, song 248). In another lyric he speaks of the *Ananda-dbara*, i.e. the stream of joy, flowing in the univetse. He suggests that man should not remain imprisoned in his narrow personal sor-

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rows but enlarge his heart to compare his lot with others. The *Amrit-rasa* is following incessantly. Fill your desolate life with love (ibidem: song 3 to 6), he advises. The poet believes that God dwells in *Anandalok* and since you (God) are close, joy remain awake in your universe' (ibidem: song 485). The poet had identified joy with God and wherever pure joy or bliss existed, God's presence could be felt. Tagore's aesthetic vision is comprised of the beautiful, the joyful and the sublime. His entire personality was charged with the 'idealistic postulate' that was intuitive. Intuitively he felt that the negative aspects of life were only a partial aspects of the positive. Evils, shortcomings of life, more than ever, were compensated by the goodness and the perfection of the Infinite. In a celebrated *Brahmasangeet*, the poet sings, 'Nowhere is there sorrow or death or separation/How-ever far with all my soul I seek into thy boundless world. But the moment I turn my gaze from thee unto myself/Death becomes dead-ly and sorrow burrows deep well' (tr. by the writer, ibidem song 596). It is not possible for all mortals to have this vision of the world permeated with joy. The reason is obvious. We are distanced from Him because of our ignorance and thus we fail to realise His presence in the stormy night. The poet knows that in the stormy night the tryst with the beloved is awaited (*Gitanjali*, song 23). He sings, 'Master thou art bliss, thou art goodness, thou art beautiful' (*Gito-bitan*, Puja song 240, tr. by the writer). If God is, there is nothing fear. 'I will not be afraid, if you come in the person of sorrow/Wherever there is pain I will experience you more intimately' (ibidem: song 230). There are innumerable lyrics of Tagore that describe God as the embodiment of the ideal concept of pure bliss.

It is interesting to note that though Tagore had given great importance to the Being, yet he had not underestimated the significance of man in this *Leela*. In *Gitanjali* the poet says, 'Thus it is that thy joy in me is so full/Thus it is that thou has come down to me-/Oh thou Lord of all heavens/where would be thy love if I were not present? .. / In my heart is the endless play of thy delight... / And for this thy love loses itself in my love/And there art thou seen in our perfect union (*Gitanjali*, Bengali version, tr. by the writer, song 121). Thus God's joy can be manifested exclusively through man and nature. These words can be voiced by a person who has visualised Almighty as the Eternal poet, Master, Lover, Friend, Father etc.

The path to *Anandadham* (*Gitobitan*, song 304), where *Anandaswarup* resides, is all round us. It is not necessary to search for Him in the dark corners of the temples. He is with the dirty tiller and the path maker. The poet advises, 'Put off thy holy mantle and even like Him, come down on the dusty soil'. 'Leave this chanting and singing

and telling of beads' (*Gitanjali*, song 11). Though the King rides on the chariot yet he comes down near a beggar-maid whose heart is as pure as a lotus flower. He waits for no invitation; His arrival may be announced either through music or storm. 'He came when the night was still: He had His harp in His hand and my dreams became resonant with its melodies (ibidem song 26). 'Have you not heard His silent steps?... He comes, he comes... In the rainy gloom of July nights, on the thundering chariot of clouds, he comes he comes (ibidem. song XLV). It is sure that He comes to his devotee, friend, slave, in joy or in sorrow. The concept of God abandoning man is not to be found in Tagore's poetry; the separation is always temporary.

In Tagore's poetry, God is not only pure bliss but also pure light. He pleads, 'Purify me with the fountain stream of light... Purify me with the stream of joy. In the lyre of my soul the Eternal music sleeps. It lacks speech, rhythm and music. Vitalise it with *Ananda* and awaken it' (tr. by the writer, *Gitobitan*, Puja song 92). One needs Tagore's enlightened mind to see the light that exists at the end of the dark tunnel of life. The ever increasing desire of the *atma* to identify with the *Parmathma*, opens the path of realisation that ultimately leads to pure bliss. This is the essence of Tagore's poetic philosophy.

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Swami Vivekananda's Message of Vedanta i The Voice of Peace and Integration

Kiran Ramachandron Nair

Introduction :

Man has succeeded in averting the threat posed by the nuclear clock but is faced with yet another disaster. Conflicting ideologies—religious, social, cultural, political and economic—compounded by intolerance and bigotry greatly undermine the survival of humanity on this planet. Mankind is gradually sinking into a dark abyss haunted by the ghosts of religious, racial and ethnic prejudices. The world civilisation in dire peril invokes grand ideas of Liberty, Fraternity, Peace and Co-operation which devoid of its true essence fail to dispell human misery. Amidst this emerges a ray of hope which intensifies into a bright, dazzling sunlight. It was exactly one century ago that Swami Vivekananda lifted man from the depths of despair to everlasting glory and peace by his touching and inspiring address at the world Parliament of Religions at Chicago on 11th September 1893. As the time draws closer of this memorable, historic event, the world needs to re-learn the lessons taught by this great humanist and world teacher. The greatest homage we could pay to Swami Vivekananda is to inculcate his ideals and carry the message of Vedanta—the Voice of Freedom, Global peace and human solidarity—for posterity.

Swami Vivekananda's Mission of Human Regeneration :

Narendranath Datta was a precocious child with an enermous store of energy which vested him with the courage to face all odds and emerge Victorious. Naren's meeting with Sri Ramakrishna finally ended his ardent search for a man who had seen God and he as Swami Vivekananda was transformed into a dynamic personality who was to tower over all men.

Naren was speechless to hear Sri Ramakrishna addressing him be seechingly thus: "Lord ! I know you are the ancient sage, Nara—the incarnation of Narayana—born on earth to remove the miseries of mankind".¹ It was Sri Ramakrishna's overpowering love and perfect understanding that captivated Naren. He became Sri Ramakrishna's chosen disciple and messenger of peace, love and brotherhood to the world. It was the dawn of the fulfilment of the Master's prophecy: "Naren will shake the world to its foundations".² Indeed Naren as Swami Vivekananda, an allusion to his power of discrimination, would draw men all over the world towards him by the power of his magnetic soul.

Remain Rolland writes of Swami Vivekananda: "Like a driver he plunged into the Ocean of India, and the ocean of India covered his tracks. Among its flotsam and jetsam he was nothing more than one nameless Sannyasin in saffron robe—among a thousand others. But the fires of genius burned in his eyes. He was a prince despite all disguise".³

Swami Vivekananda was an imposing figure in red, ochre and yellow who raised the arch that was to span the East and West. It was the tragic picture of humanity around him that led him to expend a torrential force in order to carry out his mission of human resurrection not only in India but all over the world. He was to give the world a convincing philosophy of religion that would lay the foundation of a lasting spiritual unity among nations.

The world Congress of Religions saw the blossoming of a sovereign genius. Swami Vivekananda, as a world citizen was a perfect confluence of the Eastern and Western waters. At the Congress he was undoubtedly the first to shed all formality and address the audience as though he had known them all but was meeting them after a long separation. His address was distinctly different from the other speakers who gave a rather dry and narrow projection of their own religion and God. But Swami Vivekananda alone held the audience spellbound by an exposition of all religions and uncovering the universal in all Gods. To him alone goes the credit of breaking the barriers that confined man in his own isolated, limited groove and leading him to have a glimpse of the limitless spiritual sky. The Parliament of Religions gave this young Orator a standing ovation in reco-

1 Swami Nikhilahanda (ed.), *Vivekananda: The Yogas and other works*, New York : Ramakrishna—Vivekananda Centre, 1953, p. 13.

2 Rolland, Romain, *The life of Vivekananda and the Universal Gospel*, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1953, p. 103.

3 Ibid, p. 20. CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Swami Vivekananda's Message of Vedanta.

gnition of a long-awaited event of the restoration of mankind to his glorious state. The moment of illumination of the world had just begun with the appearance of a giant comet, Swami Vivekananda, on the spiritual horizon.

His mission was to teach man to have a fair exchange with one another of their strengths and abundance. The West was at its height of material advancement and had a convincing role to play in mitigating poverty, hunger and disease in other countries. The Eastern civilisation had the spiritual treasures essential for the basis of a humane civilisation. Mutual understanding and cooperation on world problems would forge greater contact among nations and promote peace and unity among the world community. Swami Vivekananda made this mammoth task his goal in a world torn by intolerance, self-absorption on war. His mission was, "to save his people, body, and soul, to mobilise the whole world to help him in his task by widening his appeal, until it becomes the cause of the people, the cause of the poor and the oppressed of the whole world".⁴

He was against the condescending and piteous attitude of rich nations assisting poor nations in the name of charity. He asked for a magnanimous expansion of the human heart and give not because he had but because God had given him the ability to give says he. "Give and take ! Let there be no more talk of the hand stretched out for charity falling in pity from above. Equality ! He who receives, gives and gives as much as he receives, if not more. He receives life, he gives life, he gives God".⁵

His writings from the West outline a plan of action of stirring the people of India and strengthening them as individual forces and disciplining them to work unitedly not only for their own country but for the whole of mankind. He emphasizes that the foremost challenge facing man is exploitation leading to widespread discontentment and conflicts. Science and religion was to unitedly turn the course of human history from destruction to peaceful and constructive co-existence.

The greatest stumbling block to mutual understanding and acceptance of religions lay surprisingly in the diverse interpretation of religion and the word 'God'. It embraces a whole range of ambiguous ideas and associations and has been used greatly to subdue the spirit of freedom and the quest of truth by the human soul. God is a summation of the all powerful, pure, merciful cosmic intelligence reflected by all beings in the universe. It is not rejection of religion

4 Ibid, p. 72.

5 Ibid, p. 72.

or coining new names which will alleviate human misery, what is essential is to free religion of all impure and false association and discover its true spirit and infinite potential for human welfare.

Swami Vivekananda is deeply convinced that the religions of the world have a real and significant service to offer for the promotion of peace on earth. He observes, "The fact that all these old religions are living today proves that they must have kept that mission intact. In spite of all their mistakes, in spite of all difficulties, inspite of all quarrels, inspite of all the incrustation of forms and figures, the heart of everyone of them is sound—it is a throbbing, beating, living heart".⁶

It is with this profound hope that he delivers the message of Vedanta—a doctrine that a greater power than hate, enmity and selfishness will prevail over man. Fear cannot prevent discord or bring true peace. But only infinite love unarmed, without constraint can create a better world. It is this love which is the very essence of every religion. What is more surprising is the Vedanta convincingly asserts that man is capable of such sublimity of purpose and action.

The Message of Vedanta :

The later part of the 19th Century saw Swami Vivekananda translating his mission into action by anointing the Western World with the eternal waters of the Vedanta. His prophetic declaration: "I have a message to the West as Buddha had a message to the East",⁷ was to inspire men struggling everywhere in their ascent to spiritual realisation. The sublimity of Vedantic thought lies in its philosophical essence—the Unity of Truth, the divinity of man and the harmony of all religions.

Romain Rolland, the great French Savant, writes on Vedanta: "The true Vedantic spirit does not start out with a system of preconceived ideas. It possesses absolute liberty and unrivalled courage among religions with regard to the facts to be observed and the diverse hypotheses it has laid down for their co-ordination. Never having been hampered by a priestly order, each man has been entirely free to search wherever he pleased for the spiritual explanation of the spectacle of the Universe".⁸

The gospel of Vedanta is one of strength and is aimed at self-dehypnotizing man. The world would be revolutionised by a few

6 The complete works of Swami Vivekananda (Hereafter as C.W.) Calcutta; Advaita Ashrama, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 371.

7 C. W. Vol. 5, p. 314.

8 Rolland Romain, *Op. Cit.*, p. 179.

strong vigorous, believing and sincere men. The strong will comes from God Himself and everything must bow down before it. Philosophy and psychology has been revolutionised by Vedantic thought. No force is needed to preach Vedanta as it is a divine philosophy ordained for the collective good of humanity. Vedanta is like an expansive ocean bathing the shores of all nations and bringing about a mingling of waves carrying different ideas and thoughts.

Swami Vivekananda shook the foundations of human existence with his assertion that every being was the manifestation of the Atman — "Him the sword cannot pierce, nor the fire burn nor the air dry, immortal, without beginning or end, the all pure omnipotent and omnipotent Atman".⁹ Man labouring under the ages of negativist theories which reduced them to inconsequential creatures had an unnatural fear of this assertion. Such was the degradation of humanity.

In his lecture "The Mission of the Vedanta" Swamiji deals a death blow to all negativist and degrading theories. According to him, "Behind everyone, there is that Infinite Soul, assuming the infinite possibility and the infinite capacity of all to become great and good. Let us proclaim to every soul; Arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached. Arise awake! Awake from this hypnotism of weakness. None is really weak; the soul is infinite, omnipotent and omniscient: Stand up, assert yourself, proclaim the God within you, do not deny Him!"¹⁰

Swami Vivekananda denounces kitchen based religion equated with 'don't-touchism' and meaningless ritualism. This state of affairs was a sure way to ruin. He calls for a religion and theories that would be progressive for mankind releasing man from the shackles of fear that weakened him physically, intellectually and spiritually. This weakness was indeed a poison that drained humanity of all life. This falsity could never be religion. Man must instantly open his eyes to these weakening mysticisms and let it stand the test of truth. Truth alone was strengthening in its pure and all knowledgable character. It would enlighten man and endow him with a new energy in his quest for spiritual realisation. If it sounds impossible to the doubting, Swamiji brushes aside such doubts, "... the greatest truths are the simplest in the world, simple as your own existence".¹¹

The nation in deep sleep was awakening to the clarion call given by Swami Vivekananda. Their idyllic dreams were disrupted and the must of doubt and uncertainty cleared. Men were ready for a spirit-

9 C.W., Vol. 3, p. 224.

10 C.W. Vol. 3, p. 193.

11 C.W. Vol. 4, p. 225.

ual renaissance. He had succeeded in shaking the torpid colossus from the stupor into which it had fallen. This awakening of the human spirit was the prelude to nations marching to the best of the heroic trumpet.

His plan of campaign entailed a message vitalised by the national and universal perspective while the universal dominated Swamiji's vision the nationalistic strain would help in bringing about the much needed unity among the conflicting Indians. Unless unity prevailed within the boundaries of one's own nation, it was futile to attempt to unite mankind into a world community. The teaching of Vedanta were of paramount importance for in it Swamiji visualised a 'sovereign tonic' — "To revivify the country through the thundering notes of the Vedic rhythm"¹². He desired men to have an ideal combination of practicality and idealism in their lives. He wanted men to take up one idea, make that single idea their lives; think of it; dream of it; life on that idea until it dominated their whole lives to become an inseparable part of themselves.

It was his philosophy, thought and ideas that urged men instinctively on the path of enlightening knowledge from the darkness of ignorance. For centuries man was enmeshed in the materialistic net and sought some way of escape from the resultant misery and dissatisfaction. This untiring attempt for freedom was an eternal problem dwelt on philosophically by many seers. Swami Vivekananda came up with a conclusive and practical answer with his message of Vedanta hinged on the wings of freedom. Says he "What is this universe?... In freedom it rises, in freedom it rests."¹³

He opined that organised religions had done more harm to humanity by creating intense hatred in the minds of people. In these moments of deep despair and helplessness man has sudden glimpses of immortality which initiates a quest for spiritual bliss. Swami Vivekananda fills man with renewed energy and commands them: "Come up, O lions and shake off the delusion that you are sheep. You are souls immortal, spirits free, blest and eternal. You are not matter, you are not bodies. Matter is your servant, not you the servant of matter"¹⁴. It was the duty of all enlightened teachers to guide men and lead them from weakness to the pinnacle of divine expression.

The wide differences in religion apparently perceived are in the light of changing conditions of time and space and the recognition of

12 Rolland Romain, Op. Cit., p. 128.

13 C.W. Vol. 2, p. 125.

14 C.W. Vol. 3, p. 11.

Swami Vivekananda's Message of Vedanta:

this truth will enable mankind to accept the universality of all religions however great or small. Swamiji express the whole world of religions as a travelling, a coming up, of different men and women, through various conditions and circumstances to the common goal of spiritual evolution though with apparent contradictions just as a ray of white light is split into different colours when it emerges from glasses of varied hues.

Swami Vivekananda commands the spirit of freedom of man to soar like a bird and exert its individuality even in religions faith.¹⁵

Vedanta: The Voice of Peace and Integration:

Swamiji explore a fundamental question of the apparent difference in religions. The contradiction seen in the various external symbols such as rituals, books, languages are inconsequential. It is the innermost core of each religion that needs to be examined to establish the underlying unity of thought. Swemiji illustrates the differences in perception among men; a man journeying towards the sun takes photographs at various points which appear quite dissimilar, yet it is the same sun. Human perception of truth is sometimes blurred due to limitations of forces acting directly or indirectly.

The attempts of many nations to evolve an ideal universal religion which would bring together mankind amicably failed as it lacked a practical approach. As Swamije observed many have accepted the equality of all religions but none could show a practical way of bringing about a confluence without a loss of individuality of religions in the conflux. He believed that a practical plan should preserve the individuality of men from all faiths and guide them towards a global spiritual union.

Swami Vivekananda places before mankind his plan of achieving an idealistic universal religion. He wants man to give up his destructive tendencies and use his power constructively: "Break not, pull not anything down, but build. Help if you can; If you cannot, fold your hands and stand by and see things go on. Do not injure, if you cannot render help. Say not a word against any man's convictions so far as they are sincere. Secondly, take man where he stands, and from there give him a life".¹⁶

Swami Vivekananda wishes to see the present void in religion filled so as to satisfy the largest proportion of mankind: His whole

15 Nair, Kiran Ramachandran, Siddhashrama, B. P. 'Swami Vivekananda's Perspective of Religion: Its implications of War and Peace', Journal of Dharma, An International Quarterly of World Religions, Dec. 1992, p. 367.

16 C.W. Vol. 2, p. 384.

life was devoted to the propogation, of a religion with an agreeable blend of the emotional, mystical, rational, and yet conducive to action. He worked to see that Vedanta would find acceptance as a Universal Religion. His religion would show how to realise the philosophy that taught that this world is one and there is only one Existence in the universe. It is the combination of the elements of philosophy, mysticism, emotion, and of work which would be the ideal of the closest approximation of a universal religion.

The human soul in its varied cultural and ethnic flavour reminded Swami Vivekananda of the various branches of the same tree, mutually sharing the same changing seasons. Accordingly, there are cosmic laws which govern the evolution of mankind. Swamiji claims: "It is grand to know the laws that govern the stars and planets; it is infinitely grander to know the laws that govern the passions, feelings, the will of mankind. This conquering of the inner man... belongs entirely to religion".¹⁷

Religion is truly a harbinger of peace but religious leaders have betrayed the trust placed in them. They make promises of reward to those who follow them and pronounce a life of suffering and misery for those who reject them. This politicising of religion has made people blindly follow them to the tune of a Pied Piper and who successfully crystallised their mutual hatred into a fanatic persecution of each other. This dismal picture continues inspite of intellectual assent of universal brotherhood.

Vedanta decries any idea of a tyrant God sitting in heaven on a throne and dispensing justice. Heaven and Hell are both a creation of man in his moments of weakness. They are nothing but states of the mind—the mind which can lift man from the most vile thoughts to sublime levels of action, with strength. Man should shed all inhibitions and stop fearing religion which has labelled him a sinner. Man is a reflection of God and in that he is indeed divine. Once this realisation dawns on man he will find no need for redemption through a religion that preaches fear of God, says Swamiji.

"For thousands of years millions and millions all over the world have been taught to worship the Lord of the world, the Incarnations, the saviours, the prophets. They have been taught to consider themselves helpless miserable creatures and to depend on the mercy of some person or persons for salvation... Men are still hypnotised into object degradation. However there are some souls who get over that illusion. The hour comes when greatmen shall arise and cast off

17 C.W. Vol. 2, p. 65.

Swami Vivekananda's Message of Vedanta:

27

these kindergartens of religion and shall make vivid and powerful and true religion, worship of the spirit by the Spirit".¹⁸

Swami Vivekanandas, prophet, saint and humanist unhesitatingly declares that a man may not have a philosophy, nor have faith in any God or pray. But if the power of his pure and good deeds leads him to a life of sacrifice for others he has arrived at the same point to which others will arrive by prayer and knowledge.

He urges man to his spiritual goal of seeing God in everything. Man must begin by seeing God in one of his favourite things and go on progressing by seeing God in numerous other things. He reassures man, "There is infinite life before the soul. Take your time and you will achieve your end".¹⁹ Man has to retread the path from which he has come very far to return to his original state of infinitude.

Swamiji's constructive genius lies in establishing love as an eternal motive force on this earth. Love in its purest form is free from all limitations and attains a cosmic nature. Demonstrating the potency of love Swamiji cites the life of Christ who gave up his life on the cross for man under the impetus of love; Buddha for an animal, a mother for the child, the husband for the wife. It is under the impetus of love that men overcome insurmountable barriers and even lay down their lives for others. But surprisingly it is the same power of love that makes one a thief, a murderer. The thief has love for gold, the spirit is present but it is misdirected.

"So, in all crimes, as well as in all virtuous actions, behind stands that eternal love... The motive power of the universe is love without which the Universe will fall to pieces in a moment and this love is God".²⁰

It was essential to bring to the fore the real, spiritual and universal concept of religion which could make it practical and conducive to action. This has to be imbibed by the world community and practised consciously every moment till it has become a part and parcel of life in all spheres. This would bring about a change in public opinion and awaken public conscience to take a firm stand against all repressive measures and the delusion that was would bring peace.

Romain Rolland says of Swami Vivekananda: "He of all modern men achieved the highest equilibrium between the diverse forces of thought, and was one of the first to sign a treaty of peace between the two forces eternally warring within us, the forces of reason and faith".²¹ Swamiji envisioned a better future for mankind with the growth of the religion of science; of liberty and of human solidarity with a decline in negation in thoughts and mutual exclusiveness of nations.

18 C.W.; Vol. 8, p. 141.

19 C.W. Vol. 2, p. 153.

20 C.W. Vol. 6, p. 90.

21 Rolland, Romain, *Op. Cit.* p. 176.

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Says he: "Each one has conceived its own splendid but incomplete ideal; Christianity its dream of moral purity; Hinduism, spirituality; Islam; social equality;... They are all of diverse and graded powers in the divine economy of the Being as it ceaselessly advances".²² Man need not fear that diversion from the long tread spiritual path will lead them away from God as the whole universe is the circumference of a divine wheel with God as its centre and all men are radix converging with the source. Swamiji's message gives man a fresh spell of life free of hate, mistrust, discord. He has shown the way; now it remains to be seen whether man will follow it or not.

CONCLUSION ;

Swami Vivekananda's message of Vedanta brought the various warring and inimical forces into a harmonious and unified existence. This is indeed a formidable task as the world was being ravaged by intolerant religious factions each trying to stamp out other faiths claiming sole monopoly over the truth. He enlightened man about the triangular relationship between peace and human rights, between religion and peace and between religion and human rights, with religion as the apex of the triangle.

He could not acquiesce in a religion which condemned man as a sinner with no hope of help. His message was one of strength and self-help. It dismisses the permanence of divisive forces and visualises the possibility of better world in which man would work unitedly with better understanding and co-operation. His message had a far-reaching influence on world thought attering the foundations of religion and effecting a positive change towards a world free of discord and injustice. He impressed upon the world that a new global order of freedom, security and peace would be achieved only by those motivated by lofty spiritual ideals. His message endows man with the courage to withstand great upheavals and live a coherent and purposeful life.

Sri Aurobindo's words on Swamiji recalls the relevance of his message and the fact that it is taking shape as some formidable force on the earth. says he: "Vivekananda was a soul of puissance if ever there was one, a very lion among men, but the definite work he has left behind is quite incommensurate without impression of his creative might and energy. We perceive his influence still working giganticly, we know not well how, we know not well where, in something that is not yet formed, something genuine; grand, intuitive, upheaving that has entered the soul of India and we say 'Behold Vivekananda still lives in the soul of his Mother and the souls of her children'".²³ His spirit is still alive, ever expanding and enlarging to complete the conception of unity, the work he left to mankind. Amidst the strife and struggle of life, the din and turmoil, the jealousy and hatred of religions from time to time are heard powerful voices of peace, harmony and integration. Will it ever come ?

22 Ibid., p. 265.

23 parameswaran P. Marx and Vivekananda: A comparative study, New Delhi; Sterling Publications, 1987, p. 127.

Hinduism

Sonal K. Amin

Originally the word 'Hindu' has a geographical connotation. It was only later that it developed a religious significance. The Rig Veda mentions that the Aryans who settled along the banks of the Sindhu (Indus) river were called Hindus by the Persians. The Aryans when they came to India had some of their own religious beliefs. Change, modification and growth occurred while dwelling in the Indus valley. As the Aryans spread into the Indo Gangetic plain and towards southern India they came into contact with the local inhabitants; the numerous cults, primitive tribes and the highly cultured Dravidians. This new onslaught of thought encouraged further heights in the realm of the spirit but the roots, the ancient continuity was left intact. This is one of the marked characteristics of Hinduism. It has a tremendous 'absorptive capacity' and almost a magical gift to create a harmony from the various concordant and discordant sounds. Hinduism is a combination of diverse cultures. The inhabitants of India were practising different religions, worshipping various Gods and following a variety of customs. These variegated colours make up the rich tapestry of Hinduism.

Yet, in spite of these superficial differences there is an underlying unity in Hinduism which accounts for its survival for so many years. This unity is because Hinduism is not a set of dogmas, a creed or an intellectual and rationally thought out conviction, but it is a relationship of the total man with the ultimate Reality which is his very essence. It is this intuitive perception (darsana) which is what Hinduism embodies. This super-sensuous perception or vision is self-evident (Svata Siddha). Reason is used to interpret this holistic experience in the terminology of the current age. The same truth is made to wear different garbs in accordance with the requirement of the time. The relevance of reason or intellect lies in interpreting the vision, keeping in mind the challenges faced by society.

The Vedas are called Shabda Pramana or held in authority because they contain the spiritual insight of the Rishis or Seers. The Rishis are not the 'chosen few' who alone can experience Reality. We can also reexperience the Truths described provided we follow the path specified. But Hinduism is not just the Vedas. It is the Epics, the Puranas, the Tantras, the Agamas. It is the Buddha and Mahavir. It is also the Charvaka.

The basic belief of Hinduism is that truth is many-sided. We view the truth from our own angle. All the different roads lead to the same mountain top. What is important is not the road but the quest, the reaching, the goal. Man's opening to the divine.

Belief in a supreme Reality is a cardinal feature of Hinduism. The religious text of Hinduism, the 'prasthan trai'—the Upanisads, Badrayana's Brahma Sutra and the Gita are steeped in this Reality. But the experience and the interpretation of Reality is accepted to be 'psychologically mediated' i.e. it is dependent on our culture, own beliefs, our personality, prejudices and expectations. Svetasvatara Upanishad iv, 17, makes this amply clear. "God the Maker of all the great spirit, ever seated in the hearts of creatures, is fashioned by the heart, the understanding and the will. They who know that become immortal". A Muslim, a Christian, a Hindu will see their God differently. We see our Gods in our own image!

Besides what we see is not the whole truth. There always remains much more. Our finite intelligence cannot grasp the infinite Reality fully. It was for this reason that the Upanisadic seer sat silent and Yajnavalkya exclaimed *Neti ! Neti !* (not this ! not this !).

The realisation that all our utterances are only an approximation of truth makes a Hindu broad minded and sympathetic towards another's belief. No major religious wars have ever been fought in India. Hinduism does not believe in conversion or proselytizing. It attempts only to reform, to wash off the dross.

Hinduism looks upon religion as a personal growth or evolution. Spiritual advancement means working towards deeper and deeper realisation until only the truth remains. Every stage of growth is given its due share of importance. The earlier stage is not discarded, ridiculed or condemned but reformed and looked upon as a stepping stone to further growth.

The impersonal and personal aspect of Reality are accounted for in Hinduism. The Bhagavata describes Brahman as reality in itself and Bhagvan as in relation with man. The rich religious literature describes the various shades of relation possible between man and

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God. The worship of natural forces like Agni, Indra, Usha, Varuna, the devotion of Radha, Sudama, Yashoda for Krishna, the worship of Goddess Durga or Kali all have a place in Hinduism.

Hinduism is an intermingling of the Aryan or Vedic and the Non-Vedic religions. At time the Aryans established their authority and at times the Non-Aryan. Rama breaking Shiva's bow to wed Sita or Krishna dancing on the serpent Kalia's head show the domination of the Vedic religion. Whereas, the story of Sati and her love for a non-Aryan God Shiva, the importance of puja over the Vedic Yajna, show the victory of the non-Aryan.

Hinduism in its flow was able to merge within itself all minor streams because it did not discard a non-Vedic God but elevated it and finally looked upon it as a form of the Ultimate Reality which is the atman. This is how the Hindu pantheon grew. Non-Aryan Gods like Goddess Kali or Shiva were all added to the list and enriched Hinduism.

Hinduism does not believe in any one particular God, or any one particular book, prophet or path. It does not believe that any one religion is the sole possessor of truth and that others should convert to it or burn eternally in the fires of hell! Different religions and belief unfold the truth at different stages of development. Some more and others less. The attitude to be adopted is not one of force or regimentation but understanding, sympathy and persuasion. Growth cannot be forced. It comes from within through proper understanding. 'Grow where you are planted' is the message of Hinduism. But do rid yourself of the slime and the dirt till you arrive at the final vision of truth in all its glory. Where to see is to be.

Hinduism is one of the most tolerant religions of the world. No wonder India became a shelter for the followers of persecuted religions. The Parsees, the Jews, the Christians, the Muslims have all made India their home. Emperor Ashoka's Rock Edicts are classic of religious tolerance. In the Twelfth Rock Edict is written "The King, beloved of the Gods, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion where of this is the root to reverence one's own faith and never to revile that of others. Whoever acts differently injures his own religion while he wrongs another's". The Chinese traveller Yuan Chuang describes a religious festival at Prayag. On the first day King Harsha dedicated a statue of Buddha, on the second day that of the Sun God and on the third day that of Shiva.

Our world has constricted. Modes of communication and travel have brought our neighbours much closer. To-day, more than at any other time in history the commandment, 'love thy neighbour' needs to be practised. A religion claiming to be solely in possession of the Truth is a Challenger to another and will create unrest and dissension. The Hindu attitude alone can rid the world of religious conflicts and bring about a unity in which differences are appreciated and a helping hand is given for Spiritual growth.

5

What is Philosophy ?

Bhajan S. Badwal

The word "philosophy" comes from a combination of two Greek words—*philos* meaning "love" and *sophia* meaning "wisdom". Etymologically, "philosophy" means the love of wisdom.¹ It is the pursuit of wisdom about what it means to be a human being, what the fundamental nature of God and reality are, what the sources and limits of our knowledge are, and what is good and right in our lives and in our societies.² In *Fundamentals of Philosophy*, Jay F. Rosenberg states, "Aristotle believed that philosophy begins in the impulse to wonder about fundamental questions such as: Do time and space go on forever? Is there a God? What is the meaning to life? Are there any absolute truths?"³ As Velasques and Barry (1988) observe, "We have all been touched and moved by the feelings of wonderment from which all philosophy derives. We wonder about who we really are; whether God exists; why pain, evil, and sorrow exist; why a close friend was killed; whether science tells us all there really is to know about the universe; whether there is life after death; what true happiness, love, and friendship are; whether standards of taste in music and art are only individual likes and dislikes; whether moral right and wrong are based merely on personal opinion; and whether suicide, abortion, or euthanasia are ever justified. This wonderment and questioning is at the heart of philosophy and begins early in our lives. Almost as soon as children learn to talk, they ask: Where did I come from? Where do people go when they die? What's beyond the sky? How did the world start? Who made God? Why is one

- 1 Gary E. Kessler, *Voices of Wisdom: A Multicultural Philosophy* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1992), p. 5.
- 2 Manuel Velasques and Vincent Barry, *Philosophy* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1988), p. 1.
- 3 David Stewart and H. Gene Blocker, *Fundamentals of Philosophy* (New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1992), p. 28.

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two and not three ? Virtually from the beginning of life, every human being becomes familiar with the questions that form the subject matter of philosophy."⁴ Thus, theorizes Plato, "The feeling of wonder is the mark of the philosopher, for all philosophy has its origins in wonder."⁵ However, Rosenberg goes on to surmise that somehow such questions are dismissed, postponed, rejected or repressed in the hubbub of daily life. He observes, "And yet, a feeling may very well remain—the frustrating feeling that these are surely *important* questions, questions with important answers. If only one knew how to find them."⁶ Velasquez and Barry (1988) state, Although philosophy begins with wonder and questions, it does not end there. Philosophy tries to go beyond the conventional answers to these questions that we may have received when we were too young to think through our own answers."⁷ According to Rosenberg, "A philosopher is a person who tries to find them (the answers),... to go beyond such feelings, to bring such questions within the scope of an activity of reason, to move them out of the heart and into the mind...to make of such questions something that one *can* think about—and then to think about them."⁸ Therefore, in the opinion of Velasquez and Barry (1988), "The goal of philosophy is to enable us to decide the answers to these questions for ourselves—to make up our own minds about our self-identity, life, knowledge, art, religion, and morality without solely depending on the authority of parents, peers, T.V., teachers, of society. Many of our religious, political, and moral beliefs are beliefs that we accepted as children long before we had the ability to question them or explain to ourselves the reasons behind them. Philosophy examines these beliefs, not necessarily to reject them but to learn why we hold them and to ask whether there are good reasons to continue holding them. In this way our basic beliefs about reality and life become *our own*: We accept them because we have examined their rationales, not because we have been conditioned by our peers, parents, and society. We thus gain a kind of independence and freedom, or what some modern philosophers call "autonomy". The goal of philosophy, then, is autonomy: the freedom of being able to decide for yourself what you will believe in by using your own reasoning abilities."⁹ Socrates believed that philosophy was a total way of life, and something each person must do individually...that each per-

4 Velasquez, 1988, p. 3.

5 Ibid., p. 2.

6 Stewart, 1992, p. 28.

7 Velasquez, 1988, p. 3.

8 Stewart, 1992, p. 28.

9 Velasquez, 1988, pp. 3—4.

son must be his or her own philosopher. "Despite its often seemingly technical nature, philosophy is really the most natural human activity, and there is a sense in which everyone engages in philosophy. That is, we have all decided (whether or not we are consciously aware of it) what our standards of conduct will be, what principles we base our reasoning on, and what importance we attach to our humanness. But not everyone *critically examines* these views. It is this critical examination that studying philosophy provides. As Socrates, the father of Western philosophy, put it, 'The unexamined life is not worth living.'"¹⁰

METHODOLOGY

For such an undertaking Rosenberg believes that philosophers must have both a general strategy—a method—and particular tactics—specific techniques for applying that method. Therefore, philosophy is an activity of reason with its own strategy and its own tactics, its own method and techniques. It is, in short, a discipline.¹¹ In his *Discourse on Method*, Descartes set out four basic rules that would define philosophy for many years. The first of these was to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so; that is, to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it. The second was to divide up each of the difficulties which I examined into as many parts as possible, and as seemed requisite in order that it might be resolved in the best manner possible. The third was, to carry on my reflections in due order, commencing with objects that were the most simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, or by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming an order, even if a fictitious one, among those which do not follow a natural sequence relatively to one another. The last was in all cases to make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I should be certain of having omitted nothing.¹² Solomon (1989) states that, "One might say that the essence of these rules is to be cautious and to think for oneself. The premises, upon which all else depends, must be utterly beyond doubt, perfectly certain, otherwise

10 Stewart, 1992, p. 16.

11 Stewart, 1992, p. 28.

12 Robert C Solmon, *Introducing Philosophy* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), pp. 18–19 (From Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method* in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1911).

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all else is futile. The test or criterion of such a premise is that it be a clear and distinct idea, self-evident, and springing from the light of reason alone".¹³ Honer and Hunt (1982) state, "The work of philosophy begins typically with the identification of basic beliefs and assumptions. Key concepts are analyzed and defined; alternative positions are compared and critically evaluated. This is the starting point, the point at which fundamental questions are asked and a distinctive direction of perspective is given to the enterprise. Here, claims are made about the way to proceed so that conclusion may be reached. Once the broad foundations for the philosophical undertaking have been laid, supporting evidence is gathered and then criticisms and objections are carefully considered. Relevant arguments or evidence from different fields of experience are brought to bear in the effort to determine what can or cannot be incorporated into the eventual synthesis of ideas. The adequacy of a given philosophical proposal is then tested by submitting it to public reviews so that its structure can be inspected or its implications evaluated".¹⁴

Critical, Speculative, and Normative Philosophy

Honer and Hunt (1982) propose a continuum along which critical philosophy is where one begins, normative philosophy is the midpoint of the journey, and speculative philosophy is the farthest point to which one can go. This continuum clarifies the differences in emphasis and objectives of contemporary philosophical endeavors.¹⁵ They declare, "Critical philosophers contend that their primary function is to analyze statements and to identify the precise meaning and the mutual relations among concepts. They insist that if we are ever to proceed beyond fuzzy meanings or unreliable knowledge words must be used carefully and consistently, and language must be clear and precise. Critical philosophers accept an obligation to clarify the meanings and determine the relations of fundamental concepts..... Critical philosophers also accept responsibility for examining and criticizing the fundamental beliefs or basic assumptions held by people as they organize their worlds or express their convictions... This kind of analysis, appraisal, and constant challenging of basic premises is a central concern of critical philosophers. Their most rigorous test is to subject initial assumptions or statements of belief to all possible objections... Critical philosophy restricts the philosophical enterprise to a separate and distinct field of intellectual activity—one so

13 Ibid., p. 19.

14 Stanley M. Honer and Thomas C. Hunt, *Invitation to Philosophy: Issues and Options* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1982), pp. 10-11.

15 Ibid., p. 11.

important and so technical that it recruits specialists trained to analyze, evaluate, and propose alternatives to the concepts used by either experts or amateurs in any realm of human thought or endeavor"¹⁶. In contrast, they go on to explain, "Speculative philosophy is more in line with what the average person believes philosophy to be. Speculative philosophy may be less exact, but it is surely more exciting, for it seeks the broader vistas, asks more provocative questions, and concerns itself with piecing together wholes—regardless of whether or not the language is clear or the logic precise".¹⁷ Therefore, the object of speculation is to put enough of the big parts together so that life takes on meaning and integration and possibly direction. A. N. Whitehead explains it this way: "Speculative Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted."¹⁸ However, Honer and Hunt (1982) believe speculative philosophers may strive for clarity or consistency or precision—but not at the expense of significance. Intuitive judgements, ethical prescriptions, visionary projections, and existential declarations are among the philosophical expressions to which the term "speculative" might apply, they affirm.¹⁹ Nevertheless, in response to the current dissatisfaction with speculative philosophy, in that it supposedly sacrifices precision for significance, there has been an increasing interest in normative philosophy. "The normative philosophers stress the need for standards to guide our specific value decision, and they claim that human thought and experience do provide a reasonable basis on which to construct such standards. They maintain that limited goals, careful and experience-based reasoning, and avoidance of speculation about ultimate things make normative philosophy less vulnerable to attacks by critical philosophy".²⁰ Philosophy as a discipline is distinguished by its method rather than by its subject matter, therefore. The activity of philosophy, then, whatever the details of its methodology is carried on at one remove from the "first-order" facts. It is not an inquiry into facts in this sense at all but into the methods by which we search for such facts, the grounds or reasons on the basis of which we assert them, and the concepts we use in formulating them. Such results as there are, then do not take the form of new facts, but

16 Honer and Hunt, 1982, pp. 11—12.

17 Ibid., p. 12.

18 Honer and Hunt, 1982, p. 12. (From Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (New York Free Press, 1969), p. 5.

19 Ibid., p. 12—13.

20 Honer and Hunt, 1982, p. 13.

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rather of a new clarity about what are and aren't the old facts and about their modes of legitimization ²¹

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWERS

Philosophy is the rational attempt to formulate, understand, and answer *fundamental* questions as defined by Kessler (1992). He states, "Philosophy is an activity rather than a body of set teachings and philosophers are as concerned with formulating and understanding questions as they are with finding answers. The purpose of formulating and understanding questions as precisely as we can is to find answers. But often our answers lead to further questions. Why assume some answer is final? Or why assume all questions we can ask have answers? Also, what counts as an answer? How do I know when I have a good one?"²² As Bertrand Russell remarked;

Philosophy is to be studied, not so much for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true; but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good. (1959, 93-94).²³

Therefore, Kessler expounds, "Philosophers are concerned with not just any sort of question, but with *fundamental* questions. The word "fundamental" means "basic" and has to do with what is primary and essential. Hence fundamental questions are radical questions in the sense of pertaining to roots. They are the most basic questions we can ask. They are presupposed by other questions. Therefore they are often abstract questions that have to do with a wide area of human experience. Philosophy seeks to discover the most basic questions we can wonder about."²⁴ Further, Kessler remarks, "Fundamental questions are not just basic and abstract, they are also *universal* questions. One important question is whether we can discover standards for making these distinctions (between appearance and reality, knowledge and opinion, and fact and value) that are universal and not merely relative to our own particular time in history and our own particular cultural view. The abstract distinction may be culturally and temporally universal, whereas the concrete way in

²¹ Stewart, 1992, pp. 28-31.

²² Kessler, 1992, p. 7.

²³ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

²⁴ Kessler, 1992, p. 8.

which the distinctions are made is not.”²⁵ Kessler (1992) arrives at this final definition of philosophy, therefore, “Philosophy is the activity of rationally attempting to formulate, understand, and answer fundamental questions”²⁶

One of the most debated fundamental questions in contemporary philosophy is *What is Rationality?* Kessler defines the quality of rationality as the ability to think clearly. The quest to attain rationality has led to the study of logic. Kessler further explains: “In attempt to become clear about “clear thinking” philosophers have engaged in the study of logic. Logical techniques have been developed as a way to avoid fuzzy thinking and to ensure clear thinking. Logic has to do with the evaluation of ideas and so critical analysis has become central to the philosophical task. The concept “rational” has been almost totally reduced to the concept “logical”. To be rational is to be logical, or so it has seemed to the mainstream of traditional Western philosophy.”²⁷ Honer and Hunt (1982) have examined the relationship between what is commonly called critical thinking and what philosophers call *logic*. They explain, “The study of logic is a study of the rules or reasoning by which people arrive at conclusions. Logic is defined popularly as the science of reasoning, but that is not entirely accurate. The term “reasoning” merely identifies the practice of drawing conclusions from premises. There are two distinctive processes of reasoning: psychological and logical. The psychological process of drawing conclusions from premises is called *inference*. The psychological process is difficult to describe, but we know that human beings do it all the time; it is somehow related to the activities of the human brain and nervous system. Logical reasoning, in contrast, only takes place when evidence is stated in the form of propositions, and those propositions are formally related as premises and conclusion. Philosophers are concerned with the structure of logical reasoning, and they attempt to identify both logical and fallacious forms of reasoning. Logicians are not concerned with the psychological aspects of the process of inference. Psychologists or neurologists might study the mental or physical processes leading to my acceptance of a particular belief or opinion, but logicians are interested only in the relationships among propositions and in the logical order of the argument. They are concerned with the formal correctness of the completed structure of the argument. Logicians study the methods and principles used in distinguishing good (correct) from bad (incorrect) arguments. It is their intention to be formal and objec-

25 Ibid., pp. 8–9.

26 Kessler, 1992, p. 9.

27 Ibid., p. 10.

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Reason implies some sort of orderly thought process that can be traced, analyzed, and judged by intellectual standards. Reason claims to increase human knowledge or understanding, often apart from its practical application. Reason may be valued for its own sake because it illuminates meaning, order, and perspective. Reason emphasizes the passion for clarity and truth; it stresses criticism and the search for good arguments. Logical reasoning is one of the most important areas of contemporary philosophical study. The traditional way of classifying logical arguments is to designate them either *inductive* or *deductive*. Different criteria are employed in evaluating each type".²⁸

Inductive/Deductive Reasoning and Informal Fallacies

Honer and Hunt define inductive reasoning as follows: "*Induction* refers to the process of drawing conclusions from specific evidence. It is a process of reasoning in which conclusions are typically drawn from the observation of particular cases. Inductionists claim that we can only experience directly what is concrete and particular. Particulars are the individual units of perception or experience rather than the general or universal aspects. When we generalize about these particulars, we go beyond the immediate experience of those particulars. Consequently a conclusion reached through the inductive process is never absolutely certain. In induction, reasoning proceeds to a conclusion that is not confined to the scope of the premises but is somehow additional to, or beyond, them. Inductive logical procedure is tightly linked to the concept of *probability*. The conclusion is based on the evidence, but the conclusion is never absolutely certain. It is only probable. After all, there is the possibility of discovering new evidence. The inductive probability of an argument is the likelihood that its conclusion is true as long as the premises are factual. Inductive arguments are strong or weak. The claim is that their premises constitute *some* evidence for their conclusion. The greater the weight of the evidence, the stronger the argument. Inductive logic is concerned with tests for measuring the inductive probability of strength of arguments and with the rules for constructing strong inductive arguments. This method of reasoning has been identified with scientific activity, but the scientific method involves much more than the strict application of inductive logic".²⁹

Deductive reasoning is defined by Honer and Hunt as follows: "The basic principles of *deductive* logic are fairly well established. There is widespread agreement on the definitions of its basic concepts,

28 Honer and Hunt, 1982, pp. 26—27.

29 Ibid., pp. 27—28.

and the rules of procedure are precisely formulated. The defining characteristic of a *valid* deduction is its certainty. If the conclusion is necessary—that is, if it is forced by the premises—the argument is certain. A deductive argument involves the claim that its premises provide all the evidence required for a conclusion. Additional evidence does not affect the credibility of a valid deductive conclusion. A deductive system of argumentation is a closed system; it cannot advance beyond the scope of its premises. Deductive arguments are typically analytic. They are analytic in the sense that they analyze, or separate out, something that is already in the premises, and then they state it in the conclusion. Also, the propositions in a deductive argument are often *a Priori* because they are validated without regard to the facts and are, in this sense, prior to them. The task of deductive logic is to clarify the nature of the relationship that holds between premises and conclusion in valid arguments and to provide techniques for discriminating the valid from the invalid.”³⁰

Honer and Hunt also discuss informal fallacies as such: “An error in logical reasoning is called a *fallacy*. If the structure of an argument is wrong or if the language of an argument is vague or confusing, then the conclusion of that argument cannot be accepted with confidence. The term “fallacy” is also used to refer to an argument that persuades for psychological or emotional reasons rather than for logical ones. If the selection or arrangement of words is contrived so that the effect is to trick or deceive another person, we also call that type of argument a fallacy. For the logician, the term ‘fallacy’ refers to a logical error whether the argument persuades for emotional or other reasons and whether it is the arguer’s intent to trick or is simply an honest error.”³¹

A Note to the Student

Honer and Hunt emphasize the importance of the field of logical reasoning to the prospective student of philosophy as follows: “It is important for those attracted to the field of philosophy to recognize that critical thinking and logical reasoning will present intellectual challenges and require special competence in “close-order” thinking. If students contemplate the pursuit of philosophy as an academic major or a professional career, they must face the likelihood that certain areas of philosophical study will demand an intensive knowledge of various logical procedures and intellectual skill in what has become a very technical and intricate discipline. For those just beginning their explorations in philosophical territory, a few general

30. Honer and Hunt, 1982, pp. 30—31.

31. Ibid., p. 34.

remarks may help to keep expectations more realistic. Philosophical thinking demands that we be accurate and precise in the use of symbols and words. Structured language is essential to the process of communication, the mutual exchange of meaning. Clarity and consistency are among the criteria by which philosophical activity is judged. Logical reasoning is a time-honored philosophical trademark.³²

MAIN BRANCHES OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Some of the main branches of Western philosophy are distinguished by the kinds of *fundamental questions* they ask. These include *Metaphysics*, *Epistemology*, and *Axiology*. Kessler (1992) states: "The branch of philosophy called *metaphysics* deals with the question, 'What is truly real? and related issues. (not everything that appears to be real is real, therefore how might we distinguish appearance from reality? Some philosophers have claimed that one of its purposes is to develop a theory of reality or a theory of what is genuinely real. It is also concerned with what might be the most fundamental question we can think of, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'"³³ J. Donald Butler (1968) redefines the problem of reality, the great question with which metaphysics deals, as "What kind of world is this in which we live? After the wrappings are peeled away, what is the solid core of it which is real and cannot be disputed?"³⁴ He continues, "One thing involved in any theory of reality is to understand the character of the physical world. Just what kind of structure is the universe? To think in such ways as these about the kind of organization which ties the universe together is to be concerned with *cosmology*. For that term refers to the branch of metaphysics which deals with beliefs as to the organization and orderly arrangement of the various parts of the universe. Of course, there are many things to be taken into consideration in cosmology. Among these there is the nature of time and space, and the factor of causality. Another aspect of metaphysics is the study of man. We do not see the real only in the overall view of the physical universe; we see it also in man, whom we are somewhat egotistically inclined to regard as the most unusual creature in all creation. In fact, it is on this very difference in frame of reference that some of the great issues in philosophy have turned. The early Greek physicists made external Nature their province of study. But when Socrates began to teach, he created a revolution by his insist-

³² Honer and Hunt, 1982, p. 36.

³³ Kessler, 1992, p. 8.

³⁴ J. Donald Butler, *Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and Religion* (New York: Harper and Row, Pub., 1968), p. 15.

ence that man's own study of himself was the most direct route to reality. "Know thyself" may have been the catch phrase he adopted to underscore what he held to be the true starting point in metaphysical investigations. Man is an important object of study in metaphysics because he has the unique position of being subject as well as object. For when we philosophize about man we are talking about ourselves. And thinking man is in the singular position of examining his own nature. This becomes significant in view of the possibility that ultimate reality, for which we are looking metaphysical investigations, is not all on the outside of Nature to be viewed by the naked eye, but instead is behind visible and evident things. If it is possible that reality is hidden from open view in this way, then man's study of himself becomes important; for in looking at himself he can look on the inside as well as the outside. And in his view from within he is supposedly at least one step closer to reality than he is in the observation of Nature from the outside alone. Among the many questions man can ask himself; on which is most significant in metaphysics is this: What am I? Just a body, a physical organism, a machine? Or am I a soul, a spirit, a mind? Or, perchance, am I both soul and body? Now the answers given to this question, or cluster of related questions, will determine rather completely one's entire metaphysics. There is at least one other consideration concerning man which has a metaphysical connection, the question of his freedom or lack of it. Does man have a *free will*? Or is he so completely a cog in the vast machinery of the cosmos that every act in which he engages is determined for him by forces over which he has no control? A third concern about man, which may seem to be predominantly ethical but is metaphysical at least in part, is the moral status of man. Does the moral condition of man affect the kind of existence he has? Or is this question irrelevant, it being assumed that man is a nonmoral species in a nonmoral universe in which morality has nothing to do with existence? For those of us in whose experience religion has been a primary influence, the most crucial queries of metaphysics, if not of all philosophy and thought, are questions as to the existence and nature of God. It is important however to understand something of the nature of the reality or object we signify when we use the word "God" as well as to believe concerning His existence. Commonly we have placed too much stress on a formal or nominal answer to the question concerning the existence of God and have not been sufficiently concerned about the definition of that ultimate reality we may call God. A further consideration in metaphysics has to do with (the question of) number, since it is involved significantly in the most fundamental problems. The most common number questions are the

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following: How many substances comprise reality? Is reality one? Is it two? Or is it many?...Now there is an important observation to be made on these beliefs about quantity of being. When we speak of reality we usually imply a number of qualifications. The following are three qualifications we expect reality to fulfill: (a) that is solid and enduring, self-subsistent, not depending on anything else to maintain its existence; (b) that it is bound by no limits of time, and is therefore eternal; and, (c) presumably, that is also infinite knowing no limits of space as well as time. The crisis of the problem of number is more clearly seen when it is viewed with these qualifications of reality in mind. On the one hand, it is questionable whether reality can be dual or plural and still qualify as real. On the other hand, pluralism seems to dilute the meaning of reality per se. At the same time, it should be observed that monism is not established without difficulty. Infinity, eternity, and ultimateness are all completely exclusive requirements. For any one substance to qualify is to exclude all other possibilities. What one thing is it that deserves this distinction? The crux of all metaphysical considerations, to which this brings us, is this: What do we mean by existence? This is the great investigation of *ontology*, a major phase metaphysics. The term ontology contains in its first four letters a form of a Greek verb which means "is" or "to be". For the task on ontology is to determine what we mean when we say that something is. Exactly what does the infinite "to be" mean? What is it to exist?"³⁵

Kessler identifies another branch of Western philosophy known as *epistemology* which concerns itself with the issues of *knowledge* and *truth*. He states; "Epistemologists search for a theory of what knowledge is and how it might be distinguished from opinion. They look for a definition of truth and wonder how we might correctly distinguish truth from error".³⁶ Therefore, the second great problem of philosophy, according to Butler, is the question of knowledge. He states: "One aspect of knowledge, when considered philosophically, is the possibility or impossibility of getting it. Probably no one seriously doubts that as individuals we have some sort of relation with the world about us, long as that relations is understood as interaction with, experience of, or information about. But as far as our being able to have indisputable knowledge of the reality constituting the heart and core of existence, there are very serious questions which have been raised (*agnosticism*, *skepticism*, and the *affirmation of knowledge*). A second aspect of the knowing experience is the instrument of knowledge. There are at least five possible instruments of know-

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 15—21.

³⁶ Kessler, 1992, p. 8.

ledge, two of which are recognized with varying degrees of emphasis in most theories on knowledge. These are sense perceptual experience, reason, intuition, authority, and revelation. If a person concludes that sense-perceptual experience is the primary instrument of knowledge, he is embracing a position in epistemology that is known as *empiricism*. In this theory of knowledge reason is subordinated but not excluded. The function of reason for many empiricists is one of coordinating the findings of experience. Reason, apart from sensory experience, is regarded as quite helpless to yield and knowledge. Empiricists may or may not recognize some knowledge as certified by authority. Of course, thoroughgoing empiricism will recognize no authority other than scientific method, and that is simply a means of testing experience. If it is concluded that reason is the instrument of knowledge which is of first importance, the position embraced is that of *rationalism*. Paralleling an equivalent attitude in empiricism, rationalism does not commonly disdain sense perception as having a place in the knowledge process, but its function is regarded as definitely secondary. While sensory experience provides some of the raw materials of knowledge, the rationalist sees this function as yielding little apart from the work of reason in interpreting, relating, and unifying the results of experience so as to yield meaning and significance. As with empiricism, a thoroughgoing rationalism recognizes no authority reason, but reason is commonly regarded as universal and therefore greater than any individual mind. Another position regarding the instrument of knowledge is termed *intuitionism*. According to it, truth is known by a flash of insight or immediate awareness. Commonly, intuition is regarded as jumping ahead of reason and discerning understandings at which reason later arrives by its own slower means. Strong reliance on external authority in one's theory of knowledge is known as *authoritarianism*. The authoritarian regards knowledge as being comprised of objective content. He also regards this content as being certified by some agency which is resident within the experience of man... Authoritarianism, in addition to relying on a human or part-human agency of authority, also apparently finds no gulf between the private experience of the individual and the common experience or history of the human race. According to it, once an item of knowledge becomes a part of the common experience of man, it is a rather simple matter for this knowledge to be transferred into the experience of each individual. The instrument of religious knowledge known as *revelation* should be mentioned as well. Of course all religious authoritarianism is regarded by its adherents as beings based upon revelation; but revelation so linked with authoritarianism is regarded as being largely in the past. How-

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ever, there is a large body of Protestants who are not authoritarian either in a Roman Catholic or fundamental sense. For them revelation is a present instrument of knowledge, comparable to sensation, reason, and intuition. The Bible, the Church, and Christ are the media of revelation, but each is a present event as well as being related to past events. A third aspect of epistemology has to do with the degree of directness or indirectness there is in the knowing process. Is there such a thing as direct knowledge? That is, do items or objects of knowledge themselves enter our minds when we come to know them? There are those who give an affirmative answer to these questions. For them, the so-called facts of experience are indisputable intruders into the realm of consciousness, and are just simply known directly as they are; But there are others who feel that this is an oversimplified description of the knowing experience. Knowledge, it is held, is more complicated than this. The knowing subject and the object known do not ever meet in a direct fusion, in the way two lines do when they intersect each other. Instead, both knowing subject and object of knowledge have respective privacies which are never entirely lost in the kind of meeting involved in knowing or being known. Knowledge is not a direct intrusion into the mind of something foreign to it; it is always a matter of inference, interpretation, or conclusion which the mind constructs in response to the impressions the world makes upon it. Thus, the problem of knowledge focuses in the sense-perceptual situation. Just what is it that happens when our senses are stimulated? When qualities arise in consciousness and are identified as colors, particular objects, sounds, textures, warmth cold feelings, etc? This is the crux of the epistemological problem. And when we recognize that it is largely at the sense-perceptual level that the individual is consciously in contact with the vast remainder of existence which is not himself, we will be ready to agree that sense perception is the great watershed in epistemology, if not in all philosophy. A final consideration in epistemology is the overall question as to whether the theory of knowledge exerts a preponderance of influence over other philosophic questions. Is epistemology the soul of philosophy, is it just one of the problems of philosophy, or is it unimportant? To answer this question is to anticipate at least five of the major types of philosophy. The answer is one of the following: for *idealism*, the theory of knowledge is of utmost importance; for *realism*, it is of importance, but no more so than other problems of philosophy; for *pragmatism*, both useless and detrimental unless closely tied to the active realization of human values; for *existentialism*, important but not primary; and for language analysis, important in confirming statements about matters of fact".³⁷

37 Butler, 1968, pp. 22-27.

A third branch of philosophy known as *axiology* has to do with the study of *value* and the distinction between value and fact. It is divided into two main subdivisions as defined by Kessler: "*Aesthetics* comes from a Greek word meaning 'having to do with the senses', but has taken on the technical meaning of having to do with beauty and art. *Aesthetics* seeks to develop a philosophy of art which, among other things, explores concepts like beauty. *Ethics* or moral philosophy deals with questions, issues, and problems relating to moral values".³⁸ The field of axiology is further explained by Butler: "If we stop to think about it, most of us will recognize that there is a realm of being and a realm of value. While the existence aspect of the things entering into our experience is important, much of our experience is made up of the value and worth which is somehow attached to these things. That the world is, we commonly take for granted; that we know the world as it is, we also commonly assume; but we do most of our living at the level of choosing, desiring, and preferring. Though it has roots in Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Spinoza, axiology, the theory of value, is a comparatively young child in the family of philosophy. *Ethics*, the theory of moral good, is one of the oldest fields in philosophy. And *aesthetics*, the theory of beauty, has long engaged the serious attention of philosophers. But in recent times many have concluded that there is common ground shared by these fields as well as by all other phases of our living which are concerned with the worth of things. If some fundamental ground can be found for the whole value side of living, it is believed, this will be the key to all of these different value fields. The name axiology has been used, the Greek stem, *axios*, meaning 'of like value' or 'worth as much as'. There are, of course, different theories of value; and there are different types of value as well. Those kinds of value receiving more direct attention so far from philosophers are the *ethical*, *aesthetic*, *religious*, and *social* values. Some others are the economic, political, educational, utilitarian, recreational, and health values".³⁹

CONCLUSION

Philosophy, then, is the process of formulating and finding the answers to fundamental questions, while, at the same time, questioning those answers. Honer and Hunt observe, "Typically, philosophers devote much of their effort to the careful framing of significant questions. But philosophers also concern themselves with answers. But if these answers are critically analyzed for clarity and reasonableness, if they are rigorously compared to alternative proposals, and if

38 Kessler, 1992, p. 8.

39 Butler, 1968, p. 29.

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they are evaluated on the basis of their overall adequacy, students are led directly to the center of philosophy. Analysis, comparison, and evaluation are the tools with which the ground of philosophy is surveyed and the mine of philosophy worked. Questions and answers are like raw ore—of questionable worth until sifted, graded, refined, and fused into alloy".^{4]}

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A Note on the Original Source of the Sufi Mysticism

Md. Tirajul Islam

Mysticism is an indispensable part of almost all religions in the universe. It is the means of immediate consciousness about Reality, making use of intuitive faculties, which are existed within the devotee in dormant or latent form. Here devotee aspires for absolute communion with Divinity. So here human soul and Divine soul are united. The hypothesis on which it rests that there is a real affinity between the individual soul and the Transcendental spirit.

The Islamic mystical philosophy is generally known as sufism. Sufis believe that the world can never remain without 'quth'; upon whom depends the preservation of the faith and the guidance of human beings. He is nearest to God, is the gurdian of the faith and receives instruction from "Allah" directly. The supreme goal of sufimystics is same as mystics of other religions. In Islamic mysticism God (Allah) is one supreme Reality and every human being is His creature as well as servant (Abd). Sufis considered, 'Love' as the essence of Divine life. 'These mystical path is the path of Love which ends with the realisation of the absolute unification with the Reality'¹

Sufism is a very complex phenomenon. There is a controversy regarding the original source of it. Various thinkers have presented their own opinions concerning the original source. So, usually the origin of Sufism is a subject of endless controversy.

Let us try to trace the actual root of it :

¹ Indian Quarterly—A Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No. 3 & 4, 1987, p. 350.

A Note on the Original of the Sufi Mysticism

Some one says the term 'Sufi' is derived from Arabic word 'Safa' (pure). It bears the meaning, sufi is he, whose heart is sincere towards God. So, he is considered as a "mutasawwif".²

But if the term 'Sufi' is derived from 'Safa' then the correct form of it would be 'Safawi' and not 'Sufi'.

According to other Sufis, the word 'Sufi' is originated from 'Saff' (rank), i.e. their rank was first.

But if the origin of the term Sufi is referred to 'Saff' then it would be 'Saffi' and not sufi.

Another class of sufis claimed, the term 'Sufi' is originated from 'Suffa'. Abul Fida, the well known historian considered that at the time of Prophet (S. some of his companions got appellation "Ashabi Suffa" (the people of the bench/sitters in the shrine). "They were poor strangers, without friends or place of abode, who claimed the promisses of the apostle of god, and implored in protection. Thus the porch of the temple become their mansion and they then obtained their name. When the prophet (S) went to meals, he used to call some of them to partake food with him and selected other to eat with his companions.'³

The argument is that, if the term 'Sufi' appeared from 'Suffa', then the correct form of it would be 'Suffi' and not 'Sufi'.

Some other circle of people declares, the term sufi is derived from the Greek word 'Sophia' (wisdom).

But the above opinion is not acceptable and it is philosophically impossible, because, in the early stage sufism was in esoteric form and naturally it had no connection with the Greek or other source regarding its origin. The link with Greek word 'Sophia' is rejected on the ground that the Greek word 'Sophia' is started from 'sigma', which generally translated in Arabic as a "sin" (Sh) but the first word of 'Sufi' is "sad" (S) not the "sin" (Sh). Therefore, it is apparent that there is no link between these words.

The argument which seems more convincing to accept is that the word 'Sufi' is originated from Arabic language 'Suf' (wool), and etymologically as well as lxicographically it has much affinity with this word. As to Arabic lxicon the word 'Tasawwufa' means, "he donned woolen dress".⁴

2 Hujwiri—Kashf-al-Mahjub tr. by Nichalson R. A., Taj Company, Delhi, pp. 34-35.

3 Ali Sirdar Iqbal—Islamic Sufism, Idarh-i-Adabiat-i-Delli, Delhi, p. 16.

4 Valiuddin Mir—Quranic Sufism, Motilal Banarsi Das, Delhi, 1977, p. 2.

If the word "Sufi" be accepted as a derivation of "Suf" then it will be more appropriate according to Arabic lexicography. There is no doubt that from etymological and lexicographical point of view the word *sufi* is derived from the root 'Suf', but if we think deeply the real and inner import of the word *sufi*, it seems pure or purification, because a man can never be *sufi* without it. On the other hand the essence of *sufism* is to acquire *marifa* (gnosis), which has much affinity with the Greek 'sophia' (wisdom). So, the notion of 'Sophia' is also implicitly involved in the notion of Sufi thought and philosophy.

The eminent *sufi* Abu Nasr-al-sarraj declares the word 'Sufi' is derived from 'Suf' for the woolen raiment was the habit of the prophet (S) and badge of the saints⁵. In the first two centuries of Islam the garments of coarse wool were used by the common people and especially by those who followed ascetic life. The wearing of the patch frocks (*muraqqah*) were prevalent in the period of prophet (S) and his companions. In this aspect some one says—"Alaikum bi labs al Suf tajiduna halawat al iman fi Qulubikum", i.e. see that ye wear woolen raiment that ye may feel the sweetness of faith in your heart".⁶ Further one of the companions of the prophet (S) attests, 'Kara-l-Nabi (S) Yalbasu-l-Suf-Wa Yarkabul himar" i.e. the prophet (S) used to wear woolen garment and ride on the ass.⁷ Prof. Arberry A. J. writes in his book "Religion in the middle East", the fact is that "Muhammad (S) himself died wearing a woolen garment, must have added greatly to the spiritual association that such dress already had".⁸

The word 'labs al- Sufi' in later time have been applied to them who renounced the world and became an ascetic. When asceticism passed into mysticism the 'labs-al-Suf' generally used by the *sufi* devotee. In persian too ascetic is called "pashminapuso" (the wearer of woolen dress), which was generally used by the earlier penitents of Islam and in latter period it has been applied to pious devotees⁹. Some argued that 'the system is believed to have arisen among the persian muslims into 9th century A.D. as a reaction against rigid Monotheism and formalism of Islam, they clothed themselves to hide

5 Al-Sarraj—Kitab al-Luma, tr. by Nicholson R.A. 1916, p. 10.

6 Hujwiri—Op. cit., p. 45.

7 Ibid, p. 45.

8 Arberry, A.J.—Religion in the Middle East, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 253.

9 Browne E.G.—A literary history of Persia, London and Leipsic, T-fisher and Unwin, 1907, p. 417.

A Note on the Original of the Sufi Mysticism

their nakedness containing with rough hair cloth and coarse wool¹⁰, because at that period muslim caliph used to give much stress on mere rituals without any inner purity. Sufis also maintained rituals but they, at the same time, laid much emphasis on inner purification. They hold, rituals would be valueless if the mind of the devotee would not be pure. Even they say— "La salata illa—bi huzril qalb", i.e.—no prayer will be counted without concentration.

Therefore, we may say, that a Sufi is he, who not only wears coarse woolen garment but at the same time his heart is pure and filled with the love of God:

To ascertain the original source of Sufism Shaykh Shahabuddin Suhrawardi stated—

"the seed of sufism sown in the time of Adam
 Germed in the time of Nuh
 budded in the time of Ibrahim
 began to develop in the time of Musa
 reached maturity in the time of Christ
 produced pure wine in the time
 of Muhammed"¹¹.

So, on the basis of Shaykh Suhrawardi's account Sufis designated Adam as the first Sufi; he was 40 days' in seclusion before God endowed him with spirit, then God put the lamp of reason in his heart and the light of wisdom on his tongue, and he emerged like an illuminated mystic from the retirement during which he was knoaded by the hands of God¹²:

If the above reference is authentic then we may say that Sufism was existed from the very begining of human society. At least it is apparent that though the word Sufi was not used at an early period of Islam yet it is undeniable that Sufi practices were there. Some practices of the holy prophet (S) and his companions may be regarded as mystical practices adopted by the alter sufi.

The eminent orientalist D—Ohssan stated in his celebrated work "the ottoman Empire" regarding the emergence of Sufi as—"in the first year of the Hijra (corresponding to 622 A.D.) forty five citizen of Mecca joined themselves to as many others of Medinah. They took on oath of fidelity to the doctrines of their prophet; and for-

- 10 Sharif Jafar—Islam in India or Qanun-i-Islam tr. by Herclots, G.A. Oxford University Press, p. 283.
- 11 Suhrawardi Shahrabuddin—The Awarif al-Ma-arif, tr. by Clarke, H W. Taj Company, Delhi, 1984, p. 2.
- 12 Annemarie Schimmel—Mystical Dimensions of Islam, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1975, p. 16.

med a sect on fraternity the object of which was to establish among themselves a community of property, and to perform every day certain religious practices in a spirit of penitence and mortification. To distinguish themselves from other Mahammedans, they took the name Soofees".¹³

But so far as we are aware that Mr. D. Ohssan's opinion regarding the origin of sufi philosophy does not hold—water, because, the term 'Sufi' was not prevalent in the 1st Hijra (622 A.D.), rather scholars are unanimous that the term 'sufi' has been first applied to Abu Hashim 'uthman b. Shanik of Kufa (d. 776 A.D.)¹³. Therefore, it is clear that the term 'Sufi' came in vogue in later period.

Imam Qushayri clearly indicated that the word 'sufi' came in vogue a little before the expiry of the second century Hijri (822 A.D.). During the life and even after the death of holy prophet "Companions was the title adopted by the people at that age. They needed no better title for 'Companionship' was unanimously regarded to be the highest and best. Those who associated with the companion were called in their own times Tabeyin (followers) and the tabe tabeyin (followers of the followers) was the title conferred upon those who sat at the feet of the followers. After the expiry of this period there was a slackening of religious spirit. Hearts were turning more towards the pleasury of the world than towards God. A number of branches cropped up, each order was divided into a number of branches, seeing this state of affairs those who God above all things and were wholly consumed by the fire of His love, reported themselves from the rest of the world and devoted themselves to the recollection of their love. These men were later called "Sufis",¹⁵

On the basis of this above discussion it becomes apparent that the term sufi has not been applied in the period of Sahaba (companions), tabeyin (followers) and tabetabeyin (followers of the followers). Their rank was more higher than the rank of the sufis. Though it was not in vogue at that time but it existed in latent form, it took the name sufi afterward, So, Dr. Kawsar Yazdani in his sufi Darshan abom Sadhana reported us—"Sufi Sabda Hazrat Muhammad (d) Ke damaya me bilkul hi prachalit nahi tha. Kaha Jata hai ki iska chalan tabeyin (Muhammed Sahab ke Sathio ke bad ki logo) Ke samaya me suruhua", i.e. the term sufi actually was not prevalent in the period

- 13 Brown, J.P.—The Derwishes, 1968, reprint, London, 1968, pp. 208 9, vide also Paul Harendra Chandra—Jalaluddin Rumi & his Tasawwuf, MIG Housing Estate, Calcutta. 1985, pp. 110-111.
- 14 Bhatnagar, R.S.—Dimensions of classical Sufi Thought, Motilal Banarsi Das, Delhi, 1984, p. 2.
- 15 Valiuddin Mir—Op. cit., pp. 2-3.

of Hadrat Muhammad (S). It is said that it began to apply from the period of tabeyin (followers).¹⁵

Now the question may arise how far it is related with Quran and Hadith? It is clear that the word 'Sufi' is not found anywhere in the holy Quran by which we may infer that it was prevalent in the period of prophet (S). Though the word 'Sufi' did not appear in the holy Quran but there are many synonymous words, such as—"muqarrabun", (friends of God), "Sabirin" (patient men), "Salehin" (righteous men), "abrar" (virtuous men), "Zuhad" (pious men), "muttaqin" (God fearing men) etc.

In order to establish the authenticity of sufism we may refer the followings Quranic quotations:

- (a) "we nahnu aqrabo ilaihe min hablil warid"
i.e.—For we are nearer to him than (his) jugular vein¹⁷.
- (b) "Aina yashrabo bihal muqarrabuna"
i.e.—A spiring from (the waters) where of drink those nearest to God¹⁸.
- (c) "Innst abrara la fi nayeemin"
i.e.—Truely the righteous will be in bliss¹⁹.
- (d) "wa yukallemunnasa fil mande wa Kahlan wa minas—Salehin" i.e.—He shall speak to the people in childhood and in maturity and he shall be (of the company) of the righteous²⁰.
- (e) "Innallaha Yuhibbul muttaqin"
i.e.—For God loveath the righteous.²¹

Not only these references of the holy Quran are sufficient but there are various other allegorical verse giving attestation regarding esoteric and mystical interpretation, but here is no scope to trace all such verses.

Not only in the holy Quran but prophet Muhammed (S) also spent a good deal of time in seclusion in the cave of mount Hira. Besides that he preferred night vigil, prayer and esoteric practices. Hence sufis regarded him as the perfect man (al-insan al Kamil)

The ascetic of sufism are based on the simplicity of the life followed by the prophet (S). Prophet (S) gave the advices to his followers to live a simple life. We noticed unways Qarani, Hadrat Ali and Hadrat Abu Bakr all have maintained simple lives.

Therefore, we may come to the conclusion that the original source of sufi mystic philosophy is the holy Quran and prophetic sunnah. It was existed there in latent form without the name sufi. In later period it emerged in a new shape and took the name sufism and ultimately got large popularity in the world for their egalitarian attitude and penitence as well as rigid meditation.

16 Yazdani Kawsar—Sufi Darshan Ebam Sadhana (Hindi). Genuine Publishers and Media Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1983, pp. 10-11.

17 The Holy Quran, tr. by Yusuf Ali, A., L : 16.

18 Ibid. LXXXIII : 28.

19 Ibid. LXXXIII : 22.

20 Ibid. III : 46.

21 Ibid. IX : 4.

Wittgenstein And Nishida on the Possibility Of Self-Realization Through Beauty, Truth, and Goodness

Thomas T. Tominaga

I. Introduction

Understandably and expectedly there can be some fundamental differences between Ludwin Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) on the quest for self realization, given that their cultural and philosophical orientations are undeniably different. But be this as it may, we can assume with some justification that their views on the possibility of self-realization may be similar, opposed, or complementary in some respects. Such a hypothesis is not only interesting and significant, but it also needs to be explored and discussed. Doing so will not only be a contribution to the study of Comparative Philosophy, but it is also an inspiration to attempt to show how the quest for self-realization is possible through the functional interrelation and unity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness when viewed in different, similar, opposed, or complementary ways by Wittgenstein and Nishida. What such differences and similarities are, whether and how the differences are opposed, whether and how the similarities are complementary, and how they (especially the similarities) can help us show the possibility of self-realization will be made clear in our ensuing discussion.

Our discussion will show that in order to present a coherent and defensible account for the possibility of self-realization through the interrelation and unity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, we can and we should capitalize on those aspects of Wittgenstein's and Nishida's views that are found fruitful and germane to the task at hand, although they may be different, similar, opposed, or complementary in some respects. In order to show some different, similar, opposed, or

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complementary aspects of Wittgenstein's and Nishida's views on the possibility of self-realization, let us try to elicit and discuss some definitive responses to the following questions :

(1) How is the self to be characterized with respect to the quest for self-realization ?

(2) How is it possible to attain self-realization through the interrelation and unity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness ?

(3) What is the overall effect of self-realization on the person who attains it ?

II: Characterization of the Self with Respect to the Quest for Self-Realization

On the first question, Wittgenstein's and Nishida's views of the self are different in one significant respect but are also similar in another respect. For Wittgenstein, the self can be characterized as a willing, value-conferring, and acting subject that is a limit of but is not a part of the world amenable to the language of description. To this effect, Wittgenstein remarks as follows :

Good and evil only enter through the *subject*. And the subject is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world.¹

The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world.²

The world is *my* world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of *my language* (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of *my* world.³

As the subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence, so good and evil are predicates of the subject, not properties in the world.⁴

The subject is the willing subject.⁵

This is clear: it is impossible to will without already performing the act of the will.⁶

One cannot will without acting.⁷

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks*, 1914-1916, tr. by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, publishers, 1969), p. 79e.

2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, tr. by D.F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (New York: The Humanities Press and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 5.632.

3 *Ibid.*, 5.62.

4 Wittgenstein, *Notebooks*, p. 79e.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 87e.

6 *Ibid.*; p. 87e.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 87e.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 86e.

It is true that the knowing subject is not in the world, that there is no knowing subject.⁸

There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.⁹

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.¹⁰

This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.

For what the solipsist *means* is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.¹¹

If we can apply the Principle of Charity to these interesting and revealing remarks, we can take them to imply at least three areas of emphasis relevant to the quest for self-realization. The first of those is the advocacy of voluntarism instrumental to the quest for self-realization, which seems to provide the self with the motivating force to take up the quest for self-realization as a worthwhile endeavor. The second area of emphasis is a linguistically inspired solipsism, which is a consequence of viewing the self as a limit of the world. For Wittgenstein, since the self from an axiological and volitional view point is outside of the limits of language applicable to the describable world, we must refrain from describing the solipsistic aspect of self-realization, lest we would run the risk of uttering meaningless nonsense, as Logical Positivists would say. Accordingly, as the impetus behind the quest for self-realization, the Wittgensteinian self is not only free to will any act that would achieve self-realization, but is also obligated to perform the act that is already willed.

And the third area of emphasis is a total rejection of any attempt to make the quest for self-realization contingent on any epistemic or cognitive factors believed essential to understanding and fulfilling the nature of the self. Such a rejection would seem to indicate that, for Wittgenstein, the quest for self-realization is neither an epistemic nor a cognitive activity for the self. This seems to imply that willing and acting must be primary and inevitable existential requirements for the achievement of self realization.

What is significant to observe here is that the voluntarism implied in the quest for self-realization is intended to acknowledge and place in proper perspective the truth or correctness of the implied solipsism. Accordingly, whatever experience or insight that is associated with self-realization, it is, in principle, unsayable but showable through the concrete actions that are willed and performed by the

9 Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 5.631.

10 *Ibid.*, 5.61.

11 *Ibid.*, 5.62.

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willing and acting self. It is also significant to observe that the elimination of epistemology and cognition from the quest for self-realization seems to call for the emergence of a non-Cartesian self that must operate at the periphery of the world, as it is required by its status as the limit of the world.

Given the voluntarism, solipsism, non-epistemism, and non-cognitivism implied in the Wittgensteinian quest for self-realization, we can observe justifiably that, for Wittgenstein, what is crucial for self-realization is not the activity of thinking or knowing which is characteristic of the Cartesian or Kantian self. Rather, it is the combination of willing, value-conferring, and acting that sets in motion and sustains the intensity and continuity of the quest for self-realization.

In partial agreement with Wittgenstein's emphasis on willing, value-conferring, and acting as being crucial to the quest for self-realization, Nishida points out the importance of viewing a course of willed action as an expression of the absolute free will as follows :

What does it mean to penetrate to the root of the self? What is the self in this case? The self is identical with the self that looks back upon itself as object and in which the reflecting and reflected self are one. Perhaps such a self may be thought to be mere intellectual act. But, in essence, the self must be pure behavior, pure will... In this horizon, the myriad things appear as expression of the self.¹²

Although there seems to be a partial agreement here based on a mutual recognition of the voluntaristic factor in the quest for self-realization, Nishida's view of the self does not lead to solipsism whose correctness was recognized by Wittgenstein, in so far as what solipsism stands for cannot be said because it lies outside of the limits of language. Nor does Nishida's view lead to a full-scale and permanent pantheistic or monistic approach to the quest for self-realization, though some form of pantheism or monism with respect to voluntarism is implied in his approach as a tentative and pragmatic requirement.

This is because in Nishida's view there is a self-determining non-ego foundation for the self which is discoverable within the world of objective reality. Accordingly, the lived content of the actions willed and performed by the self cannot be a mere actualization of the demands and impulses rooted subjectively and artificially in the subject qua ego-subject.¹³ For Nishida, what the self is and can be-

12 Nishida Kitaro, *Art and Morality*, tr. by David A. Dilworth and Valdo H. Viglielmo (Honolulu, HI: The University Press of Hawaii, 1973), pp. 78-79.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 199.

come in the quest for self-realization must be grounded in the ever changing and progressive world of objective reality that resembles Hegel's objective spirit.¹⁴ However, saying so is not an uncritical acceptance of a personal identification with Nature or with a single all-pervading substance which is characteristic of the pantheistic or monistic approach to the quest for self-realization. Nor is it the emergence of a mere synthetic unity of the demands of formal morality or personal self-determination. Instead, the ego-subject, for Nishida, needs to submerge within a wider place or *topos* of absolute nothingness which can function as an egoless ground so that a dialectical and dynamic unity of the self can be initiated and sustained. In this way; any egoistic, solipsistic, pantheistic, or monistic tendency can be checked and redirected so that a personal and dynamic unity of the true self can be shown to be grounded on an absolute other or Thou as Buber would say. So the true self is essentially a specific instance of the self-identity of absolute contradictories (opposites) as Nishida would be inclined to hold.

For Nishida, "the true self is an acting self" and "true reality is the object of the acting self. We realize our selves by living and acting in this world".¹⁵ Since the true self can only achieve self-realization by living and acting in the world of true reality which consists of changes, similarities, differences, and contradictories (opposites), Nishida needs to make an adjustment in his characterization of the true self. Accordingly, for Nishida, the true or practical self should be viewed as a concrete manifestation of the dialectical and dynamic unity which sustains and underlies the union of subject and object, good and evil, the beautiful and the ugly, the true and the false, and all other pairs of opposites or contradictories that exist in the external world of objective reality. To this effect, Nishida informs us forcefully as follows:

...the self's reflections of itself within itself involves an infinite continuity of acts ... This kind of infinite continuity of acts—that is, the infinite acts of the self—becomes projected externally as a world of infinite reality with respect to the self. But the dialectical unity itself of these two mutually opposing directions is the true self, and hence when the 'self' is self-conscious of the unity of this kind of dialectical contradiction, it can include the infinite external world within itself. In other terms, it turns from the intellectual self to the practical self.¹⁶

14 *Ibid*, p. 200.

15 David A. Dilworth, "The concrete World of Action in Nishida's Later Thought" in *Japanese Phenomenology*, ed. by Yoshihiro Nitta and Hirotaka Tatematsu (Dordrecht, Holland; D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 255.

16 Nishida, *Art and Morality*, p. 79.

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By characterizing the true self as the dialectical and dynamic unity of opposites grounded in the self-identity of absolute contradictions, Nishida has thereby given us an important alert. Namely, if the "ego-self" is to be the true self with the potential of achieving self-realization, we need to penetrate the depth of the "ego-self" until we reach the egoless ground of the true self; This egoless ground of the true self can be no other than the ultimate place or *topos* or *basho* of Absolute or True Nothingness.¹⁷ Doing so would also eliminate any subjective or psychological barriers that may prevent the true self from carrying out some truly creative actions that are predicated on the absolute free will of the true self.¹⁸

In order to reach the egoless ground which is the wider place or *topos* of Truth Nothingness, the true self needs to cultivate a higher degree of self-consciousness by having a pure or immediate experience of the external world. For in the meaningful context and concrete content of pure experience, there is no admixture of thought or conceptual discrimination, there is neither subject nor object, knowledge and its object are fused, and knowing and acting become one and inseparable.¹⁹ When the ego-self is grounded in the ultimate and wider place or *topos* of True Nothingness, we can say that the true self has become a freely creative and undividedly active part of True Nothingness. Parenthetically, it is instructive to keep in mind that True Nothingness is not simply non-being as opposed to being, since True Nothingness includes both being and non-being.²⁰ That is to say, viewed in its quest for self-realization, the place of True Nothingness cannot be reduced to being or non-being, since the place of True Nothingness is presupposed by both being and non-being as their mutual point of reference. So behind the place of True Nothingness is not an ontology of nothingness predicated on the denial of being in favor of non-being. Neither being nor non-being is given priority over the other.

III. Possible Attainment of Self-Realization

Now that we have characterized and discussed from Wittgenstein's and Nishida's points of view the true self's quest for self-

- 17 David A. Dilworth, "Nishida's Final Essay: The Logic of Place and a Religious World View", *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XX No. 4 (October 1970), p. 359.
- 18 Shimomura Torataro, "Nishida Kitaro and Some Aspects of His Philosophical Thought" in Nishida Kitaro, *A Study of Good*, tr. by V. H. Viglielmo (Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Japanese Government, 1960), p. 210.
- 19 David A Dilworth, "Nishida Kitaro : Nothingness as the Negative Space of Experiential Immediacy, *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol, XIII No. 4 (December 1973), p. 468.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 481.

realization, let us try to discuss how it is possible to attain self-realization through the interrelation and unity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness.

For Wittgenstein, the quest for self-realization is possible as an attempt by the willing, value-conferring, and acting ego-subject to see the world aright. And to see the world aright is to see the world directly with a new clarity of vision without relying on a limited tool such as the language of description. Although the ego-subject's true and real nature can show through the good or misguided exercise of the will, what it becomes with the attainment of self-realization is solipsistically mysterious or is semantically unknown in that it is by definition beyond the limits of the logically describable world. Any attempt to describe or say what has been experienced as indicated by the new and clear vision of the world is bound to invite a whole host of meaningless and nonsensical expressions. Thus, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, although the quest for self-realization is possible by virtue of seeing the world with a newly found clarity of vision, the immediately experienced content of self-realization can only be shown non-linguistically by being actively and creatively involved in some kind of worthwhile practice.

But for Nishida, the quest for self-realization is possible by deepening the willing and acting ego-subject's awareness. For its true and real nature is inextricably linked to and is dialectically unified with the way different and similar things are in place in the objective world that we all perceive and experience. This possibility of self-realization would appear to be based on a Spinozistic or non Spinozistic version of pantheism. Upon closer scrutiny, the Nishidan possibility of self-realization seems to be based to a certain on a Spinoza-type premise, according to which all things are the self-determination of the place of True Nothingness.²¹ On the basis of this premise, we can say that the Nishidian possibility of self-realization is only partially and temporarily pantheistic in that True Nothingness becomes the ultimate place within which the actions of the willing and acting self receive their self-determination as the concrete universal which also includes a principle of particularization.²² Although the place of True Nothingness pervades everything including the willing and acting self in the quest for self-realization, we need to particularize each case of self-realization by focusing on the lived content and concrete action involved. It may be helpful to point out that the presence of True Nothingness can be likened to the presence of nega-

21 Shimomura, *Op. Cit.*, p. 210

22 Nishida, *Art and Morality*, p. 199.

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tive space at the point of intersection between the concrete universal and each individual self that is in the quest for self-realization.

So, for Nishida, we can say in a qualified and partial pantheistic sense that the ego-subject can become the true self when its quest for self-realization is achieved by discovering through self-consciousness of the presence of Nothingness and through action-intuition that the true self of concrete and pure experience can be disclosed by neither identity nor difference, by neither being nor non-being, by neither the concrete universal nor the individual self, and by neither any other pairs of opposites.²³ Instead, the true self of concrete and pure experience can only be realized by the place of Absolute Nothingness, in and through which the ego-subject can take up the egoless status of the self-identity of absolute contradictories on the dynamic unity of opposites.

From Nishida's viewpoint, when the true self becomes grounded in the self-identity of absolute contradictories, one can have a pure and immediate experience of the unity of knowledge and action whose concrete content is the creative and created unity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. This unity of knowledge and action reminds us of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action, according to which knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the fulfillment of knowledge. For Nishida, the true self, through the immediacy and directness of pure experience, becomes the union point or point of intersection of the concrete content of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. However, in the Wittgensteinian quest for self-realization, the ego-subject tends to occupy a solipsistic position at the periphery of the world. Doing so is advantageous for the ego-subject, since it can see the world as a place in which and to which the beautiful, the true, and the good are applicable as aesthetic and moral values which are imposed on the world from outside. For Wittgenstein, the quest for self-realization cannot be predicated on Beauty, Truth, and Goodness as if they were intrinsic to the describable world of which the ego-subject is a limit and of which it is not a part. Instead, we must view Beauty, Truth, and Goodness as aesthetic and moral values, which the ego-subject, upon the achievement of self realization, is empowered by the will to attribute to the world.

From our discussion thus far, we can begin to understand that characteristic of some complementary similarities are Wittgenstein's and Nishida's views on the voluntarism inherent in the quest for self-realization. For both Wittgenstein and Nishida, the dominant feature

²³ Dilworth, "Nishida Kitaro: Nothingness as the Negative Space", p. 479.

of the self in the quest for self-realization is the willing of a needed or desirable course of action which can only be fulfilled by the actual performance of the willed action. However, for Nishida, the willed action and the performed action are so integrally fused that we cannot justifiably attribute to their experienced concrete content Beauty, Truth, and Goodness as abstract names for Platonic Ideas. This is because doing so would amount to reifying the immediately and directly experienced concrete content of the willed and performed action by focusing on Beauty, Truth, and Goodness in the formal sense indicative of formal morality. Instead, Nishida urges to us adopt the phenomenological suggestion that Beauty, Truth, and Goodness are interrelated and unified as "ideal beings".²⁴ As ideal beings whose meaning is applicable to the quest for self-realization, Beauty, Truth, and Goodness have their logical place as meaningful norms or values in the intelligible world which is inseparable from the natural world and the world of consciousness.

But for Wittgenstein, this does not mean that self-realization can be attained by leading the willing, value-conferring, and acting self to some ostensibly pointable referents named Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. Rather, for Wittgenstein, it does mean that we need to make some collective and ongoing efforts at learning and practicing some specific ways in which the terms "beautiful", "true", and "good" are used in some occasions as part of a shared practice. For through such shared practice in the use of the "beautiful", the "true", and the "good", we can have a wider framework in which the willing, value-conferring, and acting self can understand how the intended meaning of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness is applicable to the willed and performed action. That is to say, what is meant by the beautiful, the true, and the good is not determined by what they refer to, but by the context and circumstance in which they are used as aesthetic and moral predicates, in connection with actions that are willed and performed by the willing and acting self.

Since the immediately experienced content of the willed and performed action is concrete and specific to each willing and acting subject in quest for self-realization, we can partially account for the applicability of the beautiful and the good by accepting two of Wittgenstein's relevant premises. The first of these is the axiological premise that the beautiful and the good (which Wittgenstein equates with a life of happiness) are predicates which the willing, value-conferring, acting self is motivated or obligated to impose from outside onto the

24 Kitaro Nishida, *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness*, tr. by Robert Schinzinger (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center Press, 1966), pp. 29-30.

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world of intended actions, objects, and situations. The second of these is the aesthetic premise that when such intended actions, objects, and situations are viewed with the "happy eye" of the willing and acting subject, they can be seen as beautiful and as good for a happy life.

In a similar and complementary manner, Nishida observes that what is essential for understanding the willed and performed action is the concrete content of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness that is experienced and acted out by the willing subject's action-intuition.²⁵ Moreover, operative in the willing and acting subject's development and unity of self-consciousness is the "pure heart".²⁶ As a unifying vehicle of the self-identity of absolute contradictories, the "pure heart" enables the willing and acting subject to see things and situations as being beautiful, true, and good prior to and independent of the beautiful-ugly, true-false, and good-evil distinctions. As Nishida remarks, "The pure demands of the heart are all beautiful-good—indeed, there is not yet the distinction between good and evil, beautiful and ugly".²⁷

What Wittgenstein and Nishida seem to call to our attention here is that the actions willed and performed by the willing, value-conferring, and acting subject in order to attain self-realization are neither beautiful nor ugly, are neither true nor false, and are neither good nor evil when they are seen with Wittgenstein's "happy eye", or with Nishida's "pure heart". Instead, they are viewed with the "happy eye" or "pure heart" of the willing, value-conferring, and acting subject as being inseparably and functionally beautiful, true, and good without drawing any sharp distinction with respect to their contradictories or opposites.

IV. Overall Effect of Self-Realization

If we have achieved some moderate success in characterizing the true self in the quest for self-realization and in accounting for the possibility of attaining some kind of self-realization, let us now make an effort to discuss with the help of Wittgenstein and Nishida the overall of self-realization on the person who attains it.

With the attainment of self-realization, the overall effect on the willing and acting subject is viewed by Wittgenstein and Nishida in similar ways. For Wittgenstein, one possible effect is a newly gained

25 Dilworth, "Nishida Kitaro: Nothingness as the Negative Space", p. 476.

26 Nishida, *Art and Morality*, p. 165.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 166.

clarity of vision²⁸ by means of which the whole world can be seen in new ways. The whole world can be seen as the background against which or as the whole of logical space in which Beauty, Truth and Goodness can be viewed and attributed to intended actions, objects; and situations that are needed to bring about the fulfillment of a happy life for the willing and acting subject.

For Nishida, another possible effect is an urgent sense of aesthetic and moral reform²⁹ on the part of the willing and acting self. The urgency of such personal reform is made manifest when the subject-object dichotomy is eliminated or suspended, and is replaced with the unity of subject and object, which is crucial to the unity of all other opposites or contradictories.

From Nishida's viewpoint, at least one positive and beneficial results is that the interrelation and unity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness can begin to be reflected and shown in the lived unity, character, and behavior of the willing, value-conferring, acting subject. But for Wittgenstein, such a personal reform shows that the willing, value-conferring, and acting subject is imbued with a feeling of being at home with the truth and is prepared to speak the truth.³⁰ That the willing and acting subject can do both of these things is attributed to his mastery of himself by discovering and living the truth about himself not in just one occasion, but as a matter of regular practice. This seems to imply that for Wittgenstein, some kind of practical life style or way of living is or must be adopted and practiced upon the attainment of self-realization.

When we look more closely at these two possible overall effects of self-realization, we can observe that both Wittgenstein and Nishida seem to imply some kind of therapeutic achievement of self-therapy. When self-realization is attained, the willing and acting subject has thereby undergone some internal development or change of perception. For Wittgenstein, this change of perception results in beginning a beautiful and thus a happy life because everything is seen in some place or other as beautiful, true, and good by the "happy eye" of the willing and acting subject. But for Nishida, the internal development is indicated by the dynamic unity of the various aspects of the willing and acting subject's life, which unity is a concrete and lived instance of the self-identity of absolute contradictories or opposites.

28 Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*. 6.5.

29 Nishida, *Art and Morality*, p. 94.

30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, tr. by Peter Winch (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1980), p. 35e.

What is significant about the possible overall effects of self-realization suggested by Wittgenstein and Nishida is that the volitional and the behavioral elements are functionally and therapeutically fused for different reasons. In Wittgenstein's view, we need to make the quest for self-realization as personal and as solipsistic as it is axiologically sound, and as it is aesthetically warranted. In Nishida's view, we need to ground the dynamic unity of the true self in the egoless place provided by the all pervading topos of Absolute Nothingness. Accordingly, for Nishida, the quest for self-realization needs to be made as personal and as non-solipsistic (i.e., as moderately or minimally pantheistic) as it is dialectically possible and as it is creatively warranted by the self-identity of absolute contradictories.

V. Concluding Remarks

Our discussion has shown that the possibility of self-realization through the interrelation and unity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness seems to involve two main views. The Wittgensteinian view seems to rest on the recognition that what is crucial for the possibility of self-realization is that the willing, value-conferring, and acting subject can attribute the beautiful, the true, and the good to the world of which it is a pragmatic limit and of which it is not a part. The Nishidan view seems to emerge from the conviction that what is germane to the possibility of self-realization is the removal of any subjective and conceptual admixture from the concrete content of the pure experience of the unity of opposites, as reflected by the lived and dynamic unity of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness in the life of the willing and acting subject.

One basic difference seems to lie in the understandably solipsistic tendency of the early Wittgensteinian quest for self-realization and in the partially pantheistic tendency of the Nishidan quest for self-realization. The solipsistic tendency seems to come from Wittgenstein's insistence that the quest for self-realization must be predicated on a self whose experiences and values are unsayable but showable through its willed and performed actions. The partially pantheistic tendency seems to arise from Nishida's methodological requirement that the ego-subject can only remove its egoistic and subjective elements if the true self is grounded in an all-pervading place or topos of Absolute Nothingness, from which the true self can initially emerge without distinguishing sharply between the beautiful and the ugly, the true and the false, the good and the bad, and any other opposites. Since the all-pervading and self-determining place of Absolute Nothingness is neither being that can be affirmed nor is it non-being that can be denied, we can see that the alleged pantheistic tendency

of the Nishidan quest for self-realization is quite misleading. It is misleading because we can have the wrong impression that under Nishida's view the quest for self-realization is nothing more concrete and specific than an attempt to discover the self-determining presence of True Nothingness in everything and in the self. To the contrary, Nishida's view involves a dialectical check and acknowledgement of the various variables and horizons that the self would confront in the objective world with respect to the quest for self-realization in the past, present, and future.

Another basic and significant difference is that in Nishida's but not in Wittgenstein's view, there cannot be any permanent ego-self that would constantly and uninterruptedly search for self-realization at the periphery of the world. This lack of a permanent ego-self reminds us of David Hume's view that the self is no more than a bundle of incoming impressions whose temporary existence is causally responsible for the temporary and contingent existence of the self. In the Nishidan quest for self-realization, the ego-self is always subject to the demands and negations of the dialectical unity of opposites in the world. As a result, in the Nishidan quest for self-realization, the ego-self does not and cannot exist as a mere individual person with an unchanging personal identity that remains the same from one moment to the next. This seems to reflect Nishida's acceptance of the Buddhist doctrine of *anatta*, according to which there is no underlying substantial self that remains the same in the midst of change.

What we have in the Nishidan quest for self-realization is a Humean-type recognition of the temporary existence of the self, which is contingent on the conditions relative and specific to the circumstances that surround each quest for self-realization. For Nishida, the true self can emerge a new and independent of each moment of the process of self-realization, depending on which relevant factors are considered and which region of time is referred to. So instead of one continuous unchanging self in the quest for self-realization, there is only a self whose nature, at any given time, is discontinuous with what it experienced previously, though there is continuity and unity of independent and related moments of the process. To this effect, Nishida remarks as follows:

Personal unity is not a mere temporal duration from past to future, but rather a continuity of discontinuity, a unity of something independent at each and every step of its process. The self of yesterday must be in communication with the self of today. ... The person which is independent and free at each and every step is grounded in the identity of absolute contradictions.³¹

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The true unity of contradiction determines individuals in the case of one activity giving birth to another activity. It determines activity. Personal unity is established through such determination. Therefore it is a progressive living through dying. ... True self-identity is the self-identity of absolute contradictions, and there is always identity at the root of mutual contradictions.³²

Although both Wittgenstein and Nishida do recognize the indispensable role played by the will independent of each step of the process of self-realization, Nishida, unlike Wittgenstein, does recognize the unity of knowledge and action when the quest for self-realization is predicated on pure experience whose immediacy allows for no sharp distinction between knowledge and action. For Nishida, the unity of knowledge and action would add to the volitional aspect the dimension of practical or applied knowledge which is essential to the quest for self-realization. That Nishida does recognize the unity of knowledge and action is indicative of the third difference between his view and that of Wittgenstein. In Wittgenstein's view, there is no unity of knowledge and action in the quest for self-realization, although there is a unity of willing and performing an act. But for Nishida, the unity of knowledge and action cannot be ignored and cannot be eliminated in favor of the supremacy of the will.

31 Nishida Kitaro, *Fundamental Problem of Philosophy*, tr. by David A. Dilworth (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1970), p. 19.
 32 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

A. C. Ewing on Reasoning Vis-A-Vis Intuition in Ethical Judgement : And Appraisal

Surendra Kumar

A. C. Ewing is an ethical intuitionist, and he has propounded a new brand of intuitionism, and that in face of the rival theories like emotivism, prescriptivism and neo-naturalism. The uniqueness of Ewing lies in the fact, that he, after weighing the relative merits and demerits of rival theories, has evolved a middle way in ethics incorporating and synthesizing their good points. It is very interesting to note that Ewing has something to say on almost all the important issues which were currently being discussed

For Ewing, reasoning occupies a very important place even on moral issues, but he regards intuition and reason as indispensable allies. Quite commensurate with his middle course approach in moral philosophy, he has made a concerted effort to compromise between the two. The present article is, therefore, a reflection on Ewing's point of view on 'Reasoning Vis-a-vis intuition in Ethical Judgements'.

Reasoning is regarded basically as a process of drawing of inferences or conclusion from some unknown or assumed facts. It is concerned with defending or supporting what the speaker says. And a reasoning characterised as moral, i.e. a moral reasoning, is somehow associated with moral issues, moral discourses or moral judgments. The term, 'reasoning' or its synonym 'argument' is generally used in logic to stand for a set or group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing evidence for the truth of that one. Arguments have a role in ethics also, as it is certainly not true that we cannot argue in ethics. But the 'reasoning' of ethics should not be confused with

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'the reasoning' of logic. Moral reasoning is involved in resolving moral disagreements, in determining a person's ethical decisions or in solving moral problems or in justifying moral judgements. Ewing admits of good and bad reasons in ethical field.

In actual ethical reasoning Ewing claims to be mainly utilitarian. He has accorded an important place to "straight hedonistic reasoning". But in order to maintain his intermediate position, he takes into account the intrinsic character of the action to the extent it can be distinguished from its consequences.

Ewing puts reasoning, roughly speaking, into two very different classes : (i) deductive apriori reasoning in which the conclusion follows with logical necessity from the premises; (ii) inductive problematic reasoning which consists of generalizations and analogies based on observed empirical facts and extended to what is unobserved. And he says that neither kind of reasoning can be adequate in determining what is true. In order to prove the truth of a conclusion, reason requires true premises which too are to be established by reasoning and this process lands us into a vicious infinite regress. Hence in order to establish conclusion of any sort by reasoning we need premises which are supplied either by experience or by immediate insight as opposed to reasoning. Moreover, we could not start at all in any reasoning without assuming that we immediately perceive a connexion between certain premises and their conclusion and that not by mediate reasoning but intuitively. The same type of difficulty applies to inductive arguments also. For an inductive argument we must either see immediately that certain general principles are true universally, e.g. the uniformity of nature or the principle of causation, or we must see that the particular kind of evidence used in a particular case makes the conclusion probable. Further most inductive conclusions at least are never verified by experience unless we make certain assumptions of a kind which themselves would have to be justified by induction. It is true that in case of dispute about an inductive argument, we can some way to meet the objection by argument, but arguing the points involves appealing to the opponents' immediate insight into the quality of evidence preferred. In each case of a legitimate inductive argument consciously made, there occurs an insight and we must depend on such immediate insight that on given evidence the conclusion is probable. These show that there are intuitions presupposed in deductive or inductive reasoning and immediate insight as opposed to mediate reasoning seems to have a larger sphere. Intuitions are immediate, or at least only mediated in the sense of being helped, not proved, by discursive reasoning.

If 'reason' be taken to mean 'mediate reasoning' the functions we can ascribe to reason are very limited and dependent at every stage on something else which is commonly called intuition. But the term 'reason' is generally being used to cover something more than reasoning, though it certainly does also cover reasoning. It is used to include besides reasoning 'intuition', or the seeing something to be true, not because it is inferred from other propositions or established by observation, but because of its own intrinsic nature it must be, or at least is, true. Ewing is a defender of reason in a sense which includes intuitive reason and he insists that intuition is required by all reasoning and not only by ethics. In fact, inference and intuition are linked together. Inference always presupposes intuition to provide the links in the inference, but inference also is needed to support, prepare for, and develop intuition. This is so in four ways:

- 1 What we think we see immediately without proof can also be tested mediately by its coherence with other acceptable beliefs perhaps also by other arguments. These tests may give positive support to the intuitive conviction and may often be necessary to raise it to the level of a well-justified belief. Intuition of a truth together with arguments for it may be sufficient to justify its acceptance where neither would have been sufficient alone.
- 2 A process of reasoning often is necessary to make clear to ourselves what it is that we really see intuitively. Our apparent intuitions about probability, cause, substance, goodness, God need to be analysed and separated from what is irrelevant, and this process cannot be carried out without reasoning.
- 3 In order to intuit rightly, we have to be in a state of mind which is equipped with powers of inference, rational thinking. Without any study of a subject and without having thought rationally about it, a person is not likely to have new, clear, true, and fruitful intuitions in regard to that subject.
- 4 In certain cases causes of false intuitive beliefs are commonly either some intellectual confusions or some prejudices due to the influence of emotion or desire, e.g. wishful thinking things, and these irrelevant causes of belief can be removed by a process of negative testing of alleged intuitions. The intellectual confusion can be removed through a process of reasoning and the emotional influences can be erased through psychological treatment, personal influence, or preaching. Although it is not humanly possible to achieve success through these remedies in all cases, but this is a purely empirical limitation and a matter of degree,

hence from the above it does not follow that on principle they are in applicable.

Ewing accords recognition to the role the arguments play in ethics and he confirms that these determine a person's ethical decision. In ethical argument we are very soon brought to a point where we have to fall back on intuition, so that disputants are placed in situation where there are just two conflicting intuitions between which there seem to be no means of deciding. Ewing asserts that some intuition is necessarily pre-supposed in all reasoning. Consider the argument A ... B ... C. Now, this argument will be invalid unless A entails B and B entails C. This must either be seen immediately—a case of intuition, or must require a further argument in which case an intermediate proposition D must be interpolated which itself follows from A and from which B follows. Similar is the case with B and C. But this only puts the problem further back because the process of interpolation cannot go on ad infinitum. Sooner or later we must come to some link which see intuitively. Inference itself pre-supposes intuition of the connections between the different stages in the inference. Ethical intuitions are not indeed intuitions of logical connections but the above argument shows that possibility of intuition cannot be rejected on principle. Thus if we are to have any valid inference at all, we cannot get rid of intuition.

In ethics, we have to decide what we ought to do and for this we have to balance different probable arguments, and in order to do this we must rely at some point or the other on an estimate of their strength which cannot itself be further justified by mediate reasoning. In ethical questions about what is the right action in a given situation, some people may be found inclined to attribute more weight to one consideration, while some others to another. And in order to deal with the situation rationally and give a decision we must also estimate the weight of these other arguments, so that in the last resort it is matter of insight into their nature which cannot be settled by other arguments ad infinitum. Just as in a demonstrative argument one must see intuitively how each step follows from the preceding one, so in the case of a probable argument one must rely on estimates of the degree of probability given by the argument as compared to that given by arguments on the other side, and these estimates must either be themselves intuitive or be deduced from other estimates which are intuitive. Ewing further cautions that intuition should not be regarded as a quasi miraculous flash of insight or some such thing standing quite by itself, uninfluenced by inference and not essentially linked with any other thought process at all. Intuition is

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helped by inference but sees beyond what could be proved by inference. When intuitive ethical views differ, inference may be employed to support one or other of the clashing views, especially by showing that it fits well into a coherent ethical system. This may not settle the question absolutely conclusively, but it can help toward settlement. By the use of inference, one of the disputants may be made to realize that he does not see by intuition what he claimed to see, but something rather different. Ewing writes :

It would thus be a great mistake to say that, when two men disagree on an ethical question, there is nothing to be done about it or that there is no scope in ethics for inference.¹

Ewing further says that an intuition must be regarded as a rational judgement, though one not based on argument, even if capable of confirmation by it, and not as a mere feeling. The best and most reliable intuition comes after reasoning and not before. Intuition may even spring from reasoning in the first instance, though it goes beyond it, and it certainly must be subject to the test of reasoning. Though everything we know cannot possibly be established by reasoning, we are not entitled to reject a view merely because we cannot prove it. Intuition presupposes at least a rational selection between different aspects of the situation. Now, this selection may be made instantaneously or gradually but it is certainly affected deeply by our previous experience, thought and action. In course of making a particular ethical decision, what one seems to see immediately may be the fruit of long experience and thought about similar situations, without being itself a logical deduction or induction from definite features in the situations in question. In that case the more reasoned and reasonable his thought is, the more likely it would be for his intuition to be reliable. Ewing further asserts that his insistence on intuition must not be, in any way, regarded as a protest against the use of reasoning in ethics. What he insists on is the need of more reasoning and not less.

Ewing refers to the people's general talk as if modern psychology had shown that we ought not to reason, and he points that what it has shown is merely that reason does not influence us as much as we thought and that there is a lot of bad reasoning. But, Ewing asserts that, that reason influences us little is no ground for denying that it ought to influence us more, and that there is much bad reasoning is no ground for not trying to make it good. Psychologists have shown that the neglect to use our reason properly cast deplorable effects on individual life, and the evils of irrationalism find expression in pub-

lic affairs in the present generation. It is the people's inclination to satisfy their emotions by accepting what is thoroughly unreasonable that has allowed the ideologies which have devastated the world in recent years, to have gained a grip.

The better we reason the better our intuitions: the two are not enemies but indispensable allies. It is indeed better, as is often done, to include under "reason" both reasoning and reasonable intuition.²

Ewing himself uses reason in his ethical arguments as is evident from the following excerpt,

The reason why something, A is good, that is, why we ought to adopt these attitudes to A, lies in the natural, factual characteristics of A itself, for instance the characteristic of pleasantness possessed by certain experiences or the characteristic which certain acts have of being the fulfilment of promises.³

Thus, he admits that the presence of reasons in favour of doing a particular action that one ought to do is always there in the shape of general characteristics which it shares with other actions.

It is certainly not true that we cannot argue in ethics. Ethical arguments consist, to a large extent, in predicting consequences, and this is a matter for causal reasoning ultimately based on empirical generalisation, but the work of reasoning in ethics does not stop there; for it is not the mere fact that certain consequences are likely to follow which is relevant to the rightness or wrongness of an action, but the goodness or badness of the consequences.

For Ewing it is of great theoretical and practical importance to attain such a middle course between intuition and reason which will do justice to intuition and yet enable us to deal with intuitions rationally, avoiding the extremes both of an irrationalism which spurns cold reason as useless and hampering, and an arid and narrow rationalism which seeks to deny everything that cannot be logically or scientifically proved. The remedy for our ills in ethics lies in not less reason but in more. Such a reason should not be so sceptical as to require everything to be empirically given or formally proved, nor should it be a mere slave to the reasoner's own desires; *rather it should include both critical reasoning and wise intuition*. Good will is the prime necessity and reason without will is paralysed as also will without reason is blind.

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C. Ewing, *Ethics*, p. 143.

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C. Ewing, *The Definition of Good*, p. 201.

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Neo-Pragmatism in Contemporary American Philosophy

Willis H. Truitt

In this paper I will discuss a growing and influential movement in philosophy in America (USA). This movement is usually called pragmatism or relativism. In aesthetics it is closely associated to postmodernism, which I will touch upon briefly in this paper. Below, however, I will try to characterize it as a broad philosophical tendency, but first I will consider an historical parallel.

The end of the 19th century brought with it the end of philosophy on the European continent or so some philosophers declared. This "death" of philosophy was attributed to two causes. First there was the translation of all philosophical questions into the language of the positive sciences, for example, in theories advanced by Comte and Engels. Second, there was the translation of Hegel's rational metaphysics into the febrile, pragmatic subjectivism of Croce and Gentile.

The second of these developments led to a theory of action or practice which described itself as post-rational and post-philosophical. This new outlook was championed by such post-philosophers as that exquisite snob of Italian idealist philosophers, Benedetto Croce, or the fascist anti-intellectual also mentioned above, Giovanni Gentile. In *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*¹ Gentile proclaims that the world as experienced is fact, that we must face the facts because they are bound by the iron law of the past. "Man makes himself what he is and is not made". Man is the freedom and power of his will. Facts are produced or created by action, actions are unique and cannot be explained by historical or philosophical explanations. Freedom is produced by the power and force of individual actions.²

1 *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, MacMillan, London, 1922, p. 180.

2 *Ibid.* p. 184.

Philosophy, according to Gentile, would no longer be a theoretical discipline for there is no such thing as a theoretical truth. In his writings practice and action take the place of theoretical. The only reality is an act of will that transforms subjective desire into fact. This was one of the first steps in what G. Lukacs was later to describe as the *Zerstörung der Vernunft* (Destruction of Reason).

A feverish repugnance to intellectualism is evident in Gentile's post philosophical practice which, one must note, includes his "Philosophical Basis of Fascism".³ a paean to Mussolini and the Absolute State: and it was the same contempt for reason and theory that enabled the acceptance by many German "intellectuals" of H. S. Chamberlain's racist *The Nineteenth Century* (Hitler read it carefully) and A. Rosenberg's Nazi blood-race "theory" of history, a rhetorical work that he himself entitled a myth (Albeit a fascist truth), *Die Mythos der Zwanzigste Jahrhunderts*.⁴ In the vicious charge to exterminate the inferior, Nietzsche was invoked and Heidegger was recruited.

The proclamation of philosophy's death proved premature. In Great Britain, the parallel demise of Bradleyan idealism led not to the death of philosophy but to its redefinition with B. Russell and G. E. Moore as analysis. Thus analytic philosophy was born and it established the Anglo-American paradigm for philosophical inquiry. In this remarkable recovery philosophy not only continued but in its analytical and positivistic forms even enjoyed a robust life until very recently.

Now the analytic paradigm is under attack. This is particularly the case in aesthetics, but this attack is directed against the analytical, philosophical enterprise in general. It's detractors and critics are members of the neo-pragmatistic mentioned at the very beginning of this paper. Joseph Margolis attributes the "eclipse of analytic philosophy" to:

The acknowledgment of the complexities of historicism, the advocacy of ontic indeterminacies, of conceptual incommensurabilities, of divergent pluralisms, of relativistic values, the rejection of closed systems, the insistence on the symbiosis of realism and idealism, and the constructive nature of selves and world.⁵

³ From *Readings on Fascism and National Socialism*, The Swallow Press, Chicago, 1952. Reprinted in Gould, Truitt, *Political Ideologies*, MacMillan, 1973, p. 107.

⁴ *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, 1930, from *National Socialism*, a report prepared by the Division of European Affairs, US Department of State, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1943.

What is most important in the attack on analytic philosophy is that it is only part of a grand strategy to discredit the whole of philosophy. The neo-pragmatists program aims to bring about the second death of philosophy (I think unaware that philosophy survived its first death).⁶ Indeed, the criticism of philosophy advanced by the neo-pragmatists parallel those of the proto fascists and fascists that I have considered above, especially the project of discrediting reason and rejecting objectivity. Let me attempt to set out the main characteristics of the neo-pragmatist project.

The neo-pragmatists⁷ represent a rather new development in American philosophy which was well on its way by the late 1980's. I say new here in a qualified sense because they have predecessors who, working in the field of social philosophy, announced the end of ideology in the 1950s. For now let us look at the assault on philosophy as it is being orchestrated over the past several years.

The first of the post-philosophical strategy is to thoroughly discredit the mainstream western philosophical tradition, which from the Greeks to the present has been fixated on the search for truth and objectivity. According to the neo-progmatists (as I noted above they also call themselves relativists) the traditional philosopher is one who believes himself to be in touch with the nature of things, not by way of the opinions of his community or consensus of his fellows, but in a more direct way. For example, in the Enlightenment the Newtonian physical scientist became the model for truth seeking and objectivity. He was seen as one who steps outside of his community in quest for a truth that transcends the common consensus or the accepted criteria of the community. In his pursuit of objectivity, truth becomes correspondence with reality, with accompanying procedures set down for the justification of beliefs which are natural and universal, not merely local. Thus truth is attained.

It is the claim of the neo-pragmatists that this long enduring project—that of the rationalists, naturalists, positivists, materialists (in fact going all the way back to Plato) has collapsed. The leading proponent of the trend is R. Rorty who has developed an iconoclastic metaphilosophy with which he attempts to discredit all traditional

5 "The Eclipse and Recovery of Analytic Aesthetics" in R. Shusterman, *Analytic Aesthetics*, New York, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 185.

6 I will use neo-pragmatism in this paper to distinguish it clearly from the pragmatism (instrumentalism) of John Dewey which was firmly based on experimental science.

7 Best known, perhaps, are T. Kuhn, P. Feyerabend, and R. Rorty. Influential also have been the French theorists Derrida, Foucault, and Leotard.

philosophy as well as "scientific analytic philosophy".⁸ The three main objects of his criticism are (1) The Platonic doctrine concerning truth and knowledge, (2) the Cartesian doctrine of the mind, and (3) the Kantian concept of philosophy as foundational for all cultural and scientific interpretation. Rorty rejects the Platonic doctrine because it is impossible to demonstrate that truth is correspondence with nature. He dispenses with the Cartesian mind because of the claim that knowledge is an inner representation of outer reality. Such a claim is unjustified he says. He jettisons Kant because it cannot be shown independently that philosophy, as epistemology, can set universal standards of rationality and objectivity that serve as the foundations of the sciences and the arts. The attack on analytic philosophy is a by-product of his critique of the tradition in as much as analytic philosophy has appropriated the first and third elements above while transforming them linguistically.

All of this leads Rorty and his supporters to the conclusion that science and philosophy are not involved in making any truth claims because language in general is not representational and therefore truth and knowledge in science (and philosophy) are matters of social practice and approval, not representations of external reality. Accordingly science and philosophy are no more than conversation.

It seems that this trend has committed to a kind of programmatic lawlessness that is viewed by neo-pragmatic advocates as a kind of emancipation from intellectual absolutism. Their new position has been depicted as a reduction of objectivity to solidarity.⁹ Solidarity here means a contribution to the community. As we have seen, the neo-pragmatists eschew any resort to epistemological or metaphysical foundations. They view truth either as community approval or, following James, as what it is good for one to believe. There being no correspondence between beliefs and objects, traditional epistemologies must be liquidated. Thus the opponents of the neo pragmatists are charged with such crimes as epistemological realism.

The alternative neo-pragmatic epistemology includes the following claims or implications. (1) Every belief is as good as any other, (2) "True" is an equivocal term with many meanings, (3) Truth is conventionally determined by the familiar procedures of a society, a local community or a group, i.e., it is a matter of solidarity. (4) "true"

⁸ See his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton University Press, 1979, *The Consequences of Pragmatism*, University of Minnesota Press, 1982, and *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

⁹ R. Rorty, "Solidarity as Objectivity" in Michael Krausz, *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, p. 37.

is a term of commendation, and (5) The best account of a philosophical or scientific problem is an interesting story, i.e., anything goes.

Rorty challenges philosophers to cite an example in which philosophy has provided the *conceptual* foundations for anything. No one has met this challenge to the best of my knowledge.¹⁰ What Rorty has in mind here are the attempts by the ambitious unity of science movement (the logical positivists of the 1940s and 1950s) to establish conceptual foundations for the sciences, attempts which ended in embarrassing failure. Perhaps the conceptual foundations of something cannot be ascertained on a "purely" conceptual level. However, when conceptual analysis follows empirical study then surely Galileo (motion), Einstein (simultaneity) and Bohr (quantum theory) contributed heavily to the conceptual foundations of these theories. But alas, Rorty would no doubt rule them out because they are scientists, not philosophers.

Nevertheless, there are other examples that can be advanced of philosophers who have done conceptually significant work. In politics, for example, we have the works of Hobbes, Locke, and Marx which have certainly shaped the contours of the way we think and talk out government in western Europe and the United States and perhaps in the rest of the world.

In any event, what do the neo-pragmatists mean by "conceptual foundations"? If by it is meant some kind of a priori analysis divorced from empirical practice then one would have good reason to agree with Rorty. But if we want to examine the conceptual foundations of modern political institutions, or of capitalism, or of quantum theory empirically and in detail, then Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and Bohr (as a philosopher) have surely met Rorty's challenge to a very large extent by supplying the conceptual foundations for understanding these phenomena. One might prefer the term "framework" here to "foundations", but there is no significant difference as far as I can tell.

Rorty does have a better justification for attacking recent analytic philosophy than he does the longer tradition of philosophy. This is because analytic philosophy, as Margolis has noted above, in its attempt to elucidate concepts very nearly liquidated itself. This might have been detected as early as 1940 when A. J. Ayer supported a kind of phenomenism (*The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*) that was quite content to analyze the language of science minus the facts. Or

10 Jaegwon Kim, "Rorty on the Possibility of Philosophy" and Ian Kacking, "Is the End in Sight for Epistemology" have attempted an analytic rebuttle but failed. *Journal of Philosophy*, no. 10, 1980, pp 588-597 and 579-588 respectively.

in other words, philosophy, when conducted in total isolation from empirical study and practice, as analytic philosophy mostly was, is empty and uninformative and the neo-pragmatists have every right to dismiss it.

It is not news that many philosophical movements have been abortive. But that does not justify the total replacement of traditional philosophical tasks with what the neo-pragmatists propose. Their proposal would transform philosophical discourse into conversation, rhetoric, poetry, and metaphor. Post-philosophical neo pragmatism wishes to reconstitute philosophy so that it is "interesting" rather than objective rational, and realistic. Rorty writes:

This sort of philosophy does not work piece by piece, analyzing concept after concept, or testing thesis after thesis. Rather it works holistically and pragmatically, it says things like "try thinking this way"—or more specifically—"try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions by substituting the new and possibly interesting questions". It does not pretend to have a better candidate for doing the same old things which we did when we spoke in the old way. Rather it suggests that we might want to stop doing things and do something else. But it does not argue for this suggestion on the basis of antecedent criteria common to the old and new language games. For just insofar as the new language really is new, there will be no such criteria.¹¹

But this new philosophy turns out to be not entirely new. The pragmatist campaign against the tradition has seen fit to invoke the ghosts of the two philosophers who were synonymous with discrediting the tradition, i.e., Heidegger and Nietzsche. These two, it is offered, are exemplary forerunners.

In the *Origins of the Work of Art*¹² Heidegger arrives at the conclusion that what characterizes an artwork is that in it a world and an Earth are revealed, whereas ordinary things do not yield such a disclosure. According to Heidegger the field of aesthetics has been unable to rise above the bifurcation of reality into subjects and objects and the use of the worn out concepts of matter and form. Heidegger argues that we must study the Being of artworks as "thingly". If we do so we will find that artworks are unlike other things.

As a case Heidegger studies the picture of a pair of shoes by Van Gogh from which he elicits a vision of a peasant woman's world and earth and a premonition of the menace of death along with a sense of shivering. This is the kind of new interpretation that appeals to the

¹¹ *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989, p. 9.

¹² *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, Stuttgart, Deutschland, Reclam, 1960.

neo-pragmatic-post modernists because it is a kind of uncovering of invisible things that stand behind things. Something is revealed that nobody might have imagined to be there. By the process of uncovering we are treated to a whole range of interesting metaphoric analogies. Disclosures such as this are, of course, beyond the scope of analytic aesthetics, realist aesthetics, indeed beyond the scope of any form of scientific cognition or disciplined philosophical methodology. But they are said to be more interesting.

Nietzsche is also called upon as a pre-post modernist, because of the fragmentary character of his writings which are like the letters of a traveler: dispersive communications from different times and places.¹³ Anticipating contemporary post modernists Nietzsche maintains that our awareness of self and world are mediated by tests and narratives (artworks) and that no single narrative or depiction is true. Often his writings are rhetorical "ravings". His intention is to reveal the interestingly unobvious and his arguments are designed to oppose and discredit the traditional literary and aesthetic values of coherence, closure, and organic unity. Thus Nietzsche rejects the concepts of an integrated life and a coherent subject along with the idea of a central organizing principle. As noted earlier, these are among the leading themes of neo-pragmatists.

Even though the privileged position of the philosopher can be traced all the way back to Plato, the epistemological turn that led to the alleged, current "crisis" began when Descartes, the empiricist's and Kant propounded the view that a central task of philosophy was to assess knowledge claims outside of philosophy. In the 20th century analytic philosophy took over this task in which philosophy became the arbiter of culture. This philosophy was supposed to determine what genuine knowledge is in art, morality, religion and the natural and social sciences. Today most "formerly" analytic philosophers agree that such a self conception of philosophy cannot be sustained. It is now realized that there is no way to establish an indubitable foundation for knowledge.¹⁴

13 See G. Shapiro, *Nietzschean Narratives*, Indiana University Press, 1989, and W. Truitt "Neo-Pragmatism and the New Aesthetic", in *Festschrift in Honor of Robert S. Cohen*, M. Wartofsky, ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, forthcoming.

14 See, for example, N. Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking*, Hackett, Indianapolis, IN, 1978; H. Putnam, "Why Reason Can't be Naturalized", pp. 222-244; *After Philosophy*, Kenneth Baynes, ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, 1987; H. Putnam, *The Many Faces of Realism*, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1987; Charles Taylor "Overcoming Epistemology", *After Philosophy*, pp. 464-488.

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Can the more or less traditional way of doing philosophy be rescued from this attack? Not entirely, but there are a number of ways we can defend the foundational character of philosophy if we are willing to give up the view that philosophy is purely conceptual, i.e., analytic.

As a first step, philosophy must understand its own history, especially its recent history, thus avoiding a repetition of past failures and foibles. In so doing we must try to see philosophical problems in the way that the philosophers we study saw them. For example, with Aristotle the setting of foundations for ethics was unproblematic because of the historical situation and his empirical approach. He tells us that the best way to establish ethical criteria or foundations is to study the behavior of docile, teachable, trainable, habit forming animals, i.e., ourselves. This study must be confined to the polis, the Greek city state, because only such a state possesses the civilizing institutions and practices necessary to instruct its citizens in morality. Here we see that it is very difficult to distinguish ethics from politics in Aristotle's philosophy. In fact, Aristotle did not create a discipline that he called 'ethics', this was a post-Aristotelian invention. What is at work throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics* is politics, or political considerations. For him, politics meant the art and science of the polis or of an autonomous city. Politics ceases to exist when the polis ceases to exist. This means that the modern discipline that comes closest to Aristotle's conception of politics, but still only remotely, would be the moral philosophy of the eighteenth century that included indisprudence and political economy. Aristotle's politics was both more general and more specific than ours today. Its more general aspect was that it treated all social institutions as well as ethical issues. It was more specific in that it confined itself exclusively to the polis. When Aristotle said that man is a political animal (*zoon politikon*), he meant that he is an animal that becomes humanized in the polis. For he felt that nations and empires were too large to enhance humanization; they diminish it. And finally, the transition at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not from ethics to politics, but within politics itself. It is simply a shift from considering political principles to a discussion of political constitutions, laws, educational and other institutions.

The main point here is that in a community in which the members have common values and shared convictions (the Greek polis) it is not difficult to arrive at foundations for ethics. Thus for Aristotle moral choices are not personal. They are the result careful political training and are an essential aspect of social cooperation and cohesion. Ethics, then, for Aristotle, is everybody's business. A personal or private morality is unthinkable.

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What does this account of Aristotle's ethics tell us? The answer is that neo-pragmatist, anti-foundationalism is right and wrong. It is right in suggesting that the consensus of the community is an important part of establishing what is moral (in the case of ethics). It is wrong in denying that moral criteria established in this way lack foundational status. There is a reason for this. In Aristotle's time and place moral criteria were, indeed, foundational. Today they cannot be. And the reason that ethics today is foundationless goes back to Kant. The notoriously formal and empty nature of moral judgment in Kant is a consequence of social changes or changes in social relations that are taken for granted by ethicists in such a way that moral questions no longer have the same meaning that they had traditionally and such questions even, at times, become unintelligible: In pre-capitalist society, the question of what one ought to do was largely determined by a person's location within the social structure. Normative requirements were self-evident and were linked organically with convention. Thus moral discourse came easily and was generally unproblematic, e.g., Aristotle unhesitatingly stated that all men agree upon the nature of the good. In most of the Classical Period and in the Middle Ages, certain obligations, duties, privileges, and responsibilities were essentially functions of the constitution or structure of society so that there is a unity between purely sociological descriptions of what was and prescriptions about what a member of society ought to do.

But with the development of capitalism, there also develops a reification of fact (the empiricist tradition) which stood as an obstacle to the possibility of ethics and as the main challenge that the Kantian morality attempted to overcome. With empiricism we have a reconstruction of the individual self as transcendently prior to any particular set of social relations. These 'atomic' individual selves become ontologically prior to the social structures they inhabit (J. S. Mill's notorious decontextualized individuals). In this ideological transition, the politically and cognitively based ethics of pre-capitalist societies is refuted and the discipline of ethics enters into a period of crisis. What one ought to do could no longer be inferred from what or who one was in terms of one's place in society. There was no longer any way of describing what people actually were that might have pointed to what they could become, or what they could not become.

In this situation ethical terms began to float free from cognitive analysis (non-cognitivism) and this led to the various forms of intuitionism, finalism and moral sense theories. In Kant, for example, this problem was resolved tautologically in the form, if one can give no cognitive or social answer to the question why be moral, then vir-

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tuous behavior is an end in itself: one ought to be moral because it is moral to be moral! (One ought to do one's duty because it is one's duty.) Or, alternatively, as above, the ethical sphere, separated from its political and cognitive roots, falls into the fuzzy and uncertain dimension of the sensibilities. As Hume said in the *Treatise on Human Nature*, morality is more properly felt than judged of. This constitutes a shrinkage of, and a highly specialized relocation of, ethics and ethical discourse. Ethics becomes autonomous but at the same time shapeless and enigmatic. The result was that moral questions became privatized and where translated into issues concerning pleasure, fulfillment, and self-realization. Or, in accordance with a dialectical principle, ethics floated off into a self-grounded, tautologous, formal or abstract sphere bearing no relation to cognitive inquiry...as a function of what Kant called 'practical reason' in contrast to 'pure reason', i.e., cognition.¹⁵

As philosophy became hyperconceptual the possibility of its being able to provide criteria for determining truth claims, ethical criteria or anything else diminished or, as in ethics, completely disappeared. But this does not mean that foundational inquiry cannot be usefully undertaken.

Secondly, a reform of philosophy is needed. It will be a reform in which informed narrative replaces narrow conceptual analysis. This narrative will be consistent with the human and natural sciences. Specifically, philosophical narrative will be relative to the scientific knowledge it appropriates, but at the same time it will be objective in the construction social theories because of its empirical basis of inquiry and interpretation. Such theories about our social world and how we function in it are not, as the neo-pragmatist would have it, simply a matter of subjective preference or who can tell the most interesting story. We are able to give a broadly scientific account of human nature—we are social animals—and to a large extent we possess knowledge from the sciences that will facilitate a critical understanding of which social institutions and practices enhance humanity and which diminish it. This is so even if we cannot recover the shared convictions and values of past epochs. In other words, it is possible to advance justifications for moral reasoning or the critique of social institutions and practices. Such justifications cannot be launched from a universal or disinterested standpoint—this was the fatal mistake of ethics after Kant. Our narrative will have an empirical foundation. As K. Nielsen has pointed out.

"We cannot take the point of view from nowhere or see ourselves as purely rational, noumenal beings with no local attachments or enculturations. Such Kantianism, as Hegel saw, affords of no foundation of morals. If we self-consciously seek to place ourselves vis-a-vis our considered moral convictions and our overall moral and intellectual views in the perspective of some radically different time and place, we will fail; Whether we like it or not, we are children of modernity and are deeply affected by its conditioning and the domi-

¹⁵ Kai Nielsen, *After the Demise of the Tradition*, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991, p. 200.

nant consensus in the considered convictions of modernity. (Even Islamic fundamentalists extensively educated in the West are not free of it. In certain key respects their reaction is more like the Counter-Enlightenment reaction of the German romantics to the Enlightenment.) It is true, looking at the Western industrial or (as some say) postindustrial world, that this is a matter of degree. Some strata and subcultures of society are more influenced than others by modernity, but the point is that all are deeply influenced by modernity. And as the demystification of the world runs space; we are becoming increasingly and more pervasively so influenced. Postmodernist reactions to modernity are themselves a kind of carrying through of modernity and not at all a return to premodernity."¹⁶

In conclusion, I am afraid that Terry Eagleton may have been right when he wrote that "Somewhere in the later nineteenth century, the capitalist system found itself confronted by an awkward choice. Either it could continue to try to justify its activities by an appeal to metaphysical foundations, or it could simply abandon this whole project as a bad job...nineteenth century bourgeois society was offered by Friedrich Nietzsche an alluring way out; don't bother trying to justify your practices at all. Forget about God; truth, morality, History, the state: let your activities become their own splendid, self-grounding justification, as marvelously self-born and self generative as the work of art. It was, in fact, an aestheticising solution, and present day American salespersons for the death of meta-narrative and the collapse of ultimate legitimations are its aestheticising inheritors. Bourgeois society, however, was prudent enough to reject Nietzsche's audacious suggestion, and continues to do so today; it is canny enough to appreciate that without some perfunctory talk of God, Freedom and this Great Country of Ours, the marketplace is going to look rather like a shaky, discreditable answer to the Meaning of Life. The seductive dream of throwing up the business of justification altogether, however, never quite receded, and in the midst of a sharp rightward-turn of the capitalist system is now once more back on the theoretical agenda".¹⁷

Certainly one must ask oneself is it possible that this is the unconscious (?) direction of the neo-pragmatist movement? At best we can say that such a philosophy has positioned itself in such a way that criticising injustice will be difficult if not impossible.

- 16 See my discussion of this development in "Partisanship, Universalism and the Dialectics of Moral Consciousness", *Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice*, pp. 543-550, C. C. Gould and R. S. Cohen (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1994.
- 17 Terry Eagleton, "Defending the Free World", in *Socialist Register* 1990, *The Retreat of the Intellectuals*, Ralph Miliband, ed., Merlin Press, London, 1990, p. 62.

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*Who is Mad ?**Amarendra Mishra*

In the year 1952 I was a student of final year in Patna Medical College. We Visited Mental hospital located at Ranchi district in a place named Kanka. We were there for fifteen days to study about mental diseases. At that time this institution was famous as lunatic asylum in India for treatment and rehabilitation of lunatics. Dr. Hashib was superintendent and senior most physician of that hospital. Besides being a specialist in mental diseases he was noted for his knowledge of psychology and philosophy.

Here I have described two lunatics who had some specialities. One of them considered himself as a king. He had unaccountable wealth. Any person whom he used to catch had to go round the entire area of that mental hospital as his guest. During tour he was narrating his might as follows—"At this place my stable for horses is situated, this is the place for elephants, this is my treasury. I have a dozen ministers, hundreds of officers and innumerable soldiers". When he liked he used to pick-up some soil from the ground and put it into the pocket of his guest, saying that he has filled his pocket with gold. We enjoyed his narration of imaginary kingdom, wealth, charity and hospitality. All officers, workers and patients of that hospital were his subjects. He was full conscious of the well-being of them. From morning till evening he roamed in the area of hospital inspecting his subjects. He helped one of them by snatching bucket from his hand and watering plants himself. He helped other one by putting load on his head from the ground. He used to grind spices in the kitchen and knead flour. In this way he was passing his day by helping his subjects. He was taking same kind of meal with his subjects and used to have sound sleep with them in hospital barrack.

Dr. Hashib told us—"Maharaja belongs to a middle class family. Each month this institution receives requisit money from his family for his care. He is in this hospital since six years and none of his

family members has any interest in him. He is suffering from Paranoia, he has fixed hallucination of grandeur."

Another lunatic belonged to a rich family. He was learned and had a degree of Bar at-Law. He was about fifty years of age. He was in that asylum since eight years. He had a separate room for himself. A considerable amount of money was being sent by his family for his good look after. He always remained grave and silent with his eyes fixed to the ground. He some times used to speak only one word "Babarum". No body had listened any other word from his mouth. What he meant from Babarum no one could guess. He was an early riser. He used to perform his morning routine earliest and was ready for his duty at hospital. He helped the doctors as per their instructions. He arranged bed for patients. If any patient was in agony he nursed him by massage so that he could get relief of his pain. Some insane were receiving convulsion therapy by controlled electric shock. He never went to the place of torture but when the patient was brought in the ward after shock Mr. Babarum used to nurse him by gentle massage for hours till that patient came in normal state. These services were rendered by his own will without any body's suggestion. What ever was given in his meals he ate and had a sound sleep at night.

Dr. Hashib told us that—"He is suffering from Manic depressive Psycosis. He always does good to others but remains depressed and silent. When Dr. Hashib was telling about this case suddenly Maharaja appeared and remarked—"This Dr. Hashib is himself mad that he is treating Mr. Babarum as lunatic". We burst into laughter, but Dr. Hashib became very grave and his face was full of pity. Looking at him we suddenly became quiet. Now I can understand that Dr. Hashib had realised the truth of Maharaja as he was a learned philosopher.

In the year 1955 I was posted as Medical officer in a small village hospital in the district of south Bastar in Madhya Pradesh. In that hospital I met Gober Ganesh who was fifty years of age at that time. He was considered whimsical, idiot and arrogant by people. At the age of twenty he was named by an aged physician as Gober Ganesh (named as god of wisdom but made of Cow-dung). From that time he was called as Gober Ganesh but villagers gave him a short name Gober. He was born at hospital. His mother left him at hospital and went away leaving him alone when he was seven days old. He was brought up by hospital staff. He considered that hospital was his home.

He never listened any body's instructions. He always acted as per his wishes. When people realised that his actions are always in

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good directions and he never did wrong to any one they stopped giving instructions. He liked only simple food from hospital staff. He preferred to remain hungry than to take delicious and spicy food. Hospital staff knew his liking and he was always getting simple food. He was getting simple clothing from Medical officer. He never touched money through out his life. In the beginning people wanted to pay him for his services but he always refused knowing his feeling they stopped offering any thing to him.

He was sleeping in the hospital. He woke up one hour before sun rise and began to clean the hospital premises. That hospital used to remain so neat and clean that I have not seen any hospital like that up till now. After that he used to sit on the green lawn in the morning sun in front of the hospital. Poor naked children of one to two years gathered round him to play who were residing near by. Some one pulled his hair, some scratched, one of them embraced and kissed him, another naughty one gave him a gentle slap and then ran to a distance and laughed in enjoyment. During this period he was absolutely quiet and grave without any reaction. Children used to play for half an hour entirely as their liking without any hindrance and fear. Then he again worked in the hospital and helped hospital staff in their duty. He was sweeper, ward boy, nurse and compounder every thing of that four-bedded indoor ward. He always nursed indoor patients with devotion. If he knew about any serious case in the village he used to go in his home for nursing but he never went to any body's home on any one's request. He always decided himself that in whose house he should go for nursing. In this way he passed his fifty years in his desireless duty.

In the year 1986 I was joint Director of Health services in Madhya Pradesh and looking after family welfare programme. I went to that village again on official tour. On enquiry I came to know that when Gobar Ganesh reached the age of sixty, one morning he was sitting on the lawn while children were playing with him, suddenly he rolled down on the ground and never woke up again. He had heart arrest and he went into eternal sleep.

This is a recent incident. My son is working as lecturer in Physiology in Medical College Jabalpur. He is also in charge of electroencephalograph for taking tracing of brain. A case referred by mental specialist was brought by his wife for electroencephalogram. The behaviour of her husband was not normal with her and with family. The incidence began like this—When her husband received his first salary he came back to his home distributing the entire money on the way to different persons. He had nothing to give to his wife. He did

not know what he had done. He works in his office with interest and every one is pleased for his devotion to work. With the request of his wife now his salary is given directly to her. Husband has no objection. The defect in her husband is that he has no interest in life, he always remains grave, takes no interest in wife, children and home affairs. Children play with him but he shows no reaction. He is always calm, quiet and gentle. He is regular for his office and after office hours straight comes back to home. He takes normal meals and always has sound sleep. Tears came into the eyes of his wife—"How one can live such a dry life with him where there is no charm, no humour and no love making". Tracing of the brain was normal.

In Bhagwat Gita and Vedanta methods have been described for getting permanent liberation from birth which is called Moksha. The Yogi must have a state of Sthita-Prajna i.e. permanent stability of mind or he should be a Trigunatiet i.e. beyond all qualities or he should be a Karma-yogi i.e. perfection in desireless beneficial actions for others. He can be a karma-yogi remaining with the society or become Sanyasi by yoga and samadhi in a lonely place. If he remains continuously in this state through out life he will get liberation after death and will not be born again. It is also described that the desire to get Moksha is a hindrance for liberation. Then how one can get Moksha.

A Siddha Karma-yogi or Sanyasi always works for the benefit of others without desire still there must be some reaction of his good work on his consciousness. How he can prevent the praise of people not to be impressed on his soul? It is not possible to become Trigunatiet for a yogi of sound mind. To become Trigunatiet one must have abnormal Buddhi (Mental ability) with Mati-bharama (hallucination). Such person is called insane by the world.

The only difference between our Maharaja and Maharaja Janaka is that the former had nothing though for him he possessed every thing. Later had every thing but for him there were nothing. Both were Videha (whose actions are not related to body). Gold and soil were equal for them. Both were always devoted to the service of their subjects. They did not know why and for whom they were doing all these work.

Mr. Babarum had the sign of desireless Sthita-Prajna yogi. He also did not know that why and to whom he was serving.

Gober Ganesh was a true karma-yogi. From birth till death he gave only happiness to others but did not receive any thing from them. He also did not know that why and for whom he was doing all these.

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The husband who is living with his family and agrieved wife has sign of Trigunatēet. He is beyond Satya, Raja and Tama gunas. He works for his family and from his salary they are being provided and protected. But he is always disinterested in worldly affairs. He also does not know why and what he is doing.

In Gita Sri Krishna has said "Who is inquisitive to know me become my devotee and if he has a mind to surrender every thing to me then it becomes my responsibility to look after his well-being. In every birth being devoted to me his actions are good. When ever he follows wrong path, he gets a blow, he is grieved then he understands the cause of pain and again follows right path. In this way he gets refined in every life and ultimately after several births he get entitlement for Moksha".

Only such person gets Moksha who work only for the benefit of others without knowing that when, why and for whom he is working. This is only possible when he gets such a state by grace of God in which his Buddhi and Mana i.e. his mental ability and consciousness have no relation with his actions. Such type of person is called insane in this world.

Four Innatics discribed above who have been neglected by the family, society and from the world are dearest to the supreme cnntroller who is hanging the entire Universe in space and makes them dance round and round eternally. He has helped them to climb on the last step of the stair case of birth after birth and ready to absorb them in himself. This is my view.

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Psychological Contributions in Indian Trend

J. P. Atreya,

Psychology is occupying the key position in the sphere of education. It is one of the richest subject in contents and its application. It has grown as an independent discipline in recent past and acquiring knowledge through scientific methods and is developing on the scientific lines. In spite of acquiring too much knowledge in several areas still the knowledge is limited and partial. In fact it is quite impossible to acquire complete knowledge of the mind on the basis of sense organs. The greatest folly of Western Psychology is the denial of mind and soul and is limited to the conscious and unconscious mind only. Freud and his associates tell us that all our actions and activities are governed by libido. Indian psychology does agree that there are several instinctive tendencies which are at work, but they do not agree that it is only libido.

In India we have plenty of Literature from ancient to modern times which is full of psychological material on the basic problems of psychology. In order to acquire a complete knowledge of the mind and soul Indian psychology applies various methods such as intuition, observation and experimental methods, like many other sciences Yoga employs experimental methods.

Indian psychology is beyond materialism and believes in spiritualism and in addition study other conscious phenomena- such as purusha, Atma and Ishwara. Due to this aspect of India psychology it is much other than modern Western Psychology. Indian Psychology studies the mind in all its aspects and had acquired practical knowledge.

Practice of Yoga is for the attainment for the realization of self, methods of Yoga activity and experimentation. Yoga Manovigyan tells us that the powers of mind are so extra ordinary which tell that we can have knowledge without sense organs. The knowledge of past, present and future come under the mind's jurisdiction. Yoga tells us about cognitive, conative and affective dispositions (Sanskaras). These dispositions can also be of past lives.

There are several such occurrences which are beyond sensation, time and place. Indian psychologists take them to be two different experiences - (1) sensory perception (2) Extra sensory perception. All schools of Indian Philosophy except Charvakas and Mimamsakas believe in the phenomena of extra sensory-perception.

Patanjali Yoga affirms that due to constant practice of attention man can attain samadhi and can acquire knowledge of extra-sensory-perception by Yoga practice. We can attain several supernormal powers. These powers are known as siddhies.

According to Jain school Atma in itself is of infinite knowledge. There is no liberation of time and place, past present and future, near and far, all are same.

Vadanta system has always been aware of the super conscious experiences and super normal powers of man. It aims at understanding all the aspects of human personality and to bring a unity, harmony and integration in human life in its theoretical and applied forms which is called Yoga. It lays great emphasis on the Higher Self of man called the Atman or Brahman.

Indian psychology believes in the four states of Chitta-Jagrat (Waking Swapna (dream), Sushuptid and Turya in order to study the mind as a whole. The Vedantists and the Yogis in India did develop systematic methods of self awareness and self realisation. The Astanga Yoga of Patanjali aims at this kind of swaroopavasthiti-existence in its own nature.

It is one of the characteristics of Indian thought that it thinks of reality as a whole. According to this cosmic attitude towards Reality every thing is a symbol and a part of the whole.

Our ordinary psychological approach to experience consists in observing the facts of experience and then systematising and trying to explain them. The yogic approach is normative and practical. It seeks to take forward our experience to progressively higher and higher forms of synthesis and integration. In its attempts to do so, it discovers a plane and a form of consciousness characteristically different from our general mental consciousness. This new consciousness is found to be marked by the qualities of depth, spontaneity and wholeness.

The self-poised consciousness of the Gita too virtually presents a state of consciousness higher than the mental and a full appreciation of the character of this consciousness can give a perspective which will enable us to see the vast and the varied data of contemporary psychology in a new light.

Shri Aurbindo's significant contribution to human psychology the extension of human consciousness upwards. His contribution has been to bring the concept of Transcendent and the Divine.

Indian culture has a strong strain of psychology in it. Ideas of growth, evolution, individual variation, levels of development, personal faith and worship, toleration and understanding for other's faith and ways of life, various pursuits of perfection and liberation are all grounded in the psychological conditions of life of the individual and society. The ideas of Reincarnation, of the classes and castes in society, the Varnas or the four ashrams or stages or divisions of life are founded on profound psychological insights and actual experiences. The growth of the soul, the spiritual fact of life, is the real thing and our ordinary mental, moral and aesthetic growth and its experiences are contributory factors to this basic growth. This basic growth needs long stretches of time, which can only be possible through repeated incarnations.

The Bhagvadgita itself is a great work where we find the glimpses of psychology. Many of these concepts have nearness with the twentieth century Humanistic Psychology. Shri Krishna tell Arjun and explains to him the basic tenets of Humanistic psychology - such as - what man is ? What man become and what his status in the universe is ? In chapter XVII & XVIII Shri Krishna classifies man his feelings, emotions and beliefs into three grades of purity, namely, Sattvika, Rajasika and Tamsika (Pure and Moral, aggressive and ambitious and ignorant and immoral).

Psychological terms occur in the Vedas, the Upanishads and Purans. Manas, Manisa, aham and cit occur in Rig Veda. The Upanishads provide a long list of such terms as sattav, rajas and tamas - the cognitive the affective and the cenative phases of human mind, cetav and caitanya (consciousness) ahankara (self consciousness); Prajna (Intelligence); Jnana Bhakti and Karma (Knowledge, devotion and action); Jagrat, swapna and sushupti (the waking, dream and deep sleep state) and turiya (literally the fourth pure consciousness or transcendental state).

In the literary work of sant Tulsidas we find plenty of psychological terms. Tulsidas speaks of a few instincts common to all men as - lust, anger, pride, greed, fear, hunger and thirst. The Vedas have mentioned some motives of human life, namely longevity, strength and progress and fame etc. Human instincts and desires, as the modern psychologist believes, are either expressed or repressed or else modified. The ancient sages of India have recognised the value of restricted expression of crude emotion on certain occasions, mental diseases can be unrooted if rightly treated, and treatment has a negative and positive method. A patient requires a good preceptor sadguru for a physician to treat a malady; and confidence in the tenets of the vedas for a prescriptions; devotion to God for the life restoring drug; and full faith and intelligence for accompaniments to the medicine. The company of the good (Satsang) leads to happiness and can serve as amusement to the patient.

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We also find plenty of psychology discussed at length in sankhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Bhagvat, Buddhism, Jainism, Vaiseshika, Nyaya, Mimamsa Yogavasistha, Religious literature and Indian culture. The Atharva Veda is full of Aurvedic treatise which are very valuable from the psychotherapeutic point of view. Indian psychotherapy commands a large variety of methods, many of which can be useful additions for the scientific mental therapy. By Yoga training an individual in physical, mental, moral and spiritual culture contributes greatly to the building of human personality.

It is really very unfortunate that inspite of rich material in psychology it has not been given proper place in the realm of Psychology. The future Indian Psychology should not try to live apart from the psychology developed in the West, called modern psychology. It should come in greater and greater contact with modern psychology, adopt some of its methods, and imbibe most of all its well-tested discoveries. It should bring to light all that is unique and true in Indian psychological literature and present to the world in the language of today, so that in course of time all its truths may be absorbed by modern psychology. In the long run the Western and Indian psychologies should merge together in what should be called Modern psychology, acceptable to all countries of the world.

Indian psychology of the future should have two aspects. One theoretical and speculative, in which the nature and powers of the mind, the realisations of Mind to other things in nature, and interrelationships of individual minds, should be discussed on purely empirical and introspective grounds; the other, a purely empirical and experimental psychology in which the various mental processes, activities and functions should be carefully and minutely observed, recorded and described and understood in relation to each other. We should further make experimental practices of the various yogic disciplines to test and verify or even to reject the belief that these practices bring super powers of knowledge and action. The world greatly needs those tests and experiments. Yoga and prayog (Experiment) must come together to create a new Indian psychology which should go hand in hand with modern Western psychology.

Many such facts which we found in the literature of Indian Psychology should be corroborated by the Yoga system of thought. We should develop a scientific attitude and accept those facts which cannot be discarded.

2

Exploring Consciousness: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues

K. Ramakrishna Rao

The first and foremost fact about consciousness is that it is complex. The variety of attempts to describe and explain it reminds us of the legendary blind men seeking to describe an elephant. The only common ground that seems to cover most connotations of consciousness is that it is somehow connected with our awareness. The notion that consciousness and awareness are synonymous is consistent with common-sense usage as well as dictionary definitions. We know, however, there is meaningful mentation below the threshold of overt awareness to which consciousness can be appropriately attributed. William James spoke about a *fringe* as well as a *focus* of consciousness. One's attention may be focussed on a center and around a theme, but there is also a vast surround of impressions and sensations at the periphery. The *fringe* is the floating backdrop of those images that are the focus of attention. "The significance, the value, of the image," as James sees it, "is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it" (1900, p. 166).

Consciousness and the Unconscious

Since the advent of Freudian psychoanalysis, the view expounded by the British philosopher, John Locke, that the mind is essentially transparent and nothing is hidden from it, has few adherents. Freud (1915) has shown how complex thought processes can occur without awareness and how one's unconscious may contain beliefs, desires, and feelings of which he/she is unaware. The unconscious is not the negation of consciousness. It refers to mental phenomena that are not readily accessible to introspection.

If psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on unconscious processes, showed that the unconscious is more than the absence of introspective awareness, which has a domain of its own, C.G. Jung had gone further to blunt the distinction

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between consciousness and the unconscious. The unconscious, according to Jung, is not the dung heap of repressed thoughts and infantile sexual fantasies that Freud described; rather it is the consummate source of our collectivity and creativity. The collective unconscious is "an image of the world which has taken aeons of form....[It] consists of the sum of instincts and their correlates, the archetypes. Just as everybody possesses instincts, so he also possesses a stock of archetypal images" (Jung, 1919/1954, p. 138). In his later years, Jung was led beyond archetypal images to the concept of the archetype-as-such and the psychoid level of the unconscious. The archetype-as-such, a transpsychic concept, is an a priori ordering principle by virtue of which we experience synchronistic events that suggest an "acausal orderedness." This advance in Jung's thinking from subjectively experienced archetypal image to archetype as an a priori ordering principle obscured his earlier distinction between consciousness and the unconscious (Frey-Rohn, 1974/1990). Consciousness was originally associated with a certain degree of brightness and luminosity. Jung increasingly saw that this luminosity is not limited to what is called consciousness but is also to be found in some of the unconscious contents. Jung thus came to the "paradoxical conclusion that there is no conscious content which is not in some other aspect unconscious" (1919/1954, p. 185)

Implicit Memory and Subliminal Perception

There is yet another twist to the conscious-unconscious dichotomy. Recent advances in cognitive psychology suggest that complex mental activity including our ability to acquire, store, and retrieve information is carried out by operations that primarily unconscious in that they are inaccessible to introspection. Max Velmans (1991) has reviewed evidence suggesting that consciousness in the sense of being introspectively aware does not enter into the processing of information at any level, including the organization of complex activity that requires planning, reflection, or creativity. Thus, much of mental activity seems to go on without awareness, which is traditionally regarded as an essential aspect of mind.

The studies of "blindsight" and "memory without awareness" also show the contradictions involved in the conscious-unconscious dichotomy. Blindsight is the capacity among those with a damaged visual cortex to discriminate and respond to visual stimuli without being aware of them. Weiskrantz (1986) carried out a series of tests with a subject whose right visual cortex had been removed. As one would expect, the subject reported that he saw nothing when the stimuli were presented to his left hemifield. However, when he was asked to guess whether the stimulus was *x* or *o*, the subject guessed correctly in 27 of 30 trials, thus suggesting that he perceived the stimuli at some level.

It is known that damage to certain midline structures in the brain can lead to serious amnesia in humans so that they were unable to remember their

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experience beyond a few seconds. Such an amnesia patient who just solved a jigsaw puzzle is typically unable to remember how he did it; but if he is asked to solve the same puzzle the next day he will solve it faster, which suggests that though unaware of it, he was able to retain his previous learning of the puzzle. There is substantial evidence for such phenomena of "implicit memory" from a number of other studies (see Schacter, 1987; Kihlstrom & Schacter, 1990).

Implicit awareness as implied in blindsight and implicit memory is not limited to cases where there are cortical defects. Similar phenomena occur even when one's brain structures are intact. For example, positive and negative hallucinations, perceptual distortions and analgesia that occur under hypnotic suggestion (Hilgard, 1986) are analogous to the phenomena of blindsight in suggesting some kind of dissociation between reported subjective experience and observed physiological response.

Recent research in the area of subliminal perception has produced some interesting results. There is impressive evidence that stimuli present at low energy levels, or in masked forms so that they cannot be recalled, recognized, or discriminated from other similarly presented stimuli, can nevertheless produce detectable cognitive, affective, or other behavioral effects. For example, subliminal (4 ms) exposure to the message "Mommy and I are one" is shown to have beneficial effects on those undergoing psychotherapy (Silverman & Weinberger, 1985). What is even more interesting is that the effects obtained under subliminal conditions were greater than those obtained when the subjects reported seeing the stimulus message (Bornstein, 1989). In a study by Spence and Holland (1962), the subjects were presented with a list of 20 words to memorize. Ten words had remote associations with the word cheese; whereas the rest were neutral. One group of subjects were presented the word *cheese* subliminally; another group saw the word supraliminally. The third group was exposed to a blank. The results showed that the subliminal presentation group recalled more words associated with cheese than did the subjects in the group who actually saw the word or those in the blank group. (For a scholarly assessment of the state of the art in subliminal research see Bornstein and Pittman, 1992).

ESP and Implicit Awareness

The discussion of consciousness gets further complicated when we consider psi phenomena. there is substantial evidence for the existence of extrasensory perception (ESP) and psychokinesis (PK) that cannot be explained away by any plausible conventional explanation (Rao & Palmer, 1987). These anomalies suggest that awareness need not be limited to sensorial awareness which is generally the case in our ordinary perceptual experience. ESP is awareness beyond the sensory. It is for this reason J.B. Rhine (1953), a pioneer in laboratory based psi research, felt that psi is "really" and "irrecoverably"

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unconscious. By unconscious Rhine meant that which is beyond sensory awareness. Again, it is for the same reason his wife L.E. Rhine (1961, 1965), who accumulated and analyzed the largest extant collection of spontaneous psychic experiences, thought it necessary to subscribe to the theory of two-stage psi process where the unconscious psi inputs get converted into experiential outputs with the help of such mediating vehicles as dreams, hallucinations and intuitions.

There are interesting parallels between ESP and subliminal perception (Dixon, 1979) which encourage us to consider that they are two species of implicit awareness. One may, however, point to an important difference between an ESP target and a subliminal perception stimulus. The latter is considered to be in sensory contact with the subject even though at too low an intensity level to cause explicit awareness, whereas the subject in ESP tests is presumed to be completely isolated from the target with no possibility of any sensory contact whatsoever. This difference may indeed be crucial if the subliminal target is in fact in sensory contact with the subject whereas the ESP subject is in complete isolation from the target. Such assumptions, however, are by no means obvious. In what respect does an ESP card concealed in an opaque envelope differ from a masked stimulus the subject is unable to recall, recognize, or discriminate from other similarly masked stimuli? Is it not possible that some energy, perhaps too weak to be detected with current instrumentation, is also involved in ESP function? Again, it is difficult to conceive that a subliminal stimulus presented at or below objective threshold, where the information is actually discriminated at no better than chance levels (Cheisman & Merikle, 1985), is in any kind of sensory contact with the subject. In subliminal perception, sensory contact is inferred from the observed behavior of the subject because it is assumed that such a contact is necessary. In ESP, however, though similar behavior is observed, no sensory contact is inferred because it is not believed to be necessary. In neither case do we have a clear understanding of the process by which the subliminal stimulus or the ESP target causes these behavioral effects from which we infer subliminal or extrasensory perception.

Even granting that there is sensory contact between the subject and the subliminal stimulus, we are left with the problem of explaining how such contact, that causes no explicit awareness, has an influence on the behavior of the subject. It is clear that subliminal perception, like ESP, presumes some kind of dissociation between sensory inputs and awareness. Therefore, the question of how the implicit becomes explicit awareness needs to be answered in subliminal as well as ESP research.

Consciousness-As-Such

Inasmuch as consciousness is presumed in all mental phenomena whether they are manifest in explicit awareness or remain implicit identifications.

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of consciousness exclusively with explicit thought, action and passion is unwarranted. Consciousness as mere introspective awareness appears to be no more than a mere quality imposed on certain contents of experience. That quality may indeed be no more than the outcome of certain cortical processes, such as focal attention, because their destruction leads to loss of such awareness. The existence of subliminal mentation and psi makes it necessary to postulate that consciousness is something more than focal-attentive awareness, that it underlies the explicit as well as implicit awareness, and that implicit awareness need not be sensory.

Awareness, whether implicit or explicit, means two sorts of things. First awareness refers to a state of being, for example, when we speak of states or degrees of consciousness. In this sense consciousness is a subject or function rather than a predicate of something in that it refers to itself rather than the phenomena which it reveals. Second, by consciousness we mean also awareness of this or awareness that such-and-such is the case. In this sense consciousness is always predicated of something and refers to phenomena of experience. Thus, there are phenomenal as well as subjective aspects of consciousness which should be reflected in any adequate understanding of consciousness.

The attempts to grant reality and causal efficacy to conscious/mental phenomena and yet regard them as manifestations of brain activity (Searle, 1983; Sperry, 1976) are based on false analogies. It is difficult to conceive how the complex organization of neural processes gives us mental phenomena which enjoy primacy and autonomy as causal determinants and are considered to be qualitatively different from physical phenomena. There is no good sense in which we could affirm genuine human freedom and responsibility without conceiving our minds as capable of self-determination.

Current formulations to account for mental phenomena in essentially reductionistic terms deal almost exclusively with phenomenal awareness. But when once we grant primacy and autonomy to consciousness which seems to be necessary to account for subjectivity of our experience, the volitional freedom we believe that we have and the reality of the so-called anomalous phenomena like ESP, we are inexorably driven to a notion of consciousness-as-such. Descartes' noncorporeal mind, Kant's noumenal self, Bergson's pure memory, Myers' subliminal self, Husserl's transcendental ego and even Sartre's nothingness in their own way seem to point to consciousness-as-such signifying a nonlocal aspect of our being.

The cerebral processes accompanying a conscious experience may describe a state of the brain. They, however, are not the same as, and in fact are qualitatively different from, the experience itself. For example, the "raw" experience of pain can not be translated into neurobiological processes without losing something very basic in the subjective experience of pain. My thoughts

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and experiences are subjective in that there is, in the words of William James, "a warmth and intimacy about them". That warmth and intimacy are the abiding characteristics of subjectivity and consciousness -- characteristics that we do not attribute to machines.

Again, a person may behave in many ways like a machine. Yet, one can function also as an autonomous being, exercising free-will and self-determination. Individuals have intentions, goals and objectives that may not be reduced to brain states. a person is different from a machine in that some behaviors are not constrained by the physical laws that invariably control the functions of the brain. This fact is best exemplified by the evidence for such phenomena as ESP and PK which, unconstrained by space-time variables, seem to defy physical laws and are therefore considered anomalous.

Consciousness in the sense of phenomenal awareness is obviously localized and subject to space-time formulations. It is likely that the brain has much to contribute to our awareness of the world. Consequently, we may find that various sorts of mental phenomena correlate with physiological processes in the brain and nervous system and that they could be investigated from a neurophysiological perspective. It does not follow, however, that all mental phenomena are ultimately reducible to brain states or that consciousness does not exist apart from these states. Interestingly, some systems of Indian philosophy, notably the Sankhya school, consider mind to be essentially material while at the same time holding that consciousness-as-such is nonmaterial.

According to Samkhya, there are two principles that govern the functioning of the universe. One is *purusha*, the Principle of consciousness and the other is *prakriti*, the root principle of matter. *Purusha* as consciousness refers to awareness as such (*chit*), which may be distinguished from phenomenal awareness (*buddhi*) or (mind) which is a manifestation of matter. In association with *purusha*, the *buddhi* functions as the mind and has phenomenal awareness. *Chit* signifies the transcendental aspect of consciousness without which the *buddhi* will have no systematic and coherent experience of a person. Experience belongs to the *buddhi* (mind), but is made possible by the *purusha* (consciousness). Thus, the phenomena of our experience are the joint manifestations of consciousness and the brain. Parapsychological events, like other psychological phenomena, are normal manifestations of the mind. They appear anomalous because we equate the mind with the brain and fail to see how consciousness is reflected in our minds as we experience the awareness of objects and events.

In summary, then, consciousness manifests both explicit and implicit awareness. It is a subject as well as a quality predicated of phenomena. It may refer to a state or to phenomena.

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Mental phenomena are dependent on neurobiological processes and yet not identical with or wholly determined by them. Mental functions resemble the operations of machines, and at the same time consciousness can also function in a manner and mode that machines are incapable of doing. The intrinsic problem of studying consciousness is thus inherent in its dual citizenship in the phenomenal and transcendental domains. Our methods of studying consciousness must therefore address the issues arising from a recognition of this fact.

Methodological Implications

Scientific attempts to study consciousness generally proceed from the simple mental phenomena that can be readily assimilated as the physical properties of the brain, and move upward to understand hopefully more complex phenomena and ultimately consciousness itself. In making an a priori assumption that consciousness is analyzable into events in the brain, the method of upward causation is biased against finding consciousness as an autonomous principle and consequently is ill-suited to study those aspects of consciousness that cannot be reduced to brain states. If one assumes the existence of autonomous consciousness, then the proper method to study consciousness is to begin with consciousness and work downward to discover how it is involved in specific mental events. Roger Sperry's affirmation of downward causation that mind/consciousness can influence and control physiochemical processes in the brain (Sperry, 1969, 1976) is one such attempt to develop a nonreductionistic methodology to study consciousness. Sperry, however, falls short of accepting a truly autonomous consciousness and consequently fails to provide a compelling reason to affirm genuine human freedom and responsibility.

Again, the inherent subjectivity of consciousness makes it necessary that we pay attention to *experience* as such distinguished from *observation*. Unlike physical phenomena, consciousness can be studied not only from the perspective of an outside observer (third-person perspective) but also from the perspective of the person (first-person perspective). Science traditionally ignored first-person perspective and the insights of the experiencing person, unless translated unto third-person perspective. Consciousness studied from a first-person perspective would give us an understanding of those processes that accord primacy and causal efficacy to consciousness. Looked at from within (first-person) and from without (third-person) we would have a comprehensive view of consciousness. Subjective understanding of consciousness is essential inasmuch as subjectivity is the essence of consciousness. At the same time, it may be necessary to conceptualize a common ground to which third-person and first-person views may point even though the aspects they reveal may be different.

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Consciousness-as-such in its most abstract form points to a transcendental domain in our experience. It may be considered as nonlocal being or function. Although mental phenomena, the experienced mental events, are localized, constrained, and to some extent determined by the natural world, Consciousness-as-such may be understood as nonlocal. This conception of consciousness makes a distinction between consciousness and the mind. The mind itself may be formed by the interfacing of consciousness with the brain.

Even though mainstream science ignores or rejects the notion of consciousness-as-such, it appears to be a necessary condition to account for our subjectivity, and it is suggested by the fact that human consciousness is conscious of itself (self-consciousness) that it experiences freedom of choice, marking it off from the physical world. As Albert Shalom (1985) points out, "it is categorically impossible to derive the vocabulary of subjectivity from the vocabulary of chemistry, of physiology, or of neurophysiology" (p. xxi). Also, phenomena like ESP, which appear anomalous from the point of conventional science, suggest that there are aspects to existence that lead us beyond materialism to postulate the primacy of consciousness and its presence in self-conscious beings capable of exercising volitional freedom.

The question arises, however, regarding the mode of interaction between the transcendental and the empirical domains of consciousness. It is my belief that human intentionality and attention may be crucially involved in the interfacing of the transcendental and empirical aspects of our being. Consciousness studies should be concerned with intentionality and the attentional processes in human functioning. If we can achieve volitional control over attention, and thus alter or bypass the cortical controls that ordinarily localize consciousness to give us ordinary phenomenal experience, we may then be able to reach the domain of consciousness-as-such. Several of the consciousness enhancement techniques like meditation seem to involve essentially methods for the voluntary development of attention, the aim being one of bringing about a state in which awareness is dissociated from its cortical controls.

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3

Current global problems and some peace issue¹

H.C.Ganguli²

MAN-SOCIETY-NATURE SYSTEM

Our referent in this chapter shall be not only man and society as in the traditional view of peace but man, society and nature or the MSN System. A system is defined as an organized, unitary whole composed of two or more interdependent parts, components or subsystems and delineated by indentifiable boundaries from the suprasystem within which it is embedded. The three components in the MSN system are: the individual human beings; the social systems; the larger environment, including the natural resources and animal and plant life within which human societies function. This MSN system is a global system centered around the planet earth including its atmosphere and is to be delineated from other planetary systems within the larger solar system. It is now recognized that man's relationship to his environment must be viewed from a systems approach. 'Everything is connected with everything else is the first law of ecology; here is defined as the science of plants and animals in relation to their environment. The above law reflects the existence of an elaborate network of interconnections in the ecosphere among different living organisms, and between populations, species and individual organisms and their physico-chemical surroundings.

CURRENT GLOBAL PROBLEMS

The complexities of the issue of peace is related partly to the problems affecting the MSN system. Some of these are identified below:

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1. Rapid population growth with food supplies, education and other social services lagging behind. The United Nations forecast of world population size (the 'average' estimate and not the 'high' or 'low' estimate) are: 1975-4033 millions; 1980-4415; 1990 - 5275; 2000- 6199 millions. U.N. experts have concluded that global population is likely to stabilize by the end of the 21st century at about 10.5 billion person. It has been estimated that of the 2.2 billion growth between 1975 -2000, 2 billion or about 90 percent of the growth will be in the developing countries. South Asia, the region in which some of us are interested, is estimated to have, at 2000 A.D., a population of 2.2 billion, birth rate of 27.8 percent, death rate of 8.8 percent and an average life expectancy of 60.8 years.
2. Vast and unjustified increase in use of natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, like stable fresh-water and petroleum. For example, Japan suffers from fresh water shortage of 4 billion tons a year. Usable reserves of non-renewable resources change with new discoveries and improved viability for economic exploitation. Therefore, although a total or absolute shortage of raw materials and energy is not expected, difficulties in meeting demands for special types of raw materials and fuels shall pose a real problem.
3. Negative impact of human productive and scientific activities on the environment, leading to pollution of the ecology around man, extinction of wild life etc. For example, in 1970, the estimated damage from pollution was 6000 billion yen in Japan or 8 percent of its GNP and for France, 4 to 5 percent of her GNP. Between 1600 to 1950, the extinction rate of wild life on earth was one species every 10 years; today, due to ecological ignorance and indifferent attitude to other forms of life, the world loses one species per year. About 20,000 plant varieties and 900 vertebrate animal species and subspecies are threatened with extinction today.
4. Transformation in nature of warfare leads to increased casualties, destruction of property and damage to the ecological spheres. The 1914-18 war covered 8 states, resulted in 10 million deaths and \$ 30 billion of material destruction. The Second World War extended over 40 states, with deaths exceeding 50 million and material destruction of \$ 315 billion. A third world war is likely to be a thermo-nuclear war, covering the entire globe with deaths of hundreds of millions, and the ecology so damaged as to be hazardous for all living organisms and to future generations as well.

The factors of science and technology, of industrial and population growth affect the structure and functioning of societies as well as quality of life of the individual. Relevant UNESCO documents show that yearly expenditure on scientific research and development by the end of 1970 was as large as \$ 150 billion. Of every eight research scientists who have ever worked on this planet, 7 are working today. Annual volume of world industrial production increased by a

factor of 6 between the years 1950 to 1979. Urbanisation, a concomitant of industrialization, has its negative consequences in crowding, shortage of residential housing and means of transportation and communication. A series of critical situations arise for the individual and expressed by terms like anomie, identity crisis, depersonalization of the individual and the conflict between mass culture and elite culture. The individual is subjected to the stress of information overload as the flow of information exceeds his ability to assimilate it, the problem of free time and leisure (for example, how does an Indian office worker spend his Saturday and Sunday under a 5-day a week work schedule?), of redundancy and unemployment, of premature retirement and of obsolescence in skills. The problem is compounded by the greater demands and expectations of the individual himself from life. Increase in scientific knowledge and its dissemination through educational systems and mass media lead to a demand for a more diverse, interesting and intellectually and emotionally satisfying life. Acts of group and individual violence and terrorism and undisciplined sex life, drug addiction, growth of revolutionary or strange cults etc. are essentially attempts to seek alternative solutions to an unexciting existence.

The Situation in developing countries is still worse. A dual system of production, one through advanced and automated industrial units and another by traditional methods, produce a glaring discrepancy in income and productive efficiency and in skill levels required. Note, for example, the discrepancies in income and other benefits of a worker in a factory of Bahrat Heavy Electrical Limited and a handloom textile weaver or even a weaver in an old-fashioned textile factory. Further, people are becoming increasingly aware of these inequalities and injustice as they are travelling more, seeing more and getting greater exposure to mass media like television etc. Industrialization has not been able to absorb the manpower and redundancy of manpower exists in every age group. A series of circumstances over the centuries have led to an indifference to time as an economic commodity. Time management and efficient use of time by the average Indian is still relatively unknown.

In a UNESCO sponsored study of elite subjects from three centuries (192 from India, 50 from Thailand and 51 from Phillipines) enquiry was made about the basic philosophy of the people and the cause of their backwardness (Ganguli, 1964). Indian elites mentioned, in that order, Laziness, Illiteracy or Lack of Education, a Fatalistic philosophy and Overpopulation as important determinants of Indian backwardness. Thai elites noted Laziness and a philosophy of Contentment and Peace as significant factors for them. And the Phillipino subjects blamed a philosophy of Hospitality and Laziness in their people as important factors. For India, the feudal social structure, particularly in the rural and semi-urban regions are also blameworthy. The Ma-Baap or father-mother syndrome, the Malik, Sarkar, Raja-Sahib, or My Lord culture characterise much of Indian's village and urban societies even today. Political

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and personal contacts, family and caste linkages, and not so much merit and hard work, from an integral part of the Indian reward system and thus preserve its backwardness.

MILITARY MODEL OF PEACE Vs. POSITIVE PEACE

The military model of peace is the traditional meaning of the term, namely, absence of war. From the ecological point of view, we define war as follows: War is any deliberately initiated interaction between two or more human groups, involving the use of physico-chemical forces that upset or tend to upset violently the harmony and balance in the man-society-nature system.

In enunciating the above definition of war, we distinguish it from disturbances in the MSN system through industrial accidents and through some of the more hazardous scientific experiments. The accident in the Union Carbide Factory at Bhopal in India or to the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl in U.S.S.R. have resulted in massive deaths and damage to the ecology. The Government of India estimates that the Bhopal accident in December 1984 due to massive leakage of methylisocyanate (MIC) Gas has resulted in 2347 deaths, serious injuries to 30,000 to 40,000 persons and a damage exceeding Rs. 3,900 crore (\$3250 million approximately) to property, environment and long-term exposure effects to MIC (Times of India, November 23, 1986, New Delhi). Disturbances to the system also result from experimental detonation of nuclear devices underground, overground etc. for scientific-cum-military purposes. However these are not acts of war as these are not deliberate or hostile in intention. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that science and technology have reached a stage where experiments and accidents may have effects similar to a minor war.

This military model of peace as the absence of war is still valid but is not exhaustive or comprehensive. For example, the state of cold war is neither a condition of war nor of peace. Secondly, states and peoples desire peace not merely to survive physically, but also to build and develop themselves. Thus peace is a positive phenomenon and a period of peace is one when nations can devote their energy and resources for growth and development.

Positive peace may be defined as follows: Peace is a condition within a person or a human group or between human groups that tend to maintain and promote harmony and balance within the person, within the society or within the society or within the relevant segment of man-society-nature system. It may be noted that we use the term peace in a generic sense, something similar to the Sanskrit term Shanti. The term is thus defined for use with reference to the psycho-physical-spiritual well-being of the person, for peace and harmony between various segments of a society or for harmony and balance between whole societies. The definition may of course be modified to apply only to any one of the three parties. However the key words are 'harmony and balance' and

'maintain and promote'; these we regard as the special features of peace in the positive sense.

IMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

An image is a composite of concepts, judgements, preferences and attitudes toward some comprehensive object such as a person or a nation. It involves perception and judgement as well as attitude towards actions. These have emotional moorings and regulate attitudes and behaviour much more than rational understanding of people. Since images do not necessarily represent objective situations faithfully but involve certain amount of distortion of reality in accordance with preconceived notions, images have some role to play in the determination of international tensions and conflicts and appreciation of other cultures. These images are closely related to stereotypes which are relatively rigid and oversimplified or biased perception or conception of reality, particularly of persons or social groups.

Images held by elites or decision makers in civil and military governmental departments, in business, in industry, in universities and by leaders of the media are particularly important and crucial for international relations. We propose here that empirical studies of images of leaders and peoples of countries politically, economically and militarily significant for each other is one area which deserves attention of social scientists, particularly in the newly independent countries.

Image studies, to be meaningful, should involve comparison of how A perceives B and also how B perceives A. The is, the image studies should be reciprocal. This has been done for Americans and Russians. The advantages of such reciprocal studies are many. For example, it has been found that Americans and Russians hold mirror-image of each other (white, 1961). The six major mirror-image resemblances of Americans and Russians are: 1) attributing aggressive intent to the other; 2) attributing peaceful intent to the self 3) judging both self and the other in terms of similar criteria of truthfulness, unselfishness, material well-being, unity, strength, courage etc.; 4) having a 'black top' image of the other, meaning thereby that it is the enemy leaders who are evil, not the people; 5) saying that one must not listen to the other as he always tells lies; 6) refusing to believe that the other side is motivated by fear of one's own side.

For Asian countries such studies are few and far between. In mid-sixties we made two UNESCO sponsored cross-cultural studies of images held by elites from three countries- India, Thailand and Philippines (Ganguli, 1964, 1966). Studies of Indian images for China have also been enquired into by other scholars (e.g., Sinha and Upadhyay, 1963). Unfortunately, from the Indian point of view, reciprocal studies of images of countries significant for her, namely, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, China, Russia have not been done. One wonders, for example, how far the Indian image of Pakistan and

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Pakistani image of India would mirror each other. To know this shall be enlightening.

Some of the results of the UNESCO study on images and international understanding have been presented in an earlier paper (Ganguli, 1972). Cross-cultural studies of different national groups are usually expensive and individual scholars very rarely can raise funds and arrange for international cooperation for such studies. The problem can to some extent be overcome if the scholar studies the foreign citizens not in their respective home countries but as are already assigned to and staying in the investigator's own country. Foreign students, businessmen, scientific, technical and managerial personnel from other countries staying in a country for a substantial time period can be subjects of valuable image studies. Many universities, governments, private foundations are devoting a substantial part of their resources for supporting international education exchange. One of the goals of such international education exchange is to foster understanding and friendship among the nations concerned. For example, foreign students in modern India increased from 3510 in 1958-59 to 7217 in 1970-71, after peaking during 1968-69 at 8994. During 1968-69, we estimated that a quarter of one percent of Indian total expenditure for higher education was spent on foreign students (Ganguli, 1975). In the reverse direction we note that about 40,000 Indian students and scholars are in the U.S.A. in 1987 (Times of India, New Delhi, May 25, 1987). Here is a group of captive subjects whom social scientists can study not only for educational purposes but also as a instrument of international understanding and goodwill. Such studies indicate how other country nationals perceive the host country, what are the determinants of such perceptions, the nature and extent of discrepancies existing between self-image of a people and its image as held by others and so on. All these enhance a people's understanding of itself and provide a necessary background to an understanding of its international status and the role it can play in the international field.

As a matter of interest, a few results relating to the image of India from two studies of foreign students are presented below (Ganguli, 1966, 1976). The 1965 data, a study sponsored by the Indian Council of Cultural Relations, were on a sample of 79 foreign students out of 130 staying at the International Students Hostel and three college hostels of the University of Delhi. The 1970 data were on a sample of 123 foreign students out of 410 at Delhi University and 80 out of 177 at Aligarh Muslim University, a total of 203. 68 of the 1965 subjects were doing B.A./B.Sc. and 11 M.A./M.Sc. 169 of the second study were B.A./B.sc. students and 34 were studying engineering of medicine. The subjects in both studies were 18 to 30 years old, all males and had been living in India from 1 to 4 years. 24 percent were Thai nationals, 18 percent came from the Arab countries, 25 percent were Africans and 33 percent were students of Indian origin (SIO) from Mauritius, West Indies etc.

Current global problems and some peace issue

Below is given the stereotype of the typical Indian as held by 79 foreign students in 1965. The stereotype consists of traits checked by the subjects out of a total of 44 traits referring to physical and temperamental qualities as well as to personal habits, social qualities, ideological orientations etc. The study is similar to the Katz-Baraly study in approach as well as in the trait check list.

Percent Foreign Students Assigning Different Traits to the Indian
(N=79)

Trait %	Checking
Religious	69
Narrow-minded	65
Orthodox	64
Unpunctual	55
Talkative	50
Superstitious	50
Musical	44
Kind	42
Lazy	42
Careless	40

Trait %	Checking
Forgiving	40
Weak	38
Simple	37
Hardworking	37
Imitative	37
Showy	33
Artistic	33
Conventional	33

It is seen from the above analysis that the Afro-Asian students in India tend to perceive the typical Indian, who is their host, in a most unfavourable light. The Indian is perceived to be narrow-minded, orthodox, religious, superstitious and weak. Mention is made of a few positive qualities like forgiving nature, kindness and simplicity. These are balanced by adverse social qualities like lack of punctuality, talkativeness and imitative nature. The image

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falsehood, low threshold for physical violence, lack of respect for life, lack of social or civic sense, disregard for the law of the land etc². Of course, the investigator should take care to prepare an exhaustive list of traits which includes all significant items. Alternatively, content analysis of list of traits which includes all significant items. Alternatively, content analysis of materials from discussions and debates etc. on the subject can be the chosen method of study.

International status and activities of a country are perceived differently by different nations. This is borne out by the distribution of answers to some selected altitudinal items by the four national groups of students.

Items: India is a good friend of countries in Asia and Africa

Group	Agreed %	Disagreed %	Uncertain %
Thai	25	62	12
African	58	17	25
Arab	100	-	-
S.I.O.	79	4	18

Item: India has played an important role in the independence struggle of new countries in Asia and Africa

Group	Agreed %	Disagreed %	Uncertain %
Thai	33	22	44
African	92		8
Arab	58	16	25
S.I.O.	60	20	20

Item: The role of India in international affairs is insignificant

Group	Agreed %	Disagreed %	Uncertain %
Thai	87	12	
African	20	60	20
Arab	41	50	8
S.I.O.	16	63	21

Item: The modern world needs the spiritual and moral lead of India

Group	Agreed %	Disagreed %	Uncertain %
Thai	22	55	22
African	34	33	33
Arab	50	33	17
S.I.O.	29	21	50

The above items are part of a 28-item attitude scale covering the following five attitudinal areas; living conditions in India, India's internal political policy and economic condition, the education system in India;; India's international policy; and social life and social practice in India. The scale was standardized on a sample of 85 foreign students with different ethnic background and had a reliability coefficient of 0.89. The scale was administered to the subjects of 1965 and 1970. The following conclusions have been drawn:

1. 8 Percent of the 203 students had 'Highly favourable' attitude towards India, 15% 'Favourable' 12% 'Unfavourable' and 10% 'Very unfavourable'. 55% of students held a middling position on the favourable-unfavourable continuum.
2. The table below gives the relation between student nationality and attitude towards India. The five categories of favourableness have been reduced to three by collapsing the two favourable categories and the two unfavourable categories.

Nationality and Attitude Towards India

Attitude	Thai	Arab	African	S.I.O.
Favourable	22.9	29.7	18	22.1
Middling	56.3	56.8	42	63.2
Unfavourable	20.8	13.5	40	14.7

The Arab students, it will be seen, are most favourably oriented towards India and the Africans are most dissatisfied. The SIOs and Thais fall in between.

3. A comparison of 1965 and 1970 data has shown a remarkable consistency of attitude towards India over the five years. This attitude towards the host country seems to be a stable phenomenon and not an artefact. A replication of this study now can indicate whether the four national groups have shifted their relative positions Vis-a-vis India.

A country in order to be able to conduct its international relations effectively, requires a healthy self and a healthy relation to the external world. A healthy self involves and accurate and veridical self-image and understanding and acceptance of oneself, one's drives, desires and goals. It also involves a long time perspective rather than a short time perspective and a certain degree of

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national integration in a structural sense, as well as a unified and conscious outlook on life that gives it a capacity for flexible balance under stress conditions. A healthy relation to the external world demands a capacity to take decision on the basis of internalized standards rather than because of external pressures or expediency, an accurate and veridical perception of external events unaffected by wishful thinking or other sources of perceptual distortion and finally, having an extensive repertoire of behaviour to deal with its environment. These are psychological parameters in which accurate perception of oneself and of others play a significant role. It is our position that scientifically designed studies of images, of perception of self and of others, determinants of such images and nature and discrepancies between these as also ways and means of changing these are important, if not crucial. To be saddled with the image of a 'backward' country or a country which 'lacks political will' can only encourage others to bully it. Such countries have a "psychology of the victim", a perpetual invitation to international predators.

Images and international events have a circular causal relation. Hence images of countries change and image studies are thus not a one-shot affair. Monitoring of change in images is necessary. Lastly, many newly independent nations are not familiar with subtle psychological and behavioural techniques of image building and image modification. Such psychological expertise is expected to be useful to these countries.

ESCALATION

Certain implicit psychological assumptions about nature of man and his relation to others underly the arms race and escalation thereof. The rationalistic assumption is that man can engage in various threatening acts, including warfare, without losing control of his conduct or control of the interaction that follows. The non-rationalistic view of man holds that once hostile activities are initiated, these develop a power and dynamic of their own and the original actor loses control of the situation. Original decisions may have been made rationally, but once a hostile mood and vicious cycle of hostile acts have taken off, it becomes increasingly difficult to put a brake on the series of events. Action by the authorities depend to a large extent upon what view of man they subscribe to.

Escalation is a psychological concept and rests on psychological assumptions. For example, the credibility of a party to escalate is a factor; the less credible to the other side is a particular threat to escalate, the greater is the chance that additional escalation will actually occur provided that the party was not bluffing, in the first instance. In the escalation process again, there are certain thresholds and once a threshold is crossed, it changes the situation in a qualitative manner. Acquisition of long range electronic surveillance systems by one party, or of nuclear weapons are such thresholds. Each such step raises the arms race to a qualitatively new level. Therefore, actors are particularly likely to

be cautious before crossing such a threshold since the escalation that will follow will be high and the outcome frightening. This accounts partly for India's cautious approach to developing nuclear weapons³. However, the psychological difficulties in crossing a threshold can be overcome by a country if its leadership can deliberately and realistically project an image of itself as irrational and irresponsible, almost 'suicidal', in the sphere international relations. A rationally projected irrational image of a leadership sometimes prevents retaliatory action from adversely affected powers. In international relations, a reputation for unpredictability is more advantageous under certain circumstances than a reputation for total predictability.

Personality profiles of the chief actors are also a factor in the arms race. One author (Boulding, 1962), for example, has characterised actors as 'saints', 'evils' and 'publicans'. Saints react in a friendly manner to all actions, including hostile ones. Evil actors react in a hostile manner to all actions and publicans give what they get. The level of the arms race and the probability that it will lead to an outbreak of war depend, amongst other factors, on the nature of the actors involved. Probability of war will be high when an evil actor confronts a publican than when a saint encounters either an evil actor or a publican. The probability is highest when two evil actors clash and inconceivable when two saints are involved.

The wisdom of unilateral disarmament and de-escalation has been debated for long and one school of thought advises that not to reciprocate is the best policy. However, not all arms race lead to wars. If the party starting the arms race is convinced through increase in armaments by the opposite party that it (the first party) will not be allowed to stabilize armaments at a level where it is dominant and any increase by it will be met by a reciprocal increase by the other party, the arms race may be stabilized. In the late 19th century, the British-French arms race was stabilized without leading to war when Britain could convince France of its resolve to match French increase in arms by a simultaneous increase of its own and its willingness to stabilize only at a specific level.

NON-VIOLENCE AS A STATE POLICY

One question in which the present Seminar is interested relate to Non-Violence: Can non-violence be a feasible State policy? We have written on non-violence earlier (Ganguli, 1985). In this process we have felt that although non-violence is an ancient concept in India, it has certain positive aspects which are more relevant to modern life. In the old days, non-violence was being presented as a relentless ethical code for transcendental purpose-for the individual in his search for enlightenment. Non-violence was also used at the group level, as a basic principle of social organization, for example, in the Buddhist monastic orders. The classic point of view is expressed in Sutras 30,

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31, 34 and 35 of Book II of Patanjali Yoga Sutra. Sutras 30 and 35 are reproduced below:

Sutra II- 30: Vows of self-restraint comprise abstention from violence, falsehood, theft, incontinence and acquisitiveness.

Sutra II-35: As one becomes established in non-injury, all beings coming near to him cease to be hostile.

Non-violence in Sutra 30 refers to an attitude as well as to a mode of behaviour towards all living creatures. It is based on a belief in the underlying unity of life, a point of view which contemporary environmental sciences are emphasising once again. Sutra II-35 refers to the consequences of practice of non-violence in the sense of mere non-injury to others. The Sutra says that such a person infused with love towards all living organisms automatically inspires confidence and love in them. However, today, there can be a lay dimension of this concept. For example, an attitude of non-violence is imperative for persons seeking intrapsychic and interpersonal peace and harmony.

In contemporary psychology, non-violence has not been researched much. However, the concepts of violence, of hostility, anger and aggression have been topics for serious enquiry. Hostility for example, has been analysed in terms of extrapunitive hostility having three components-acting out hostility, criticism of others and projected delusional hostility. Intropunitive hostility has been analysed into self-criticism and guilt. Such analyses are the result of intensive empirical studies and use of tools like factor analysis. Also, besides psychologists, contemporary mystics have tended to emphasise the positive aspects of non-violence. For example, the Mother of Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry has mentioned Violence, Tranquility and Benevolence. On violence (Satprem, 1982): "The Mother has remarked that this inner immobility or this power of not to respond can even stop the uplifted arm of an assassin or the leap of a snake. Only, one must not wear an impassive mask and be boiling inside. What is wanted is... true internal mastery." "Tranquility is a very positive state; there is a positive peace which is not the contrary of strife-peace active, contagious, powerful, which dominates and calms, puts everything in order, organises". Again, about benevolence, the Mother says (The Mother, 1982): "Be benevolent and you will be free from suffering; be always contented and happy, you will radiate your quiet happiness."

How do the attitudes of benevolence, tranquility, lack of inner feelings of hostility and aggression, all of these related to the generic and extended concept of non-violence, answer the original question of non-violence as a State policy? In this context, we mention our total agreement with the great American psychologist Gordon Allport (Allport, 1957) when he said: 'In the ultimate analysis, there is no solution to the problem of intergroup tension excepting the growth of serene and benevolent persons who seek their own security and

integrity not at the expense of their fellow men, but in concert with them'. Two points arise out of this. First, if the leaders and decision-makers of the government and other institutions are serene and benevolent persons, it will affect the framing and implementation of State policies certainly. Their perceptions and motivations will be reflected in their managerial and administrative functions and that will gradually bring a qualitative change in the political climate in the country. Also, the average citizen will have worthwhile models to emulate. In ancient India, King Rama can be cited as an example of a benevolent ruler with a high degree of sensitiveness to public opinion. In contemporary India, Jawaharlal Nehru possessed these qualities to a high degree. The decision-makers and the managers of a country's institutions can develop deliberately and with an effort a non-violent personality, taking non-violence in a positive sense. It is good to remember Plato's statement that kings should be philosophers or that philosophers should be kings.

Secondly, we doubt very much if non-violence can be a principle of State policy. The day that is possible, the State as we know it today would be redundant, would have withered away. A State formulates its policies and implements these through institutions. Policies and institutions to implement these are the legislative and executive functions of the State. Can we run an institution on the basis of non-violence? Running an institution is a management function and the five major management functions are planning, staffing, directing, organizing and control. Control essentially involves control of employees behaviour through judicious use of reward and punishment himself through fasts etc. to control and modify other people's behaviour; for example, after the Calcutta riots in 1947. And for others, his attempt was to re-educate them to correct their wrong behaviour. Gandhi says: "It has become a fashion these days to say that society cannot be organized or run on non-violent lines. I join issue on this point." (Harijan, December 1938). Now re-education is a lengthy though a relatively permanent process. But how many managers can solve their problems through re-education of an erring employee? Secondly, one wonders if a Chief Minister or a Chief Secretary of a State can undertake a Gandhian fast to call back to work striking employees⁴.

If non-violence has no place in managing an institution, benevolence has certainly a place. In fact nearly all effective top managers of organizations are benevolent persons. For them, concern for people is as much a consideration as concern for the completion of the organization task. They are persons who are sensitive and responsive to the needs of the people working under them⁵. Violence against authority by employees, by students, by policemen etc. nearly always takes place as a last resort, when people develop a sense of helplessness in their dealings with a management which is insensitive to their problems and tyrannical in their actions.

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We conclude by saying that if non-violence is interpreted in a narrow, traditional sense, State policy cannot be based on such a principle. But if benevolence, goodness, concern for others be looked upon as falling within an extended concept of non-violence, these should certainly form the basis of State policy⁶. The human spirit cannot develop without a climate of freedom. The practical problem that shall face each State is where to draw the line between the need for freedom for the person and the need for order in society and what sort of equation can be set up between concern for the individual and concern for society and for nature.

CAN THERE BE A JUST WAR ?

This is another difficult issue posed by the organizers of the present Seminar. The answer shall depend on the point of view; whether it is a politico-legal or moral point of view and what history one is reading. History that is mostly read is written by the victors of the wars and such histories invariably say that the war was a just war, a Dharma Yuddha. The classic example is the Mahabharata War between the Pandavas and Kauravas. The Pandavas won and immediately declared it as a war for Dharma, for justice and goodness, although on a more objective analysis, it will be difficult to overlook the extreme dynamism of Duryodhan's regime and the rapid growth of the Indian society during that period. Analytically however the question relates to whether starting a war can at any time be justified and here my reference is to the aggressing party and not to the victim of the aggression.

The question can be studied with reference to the nature of conflict and the maximum permissible limit of conflict. Conflict is not outright negative, but has a positive aspect as well. It is designed to resolve conflicting points of view; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if that unity is attained through destruction of one of the contending parties. In a way, it represents efforts of societies to rid themselves of disturbances and disharmonies. Conflict instigates innovations for social progress; it stimulates people to devise ways and means for resolving blocks to social development and work out more effective solution to social problems. Therefore, the endeavour should be not towards total eradication of conflict from human society but rather to keep it within permissible limits. Indeed, a completely conflict-less society is neither possible nor perhaps desirable. It is only within a 'block' or a rigid world order in which every member's status, role, aspirations and mutual levels of comparison are predetermined that conflict can be totally absent. An absolutely centripetal and harmonious group or world order, that is, total 'unifications' is not only empirically unreal but would show no real life process. The question therefore comes back to the criterion for permissible limit of conflict.

The permissible limits of conflict should not be too low lest it chokes off even the minor conflicts that are socially useful and which give societies and

individuals a chance to act out their aggression without causing substantial damage to others. At the same time the limit should satisfy the criteria of maximum acceptability and of visibility. That is, the limit should satisfy the basic moral values of humanity at large without regard to nationality, religion, language etc. Also, any violation of the limit should be immediately cognizable without the help of any special 'fact-finding' machinery.

on the basis of the above line of thinking, we felt that at the moment, the maximum permissible limit for intensity of conflict should be up to the point where killing of humans is not involved. 'Thou shall not kill' is a commandant that should be acceptable to social groups as well as to individuals. It is realised that this does not enable all actions emanating from conflict to be judged adequately. For example, one human group may try to exterminate another group non by direct physical damage to their person but by destroying its environmental support like the flora and fauna. It is, however, suggested that although at the moment 'Thou shall not kill' may set the maximum permissible limit, this limit may be revised or its meaning extended subsequently, depending upon new factors like developments in technology, social thinking etc. The criticism that it is a negative concept need not be taken seriously for it is sought to be used as a limiting concept only.

The above viewpoint about the maximum permissible limit of conflict as non-killing of human beings was presented in 1972 (Ganguli, 1972). We have nothing new to add to this issue since we originally enunciated it. This criterion for regulation of international relations is now recognised by some government. In the 10-point Delhi Declaration signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on November 26, 1986 at New Delhi, the second point reads as follows: "Human life must be recognised as supreme". It is good to know that powerful government leaders are reiterating the simple and basic value of non-killing of humans as a policy statement.

However, this still does not answer the question of a just war, for war by definition involves killing. Can we say that there cannot be a 'just' aggressive war but there can be a 'just' defensive war? This raises a debatable point for any war, namely, who is the aggressor and who was the victim or aggressee? For some situations this may be clear enough, like, for example, when Hitler invaded Russia, or Japan attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbour. But other situations may not be clear enough. For example, India's military intervention in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, is a case in point. Who was the aggressor? Pakistan certainly took the initiative through attacks on Indian airfields in the north. But if Pakistan had not done so, would India with ten million refugees have kept quiet? Pakistan, by attacking first provided India with a politico-legal excuse. In many ways, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour also provided the U.S.A. with such an excuse. War is usually a culmination of a series of non-military interactions between the two parties. Although physical violence

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starts with the war, violence of other types, economic, psychological, political etc. precede armed conflict. The point we raise is that very often who is the aggressor is doubtful and the verdict is usually given by the victor, who is biased in favour of its own position.

Finally, if we look upon the criterion 'Thou shall not kill' as an absolute moral law, a categorical imperative, then the question as to whether a war is just or not does not arise. No war can be just. At the present stage of our social thinking, we cannot say more⁷.

HUMAN POTENTIAL

The human is the most important element in the MSN system. What ideas have been put forth for his growth and development? Sri Aurobindo and the Mother have written on the future evolution of mankind. They have laid emphasis on the transformation of man through a change of consciousness. So has some other thinkers like the philosopher Teilhard de Chardin. 'The present evolutionary crisis comes from a disparity between the limited faculties of man-mental, ethical and spiritual- and the technical and economical means at his disposal. Without an inner change man can no longer cope with the gigantic development of outer life. If humanity is to survive, a radical transformation of human nature is indispensable. Spirituality is a progressive awakening to the inner reality of our being, to a spirit, self, soul which is other than our mind, life and body. It is an inner aspiration to know, to enter into contact and union with the greater Reality beyond... a conversion, a birth into a new being. The spiritual change culminates in a permanent ascension from the lower consciousness to the higher consciousness. (Sri Aurobind, 1982).

Sperry, the neuropsychologist, also speaks of a superordinate brain process "different from but more than" some constituent lower-order processes. Sperry describes the influence of this higher 'conscious' brain process as an envelope. "The subjective mental phenomena are conceived to influence and to govern the flow of nerve impulse traffic by virtue of their encompassing emergent properties. Individual nerve impulses and other excitatory components of cerebral activity pattern are simply carried along or shunted this way and that by the prevailing overall dynamics of the whole active process." (Sperry, 1969). The properties of experienced consciousness are "different from and more than the collected sum of the neuro-physico-chemical events out of which they are built" and the laws they obey are probably psychological laws.

Sperry thus renounces the long-standing assumptions in the neurosciences that the subjective phenomena of conscious experiences do not exert any causal influence in the physical brain process. In his theory of mind, he suggests that consciousness is an emergent property of cerebral activity and exerts a directive, holistic form of control over the flow pattern of cerebral excitation. Further, 'the conscious phenomena are in a position of higher

command, as it were, located at the top of the organizational hierarchy.' By accepting 'the existence of potent mental forces that transcend the material elements in cerebral function', Sperry has lent support to a study of consciousness in its own right and not merely as an epiphenomenon or some impotent by-product of the brain process. '...the supreme importance of the problem (of the nature of mind) of all kinds of human values, as well as scientific matters prompts us to search ahead of the evidence from time to time as science advances, for any possible new insight. Even a partial solution that would enable us to decide between very broad and general alternatives like whether consciousness is cosmic or individual, mortal or immortal... could have profound and far-reaching ideological implications.'

A certain degree of parallelism seems to exist between Sperry's thinking about the nature of consciousness based on his work in the area of cerebral commissures and in Sri Aurobindo's ideas on consciousness based on his clinical experiences as a Yogi. Research on consciousness is one of the most promising pathways to instigating growth in man.

Chardin postulates a 'global consciousness' that could emerge as a property of group of brains (groups of people) who communicated closely enough. Sperry doubts this possibility because he does not think that individual human brains could interact closely enough, in terms of physical proximity to form a super-superordinate consciousness. It is interesting to note in this context the great importance attached to group meditation in Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Such group meditation is expected to speed up the process of descent of the supermind.

All these ideas about a transformation of human nature and development of a human consciousness superior to the one existing today is exciting. Some have argued that there can be no significant increase in the weight of the human pelvis, in which no change can be foreseen. Now we find mystics, neuropsychologists and philosophers discussing the possibility of raising the level of human consciousness through other means. The human is the key figure in the solution of global problems and deserves serious consideration.

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FOOTNOTES

1. The Vishnu Purana, Book IV, Chapter 24 (c.), and ancient Hindu scriptural text, mentions the following characteristics of the present age, the Kali Yuga:

In the Kali Yuga, "property alone will confer ranks; wealth will be the only source of virtue; passions will be the sole bond of union between the sexes; falsehood will be the only means of success in life and women will be merely objects of sensual enjoyment. Earth will be venerated only for its mineral resources.. Dishonesty will be the universal means of sustenance.. The people

will be unable to bear the heavy burdens imposed upon them by their avaricious sovereigns .. In the Kali age decay shall constantly proceed untill the human race approaches its annihilation". The predicted psycho-social characteristics seem to fit the modern age reasonably well.

2. Between 1965-68, Sulaiman Abu Ghosh of Kuwait studied the stereotypes and images held by elites of nine countries-Kuwait, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, India, Pakistan, and U.A.R. The Kuwaiti subject (N=152), checked the Iranians for example, as Extremely Nationalistic (99% mentioning), Very Religious (99%), Witty (90%), Unreliable (86%); Materialistic (79%), Quarrelsome (78%) and Stubborn (75%). The important traits attributed to the Saudi by the Kuwaitis were; Conservative (78%); Very Religious (75%); Honest (72%); Happy-Go-lucky (69%); Courteous (53%) and Generous (57%). (Sulaiman Abu Ghosh: A Socio-Psychological Study of Modern Kuwait. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis of the Delhi University under Professor H.C. Ganguli, 1968). There are usually methodological deficiencies in elite studies of this type like sampling bias and inadequate sample size.

3. The Indian psychologists as also the general public in India are not consciously worried about the possibility of a nuclear war in this subcontinent. It is however different with American psychologists. The American psychologists' professional interest in risk of nuclear war and governmental nuclear policy has been a resurgence of interest among psychologists in issues relating to nuclear policy and nuclear war. Particularly since the advent of the Reagan administration, many psychologists in America have concluded that the risk of nuclear war is dangerously high and prevention of such a holocaust is of pre-emptive human importance. Articles and books are being written, for references held and so on this topic. The key causative agent for the upward spiralling risk of a nuclear war, as perceived by the psychologists is, superficially, the arms race. But more basically, it is attributed to the pathological superpower relationship, a pattern of interaction that provides the psychological fuel for the arms race. We have referred in this chapter to the mirror-image the Americans and Russians hold of each other and such and other studies are part of the psychologist's attempt to understand this superpower relationship. Simultaneously, attempts are also being made to understand the effects of the threat of a nuclear war on people today. Unfortunately, however, the psychologists lament that nuclear psychology is almost universally ignored by nuclear policy makers in America.

4. A brief account of the philosophy of Danda, the Force that punishes the unlawful, as propounded by Manu, the noted law-giver of ancient India, in Manu Smriti is given below (quoted from Professor Satichidananda Murty's book 'The Quest for Peace', Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1986).

"The purpose of the king is to see that righteousness and Law (dharma) are realised and protected in this world. For the sake of the king says Manu, the creator created Danda... the son of virtue, the protector of all beings. It is because Danda is feared that all beings, movable and immovable, do not deviate from their intrinsic nature and righteousness, and allow each other enjoyment. It is Danda that rules peoples and protects them, and the wise know Danda as Dharma. The king should use Danda appropriately, taking into consideration all the circumstances such as the time, place, and the education of those who break the Law. If the king does not apply Danda to those who deserve it, there will be chaos in the world and the strong will finish off the weak, as is done among the fishes."

5. See, for example, the concept of the Managerial Grid developed by Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton in *The Managerial Grid*, Gulf Publishing Co., Houston, 1964. The grid represents and underlying philosophy of management based on two dimensions; 1) concern for production and 2) concern for people. Also refer to the excellent chapter on My Doctrine of Command in *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery*, the Commander of the Allied Eighth Army in the Second World War and later Chief of the Imperial General Staff at London. (Fontana Books, London, 1960). We quote:

"My own definition of leadership is this: 'The capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which inspires confidence'. Again: Unlike steel, army is a most sensitive instrument and can easily become damaged; its basic ingredient is men and, to handle and army well, it is essential to understand human nature. Bottled up in men are great emotional forces which have got to be given an outlet in a way which is positive and constructive, and which warms the heart and excites the imagination. If the approach to the human factor is cold and impersonal, then you achieve nothing. But if you gain the confidence and trust of your men, then you have in your possession a priceless asset and the greatest achievements become possible."

6 A logical distinction can be made between a State's internal administration and its principles and conduct of international relations. The nearest formal approach to a non-violently oriented code of international relations till today is the Panch Sheel or five principles of self-discipline enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru and signed by him on behalf of India with China.. The principles are:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territory
2. Non-aggression
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
6. Peaceful coexistence

Current global problems and some peace issue

There are other view on a Just War -both classical theories as well as theories formulated for the nuclear age. Cicero, for example, mentioned self-preservation and honour as the two grounds of a just war. With reference to nuclear war there are opposing schools of thought. For example, Michael Walzer writes: "Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war" (Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books. 1977). Arthur Kenny, on the other hand, says just war theory "still provides the best theoretical framework within which to consider questions of right and wrong of warfare". (The Logic of Deterrence, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). The controversy continues.

4

Meditation and Personality Development

G.C. RAI

From times immemorial Meditation is being practised by people. Although, in temples, mosques and churches the priests and their followers are devoted to worship their deity in various ways, but the common feature in each of these performances is meditation in some form or the other. Meditation is attached to religious significance, but it is noted that many people who are not believer of any religion also practise it all round the world as it gives them solace. Meditational techniques do not require allegiance to any specific religious beliefs and allow the client to build on an inner experience as a way to develop their personality (Sheila, Joan, 1988). Meditation is, thus, a common link between people of various religions and nations. It tends to bring the people together and closer irrespective of their diversities and promotes universal brotherhood which is so necessary today.

Ancient Indian saints have been the champions of evolving the methods and techniques of meditation and indulging themselves in it as an activity of yoga for enlightenment, for broadening the depth of vision and outlook and also for mental and spiritual peace (Aurbindo, 1982).

Besides, preaching and training about the meditational techniques was also given to disciples who, in turn, propagated it to the common man for being used as a means of relaxation of tension which may have arisen in day-to-day routine activities and, thus, ease them in building-up harmonious personality. As a consequence, there was congenial inter-personal relationship between the members of society and there was peace in society with least conflicts.

But Alas! with the passage of time, we in India and other Eastern countries have come under the modern influence of Western culture and have become more and more materialistic, getting away from the idealistic values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness and have entangled ourselves in malpractices, untruthfulness, conflicts, aggression and barbarism resulting in deterioration of

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personality and break down of law and order in society. Amazingly enough, while we in India are drifting towards materialism, the Westerners are not tending to drift towards spiritualism and are visiting different religious places in India and are contacting saints for self realization and getting peace of mind and soul. Many of them on return to their country have established Meditation centres. People of Japan, U.S.A., Canada, Russia, Germany and other parts of the world are eager to learn and practise meditation. To exemplify, in Japan, Yoga Institute was opened some 20 years back and now it has 42 centers for practising Indian yoga, where the technical medical measures of the practitioners have shown that our body and mind can be kept happy and merry with the help of meditation. Despite the communist tendencies in the people of erstwhile States of Soviet Union are recently changing their life styles. They have stated considerably changing their values from mechanistic to spiritualistic and are attending the meditation centers started at Moscow, Tbilisi and other places. I had the opportunity to observe it during my visit to U.S.S.R. in 1989. From United States of America also there are thousands and thousands of people are coming to India to get training in yogic practices including Meditation. At Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's Institute in India and its branches in U.S.A. and other countries, large number of doctors, engineers and teachers are being imparted training in transcendental meditation. At Deaconess Hospital in Boston Dr. Herbert Benson (1975) a cardiologist and his coworkers at Harvard Medical School uses meditation to achieve the relaxation response, a physiological state characterized by lowered blood pressure heart rate respiration and metabolism. Swami Pranavananda, Director of Yoga Society of America, San Francisco, California is contributing a lot to propagate meditational techniques in U.S.A.

Are not the above narrated examples of meditation and yogic practices abroad our eye-openers? They are. It is imperative for we Indians to look to our rich cultural heritage of ancient past and to utilize it for our rapid progress instead of leaning towards or depending upon Western culture. We will have to revive the practice of meditation not only at places of worship but also in homes, schools, colleges, universities, work places and reformatory institutions for bringing about adequate personality development. Man's performance and success is closely tied to meditation (Krishnan, 1991), Resurrection of human excellence can be boosted by means of meditation as the latter is a way of life (Khanna, 1990, 1991).

The Father of our nation Mahatma Gandhi was a Revivalist. He devoted his life for the revival of our culture from western to eastern. In quest of this mission, he himself disbanded English dress, food and the like and instead of it adopted Indian way of life. In pursuit of this, he strove for spiritual development of the educates. He stressed that education should aim not only at physical and mental development as in West, but also spiritual development as in Indian

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traditions. He stated and I quote him : "By education I mean all round drawing out the best in child and man - body, mind and spirit."

Meditation is not only conducive to personality adjustment (Ahmad, Ahmad and Sumboo, 1989) and mental health (Kumar 1991) Rao and Parthasarthy, (1987) of an individual, but is also useful for saving him from the abnormalities and diseases. There have been reported so many studies in this regard. However, some of the illustrative studies may be cited hereunder.

Vahia (1992) on the basis of his work with 132 mentally abnormal patients at R.N. Cooper Hospital, Bombay observed that Indian meditational techniques were as effective as western pharmacological therapy. As such, it is quite evident that it is better to go for meditation to become free from mental abnormalities rather than to have doses of the medicines which have so much ill-after effects. Meditation have no ill-after effects if practised scientifically.

Therefore, it may be said that "MEDITATION IS BETTER THAN MEDICATION".

Many mental diseases are also being cured by taking the courses of meditation. Sahib (1988) on the basis of his study of yogis concluded that those yogis who practised meditation were prone to infections even if they live in places exposed to malarial, bacterial or viral contaminants. Rai (1993) on the basis of his study suggested that aggressive adolescents who suffered from Psychoticism and Neuroticism could be cured of these diseases by way of meditation.

The complexity of society causes stress to an individual and this tends to make him older. Glaser (1992), however, on the basis of his study with meditations showed that they approached life with more calmness, more tolerance and less physiological reactions to stress, and they looked younger than the other persons of the same age, Sogani (1989) emphasised that for relaxation of tension, the role of meditation is of basis importance. Swada and Andrew (1989) on the basis of their study of the effect of brief meditation training on cardio vascular stress responses of 24 women found that meditation could be used as a stress management technique.

Pearl (1987) studied the effect of Transcendental meditation upon anxiety and observed that it had positive role in reducing state-trait anxiety of 23 adult subjects. Similar results were found in a subsequent study by Jangid, Vyas and Shukla (1988). The concluded that the course of Transcendental Meditation not only significantly decreased anxiety scores of 30 subjects but also significantly enhanced their memory.

In America in a study with jail inmates the meditational techniques have been found to be useful for correcting the behaviour of the criminals by David

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(1982). In India in a similar study Bedi (1993) observed some positive change in attitude and behaviour of 70 convicts in Tihar jail Delhi.

Benson (1974) found that practice of meditation decreased alcohol intake among subjects. Meditational techniques according to Sheila & Joan (1988) are good means of recovering from drug or alcohol abuse.

The purpose of meditation is not merely to remove the abnormalities and diseases but also to promote self - realization, which is emphasised by all religions and also the eastern as well as western spiritual disciplines. Self realization is higher level of consciousness designated as superconsciousness (Akhilanand, 1947) much above the consciousness (Mc Dougall, 1905) and unconsciousness and subconsciousness (Freud, 1925). According to Aurobindo (1976) it is the super conscient and not the subconscient which is the true foundation of things. It taps at consciousness without sensation of external stimuli, it is Extra Sensory Perception (E.S.P.). Self can be known (that is, self realization) through transcendence of normal state of consciousness to the aforesaid higher level of consciousness. Meditation, it is claimed, can result in increasing integration and growth of an individual and healing of his psychological and psychosomatic disorders. It can lead also to enhanced creativity and improved relationships with others. Thus sociability of a person can also be improved.

As regards nature of Meditation some people often imply that they have to sit down and learn many new terms and a philosophy. The word 'Meditation' is from the latin root 'meditare' which means 'to reflect', 'to exercise', 'to practise'. To specify, it is talking within the mind, it is an inner speech-the inner whispering of the heart.

Meditation in broadest sense means 'to detach your-self from outside world and to attach it to your inner 'self'. Chang (1978) discussed Meditation as a means of understanding consciousness in which all psychological phenomena include two meanings of consciousness : the faculty and the content, thereby, implying a content-free and conflict-free state : pure consciousness. According to Thomas (1978) Meditation is a process in which 'You' and 'universe' become 'Youniverse'. As per Indian tradition, Krishna (1975) explained the nature of meditation in terms of a set of techniques to achieve higher consciousness ('Kundalini'), a state of activity in which the reproductive system of body recoils on itself and transfers energy to the brain and that can lead to transcendental states of consciousness, genius and supernormal psychic powers.

Meditation has been explicated mostly in religious usage as the reverent, intense, active and sustained contemplation of God or some religious theme or ideal. As such it is regarded as a spiritually strenuous and purposeful exercise, requiring composure of mind, a long procedure of internal quietitude, of abstraction from sense of absorption in reason and persistent concentration of

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attention by which the human soul is attuned to the Divine,' and the soul exercised thereby has among other spiritual possessions also the 'power of seeing into eternity'. Its aim is the strengthening of the moral life through communion with God. It is an important form of devotion in the higher religions and is especially emphasised and practised by the great mystics.

However, the word Meditation has not merely religious connotation but the other connotation which does not mingle it with religion, religious performance or God, Meditation is in terms of withdrawing attention from things, events and people of world and to rivet the eye on nose point. Similarly, Boehme (1901), for example in his 'Dialogue on the super - sensual life' described the process of meditation as the "cessation of individual activity, and urges the direct and steadfast fixing of eye upon any one point. Again, Naranjo and Ornstein (1971) defined Meditation as a set of techniques which are the product of another type of psychology, one that aims at personal rather than intellectual knowledge. As such the exercises are designed to produce alteration in consciousness - a shift away from the active, outward - oriented, linear mode towards the receptive, inward - oriented and quiescence mode and usually a shift from an external focus of attention to an internal one (Don, 1977). In the words of Abdullah and Schueman (1976): "The basic technique of meditation is the passive focusing of attention on a constant stimulus, visual auditory in nature, or just a thought or an idea. Meditation possibly is a function of right hemisphere of the brain as opposed to the analytical, verbal functions of the left hemisphere". However, little scientific researches have been conducted on physiological correlates of meditation.

Having discussed the various view-points about the nature and meaning of Meditation may be given as deployment of attention designed to purify the ordinary states of consciousness by removing illusion and / or to facilitate the eventual production of states of consciousness in which truth is more directly perceived and the world is viewed in a new illuminating direct way.

From the foregoing account it is obvious that Meditation involves some or the other techniques for withdrawal of attention from external states and to mould it towards internal states. Although, this is the common focal point in various meditational techniques, as propounded by the practioners but the approaches somewhat differ in nature and complexity. So, it would be necessary to state briefly some of the illustrative techniques and programme of meditation which are being widely used in eastern and / or western part of the globe for scientific investigation as well as for attainment of higher states of consciousness.

Simple Meditation

This is the simplest technique in which the practioner concentrates his attention on word 'Om', or a Dot or on a sentence such as 'Godly Light is within

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me' every morning and evening for the period generally ranging from fifteen minutes to an hour. Currently in India Mataji Nirmala Devi is propagating it in small groups of persons.

Japa Meditation

In this technique the practioners use beads, thumb and forefinger and meditate. On each stroke of bead or movement of fingers they pronounce 'Ram', Allah' or 'Christ' or 'Om" and so on. Meditation is done in morning/evening and some people practise it for hours during waking period. Old age people have been observed to use this technique frequently. This technique was used in researches by Murphy et.Al. (1987).

Zen Meditation:

Zen is a branch of Buddhism which has evolved it and it relies heavily upon it to achieve enlightenment and understanding of a ourself and the universe. It aims at a complete shutdown of input processing which, obviously, results in an expanded awareness. It has five steps-the first three steps focus on breathing exercises, the fourth step involves global desensitization and thought stopping, and final step pertains to awareness, relaxed feeling. Zen meditation has been analyzed in terms of behavioural control of the drug addicts (Shapiro and Zifferblatt, 1976).

Prekshadhyan

It was evolved by preachers of Jainism. It is widely used. It aims at concentration on therein centers of consciousness such as centers of cognition, tranquility, introspection, health, power etc. The various centers are systematically purified and strengthened so as to improve physical, mental and spiritual aspects of the practioner. It has been used in curing such diseases as hypertension, heart trouble, peptic ulcer and insomnia.

Transcendental Meditation :

It has been evolved by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi and practised in Maharishi Meditational centers in India and United States of America. Transcendental meditation purports to bring out a state of restful alertness from which the practioner is said to emerge with added energy. It involves breathing exercises as well as the exercises which permit the meditator to perfect his ability to allow his consciousness to settle down spontaneously to its state of least excitation. It is the experience of a pure undifferentiated state of awareness beyond the bounderies of space and time and leads to the unfoldment of creative intelligence in the meditator (Mahesh Yogi, 1966). Generally, it has daily sessions each lasting 15 to 20 minutes. Transcendental meditation can be learnt from teachers (specially trained in it), who charge substantial fee. Bourliere (1970) found that T - M technique is useful in strengthening cardio - vascular

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system and neuro-endocrine system and considerably preventing deterioration due to ageing.

Benson's Relaxation Technique :

It was evolved by Herbert Benson et al. (1975) at Harvard. It emphasises upon developing relaxation responses in the meditator. It involves following steps-sitting with eyes closed, relaxing all muscles, concentrating on breathing, disregarding other thoughts. Meditation practice is done twice daily for 20 minutes period each. It is done at least two hours after the meals. Benson et al. (1978) observed that due to meditation the metabolic rate is reduced resulting in less energy consumption. Don (1978) reported that Benson Relaxation technique of meditation increased alpha power in electro-encephalographic record.

Silva technique of Meditation:

It was developed in the early sixties by Mexican- American Jose Silva a dynarnic natural psychic. It is becoming popular. Over three million graduates in 60 countries have been trained in it. The Silva method of meditation gives in as few as four days the realisation of one's hidden potential and access to a host of techniques for improving our lives. The trainee graduates have been found to stop smoking, give-up drugs, regulate sleeping and enhance ego strength, maturity, calmnes, self assurance, tranquility and intelligence (Datta, 1991).

Hatha Yoga Meditation

It is practised mostly in India. It is stringent technique of penance. It involves such activities as lifting hand or feet, or confining to extereme cold or hot temperature for many days, weeks and months. During this hard exercise the individual, of course, does reflection. An interesting example of Hatha Yoga meditation from India is reported in the issue of the Hindustan Times of 24th June 1992 about the Chief priest Ganga Das Baba of an Ashram at Amravati. At the peak of summer when the mercury shot there between 40 o to 50 o celcius, the priest installed himself on a pedestal and engulfed himself in a fire of cowdung cakes, while lost in meditation. It winter, he immerses himself in a well for hours together in the early hours each day. Baba told the correspondent that this method of meditation purifies his soul and gives him spiritual satisfaction. There are so many instances of Hatha Yoga meditation in Allahabad, Varanasi, Hardwar, Calcutta along the river Ganges in India.

Recent Research Study on Meditation by the Author :

considering in the foregoing account the important aspects and issues pertaining to Meditation, the present author planned a research study on the role of meditation in development of personality of students. This research, its findings and the implications are being discussed in the following description.

Problem :

The aim of present day system of Indian education is mainly in respect of raising the level of academic achievement of students. Of course, this is important but it is important to develop their personality as well. Many research studies discussed already in this paper have pointed out the significance of meditation in development of personality characteristics. However, the review of literature showed that most of the studies reported in this field of research are from religious resources and clinical resources but the studies are scarce from educational institutions especially in India. Moreover, the studies on the effect of meditation on academic performance are also counted in number (Paul, 1985). It is imperative, therefore, to conduct researches to relate meditation to personality characteristics as well as academic achievement of students because personality development and educational development both are equally important for students.

Keeping the above - stated facts in view, the problem of the present study was to find out the effect of meditation on the personality characteristics, namely, Anxiety, Neuroticism, Depression, Emotional adjustment and self concept of under - graduate students including the students with high academic achievement and those with low academic achievement.

Sample :

The sample of the study consisted of 100 undergraduate Art students from the colleges of Udaipur University. The subject age range was 17+ to 20+. The sample included only those students who had never practised any type of meditation earlier.

Experimental Design :

It was a 2 x 2 factorial design experiment with two conditions of meditation (Meditators and Non-Meditators), two levels of academic achievement High Achievers (that is, first divisioners and Low Achievers that is, second divisioners). Thus, there were four groups of students - Group I of Meditator High Achievers, Group II of Non-Meditator High Achievers, Group III of Meditator Low Achievers and Group IV of Non - Meditator Low Achievers. There were 25 students in each of the four groups. The subject of the different groups were matched on age, scores of Anxiety, Neuroticism, Depression, Emotional adjustment and self concept. These four personality characteristics were the dependent variables of the study and the independent variables were Meditation and Academic achievement.

Techniques & Tools :

The following technique and tools were used in the study :-

- (i) Bensons Relaxation Response technique of meditation (Benson, 1975).

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- (ii) Hindi version of cattells' IPAT Anxiety scale questionnaire (Kapoor, 1970).
- (iii) Hindi version of Eysenck's Maudsley Personality Inventory (Jalota & Kapoor, 1965).
- (iv) Adjustment Inventory of college students (Sinha & Singh, 1971), in Hindi.
- (v) Self concept Inventory (Mohsin, 1976), in Hindi.

Procedure :

Prior training in Benson's relaxation technique of meditation was given to the subjects so that they could practise meditation correctly. The meditator group of subjects meditated twice a day (Morning and evening) devoting 20 minutes in each of these two sessions. The meditation was done for 63 days by these subjects. On 64th day all the subjects of the meditator and non - meditator groups were administered the relevant items of the tests pertaining to Anxiety, Neuroticism, Depression, Emotional adjustment and self concept.

Results & Discussion :

The scores obtained by the different groups of subjects in respect of the various personality characteristics, namely, Anxiety, Neuroticism, Depression, Emotional adjustment and Self concept were analysed by 2- way Analysis of variance technique and the results are discussed in the following account dependent variable wise.

Anxiety

The mean and standard deviation values in regard to Anxiety scores of the subjects of the four groups were calculated from the raw scores and the obtained results are given in table 1 below.

Table 1.

**MEAN AND S.D. VALUES OF FOUR GROUPS OF SUBJECTS
BASED ON ANXIETY SCORES**

Groups	Group description	Mean	S.D.
I	Meditators/High Achievers	20	4.17
II	Non-Meditators/High Achievers	25.96	4.8
III	Meditators/Low Achievers	20.32	4.57
IV	Non-Meditators/ Low Achievers	24.8	6.77

In order to test whether the trends of the differences in mean value were significant or not, 2- way analysis of variance was done and its results are stated in following table.

Table 2**TWO WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BASED ON ANXIETY SCORES**

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Sum of Squares	Computed F ratio	Remarks on Significance
Main Effects	681.21	1	681.21	25.82	Sig. at .01 level
Meditation					
Achievement	4.41	1	4.41	0.16	N.S.
Interaction	13.69	1	13.69	0.51	N.S.
Within Sets	2572.4	96	26.8		
Total	3271.71	99			

An examination of F-ratios in the above table alongwith the mean values in preceding table showed that Meditators had significantly less anxiety than the Non-meditators. This finding is in line with the results of the study conducted by Jangid, Vyas and Shukla (1988). However, the results in table showed that there was no significant difference between the anxiety of high and low achievers.

Neuroticism

From the raw score pertaining to Neuroticism, mean and standard deviation values were computed for the four groups of undergraduate students. Table 3 below depicts these values.

Table 3**MEAN AND S.D. VALUES OF FOUR GROUPS OF SUBJECTS BASED ON NEUROTICISM SCORES**

Groups	Group description	Mean	S.D.
I	Meditators/High Achievers	17.16	3.88
II	Non-Meditators/High Achievers	22.72	4.61
III	Meditators/Low Achievers	17.96	3.74
IV	Non-Meditators/Low Achievers	21.96	5.59

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With a view to assess the significance of difference between the mean neuroticism scores of the subjects, F-ratios were computed from the 2-way analysis of variance and the results are shown in the following table.

Table 4**TWO WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BASED ON NEUTOTICISM SCORES**

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean sum of Squares	Computed F-ratio	Remarks on Significance
Main effects					
Meditation	571.21	1	571.21	28.06	sig. at .01 level
Achievement	0.01	1	0.01	0	N.S.
Interaction	15.21	1	15.21	0.75	N.S.
Within sets	1954.32	96	20.36		
Total	2540.75	99			

The results stated in table 4 were viewed jointly with the results given in table 3, and it was observed that the undergraduates who were Meditators were significantly less neurotic than the undergraduates who were Non-meditators. Rai (1993) also reported similar results in an earlier study with adolescents of higher secondary schools. The F-value in respect of Achievement (Table 4) further indicated that high achievers and low achievers did not differ significantly in Neuroticism.

Depression

The raw scores of the subjects of each of the four groups were analysed to find out mean values and standard deviations pertaining to Depression and the results are tabulated hereunder.

Table 5**MEAN AND S.D. VALUES OF FOUR GROUPS OF SUBJECTS BASED ON DEPRESSION SCORES**

Groups	Group description	Mean	S.D.
I	Meditators/High Achievers	12.08	2.71
II	Non-Meditators/High Achievers	15.24	4.36
III	Meditators/Low Achievers	13.64	4.58
IV	Non-Meditators/Low Achievers	15.92	4.8

The trend of difference in mean values given in above stated table were tested for its significance. For this 2 way Analysis of Variance was applied. Its results are given in table 6 below.

Table 6

TWO WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BASED ON DEPRESSION SCORES

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Sum of squares	Computed F-ratio	Remarks on Significance
Main Effects					
Meditation	184.96	1	184.96	10.39	Sig. at .01 level
Achievement	31.36	1	31.36	1.76	N.S.
Interaction	4.84	1	4.84	0.27	N.S.
Within set	1710	96	17.81		
Total	1931.16	99			

A Perusal of the F-ratios stated in above table showed that Meditation was the significant main effect and not the Achievement. Again, the examination of the corresponding mean Depression scores of Meditators and Non-meditators clearly showed that the Meditators had significantly less depression in comparison to the subjects who did not undergo the course in meditation. Thus, meditation had salutary effect in lessening the depression among the undergraduates. Delmonte (1988) also found that meditation was an aid in reduction of depression among the subjects.

Emotional Adjustment

Mean adjustment scores of the undergraduate subjects of the four groups are given in the following table alongwith Standard Deviation values.

Table 7

MEAN AND S.D. VALUES OF FOUR GROUPS OF SUBJECTS BASED ON EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENT SCORES

Grpups	Group description	Mean	S.D.
I	Meditators/High Achievers	23.36	2.43
II	Non-Meditators/High Achievers	20.84	3.06
III	Meditators/Low Achievers	21.68	3.13
IV	Non-Meditators/Low Achievers	18.76	3.5

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In order to find out whether the trends of differences between Mean values as observed in table 7 were significant, 2- way Analysis of Variance was done and the F-values so obtained are given in table 8 below.

Table 8**TWO WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BASED ON EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENT SCORES**

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean sum of squares	Computed F-ratio	Remarks on significance
Main Effects					
Meditation	184.96	1	184.96	19.8	Sig. at .01 level
Achievement	88.36	1	88.36	9.46	Sig. at .01 level
Interaction	1	1	1	0.11	N.S:
Within sets	897.12	96	9.34		
Total	1171.44	99			

On an examination of the remarks column in the above table showed that Meditation as well as Achievement were the significant main effects. These results perused alongwith the mean Emotional adjustment scores of different groups tends to show that Meditators were significantly better adjusted emotionally than the Non-meditators. Moreover, the High Achievers were significantly more adjusted emotionally than the Low-Achievers. Thus, meditation was conducive for emotional adjustment among the undergraduate students. Ahamad, Ahmad and Sumboo (1989) also found similar results in their research study.

Self Concept

From the Self concept scores of the four groups of subjects, mean and standard deviation values were calculated and are represented in the table given below.

Table 9**MEAN AND S.D. VALUES OF FOUR GROUPS OF SUBJECTS BASED ON SELF-CONCEPT SCORES**

Groups	Group description	Mean	S.D.
I	Meditators/High Achievers	32.28	3.18
II	Non-Meditators/High Achievers	29.2	4.45

III	Meditators/Low Achievers	29.28	4.8
IV	Non-Meditators/Low Achievers	27.72	6.44

To test whether or not the trends of mean differences stated in Table 9 were significant, 2-way Analysis of variance was done and the results of such analysis are shown in table 10 below.

Table 10

TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BASED ON SELF-CONCEPT SCORES

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean sum of squares	Computed F-ratio	Remarks on significance
Main Effects					
Meditation	184.96	1	184.96	7.78	sig. at .01 level
Achievement	585.64	1	585.64	24.65	sig. at .01 level
Interaction	0.64	1	0.64	0.03	N.S.
Within sets	2281.12	96	23.76		
Total	1171.44	99			

The F-ratio stated in above table in regard to Meditation and Achievement both were significant. A perusal of the mean values given in preceding table indicate clearly that the undergraduates who had practised meditation had significantly better self concept than those who did not practise it. Again, the high achievers had significantly better Self-concept than the Low achievers. Kongtawng (1977) also reported on the basis of his study that self concept of subjects can be improved by regular course of Meditation. Further, it was observed from the results stated in table 9 and 10 that the High Achievers' Self concept was significantly better than that of the Low Achievers.

Conclusions:

From the results stated in respect of different variables of the present study, the following conclusions tend to emerge out:

- (1) Anxiety of the Meditators was significantly less than that of the Non-meditators.
- (2) Anxiety of the High achievers was not significantly different from that of the Low achievers.
- (3) Neuroticism of the Meditators was significantly less than that of the Non-meditators.

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- (4) Neuroticism of the High achievers was not significantly different from that of the Low achievers.
- (5) Depression of the Meditators was significantly less than that of the Non-meditators.
- (6) Depression of the High achievers was not significantly different from that of the Low achievers.
- (7) Emotional adjustment of the Meditators was significantly better than that of the Non-Meditators.
- (8) Emotional adjustment of the High Achievers was significantly better than that of the Low achievers.
- (9) Self concept of the Meditators was significantly better than that of the Non-meditators.
- (10) Self concept of the High Achievers was significantly better than that of the Low Achievers.

Practical Implications

The present study has brought to the limelight the practical utility of meditation in personality development of the undergraduate students for their better adjustment to the environment (Allport, 1937).

The results of the present research investigation imply that meditation is very necessary for undergraduate students for reducing their anxiety, neuroticism and depression and also for enhancing their emotional adjustment and improving upon their self-concept. Since the academic achievement of the undergraduates was not found to be a significant factor in reducing anxiety, neuroticism and depression, it clearly implies that merely attaining high level of academic achievement by the undergraduates is not enough for lowering their level of anxiety, neuroticism and depression, and the practice of meditation is very necessary for this.

On the basis of the practical implications of the present study, as stated above, it is observed that there is necessity to bring awakening among the students, and their teachers about the meditation, its techniques and its usefulness. To accomplish this task, training in meditation need be given to the undergraduates so that they could practise meditation and could suitably build up their personality.

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5

The Concept of Personality in Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga Psychology and A. Maslow's Humanistic/Transpersonal Psychology.

Joseph Vrinte

The aim of this article is to enter into the challenge to integrate some of Maslow's psychological insights with Sri Aurobindo's views on the various some of the basic postulates of these two thinkers, the reader has to bear in mind that the psychologies of Sri Aurobindo and Maslow are founded on two different kinds of knowledge. Both based their psychology on authentic experience, but Sri Aurobindo expressed his insights largely in the language of Indian metaphysics, while Maslow used the Western empirical approach struggling with the language of science.

Maslow's metaphysical assumptions do not go beyond the intellect; they are based on speculations about the ultimate reality and have only limited spiritual value. For Sri Aurobindo, it is only by going beyond mind that each of us can contact and know the ultimate reality: only spiritual intuition and experience can reveal the nature of truth. Intellectual thinking, as an instrument for expressing the nature of truth, comes in only secondary as a judge of generalised statements drawn from supra-intellectual experience.

A crucial element in this comparison is the language that each employs. It is not immediately evident at any given point whether an apparent similarity or opposition in their views is a matter of ideas or simply of terminology.

Sri Aurobindo, born in the 19th century and educated in the classical tradition of the occident as well as self-educated in the tradition of his native cultural heritage, employs the English of the intelligentsia of his time

supplemented by the specific terminology of the Hindu tradition, sometimes in the original Sanskrit and sometimes in various translations.

Maslow¹, on the other hand, as a citizen of the U.S.A. developed a language which was diverging from the British main stream. He employed a syntax and nomenclature which was far more idiomatic colloquial and immediate in its impact than that of his predecessors in the field of psychology: his language had almost nothing in common with the language of Sri Aurobindo, classical scholar and mystic seer in the Hindu tradition.

1. MASLOW'S METAPSYCHOLOGY

Maslow did not develop a complete systematic theory of personality in which various theoretical systems were elaborated fully or in detail, he only emphasised a few points which cast light on certain aspects of human behaviour; he developed a series of limited hypotheses from which a more detailed theory could later be elaborated. In this paper only most of Maslow's latest developments will be discussed.

Maslow suggests that the human personality is an evolving

METAMOTIVATION

In the last chapters of Maslow's anthology "the Farther Reaches of Human Nature" he moves into the realm of the transpersonal. In "A Theory of Metamotivation," he speaks of inborn higher metaneeds for authenticity, justice, truth, beauty, love, honesty and the like. He moves to the transcendental, to the development of higher states of consciousness where the self-actualising persons are now metamotivated, i.e., they have transcended striving or desiring and are 'unmotivated'. The self-actualisers don't strive but develop, they are not seeking satisfaction for deficits, but to enrich their life through enlarging experiences, through expansion of horizons and through making the most of their potentials.

The healthy personality is involved in life long process of transcending, needs in which being and becoming are both essential dimensions. Integrated moments of being stimulate increased growth of becoming and vice-versa.

Obstructed metaneeds may produce 'Metapathology', Maslow's term of spiritual illness which related to a lack of values or meaningfulness in life. Like the peak-experiences these metaneeds are not the exclusive property of theologians or philosophers but these ultimates lie within human nature and one need not look to a non-human or non-natural source to understand them.

TRANSCENDENCE AND SELF-ACTUALISATION

In a final modification to his account of self-actualising individuals Maslow divides them into two kinds of self-actualisers; non-transcending and

A. Maslow; The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. P.105

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transcending. The transcendents are more metamotivated and find it easier to transcend the ego to go beyond self-actualisation. They are more godlike, innovators of the new and perceivers of unitive consciousness.

Transcendence as mystical experience is related to the mystic fusion with the whole cosmos. This is a special phenomenological state in which the distinction between self and not-self has been transcended and the individual becomes an enlarged self in which the universal values are incorporated. For Maslow the whole process of transcendence is based on the concept of integration, but it also means to become divine or godlike, to go beyond the merely human. However, by this Maslow does not mean the spiritual self; nothing supernatural !. The 'metahuman' or becoming divine is part of the potential of human nature and therefore a natural human characteristic.

In the farther reaches of human nature, the ego-oriented ways of experiencing are gradually replaced by an impersonal cosmic experience where the individual self is at least partly dissolved into the cosmos. This transpersonal experience goes beyond self-actualisation to self-transcendence.

System and at the core of this view of a developing human nature stands his theory of motivation.

He considers human personality as an integrated organism motivated by a hierarchy of needs. Besides the lower basic needs such as physiological needs, the need for safety, love, and self-esteem, Maslow puts at the top of the hierarchy the higher need for 'self-actualisation' when all the basic needs are relatively well gratified. Maslow's model of the hierarchy of needs is based on the existence of a certain directional tendency towards growth and development. This tendency for growth in the direction of a full psychic development led Maslow to the study of self-actualising individuals. An important consequence of Maslow's process of psychological growth is the concept of psychological health. In the healthy personality conflicts are resolved, and constraints are hierarchically integrated or disappear, replaced by a new unity, a synthesis with a new inner order.

Later Maslow replaced this concept of psychological health by the concept of being 'fully human', as not all people move towards self-actualisation when their basic needs are gratified. The latter concept is more descriptive, objective and might serve as a kind of quantitative concept for research purposes.

Maslow using the term 'self-actualisation' to refer to the best of psychologically healthy examples, investigated these models to get the clearest picture of the capabilities of human nature. Self-actualising people are not seeking gratification of full development of the potentialities of the organism.

By studying self-actualisers Maslow discovered another aspect of psychological health, which he introduced as the 'Peak-experience'. In his work

on self-actualisation Maslow tried to go beyond normal psychology to a more complete vision of human nature, but with his studies on peak-experiences he seeks to go beyond human nature to a more complete understanding of reality as a whole. Peak experiences, as secularised mystical experiences, are described by Maslow as "the best moments of the human being experiences of ecstasy, rapture, bliss, of the greatest joy". It is to Maslow's credit to have dissociated the general concept of the peak-experience from the religious and supernatural area. He replaced the term mystic province of priests, saints or yogis but is available to all mankind and therefore open to human investigation. Although these are experiences of transcendence, going beyond the ordinary human consciousness, they nevertheless remain part of human nature. By rejecting religious supernaturalism Maslow created a kind of natural mysticism, dispensing with such ideas as a personal god and divine creator. However, it seems to this author that Maslow when trying to accept the god-like experience but keeping shy from God', does so due to his crude concept of God, a God standing outside of the cosmos (as creation). It is this fight against the untenable dogma of an extra-cosmic God which leads Maslow into confusion.

THE PLATEAU EXPERIENCE

On the basis of these improved views of self-actualising people, Maslow developed a new concept which he called the plateau-experience.

The peak-experiences were just passive, emotional, transient ecstatic bursts which were not always illuminative or cognitive. The Plateau-experience is a more stable and more lasting type of unitive experience, representing a new and more profound way of viewing and experiencing the world. The cognitive elements become greater and greater as the emotional intensity dies out. The Plateau-experience is also far more voluntary than peak-Plateau-experience is also far more voluntary than experiences. One can learn to see in this unitive way almost at will, by long and hard work. However, to take up residence on the high plateau of unitive consciousness seems to require a lifelong effort.

But Maslow seems unclear when he maintains that the Plateau experience includes a transcendence of ordinary humanness. Here Maslow confuses extraordinary humanness and the metahuman, he goes beyond the ordinary humanness but does not transcend the extraordinary.

CONCLUSION

Maslow's visionary ideas remain involved in his vitalistic-biological approach which gives insufficient significance to the spiritual dimension of human development. He has been criticised for the relative vagueness of the descriptive account of his metapsychology, and obscurity of language. He formulated significant questions but rarely came up with final answers, and his

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research was more a way of clarifying his theories rather than an experimental testing of ideas.

But Maslow felt misunderstood by these critics; as he wrote; "To demand rigor, exactness, detail from a first exploration of a wilderness is just plain silly and I have refused to be apologetic about discovering a gold mine"².

As an original thinker Maslow's strength lies in his concern for the higher areas and positive dimensions of human functioning and human experience. He placed the transcendent experience, the transcending of average humanity, at the centre of his psychology, giving the individual meaning and purpose within himself.

II. SRI AUROBINDO AND THE NATURE OF BEING

For Sri Aurobindo personality is only a temporary mental, vital, and physical formation, which the real Person, the psychic entity, puts forward on the surface- it is not the self in its abiding reality. The appearance of personality arises with the development of the ego, which holds itself in exclusiveness from the outside world. However, once the ego transcends its personal consciousness it can become aware of a cosmic unity and it can get in touch with the Transcendental Self. Therefore the highest personality is not the narrow restricted surface personality, it is only a temporary expression of our self-being, temporary but not unreal. Thus Sri Aurobindo does not disregard the ordinary human personality but emphasises true individuality by focusing on the spiritual dimensions of the personality. The initial idea about human personality is not a fundamental error but an incomplete and superficial view.

Only by going inward moving beyond the superficial external personality, the individual discovers his inner being which uses the outer as an instrument for the inner self's expression in the natural world. But although this inner being is more comprehensive and powerful than the various components of the surface personality, there remains the possibility of developing a spiritual being beyond the inner being. Sri Aurobindo does not want the extinction of the individual personality in the Absolute. Through transcendence of the normal ego-bound personality, not by an abolition of all individuality, the individual can transform his human personality into a spiritualised, universalised and divinised being.

LEVELS OF BEING

Sri Aurobindo refers to many different planes or parts of the being within the structure of the individual personality. In the organisation of the being and its parts three systems are simultaneously active;

² A. Maslow: A Memorial Volume, page 75

a. A surface system, made up of the physical, vital, and mental levels of consciousness which constitute the outer being.

b. A concentric or depth system, consisting of the inner being and the innermost or psychic being.

c. A vertical system or higher being, an ascending and descending series of superimposed levels, extending from below the surface mind (the inconscient and the subconscious) to far above the reasoning mind (the Higher mind, Illumined mind, Intuitive mind, Overmind and Supermind).

A. The outer surface being is composed of three entities, the physical, vital and mental being. They are all mixed together and it needs an intense self-observation (regarding the mixture of thought, feeling and impulse) to find out the composition of one's nature and the relations and interactions of these parts with each other. In addition to these external domains of personality there is also a lower domain, the realm of the subconscious and the inconscient which is marked by obscurity and disorderliness and which exercises an extensive determining power over conscious life and behaviour.

B. But behind the apparent surface being is a large subliminal or inner existence which, like the outer being, is also comprised of three levels, the inner physical, vital and mental. This inner being, unlike the outer being, can directly experience the universal in all its levels; it has the tendency to widen and come into direct contact with the universal forces.

Though we are usually not aware of our inner being, it should therefore not be considered merely unconscious, it is invariably more conscious than the surface consciousness. However veiled from the surface consciousness, this subliminal part of the being is not at all obscure and incoherent; it has the same capacities as our waking being but it is more developed.

Within this inner being of man is revealed the inmost being or psychic being. When in the course of its evolution in Nature the psychic essence behind takes the form of an individuality, that psychic individuality is called the psychic being, which grows from life to life using the evolved mind, vital and physical as its instruments. It temporalises and individualises what is eternal. According to Sri Aurobind; "It is the psychic personality in us that flowers as the saint, the sage, the seer; when it reaches its full strength it turns the being towards the knowledge of Self and the Divine, towards the Supreme Truth, Good and Beauty, Love and Bliss, and opens us to the touch of spiritual sympathy, universality, oneness" ³.

The psychic being, though individual, can be easily located in the transpersonal realm as it forms the depth-dimension of the inner reality and

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opens the individual towards universality, though due to the action of the ego it appears to be deprived of universality.

C. The Higher being; for a spiritual change the awakening of the psychic being is essential but not sufficient. A psychic realisation provides an inner change but the outer nature continues to be moved by the mechanical effects of past energies. An ascent into the higher being is therefore also necessary for an integral union with the Divine.

The Spiritual planes above the mind are characterised by a concentrated harmonious consciousness, untouched by the movement of mental ideas, vital desires, or physical needs. It is the meeting place of the ascending and descending forces, and it ranges from what Sri Aurobindo terms the Higher mind, through the Illumined mind and the Intuitive mind, to the Overmind and beyond. This higher or spiritual mind is distinct from the ordinary mind as it does not see through distorting spectacles and its knowledge is not coloured by its instruments.

This classification of the Being is helpful for psychological self-knowledge but it should not be erected into too rigid a formula. As these things run very much into each other, a synthetical sense of these powers is as necessary as the analysis.

TRANSFORMATION AND THE INTEGRAL PERSONALITY

Sri Aurobindo's dynamic view of yoga is an effort towards the fullest realisation of the potentialities of the human personality with a psychic and spiritual transformation of all the parts of the being, and the union of the individual with the Divine, which ultimately leads to the manifestation of the Divine on earth.

He uses transformation in a special sense as; "A change of consciousness radical and complete and of a certain specific kind which is so conceived as to bring about a strong and assured step forward in the spiritual evolution of the being, of a greater and higher kind and of a larger sweep and completeness than what took place when a mentalised being first appeared in a vital and material animal world" ⁴.

For the transition beyond the human into the Divine there must be a conversion inwards, a going within to find the inmost psychic being, and there must be an ascension, a series of conversions upwards, and then a descent or a turning down to convert the lower parts.

Transformation is not the central object of the traditional Yogas, but for Sri Aurobindo a full descent of a new consciousness into the whole nature of man is essential to transform life, instead of a spiritual escape from life or a

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departure into some kind of celestial transcendence. Transformation means therefore a radical and integral transmutation of the ignorant human nature and not a mere moral purification or a revelation of the Spirit.

The term integral refers to Sri Aurobindo's stress on the development of all aspects of the human being, the body, mind and soul, to their highest potential. None of these is to be developed to the exclusion of others. The very essence of Integral Yoga is the conversion of the whole individual being into a higher spiritual consciousness and a larger divine existence.

Though Sri Aurobindo emphasises the union of the human consciousness with the Divine, at the same time he does not disregard the body, life and mind with their outer activities and experiences. It is not their destruction or rejection which is indispensable to perfect spirituality, but rather their purification and transformation.

For this total integration of personality it is essential to go beyond the mental, vital and physical being, to move more deeply inward to the psychic entity, or else upward to the highest domain of the superconscious.

III A CRITICAL ESTIMATE

WHERE MASLOW AND SRI AUROBINDO MEET

A major difficulty encountered when attempting a comparison between the two thinkers comes from the cultural distance between them, Maslow is an empirical scientist and Sri Aurobindo a Yogic seer. Another difficulty has been to arrange into a clear line of argument the rich material presented by both of them.

This article represents some aspects of their visions, but it does not try to claim any exclusivity regarding the superiority of the two views.

Maslow and Sri Aurobindo, in their search for a higher and deeper integration of human personality, study the inner dimensions of human existence. For both thinkers, man is a never finished product of evolution with endless potentialities for inner growth and has the capacity to cultivate the psyche's higher aspirations for a spiritual reality beyond the grasp of the pragmatic human intellect. This inner nature of man needs to be actualised or realised through discipline and control, however, they differ regarding the contents and the means of getting in touch with this inner nature. For Maslow this inner nature, which is often very weak, can be made effective only through the achievement of ego-strength, whereas for Sri Aurobindo one of the essential conditions for coming into contact with one's inner nature is the replacement of the limited personal ego by the true Self (Purusha).

Both thinkers discouraged a preoccupation with the individual's imperfections and gave a greater importance to man's possibilities and higher

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impulses. They share a clear-cut optimistic view of human destiny: man must learn to move towards future realisations, and all that is good and helpful in the past must be integrated into the desired form for the future.

Maslow and Sri Aurobindo both emphasise the continuum from the material life to the spiritual life and both brought the depth of the inner reality out of the exclusive sphere of religion, stressing the need for the investigation of this internal reality.

At present we are in the midst of a transitional period in which the old and the new being are mingled; the old continues to dominate ordinary life, yet a higher consciousness is quietly and slowly developing. That it is growing and working is experienced by various people who have given descriptions of their experiences which vary according to their respective cultural backgrounds. Maslow, for example, described the experience of self-transcendence beyond self-actualisation, whereas Sri Aurobindo refers to an integral and transformative experience.

WHERE MASLOW AND SRI AUROBINDO DIFFER IN OPINION

In exploring man's inner being, his potentials and future growth, both thinkers agree that ordinary life is something one must pass beyond not to any remote Heaven but in this earthly life itself. But the methods they recommend for achieving this differ widely. According to Sri Aurobindo, man's main drive is towards the transcendence of his humanity; for Maslow it is for human fulfillment. What Maslow conceives of as the farther reaches of human nature is founded only on humanistic empirical science, whereas the basis for Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga is essentially spiritual. Sri Aurobindo does not stop short at the stage represented by Maslow's term self-actualisation but proceeds further until man reaches the divine personality.

Although these two thinkers are both concerned with the development of man's basic nature and share a conviction of his essential goodness, they differ radically in their descriptions of what this basic nature is. Maslow considers man primarily as a biological organism, whereas Sri Aurobindo assumes a divine essence for man, he sees man as a slowly evolving manifestation of the Divine.

Maslow's God or divinity is based on the best and most remarkable aspects of human beings. He finds the transpersonal aspiration via faith and trust in unaided human nature; man does not have to turn to God to solve all his problems, but merely look within himself for all sorts of potentialities, strength and goodness.

Sri Aurobindo refers to man's eternal aspiration and seeking for God, the divine principle, the ultimate Truth. He sees a divine mechanism that is capable of transforming human nature and creating a new world order. Sri

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Aurobind's conception of an evolving psychic being, essentially divine, is too occult a notion for Maslow to accept, or to receive any verification from his experimental-empirical psychology.

For Sri Aurobindo present day Western psychology, which passes from one theory to another before the first is well-founded, is not a firm basis on which a metaphysical structure can be erected. His metaphysical psychology is based on a perception of man's urge towards spirituality, a divinisation of the mind, the heart, and the very body, a Kingdom of God not only within us but simultaneously in a collective human life. Sri Aurobindo's integral theory gives a complete view of the human personality; man is not merely a biological and psychological being, but a spiritual being too. No true development of the individual is possible without the awakening of the inner being, which stands at the core of an integral personality.

Maslow did not cultivate a full-blown new theory but instead elaborated a universal framework of reference and a series of limited propositions and hypotheses from which a new theory could be developed later on.

THE INTEGRAL PERSONALITY

Maslow's study of personality is based on the holisticdynamic or organismic method, according to which there must be a preliminary understanding of the total organism before its parts can be studied. Man's inner personality creates a tendency to look within, but this impels to look within for the real self is for Maslow a kind of subjective biology, which comprised of constitutional, temperamental, physiological, and biochemical needs and capacities.

Sri Aurobindo is sceptical about the biological representation of the human personality; he takes the term personality in relation to the human ego-self to mean something limited, external and separative. Behind every ego stands the true self, which is the divine individuality. He does not discard the concept of personality but rather extends it; the highest individual experience is of the persistent spiritual truth of personality and this process of spiritual growth is one of transformation through integration. A radical change in the mental, vital and physical aspects of man's being is necessary to attain a perfect integration of the personality.

Maslow's view of the integration of personality is based on the basic-need gratification. He insists that the higher nature of man develops only on the basis of the lower, although eventually when it is well established it may become relatively independent of the lower needs.

At the very heart of Integral Yoga psychology lies the concept of the psychic being, the integrating principle of the total personality. If Sri Aurobindo's ideas were to be expressed in Maslow's terminologies it might be

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said that the basic-need realm needs to be transformed by the psychic, rather than its gratification before it can be transcended.

It is clear that the two thinkers vary widely regarding the principle of integration. Maslow uses the word transcendence in a hierarchical-integrative way which implies that the higher is built upon and includes the lower. But he appears unclear about the details of this integrated hierarchy. Since development of the higher levels is dependent upon continued gratification of the lower rungs, the latter cannot disappear but continue to exist in a non-active state. How far this in active state is able to be integrated remains an unanswered question.

For Sri Aurobindo the process of integration is a taking up of what has already been evolved into each higher grade as it is reached. The higher grades are latent in the lower grades; it would not be possible for the lower to evolve into the higher unless the potentiality of the higher were already inherent within it; the lower levels of development contain within themselves the essential principle of that which exceeds them. Maslow's higher is not already contained in the lower, and his synthetical process of integration appears to be more partial.

Unlike Maslow's concept of basic need gratification, for Sri Aurobindo diverse principles do not unite on their original level after gratification but are first transformed and then enter into a greater synthesis. In this way integration means the unification of each part of the being around the central being. What Sri Aurobindo terms "Integral Transformation" is not merely a growth from lower to higher levels, but also implies the uplifting and transformation of the lower levels so that they become fit instruments of expression for the latter. When a lower level is taken up by a higher one nothing is destroyed or lost but the lower is modified and infused by the higher. This means an ascent through descent; the higher descends into the lower, transforms it, completely so that the lower ascends into the higher.

Through the type of mental integration described by Maslow, a certain mastery or control over the lower levels can be achieved; but mastery is not the same as transformation; the changes which can be brought about are not sufficient to integrate the whole being. Only when all the different parts of the being are under the control of the central psychic individuality does a full integration of all the parts of the being become possible.

CONCLUSION; MASLOW'S HUMANISATION OF SPIRITUALITY AND SRI AUROBINDO'S SPIRITUAL DIVINE HUMANITY:

Maslow, in his secular humanism, does not ignore the spiritual dimension of man, but he remains chained to man's biological nature and is therefore unable to perceive a way to divinise humanity. He did make divinity

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more accessible to human appreciation, he viewed the farther reaches of human nature as naturally self-transcending but these transcending urges, though universal, are not necessarily spiritual. For Sri Aurobindo, the farther reaches of human nature include the development of higher faculties which are still unmanifested; present humanity, however real, is no more than a shell to be pierced, the ultimate goal lies beyond the human level.

Maslow's humanisation of spirituality is a representation of spiritual phenomena in terms of human potentials. His naturalistic mysticism is based on the complete fulfilment of human nature by the gratification of metaneeds; spiritual life lies on the same continuum as the material life, it is part of the individual's full humanness.

Sri Aurobindo's spirituality, on the other hand, is not seen only as an aspect of biological life, but as the essence of life itself. His spirituality is not an idealism, not a moral purity and austerity but the essential and universal truth of existence which brings us in direct contact with the Divine.

For Maslow, full humaneness includes a spiritual life, the developmental stages of self-transcendence beyond self-actualisation remain human. Yet if what man ultimately seeks lies beyond the human level, it may be questioned whether spirituality can ever be humanistic.

At the same time it may be questioned how Sri Aurobindo's Supramental can assume a social dimension as long as it is a highly individual attainment. In stressing the individual nature of spiritual effort, and as a consequence the individualistic concept of spirituality, Sri Aurobindo characterises all the common endeavours of mankind as mental and, from the ultimate viewpoint sees all such mental efforts as ineffectual. He is usparing in his rejection of the ties that currently hold human society together, common civilization, culture, education, science, religion, social laws are all ineffective means to change and significantly improve human life, since they have no power to transform human psychology and the human race.

Maslow would certainly argue against such a view. According to his conception, what unites humankind is the common aspiration to human social values and these can therefore never be written off as ineffectual. A social world-view is built upon qualities like sympathy, righteousness, love and compassion, they are in many ways man's only route to Godhead.

But for Sri Aurobindo, these human tendencies, however noble and good, need a metaphysical justification. He does not reject human interest, but human nature itself cannot have its complete fulfilment without self-transcendence into a supra-human nature, i.e., an interpenetration of human interest by the beyond-human. Man, left to himself, will not be able to solve his problems. No rational methods can deliver men from his social, political,

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educational and moral problems; only by the emanation of the supramental is man able to overcome the limitations and imperfections of human nature.

For Maslow, however, if the value of human activity is real, than the validity of the ethical world is as real, an ideal to be achieved. Ethical laws have a purpose in explaining and deepening the individual's self-development. For Sri Aurobindo the human ethical standpoint cannot be applied to the total solution of the problem of the universe, but for Maslow such views deprives man of all his significance.

In these arguments lie the core of the main difference between the two thinkers; Maslow sees the divine as essentially an aspect of humanity, a human divinity, whereas Sri Aurobindo sees the essence of humanity as divine, and thus conceives the possibility of the evolution of a divine humanity.

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6

Contribution of Psychology in reducing aggression and violence in society

N.S. Chauhan

Aggression and violence are rising unchecked in human society and are forcibly carrying ourselves and our dreams of peace and prosperity towards annihilation or extinction. The unbridled growth of these 'negatives' of life and being, have become the utmost concerns of man on all possible levels of social existence. This phenomenal uprising with a black-history of human adventures at Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and recently in Iraq, do not indicate any thing about social, national or international development because development refers to the process of 'self-motion' from the lower to the higher, revealing the internal tendencies and the essence of the phenomenon with an emergence of the positive new (Rosenthal and Yudin, 1967). This 'dim perspective' without any prospect of 'future of man' happens to be a great challenge for investigation and solution for social sciences and for psychology in particular. Similar views have been expressed long back, (Naess, 1958), when he said that the last area to be investigated is the area of the constructive forces in human nature and society which make for the reduction of inter-group conflicts. The analysis of ethical principles with respect to the psychological processes they implicate and the social conditions which maximise their effectiveness, may be the most important next step in social sciences. The topic of the deliberation of the present Seminar, as such has a two way approach. It attempts at exploratory contribution of psychological researches related to the reduction of aggression and violence on the one hand and on the other, also investigating contribution of the discipline made in promotion of positive areas of affiliation, love, cooperation and co-being etc.

To explain, aggression includes the entire spectrum of assertive, intrusive and attacking behaviour. Aggression is the act of moving against others. Aggressive behaviour is directed against another individual expressing

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interaction or desire to inflict injury (Kaufmann, 1970). Aggressive action is a hostile action causing fear or flight in another person, failing which brings the aggressor into forceful contact with the other person (English and English 1959).

Aggression has been taken by social scientist in different forms. Some see it as a part of human nature (Freud, 1930, 1955; Konrad Lorenz, 1966; Toynbee, 1970). Mostly, aggression is noted as a function of frustration agreeing with the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis (Dollard and Miller, 1941). People widely acclaim aggression as a pattern of behaviour that is learned (Bandura & Walters, 1963). Aggression is readily learned through observation and imitation of aggressive models.

Violence, as a concept refers to aggression's destructive form. It involves infliction of physical damage on persons or property. Destructive tendencies that necessarily accompany violence usually operate in the service of antisocial action, violence usually operate in the service of antisocial action, hostility disturbed perception, irrational fears or authoritarian personality (Irwing and Katz, 1970). Aggression, conflicts, fights, revolutions, insurgencies, wars etc. are always cruel in spirit and oppressive in character. Physical power or force used in coercion or oppression, never procures self-convictions in people that emanate from openness, freedom, rationality and responsibility. That is why, wars have cost man dearly, in terms of their inevitable accompaniments, like, death grief, destruction of material resources, social disorganization. The psychological cost of war, as Coleman (1974) points out is there in an enormous quantity in terms of guilt, dehumanization irrational behaviour, alongwith, diversion of natural resources, productive capacity, trained minds. Huge money is invested to kill life in place of nurturing it.

Both aggression and violence have become international problems and their restrictive suffocating climate has snatched away creative behaviour and 'creative visions' from man. Devastating wars are continuously fought and violent crimes around us go increasing fast (Hunter & Whitten, 1976). Both aggression and violence, rampant around us have appeared as a great problem. We are experiencing increasing multiplication and routinization and even cultivation of violence, its increasing frequency and intensity and extensiveness, its increasing impersonality and insensitivity and lawlessness; its increasing arbitrariness and pettiness and callousness...; its increasingly volatile and reckless and frightening quality, its increasing venality and professionalism and recourse to more sophisticated weaponry; its suicidal and homicidal and genocidal outbursts; its increasing linkage with money power and political power, and governmental machinery. (Yadav, R.S. 1991).

Aggression and violence, as negative type of human behaviour also generate some most undesirable patterns of behaviour. Among these, hostility is one that exists as a tendency to feel anger toward and to seek to inflict harm

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upon a person. Hostility exists as a sublimated prejudice also (Lindgren, 1974). Prejudice is another correlate. Prejudice may be taken as a particular attitude or sentiment that inclines or predisposes the person to act, to think, perceive or feel in ways that are congruent with a favourable or unfavourable judgement about another person.

Thus, aggression and violence, reinforced by scientific and technological facilities and power concentrations, remain one of the greatest hazards that can bring about both destruction and extinction of human society. They can suffocate and check the process of life perpetuation.

Reduction of aggression and violence is a necessary condition for the enhancement of peace and prosperity of a good society. Humanity, in order to grow in peace and prosperity, needs a sane and creative society. Only in this society, man can actualize his creative vision. Since man's survival and actualization are worthwhile, the system of organization and behaviour of societies can be assessed in terms of their consequences for their objectives. Since society provides a climate to life, it must remain truly sensitive towards procuring the best of climate for growth and development. It must, in operational terms, provide strength to man to proceed to 'self-control' from the state of 'dependency'; to the plane of 'reality' from imaginative 'pleasure'; to the world of 'knowledge' from the darkness of 'ignorance' to 'competence' in action from deficiency based 'incompetence'; to the world of 'morality' from narrow-minded 'self centredness' (Coleman J.C. 1974). Let us never forget that growth is the process of being born; of nurturing and actualizing potentialities chooses to grow, not that he is grown (Maslow, 1938).

The meaningfulness or worth of sciences lies in their pragmatic functions to humanity. These functions mean promotion of the positive and reduction of the negative climate for man. As such, what has been the role of sciences in general and psychology in particular in the context? How could psychology contribute to the development of humanity through reduction of the negative climate of aggression and violence?

Psychology, as a science of human nature and understanding, in conjunction with culture, religion and social sciences, has made the following contributions towards reduction of aggression and violence in the individual and society.

1. Reduction or promotion in functions of a particular phenomenon depends on its correct identification, followed by a control.

Aggression and violence have been identified in psychology and other social sciences. Misconceptions about aggression as 'inborn tendencies or instincts' have gone away. Both aggression and violence are acquired phenomena

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and are results of social learning. They remain exposed to observations and imitations of aggressive models. Culture determines them in an important way.

2. Psychology, with other social sciences, has exposed the hazardous nature of aggression and violence and has made positive contributions to their reduction.

Aggression, violence, conflicts, wars-hostility, prejudices etc. speak for the psychopathology of people and their society. History supports that presence of these maladies in society, is awe-ful. Wars cost man dearly. They bring disasters, griefs, destruction of material resources, social disorganization. The psychological cost includes guilt, dehumanization, irrational behaviour, cultural chaos etc. War and violence being multi-dimensional phenomena, cost humanity, psychologically, culturally, socially, politically, economically etc.

3. Fruitful intervention-research has been done in infancy and childhood, specifically directed towards preventing the damaging effect of racial prejudice, hostilities etc. on the early development of children. Results have convincingly shown that prejudices, hostilities etc. are, to a good extent the byproduct of faulty social learning.

Avoidance of faulty learning and keeping it in a congenial setting can prevent one from aggression and violence. Both infancy and childhood are the best periods for such social programmes.

4. Attitudes, as pre-dispositions guide behaviour. Good and positive attitudes, as recommended by psychological researches, if allowed to be formed comprehensively through various media, can reduce aggression and violence as correlates of one's pathological ugliness.
5. Both psychological and anthropological researches suggest that aggression and violence of individuals as well as of society, can be managed and reduced through the following mechanisms (Hunter & Whitten, 1976).
 - (a) Grievances that flareup aggression or violence have a multidimensional status. Factors at work in the context, may be, economic, social, political or ecological. A systematic and sophisticated research is a must for a comprehensive knowledge of grievances.
 - (b) The second device to reduce aggression or violence is conciliation. Attempts are to be made to alter perceptions or depictions of the situation. This may lead to the arousal of a multi-dimensional understanding with an elimination of narrow perceptions and prejudices.
 - (c) The third device consists of bargaining. Most of our disputes can be amicably settled through negotiations between disputants.

- (d) Development is the fourth device to reduce aggression and violence. The unpleasant situation is restructured to provide opportunities to both the parties for developing new insights, interests and goals.
- (e) The fifth device refers to education in which pertinent facts from all possible sources are collected and presented to the parties for the development of factual assessment and consequent empirical attitudes.
- (f) The sixth device is that of 'Confrontation'. Various devices are adopted in the face-to face situation. It may be a passive resistance, a propaganda, a political manoeuvring or an armed rebellion.

6. (a) One can cope with hostility through catharsis which is purging of emotions by art. This is similar to 'sublimation'. It includes release of tension and anxiety by emotionally reliving the incidents of the past especially those that have been repressed and honestly facing the causes of difficulty.

Exposure of violence on the T.V. is not catharsis of violence since viewing of violence arouses it (Russell and Green et.al. 1969).

- (b) Social learning determines aggression. We learn to be the person we become.
- (c) Faulty parenting full of permissiveness, it has been noted, reinforces aggression. It must be avoided.
- (d) Parents, appearing as 'aggressive models' to the child, help and encourage the child to imitate aggressive behaviour.

When crucial problems of existence and being arise, it is through learning and culture that adaptations are made by man (Hunter and Whitten, 1976).

Indian culture, with its effective activation in a sound psychological framework, has been successful to present, one of the most promising programme for man's socialization, supplemented by society's individualisation.

It is the basic look-out of the society and culture to procure to procure, the best of conditions and facilities throughout the whole life, (from conception to death) through the systematic celebration of cultural 'archetypes'. The twice-born, as a result of the sane outlook and participation of parents, family, society and culture, grows physically, morally, and beautifully and turns out to be a highly useful citizen, quite unaware of the negative patterns of behaviour.

Society's individualization stands as a complementary part in the total process of a man's psycho-cultural 'being'. It is the lookout of the individual to proceed, through 'self-training' to rise upto the expectations of the society and the culture. He is expected to follow the 'Yoga Sadhana' -- the eightfold path of the Yogic training. The training in the Yamas and Niyamas is a must.

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The Yoga psychology contributes not only to reduction of aggression and violence but prepares the psychic background of the person for the state that knows no negative patterns of behaviour. The socio-cultural development through the sanskara and the Yogic Sadhana equip him with a strong base to grow as the 'Arya and to make the whole world as Arya.

The yogic psychology for 'Self-training' thorough the cultivation in the Yama-Niyam remains the strong base for the Yoga-Sadhana (Vedalankar, R.P. 1982). Training in the Yama's (Ahimsa, Satya; Asteya, Brahmcharya and Aparigraha) is meant to keep one's sense detached from attraction or involvement of worldly objects. In consequence, the heart gets purified.

Ahimsa, as such is not non-killing but encompasses behaviour full of affection for all creatures, all time and in all circumstances. Similarly 'Truth' stands for a close identity of contents of Mind and Speech.

The internal purity of the Shuddhi Niyam stands for vanishing mental impurity.

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The Watsonian Crusade Against Wundt : An Evaluation

Awadhesh Kumar Sinha

This paper is a modest attempt at a brief appraisal of the contributions and achievements of Wundt vis-a-vis the problems and tasks he set himself and vis-a-vis the advocacies of some other prominent figures in the field who subsequently crossed swords with him and managed to snatch away the discipline from Wundt's hands and whisk it away to their own domain. Wundt, whose name is almost unquestionably associated with the founding of experimental psychology in so far as he clearly defined the tasks of a psychologist and went ahead with a programme of systematic and empirical study of mind and consciousness, started no doubt as a towering personality in the field but ultimately got pushed into an humble position at the hands of a number of opponents who built up a massive 'Zeitgeist' that engulfed Wundt soon after he launched a crusade against what he felt to be an illegitimate confinement of psychology within the courtyard of philosophers who, over the centuries, had kept it unduly fettered with their traditional armchair speculations, incapable as they were to give the study of human nature an empirical scientific deal.

It is one of our professional obligations to examine the legitimacy of the Zeitgeist that nearly uprooted the Wundtian plant and to evaluate whether the posture that Wundt adopted had or has even now the inherent potentiality to brave the storm.

In his basic approach to a science of Psychology, Wundt proposed it to be a study of mind and consciousness and advocated that the task of a psychologist was to be to analyse, discover and unravel through scientific investigations the contents of mind. He further held that the method ideally

suitable to such investigations and one that blueprint of Psychology drafted by Wundt. In his investigations Wundt proceeded to set up experimental situations and to obtain introspective data therein and to draw conclusions on the basis of these data regarding the different aspects of mind and consciousness. Obviously, Wundt exhibited a praiseworthy consistency-his objectives and his methods being beautifully matched. Psychology was now on the track, no more lost in the jungles of metaphysics/

It was not, however, in the luck of Wundt to see psychology go ahead on this track for long and the light that he had kindled started getting dim before long. Wundt received a major jolt when Watson, a smart opponent, rolled up his sleeves against him and pleaded aggressively for an almost total rejection of all that the former's system stood for and proposed its substitution by a new system to be called 'behaviourism'. To Watson, Wundt's concern with mind and consciousness produced too mentalistic a version of Psychology which brought to the subject the character of a clouded, mysterious discipline not open to outer observational study and which, therefore, could be hardly called a science. Watson began his attack by pressing for a revision of Wundt's definition of Psychology and for a reformulation of its subject-matter in a way that something tangible and concrete replaced the so-called mentalistic and the mystic. Watson proposed and asserted that psychology should study the overt behaviour of living creatures instead of studying mind and consciousness. Watson had at the back of his notion the belief that mind and consciousness could not be scientifically observed and studied and as such could not be accorded any place in a scientific endeavour. This reformulation of the subject-matter of Psychology was the first Watsonian blow inflicted on a sober, well-meaning Wundt.

Watson did not spare Wundt a second blow and took no time to repudiate introspection which, according to him, was too subjective an approach to be able to deliver the goods. Being a highly subjective method introspection, according to Watson, yielded an endless variety of observations and results that differed from man to man and thus did not lead us anywhere. Introspection according to him, only opened debates instead of settling and closing issues. Watson was overly critical of an aversion to the use of introspection and in his zeal for objectivity pleaded that introspection be fully abandoned and finally replaced by objective observation. Wundt was once again in hot soup with severe curbs imposed upon him. Watson succeeded in winning the support of the younger group of psychologists who felt nearly hypnotised with the glamour of objectivity that Watson showed them and soon the Watsonian army outnumbered the small but loyal Wundtian band. Additionally, Watson had on his side the cult of the new, i.e., the characteristic fancy for the new and a putrid oversatiation with the old. Wundt was made to recede in the background. In order, however, to be fair to Wundt one has to examine the academic propriety

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and soundness of the Watsonian crusade against him and it is chiefly vis-a-vis this attack on him that Wundt's contributions have to be evaluated.

Firstly, was it not an oversmart Watson who went ahead rather ostentatiously to change the very objective and subject-matter of Psychology? Watson found himself at a loss to hit upon any method through which mind and consciousness could be effectively studied and instead of toiling and labouring to find out a suitable method he adopted the questionable short-cut of changing the very subject-matter of psychology. Now, was it not a shrewd arrangement of convenience that Watson worked out instead of coming forward with a scheme for handling the original problems that Wundt had posed? And further, does it not violate the canons of academic ethics to change the very subject-matter of a science on grounds of convenience of study? Instead of attempting to solve the methodological crisis Watson chose to disfigure the very original texture of psychology. How many instances do we have of this type in the other sciences, e.g., physics or chemistry or medical science etc., that the original subject-matter and objective have been allowed to be changed by a new entrant in the field just for the sake of methodological convenience? The goal or task that a science originally sets itself cannot be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. But this is what an impatient Watson actually did. Instead of finding out a method suited to the already laid down objectives Watson selected an objective that suited the methodology which he had drafted: a hysteron-proteron approach, indeed. Wundt, on the other hand, always stuck to his original goal and kept toiling to find out suitable ways and means to attain the same. He braved the difficulties and kept away from the professional offence that Watson committed even though he found the ground rapidly slipping from under his feet. It would have been a better and dignified Watson if he would have laboured to show the way for the study of mind and consciousness but he, instead, did something which nobody in any science is free to do. Changing the subject-matter severely jeopardises the stability of a discipline. Unfortunately, as we are all aware, this offense has been committed too frequently on psychology. What Wundt provided was a stable banner; what Watson did was only a glamorization of psychology.

Secondly, Watson's major crusade was there against the use of introspection chiefly on the ground that it yielded results that varied from man to man and was thus too baffling a method to be worthy of credence. We shall see below that this criticism of introspection is not unremediable, that this does not carry much weight and that the method has, far otherwise, certain inherent qualities that render it specially suitable for many kinds of psychological investigations. In some form or other even now the objective of the science of psychology is to unravel the functioning of mind and the ingredients of mental experience, direct access to which is possible only through introspection. The results obtained from all other sources are merely inferential and, in fact, we

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should feel greatly indebted to the introspective method which, by providing direct access to mental states, has prompted the initiation of many kinds of studies. We really do not know how valuable an aid we would be really missing if we choose to relinquish introspection for good and proceed to depend only upon objective observation and experimentation. I shall just quote two instances in support of my stand. Firstly, in spite of prolific research and in spite of the use of highly sensitive instruments we have not attained any remarkable success so far in differentiating the various emotional patterns on the basis of inner physiological or other directly observable overt changes and even now we have to depend upon introspection to know with certainty whether a subject is experiencing pain or disgust or anger or annoyance in a specific situation. Secondly, we do not have even now any sure way other than introspection of knowing whether a worker in a factory is fatigued or not since the physiological changes, output records and subjective feeling do not mutually intercorrelate in any definite and consistent way. These observations only speak of the high value of introspection as a method of psychology and compellingly demand that this method which was drafted, advocated and used by the founder of experimental psychology must be retained and given its due position instead of being criticised and abandoned. In our investigation we are still making considerable use of the technique of interview but are not the interview data frequently, if not always, brewed out of introspective analysis?

As it occurs to me, introspection serves at least three important functions in psychological studies.

Firstly, it helps in what may be called a "cognitive labelling" of the mental state that occurs at a particular moment. We may be overtly observing that a man is trembling, that his hands and feet are shaking, that his heart-beat and pulse rate are accelerated, but what after all do all these stand for? It is only through an introspection-based cognitive-labelling that we may be able to know whether what the individual was experiencing was fear or anger or any other kind of specific arousal.

Secondly, introspective reports are valuable validational aids and this merit of introspection must be accorded due recognition. We may be carrying on diligent researches making use of costly and sensitive instruments to ascertain the minute bodily changes that occur during fear or anger or any other kind of specific mental state but whether the changes that we have been able to record and note down are really associated with the mental state of fear or anger can be ascertained only through introspective reports. The usual practice in such researches has been to arrange stimuli that are expected to arouse a specific emotion (e.g. hurling of abuses upon the subjects to arouse anger) but whether the individual has actually been aroused in the expected manner remains to be ascertained through introspective report. Don't we know that an abuse may arouse intense anger in a sensitive subject but only disgust in the more calm and

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stable individual while a typical Indian saint may remain absolutely unaroused and neutral even in the face of this disturbing stimulus? In short then, even when we are conducting purely objective investigations we may have to fall upon introspective data for the validation of our findings. This valuable role of introspection in the study of the different aspects of mental states will always remain to be there.

Thirdly, introspective reports serve to provide valuable leads regarding the future course of research and also regarding where and at what points additional checks are needed to arrive at safe, uncontaminated findings.

Clearly, then, introspection has a significance of its own in the conduct of psychological investigations. Has not introspection been indispensable even in some purely quantitative studies and measurements of mental states? For example, do not our objective and quantitative measurements in psychophysical studies depend upon the subject's introspective report of whether one of the two weights is heavier or lighter than or equal to the other? And have not the quantitative laws of psychophysics, e.g., $\Delta R/R = K$ or $C = S \log R$ been carved out of introspective data?

Let us not, however, shut our eyes to the limitations of introspection. Its main drawback as pointed out by Watson and others is the high inter-subject variability of report which gives rise to doubts and debates. But is not this true to an extent also of observational and experimental data? In any field of psychological investigation we are frequently faced with mutually conflicting experimental and observational results. Is not this true of latent learning, of the role of emotional tone of material in forgetting, of the significance of temporal location of the interpolated activity in retroactive inhibition, of the place vs. response learning controversy, of the value of psychotherapy in the mental disorders etc., to name only a few? If we are not prepared to shun experimentation and objective observation on this ground, why should we pick on introspection alone?

Further, this fault of introspection is not unremediable. Even in experimental studies, we are aware, we do not get uniform results in cent per cent cases and we have statistical devices to assess the reliability of our findings. The faults of introspective findings are remediable in the same way and by weighing the relative figures of different kinds of findings we may arrive at valuable results. The only difference is that in the experimental method one has to adopt the deductive approach while in the introspective method one has to proceed inductively. Each approach has a logical sanction and validity of its own. Where introspective data will baffle, statistical methods will pick up; where introspective data will exhibit a specific trend, statistical checks will be called upon to confirm or refute it. This is what is done in the case also of experimental and observational data. The value of introspection will increase

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with the use of statistical aids just as the value of experimental findings increase with the use of statistical applications.

To frequently we accuse Wundt as if he used introspection to the complete exclusion of experimentation. The fact is that Wundt arranged experimental situations, at least in the sense that he introduced experimental variables as and when required, and proceeded to obtain introspective data therein and in this sense arranged a blending of experiment and introspection. His was really a method of experimental introspection and this has remained a unique and valuable contribution of Wundt, apart from his deep anxiety and intensive efforts to wean psychology from the breasts of philosophers and make it stand respectably on its own legs. This amalgamation of experiment and introspection has been carried down the ages as the most workable method of psychology and may continue to be so in future also. With statistical aids coming to join hands, it becomes a resharpened tool competent to handle most psychological investigations.

To sum up, Wundt must be credited for making psychology a systematic, independent science, for formulating its tasks, for showing unstinted faith in it and for advocating the use of experimental introspection for the achievements of the ends of this science. What is required today is a recharging of the Wundtian torch in our search for the laws governing the functioning of the mind alongwith a call for reviving our faith in introspection alongside experimentation and objective observation for the fulfilment of the aims of Psychology. The posture that Wundt assumed may have attracted criticisms but it is sturdy enough and capable of surviving most attacks only if the present and coming generation is cautious not to be emotionally and unduly swayed away by the "cult of the new".

Editorial

Humanism of Nehru

Anurag Atreya

Indian cultural tradition is extremely rich with its humanist pathos, with its ancient genuine and original humanist ideas, conceptions, etc., The various forms of Humanism and means of expression are transmitted to us from the Vedas, Brahmins, Upanishads, Mahabharat, Ramayana and so on.

Jawahar Lal Nehru contemporizes his humanism and is closer to socialist real humanism. Nehrus' philosophical views have a methodological significance for his social and political, economic sociological, moral, ethical and other views.

The Socialist Ideas in the Humanism of Jawahar Lal Nehru.

Nehru says "Socialism is the credo of my life and I am devoted to it with all my soul and heart"

During the early period he is mainly inspired by the ideas and the struggle of Mahatma Gandhi. The active participation of Jawahar Lal Nehru was in the National Liberation Movement and the Indian National Congress. The victory of the first socialistic revolution in the world exercises strong influence in the consciousness of Jawaharlal Nehru. His first visit to Soviet Union for the first time he published his book "Soviet Russia". This work showed his acquaintance with the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and other Marxist scholars which Mr. Nehru admits has exercised great influence on his mind. His views were the realistic approach towards life and the stressed humanist directedness take the upper hand. Shri Nehru was regarded as contuer of the Progressive Humanist traditions in Indian Culture. Nehru openly declared that he does not see any other way that will do away with misery in India but socialism. Nehru further says: "Socialism is not an economic teaching for me, but also the credo of my life" and also "Socialism is the credo of my life and I am true to it with all my soul and heart". Nehru's Government supported

the co-operative movement and published a book on co-operative movement. A number of progressive measures in the field of education and culture were introduced by Nehru.

The main efforts of Jawahar Lal Nehru and for the principle activity of the state and Party, the most characteristic is the desire for better life of the people, of all strata of the working masses.

Jawaharlal Nehru's striving for Active-Scientific Humanism

There is a growing synthesis between humanism and the scientific spirit, resulting in a kind of scientific humanism" (Nehru) "My roots" Jawaharlal Nehru explains "are still perhaps partly in the nineteenth century, and I have been too much influenced by the humanist liberal tradition to get out of it completely. "The old Indian social structure" had some virtues and indeed it could not have lasted so long without them. Behind it lay the philosophical ideal of Indian Culture the integration of man and the stress of beauty, goodness and truth".

Jawaharlal Nehru tried to remain true to the progressive Indian Humanist traditions. He was inspired by the tremendous achievements of socialism, the real humanism being a characteristic feature of it. Jawahar Lal Nehru was mainly concerned with the problem of man and wanted to acquaint himself with the philosophical principles which determine the thoughts and activities of contemporary man and at the same time to approach the very problem of man in a creative manner, making it possible to find active ways and means for the reformation of his nature, and together with it, the conditions for his existence too. Marxist philosophy had great influence on his thinking. Nehru does not ignore the laws of development and the spiritual values. Moral values plays significant role in the spiritual humanism of Nehru as he attaches great importance to Mahatma Gandhi's views. Jawaharlal Nehru considers social laws and bases his work on scientific analysis, which is considered the key stone of scientific socialism.

Jawahar Lal Nehru writes- The real problems for me remain problems of individual and social life of harmonious living, of a proper balancing of an individual's inner and outer life of adjustments of the relations between individuals and between groups of a continues becoming something better and

higher, of social development, of the ceaseless adventures of man "and also "A living philosophy must answer the problems of today". Nehru sees the meaning of the conscious life of man. Ordinary Material prosperity according to Nehru is not the only thing to be achieved but more as means or pre requisite for the integration of the individual.

An eminent Soviet Scholar A.D.Litman supports "the most important problem that attracts Jawahar Lal Nehru from the ideological and the theoretical point of view, is the problem of man and also, that "Nehru has always been trying to acquaint himself with the philosophical principles which determine the thoughts and the activity of contemporary man, and at the same time to approach the very problem of man in a creative manner, making it possible to find active ways and means for the reformation of his nature, and together with it, the conditions for his existence too. D.Dass, an eminent author of Political Philosophy of Nehru -Belief in man that attracts Jawahar Lal Nehru to the moral values of life and Mahatma Gandhi's teachings had left a great impact on his spiritual aspect of humanism. (Jawahar Lal Nehru does not ignore the social laws and bases his work on scientific analysis, which is considered the key store of scientific socialism.)

Man and his personality should be taken care of on the first place. Here, proceeding from scientific socialism, Jawahar Lal Nehru carries his point that man's individuality is determined by the social system, man being an integral part of it. D.Dass supported with full reason as well that private property (eg. the private ownership over the means of production) are the fundamental cause for all problems of today's society as well as for its evils avarice, selfishness, corruption, violence etc.

1

Women and Social Tolerance: Christian Perspective

Joseph Kuttianickal

Peaceful co-existence among people of diverse faith, culture, language and tradition is not conceivable at all without social tolerance. As India's social and national life is deeply marked by plurality of religion, peaceful co-existence among its citizens is simply unthinkable without social tolerance. It is a universal fact that the awareness and practice of social tolerance mark a high degree of civilization.

The concept of social tolerance embraces the life of human beings in its totality at various levels of life. The object of this paper is to study the concept of social tolerance concerning women in the Church, with special reference to the Catholic Church. The article focuses on the increasing instances of discrimination against women on the basis of sex and the need for granting women equal rights with men. Women's demand for equality is studied under the United Nations Organization's Charter of equality for women, the position taken by Feminist movements and the Church's own position on the question of women's equality.

The United Nations Organization's International Women's Year Conference was held in Mexico city from 19th June to 2nd July 1975. It proclaimed equality between men and women as regards their rights, duties and opportunities for human advancement. The Conference stressed the indispensable role of women in development and peace in the World. It resolved to come out with a world plan of action over a span of ten years (from 1975 to 1985) for the emancipation of women.¹

The concern of the United Nations Organization to defend and uphold women's rights is once again brought to light in yet another resolution of the World Body 'The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women' which was adopted in the year 1979, and came into force in 1981. It was felt that the maximum participation of women, in all areas of life, on equal terms with men, was essential for the welfare of the world at large, the full development of a country and the cause of peace in the world. It envisaged a society in which man and woman become equal partners and builders, all the same recognising their different sexual identity. The Charter also defines the meaning of discrimination in the following words:

"Any distinction, exclusion or restriction founded on sex that results in or aims at hindering or preventing women, whatever their matrimonial status from owning, enjoying or exercising, on equal basis with men, their human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other sphere."²

That women's emancipation is a crying need of the time is clear from the concern expressed by the United Nations Organization for granting equal rights to women as enjoyed by men. At the same time, it is also an indication of the state of affairs in many countries of the world where women are treated as inferior to men.

The Feminist Movements in the Church express their anguish at the unequal treatment meted out to women in the cultural and religious fronts. Women who are active in the Women's Liberation Movements regard the structure of the Church as male-dominated, as men constitute the teaching authority in the Church and occupy positions of power while women have been regarded as not eligible to such posts in the Church. One of the glaring examples of such discrimination against women is that they are not allowed to become Ordained Ministers in the Church. The Feminists regard this attitude of the Church as patriarchal and andocentric. What goes with patriarchal attitudes and patterns of thought is subjection of women to laws which favour only men allowing women to play only inferior roles in the society and the Church. One of the leading authors in the Feminist Movement, Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza points out the need of a 'Feminist. Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins'. Any one can understand the meaning of a call to go back to the very origins, to the authentic spirit of Jesus and his teachings, to read the scripture going beyond the barriers of patriarchal concepts and ideas. As scripture sets the tone of theology, proper understanding and unbiased interpretation of the scriptural texts are essential for sound theological formulations in which there is no room for discrimination against one section of humanity that constitutes women.

That there should be correct understanding and interpretation of the scriptural texts is born out of the contention that both, those who support women's movement as well as those who oppose it, can quote the scriptures to support and substantiate their respective positions. As scriptures are written against the background of a given time, culture and tradition, they have to be studied and interpreted in accordance with an evolving historical process. An examination of two key texts from the Creation Narratives in the Book of Genesis (Bible) will prove this point. The first two chapters in the Book of Genesis contain the creation accounts. But they belong to two different traditions, namely, the Priestly Tradition (Chapter 1), and the Yahwist Tradition (Chapter 2). The creation narrative of the Priestly Tradition is as follows:

Then God said, 'Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing

that creeps upon the earth'. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.³

The above text is a classic example of complete equality between man and woman. It would imply that man and woman are intended by God to work as equal partners to effect the fertility of the earth and the fertility of the human person in accordance with God's command, "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it."⁴ Woman should enjoy equality with man in every sphere of life as she shares the same human nature and is begotten in the same dignified manner by God, sharing the Maker's own image and likeness.

The Yahwist Tradition interprets the creation story in a different light. The narration describes 'man' as dominant and 'woman' as subordinate to man. "Then the Lord God formed man of the dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living being."⁵ The creation of woman does not arise at all at this Stage. God breathed the breath of life into the nostrils of man and not woman. Therefore, man is the receiver of life directly from God. As the need was felt, at a later time, of a companion fit for Adam the first man God made woman, from one of the ribs of Adam.

A careful reading through the entire text of the creation narrative of the Yahwist Tradition will show that the whole creation is meant for man and his pleasure, and he alone is the master of the whole creation, and woman is made as a help-mate for him as he could not find any one among the beasts of the field fit for him. The contemporary feminists feel deeply hurt and angered by the patriarchal images projected through such scriptural texts denigrating women and lowering her status. One of the leading feminist authors, Kari Elisabeth Borresen, gives expression to her pain and anger in the following words:

The woman was created from man and so was materially dependent on him, and for man, and therefore was existentially dependent on him. Only the human male was thought to be made in the image of God: the female was not so made.⁶

Theology is the product of human experience at a given time in history and is socially and culturally conditioned by the time. The Yahwist Tradition was developed against the background of material prosperity and national awakening during the time of King Solomon. Polygamy was the practice in Israel at the time of the Patriarches and it continued throughout the history. In a society where polygamy is practised, women have only an inferior position. They are there to serve man's needs and fill his days with happiness and pleasure.

Examining the equality of women at the level of the Church, we can see some leaders in the Church today, very sensitive to the demands of women for equality with men. Church cannot protest against the violation of human rights in the world, if she herself does not grant equality of right to women in the Church. At the 1983 Synod of Bishops on 'Reconciliation', Archbishop Vachon spoke representing the Canadian Bishops, in these words: "The Church's very active promotion in the world, for elimination of all forms of

discrimination against women is endangered. These appeals are on the point of losing all impact unless the recognition of women as full members becomes simultaneously a reality within the Church itself."⁷

Full membership in the Church calls for full participation in the priestly, teaching and governing missions of the Church, which are now reserved to men (males) only. Bishop Mathew-Clark of Rochester, New York, argues for the inclusive role of women in the Church as prophets, teachers and preachers of the gospel, fulfilling both priestly and sanctifying functions in the community of believers.⁸

Many contemporary, enlightened Church leaders regard sexism, practiced in the Church and society as a sin. Sexism tends to subordinate a human being on the basis of sex with complete disregard for her/his human dignity. It asserts that one sex, male or female, is superior to the other in the very order of creation itself. The denial of equality for women is sexism and as such it is a sin.

The above study enables us to draw the following points: Man and woman share the same human nature and are equal as human beings, having been created in the same image and likeness of God. All forms of discrimination against women is unjust and should be condemned in the strongest terms as unbecoming of civilised persons. The Church has to become more radical and pronounced in her reforms allowing women full participation in all spheres of Church's life. Sexism is the cardinal sin that is eating into the vitals of social life in general and Christian life in particular, which deserves to be condemned by all. Theological perceptions of God, world and man remain incomplete and partial, as long as they are studied only from man's (male's) point of view. Female experience and expressions of God, world and human persons are essential to make theology complete and wholesome. Equality for women is a must and women should organise themselves to fight against all forms of injustice and dehumanization, sexism, oppression and exploitation of every kind. All those who are engaged in the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women should endeavour to introduce new value perceptions in the society and the Church aimed at loosening the grip of patriarchal attitudes and structures that are oppressive and discriminatory.

2

*Sabda-A Learning Strategy**Dr. Subbarayan Peri*

Knowledge is universal. In achieving it two different approaches viz. esoteric, and scientific are witnessed. Each approach has its own Merits and demerits. Just as a coin has two, sides every established theory has its advantages and disadvantages. As human beings we cannot attain perfection in any endeavour. The best we can do is pooling up the knowledge acquired by different approaches and thereby infer the truth just as the six blind men conceptualised the elephant.

One optimistic trend developed during this century is an attitude to synthesise western and eastern lores. One is empirical, objective and scientific while the other is experiential, intuitive, speculative and subjective. So far, a linguist, a mathematician, a physicist or a psychologist arrived at the conclusion that the east and the west differ only in their approaches. They also felt from their scientific approach that the west missed the benefit of human touch. More over, all could realise that both esoteric and scientific approaches are complementary but not contradictory to each other. Capra (1984) wanted a dynamic inter-play between mystical, intuitive and scientific analysis. Murphy (1962) remarked that both the east and the west are coming close very fast. Orinstein (1972) contended that what the west missed by training the left hemisphere of the brain alone can only be compensated by following the esoteric methods of training the mind.

The present volume is prepared with a view to support the said trend with one more specific case. The theme around which I weave the thread is the process of 'Learning'. Needless to say that learning is universal in both animal and human kingdoms and that there is neither life nor progress in this world without learning.

The history of learning is as old as the life on the earth. Whether philosophers, educationalists and psychologists identify, understand, measure, predict or control the process of learning, it goes on. To understand the process of learning countless efforts were made, are being made, and will be made in the east as well as in the west. In the east, mainly traditional ways were in vogue. The understanding and application of learning was inherent in their philosophical enquiries. In the west, at the beginning of the century when efforts began to isolate psychology from philosophy and crown it off as a positive science of behaviour of organisms, the topic of learning appeared on

the scene in its full colours. Psychological enquiry upto the sixties was dominated by the study of learning alone! But during the remaining decades of the century the enthusiasm died. Today, we, the psychologists and the educationalists, show vested interest in research on learning.

Notwithstanding the rise or fall of the enthusiasm in learning research, let me consolidate the scene upto date.

All in all, we have more than thirty theories of learning developed in the west alone. There may be more theories buried in esoteric psychologies, indigenous educational systems, religious practices, and eastern philosophies. The western theories of learning can be broadly classified into two big families S-R conditioning theories and cognitive-field theories. They inherited the two philosophical schools, scientific realism and positive relativism.

S-R conditioning theorists maintain that learning can be understood by S-R bond. The relationship between stimulus and response can be measured, predicted, and controlled. There are differences among these theorists with respect to their emphasis on stimulus, response, bonding, reinforcement or contiguity, the organism, the environmental forces and so on. But most of them wedded themselves to one principle that man is nothing more than a machine. They do not allow any chance for subjective concepts like awareness, consciousness, introspection etc. More importance is attached to the practice, randomness of trials, drive, need, habit formation, extinction, discrimination and the like. The second group of psychologists started with the reaction of the organism as a whole. They argue for molar behaviour, purpose, insight etc. They define learning as the reorganisation of the perceptual field. They take into account the awareness, consciousness, introspection and other concepts related to subjectivity. Ofcourse, some compromised the two enemy camps and forwarded their learning theories to the best advantage of understanding it.

Very recently some psychologists could find new trends in explaining the learning. For example developmental psychologists like Piaget and Bruner. The adherents of humanistic psychology like Rogers, and Maslow developed the learning theories with a high degree of human touch. Those psychologists with better sociological ground put forth the social learning theories. Among this group it is worth to mention the names of Dollard and Miller, Rotter, Bandura and Walters. The gravity of their theories is that learning is possible by observation and imitation in a social setting, rather than in laboratory conditions.

We can classify the learning theories based on one more criterion. Every psychologist has base in one discipline and tries to develop a theory with the concepts and principles of that learning theories based on the principles of philosophy. For example mental discipline, apperception and self-actualisation theories. Waston, Pavlov, Bolles and others developed biological models. Hull's model is a mathematical and he imitates Newton, while Estes model is statistical. Wertheimer, Kohler and Koffka and other Gestalts based their theory on perceptual laws. Lewin borrowed the concepts of physics and chemistry.

Bandura used the sociological approaches. As such there is a chance for me to discover a learning strategy based on the Indian philosophy.

I would like to suggest that learning by verbal instruction is very important in animal and human learning. Its role in changing the behaviour is direct, simple and effective. It is not at all an over statement if we say that most of the stock of knowledge of human beings is possible not by perception, inference or imitation but by verbal testimony. Dollard and Miller hinted at the same. Bandura supported its importance.

The nature, importance, mechanism, significance and applications of learning by verbal testimony was identified, developed, felt and applied in India about two to three thousands years back. Learning by verbal testimony was developed by Indian philosophers who were mainly theistic, orthodoxy, speculative, subjective, intuitive and religious.

Epistemology of Indian philosophy, like any other epistemologies is concerned with the nature of knowledge, its means, and acquisition. The famous six systems of Indian philosophy all in all accepted six means of acquiring knowledge. They are perception (pratyaksham), anumanam (inference), analogy (upamanam), arthapatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (negation). There was an acute need for them to prove the existence of the ultimate reality, atman etc., which are abstract concepts. Perception, inference, analogy, implication, and negation suffer from serious defects and are not fit for teaching abstract concepts. Ultimately they had to depend on Sabda. These six means have been named as pramanam (to give the meaning of measure, standard, or instrument). They measure, standardise or acquire pramiti (i.e. true knowledge) of things.

The words Sabda pramanam, aptavakyam, aptopadesah, aptavacanam are Sanskrit synonyms. Aptavakyam conveys the idea that the intention of a trust worthy person brings about a change in the knowledge, actions, and/or attitudes, values, and beliefs etc., In terms of modern western psychology we call this change as learning'. Thus it is deduced that aptavakyam is a learning strategy. In ancient times Mimamsakas defined dharma the duty, as those acts or behaviours of individuals as prescribed by the Veda. In this case the Veda is apta and the regulation of behaviour of individuals by aptavakyam is learning.

The mechanism of aptavakyam learning is based on the psycho-linguistic principle of verbal conditioning. It can be described as follows. The apta communicates his ideas, mostly through sentences. Sentence is nothing but a group of words expressing an intention. The verb in the sentence is very important in the context of aptavakyam learning. The verb when used in the injunctive mood (with lin suffix in Sanskrit) it conveys five types of meanings viz. command, invitation, permission, politely express a wish, and ask question. The learner from the early stages of life through out his language development gets conditioned to the words in the injunctive mood. He acts automatically when he listens to the verb in the injunctive mood. What

action he has to do will be determined by the root of the verb-word. This is the psycho-linguistic principle that is responsible for aptavakyam learning.

As to the query who is an apta, they defined the term apta as one who has real knowledge of things, and who tells the truth. He should have a desire to convey the right thing to the learner. The learner with some degree of belief changes his behaviour in tune with the apta's intention. By the mechanism of stimulus generalisation the learner gets conditioned to any apta.

Aptavakyam learning like any other learning takes five steps. The first step is awareness of the problem. It may be on the part of the learner or apta. The second step is the development of a strategy for learning. This may be by the learner himself, or by apta or by both. The third step is acceptance of the strategy by the individual. The acceptance may be voluntary on the part of the learner, by persuasion, or by the pressure from the apta. The penultimate step is implementation of the strategy by the learner himself or with the apta's guidance. The final step is acquisition of the learning with a sense of accomplishment by the learner as well as by the apta.

Aptavakyam learning is both a mediating and non-mediating process. It is a natural way of learning because it generally starts with cognitive and ends with effective through conative or the vice versa. But some times, like in S-R learning it starts with conative and ends with cognitive or effective. However, the order depends upon the individuality of the learner i.e., his intelligence, capability, attitude, interest etc. For an intelligent individual the learning is in its natural course i.e. from cognition.

Learning is caused in the learner by an external force in aptavakyam learning and hence it can influence the learner's learning at any stage. As a mediational learning it is pervasive in nature, i.e., it can influence the learner at any stage. It is a step ahead to the reciprocal model suggested by Bandura. He balanced the importance of the factors of the learner, and the environment equally and advocated their reciprocal nature.

Aptavakyam learning is a life-long process. Right from the time of birth of the animal to its death it brings about a change in its personality for eg., the doctor or the prophet may be an apta just before the last breath. Through all stages of developments neo-natal infancy, baby-hood, child-hood, adolescence, adult-hood and old age, the apta changes behaviour of the organism depending upon the characteristics of that particular stage.

Aptavakyam learning is highly a humanistic model. It is subjective. So it always has an in-built capacity for sympathy, empathy, love for all human feelings. It is the simple, direct, and effective way of learning of attitudes, beliefs, values, interests emotions and so on.

Aptavakyam learning is controlled trial-and-error learning. Where an apta guides the individual to associate or contiguity, particular response to the stimulus naturally, the randomness of efforts gets reduced. The individual gets the benefit of avoiding unnecessary, unhealthy and harmful trials. The

guess-work on the cognitive part is taken care of by the apta. The individual has to co-ordinate the muscles only by practice.

Aptavakyam learning is a guided insight. Insight according to gestalts is transfer that it due to an understanding of basic principles, to modes of attack, or to any other type of non-specific transfer. It is described as sudden, unmistakable and immediate apprehension of the real. It's a spontaneous occurrence of a fertile idea or a reconstruction of the situation. If the individual is intelligent enough he can understand the problematic situation as a whole and can arrive at a solution by mentally reconstructing the situation. An apta can help the individual in cognising the situation, correlating its various parts to comprehend and give meaning to the whole situation. It makes the obtained insight unmistakable and real.

Aptavakyam learning is an extended imitation learning. It is essentially a social learning theory because a wide variety of social behaviours are learnt from. Bandura recognised three types of reinforcements: direct external, vocarious, and self-administered. Aptavakyam learning extends to one more reinforcement named aptavakyam reinforcement. Bandura's learning model assumes reciprocal inter-action between the learner and the environment. More over, it can act on R overt or implicit, S from any direction directly, R, awareness, or rewarded R :- Hence it is termed as pervading reciprocal inter-action. Aptavakyam learning is at the peak of the humanistic learning. It is the effective learning to inculcate attitudes, beliefs, and values. The unconditional affection and Voluntary service of the apta develops self-actualisation tendency in the learners. It is always inclusive of sympathy, empathy, warmth, soothing and love. It can prevent the erosion of human values.

Aptavakyam learning has it applications in child rearing, education, counselling, psycho-therapy, industry, etc.

In ancient Indian educational system aptavakyam learning has done much job. Each and every fact need not be learnt by observation, experimentation, and induction. Aptavakyam learning can be an effective learning strategy to teach many things. In fact, aptavakyam operates through holy scriptures, cultural heritage and it is an agency of education. We have many applications of aptavakyam learning in education, for eg., deductive method heuristic method, problem solving method, teaching of concepts, inculcation of attitudes, beliefs, values etc.

Counselling is a field where the counsellor makes the individual to identify his own problem, and solve the problem. Though counsel is the central figure much has to be done by the counsellor himself. The counselor as an apta can produce a healing affect.

In behavioural therapy many things are settled by aptavakyam. Apta's image, form, thought, sight, gestures, look, word, injunctive sentence, explanation, guidance counselling etc., is a modifier of an individual's behaviour. In any country or religion, most of the mental ill health cases can be

cured by a prophet. The principle behind this curing effect is the aptavakyam learning.

I have presented a case for synthesis of eastern and western out-look on 'learning'. Despite my handicaps in terms of resources and exposure I could visualise a concept much in vogue in ancient times and at present. Aptavakyam learning is a current flowing behind a vast majority of affairs of learning. We experience its applications in child rearing practices, education, clinical settings, counselling, industry etc., The aptavakyam learning has its firm grounds in philosophy, psychology, sociology and culture. I could identify it with my understanding of Indian philosophy, western psychology and their inter-dependency.

Really, we have a gap, even today, in our understanding of learning. As Hill (1977) rightly pointed we need a learning theory covering the following aspects

1. Ideally covering the whole range of learning phenomena in human beings and animals,
2. Dealing with complexities of human symbolic learning and problem solving insights,
3. Taking into account the development,
4. Effectively dealing with the topics of motivation and reinforcement,
5. Emphasising acquisition of skills and also learning of motives and emotions from the developmental point of view.

It appears to me that if we can develop a theory of learning by name aptavakyam theory of learning it may add something more to the already existing learning procedures. I have been also experimenting outwith aptavakyam learning in my psycho-pedagogic laboratory. Most likely, by the time this issue reporting experimental evidence will be taking its shape.

In this context, I appeal to the readers to provide me a feed-back. Am I rubbing on the wrong side? Can aptavakyam learning which has been in practice in the east for centuries really be translated into the western psychological frame work? What I intend in this volume is only of a speculative and reflective thinking. Can we develop it into a full fledged learning theory and is it necessary?

Anxiously awaiting the green signal from the elite, I remain.

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3

*Dr. Radhakrishnan's Philosophy of Art.**Nilima Sharma.*

The creative vigour of Dr. Radhakrishnan's writings is clearly in evidence in his aesthetic views which have not yet been properly appraised in the domain of philosophy. His poetic gift, lucid style, lively similes are luxuriously knitted in his philosophic writings which are firmly supported by critical judgments. His philosophy of art is a corollary of his metaphysics.

Radhakrishnan agrees with the traditional Indian view that the impulse to artistic creation springs from the intuitive faculty of man. Intuitive faculty is also the source of scientific and religious creations.

In Radhakrishnan's philosophy, art has been conceived in several ways:

- 1) Art as an expression of creative power,
- 2) Art as an imitation of inner reality,
- 3) Art as a form of knowledge,
- 4) Art as the revelation of the deeper regions of things,
- 5) Art as the utterance of life,
- 6) Art as a social bond.

The notion of art as expression finds relatively an important place in Radhakrishnan's thought. In art, the artist expresses some deep emotions, insight or intuition which he is unable to express adequately by other modes of expression. The artist's dominant interest is to express his insight, or intuition or vision. In his work of art, the artist is in need of four requisites: first the medium or the material for expression; second the technique or the method of artistic execution; third the form of the art-fact; fourth the content or the subject matter. So far as the 'emphasis' on these four requisites are concerned in an artistic creation, Radhakrishnan seems to lean more towards content.

Radhakrishnan observes that art, philosophy and religion explore the wonder, the beauty and the mystery of the world that surrounds us. All the great scientific achievements of the world are also the works of the creative geniuses. This creative power of the geniuses points to the deeper regions of the reality. This creative power is intuitive. Radhakrishnan appreciates the views of the great aesthetic thinker, Theodore Lipps who regards aesthetic intuition as an act of 'empathy' (Einfühlung) on the analogy of sympathy. If any product of art fails to appeal, it is mostly due to the lack of empathy. In each artistic creation, it has been noticed that the artist is completely engrossed in the material and he

gradually moulds it according to his ideals with the aid of his wonderful creative power. Each artistic activity reveals the creative freedom of the artist. According to Radhakrishnan, this freedom is "as rare as that purity of heart which is the condition of seeing God."¹ In the state of creative freedom, artists energies are elevated and sublimated. In artistic creations, the whole existence of the artist is involved. R.N. Tagore asserts that art is creation and creation is freedom. Hence a piece of art is not the mere outcome of man's intellect. Radhakrishnan is not in agreement with Plato while the latter declares beauty to be a "manifestation of intelligence." Baumgarten defines the theory of beauty as the "science of sensuous cognition," or "the art of thinking beautifully." Radhakrishnan says, "Art is the utterance of life."² Art is the outcome of man's spiritual vision. It is not wholly rational. The artist knows how to penetrate into the mysteries of things and to present it to the public. This he is able to do not with his intellect but with the aid of his supra-intellectual power or intuition.* His aesthetic intuition bridges the gulf between appearance and reality, the temporal and the divine. All the great artistic creations of the world because of their universal appeal, convey a message of the 'beyond'-or the other.

In his book 'on Idealist View of Life', Radhakrishnan complains that some of the best writers of his time are real intellectuals, but they are not great artists. They speak from the mind and not from the soul. Greatness in artistic creations displays the genuine inspiration, the rare creative power of the genius (Naisargiki prativa) and not his intellectual power. The creative power of the artist is treated as a divine power. "In those highest moments, the masters of human expression feel within themselves a spark of the divine fire and seem to think and feel as if God were in them and they were revealing fragments of the secret plan of the universe."³ The great works of art are the works of pure spirit, -the works of the highest, disinterested, detached state of human consciousness.** The intellectual writers skim the surface of the reality and fail to fathom deep into the heart of the reality. As a result, they present to us intellectual exercises with striking technical skills, but not genuine works of art. This, however does not mean that the true works of art are completely devoid of thought, -or that they are the works of mere emotion. Each work of art needs a good deal of reflective support for its revelation. Such reflective support is clearly traced in a symphony of Beethoven or a play of Shakespeare. Radhakrishnan does not overlook the role of reason in the creation of art. He only clarifies that the obtrusive dominance of intellect actually hinders the true focus of artistic talent. He thinks that false intellectualism persuades people to prefer in artistic life the supremacy of form to content and not content to form.

*Croce puts emphasis on intuition or vision. The aesthetic expression is identical with intuitive vision.

**In his book "An Introduction to Aesthetics", Hunter Mead writes. "To appreciate without the itch to acquire, to love without longing to possess, to contemplate with joy and satisfaction but without thought of social advantage, economic gain or practical exploitation: this is to achieve the disinterested attitude which is fundamental to the aesthetic mood." (p. 18).

Art is a form of knowledge. It is an imitation of inner reality and not of external nature. The notion of art as imitation received support from both Plato

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and Aristotle. Everybody, says Aristotle, delights in imitation. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Radhakrishnan holds that the "so-called imitative art" is not in fact mere imitation. The artists mind is at work in it with a definite purpose in view. The true artist is not satisfied with the peripheral view of things. He plunges deep into the heart of the things in order to find out the truth, the beauty, the goodness of things. Hence his idea or form is not an added value to the things, but the very core of the things themselves. In that sense, poetic truth is a revelation and not a creation. Poetic intuition is capable of giving us a kind of knowledge.⁴ In all perceptual and conceptual knowledge we find a relation between subject and object. The knowledge we gather in art is not exception in this sense. In art, we notice a response of the finer sensibilities to qualities of the real.

Radhakrishnan discerns that poetic truth is essentially different from the scientific truth. According to Tagore, "Abstract truth may belong to science and metaphysics, but the world of reality belongs to Art." Friedrich Schleiermacher clearly distinguishes the truth of art from the truth of science. Scientific truth is concerned with the revelation of the material qualities of the real which can be measured quantitatively. The poetic truth deals more subtly with the qualitative uniqueness of the real. The poetic vision itself is the criterion of poetic truth. Groce's argument of art as self-expression, does not refer to the narrow, particular self. Kant's argument in the "Critique of Judgment" is more appropriate in the sense that the pleasure which we experience as the enjoyment of beauty is subjective and disinterested and out judgment on it is universal. The scientist's activity is different from the artist's activity. The scientist organises the experimental factual data in a novel manner while he discovers a law. The artist deals with the subtle qualities of the reality and organises them in a novel way to provide a new meaning to our experience. He broadens our mental horizon and deepens our sense of reality.

True art promotes peace and reconciliation. Any great work of art, whether in literature or in sculpture, or in fine arts or in music is capable of absorbing our whole concentration into it. Our mind is lost into the vision of things. Mere intellectual analysis and sense knowledge do not suffice to comprehend the great work of art. Every beautiful art has the power of soothing out soul. It evokes in us the greater values of life and the universe. The artist concerned is not supposed to give us detailed justifications for his creations. "Every beautiful statue has a certain air of repose, every great poem conveys a sense of peace. It is no use discussing a work of art by the standards of intellect and dismissing its characters and events as purely imaginary.⁶ Imagination plays an important role in art no doubt; but it is not the sole factor in it. Imagination does not overlook the true significance of life and the universe. Each art represents a particular type of value of life. In Kantian sense, art gives us "the form of purposiveness in general." The great works of art give us an impression of ultimate decency. True art has a catholic appeal and a binding force which help it in promoting world fellowship. It cleanses the psyche and appeases the soul. Without art, life is like a desert. So art as a whole enhance our vitality. Radhakrishnan has a soft leaning for tragedy in art. "Our sweetest songs are of our saddest moods. We give in song what we learn in suffering."

Aesthetic appreciation requires intense response of the whole mind and not of mere intelligence. It demands a deeper insight on the part of the agent. Sympathy and understanding play a great role in aesthetic appreciation. In artistic appreciation, a rapport between the art-work and the experiencer is needed. Without having proper sympathy and understanding, we would fail to share the world which the artist presents to us through his creations. Schopenhauer is right while he says that the artists "lend us their eyes" and we enjoy the chance to see with them. Radhakrishnan realizes like Leo Tolstoy the merit of art as communication.

Artistic creativity is dynamic. The creative power of the spirit is still growing. It has not yet reached its summit. Art is developing.

Radhakrishnan has not treated philosophy of art as an autonomous study. Art is a handmaid to his philosophy of religion. His philosophy of art is chiefly concerned with the revelation and communication of inner values of life and the universe. So it has an ethical tone in it. Clive Bell admits art to have immense ethical value.

In his philosophy of art, Radhakrishnan has not given due importance on 'rasanubhava' as a distinctive feature of art. An art-work is usually a thing of beauty and "a joy for ever." The beauty and the joy-these two aspects of an artistic object do not exist separately. The pleasure of art is pure and unmixed. It is called 'rasanubhava'. In traditional Indian philosophy, this 'rasanubhava' is accepted as a distinctive feature of art. Whatever mode of art we analyse, -whether of literature, music, dance, drama, painting etc., we discern 'rasanubhava' as an essence of it. Moreover, his notion of art as an imitation of inner reality fails to draw interest. For, imitation is always secondary and it can never be treated as primary in art. If it were primary, then any photo-copy would have been the most perfect art-form. There might be some imitative elements in some forms of art but they cannot be the determinants of artistic worth. It is only the aesthetic value that makes an art-fact significant. In the words of Hunter Mead, "The aesthetic is the irreducible minimum of the artistic." In addition to that, Radhakrishnan's view of 'Art as an imitation of inner reality' seems to be out of joint with his other view that 'Great work of art is the work of the spirit or the inner reality.'

It may be concluded that Radhakrishnan's philosophy of art is not pleading for the doctrine of art for art's sake' which has been criticized as abstract and sterile. The pursuit of art for him has a definite end in view. Its purpose is to elevate life to a higher plane of existence and to promote world fellowship.

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4

*The Uddalakian Perspective In Contemporary Indian Philosophy**

Girish Chandra Baruah,

It is a controversy whether Uddalaka is a historical figure or a fictional one as all other Upanisadic characters are. Yet we cannot deny that there is an Upanisadic philosopher namely Uddalaka who advocates materialism. He is a dominant character in the Chandogya Upanishad as Yajnyavalkya is in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad.

It is assumed that Uddalaka flourished between 640 and 610 B.C. That Uddalaka is a materialist can be determined from his motto that breath and not thought or word is the most important element in man. He is of the opinion that stuff is more primary than thought. Instead of Brahman or Atman as ultimate reality he puts forward Sat.

The other Upanisadic seers following the Uddalakian perspective are: Usasti, Baka, Kausitaki, Raikva, Prardra, Budila, Paingya etc. All these philosophers tend towards materialistic interpretation of life and the world. They do not refer to supernatural causes as being the ground of life on earth but to breath-fluctuations. Instead of taking leave of senses they try to return to them. They often question the validity of the Yajnavalkyan notions current in the Upanishads. Although they are Brahmins they are not interested in ritual practices and believe that these practices cannot bring about human good. Again although most of them believe in deities, their deities are mostly earthly. All these prove that these philosophers have the tendencies in the direction of a materialistic explanation of the processes in nature and human being.

The philosophy of Uddalaka and his followers is quite in contrast with that of Yajnavalkya and his followers who generally emphasises the supernatural significance of words and thought. The Uddalakians think that thought is quite a physiological activity going in our brain. Again breath for them is a natural or physiological process.

We shall not discuss in detail the philosophy of Uddalaka and his early followers as the limited space here does not allow us to do so. We shall confine our discussion to the Uddalakian perspective in contemporary Indian philosophy.

*This paper was read in the U.G.C. Seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Gauhati University.

That there is an Uddalakian perspective is maintained first by a German philosopher Herman Jacobi by name. He is immediately followed by his pupil Walter Ruben who has enriched Indian philosophy by his meticulous research in the line. Walter Ruben is mainly responsible for turning our attention from Yajnavalkya to Uddalaka. Some other philosophers in the West like Oldenberg, Stchesbartsky, Vasiliev etc. have also contributed a lot to the impartial study of Indian philosophy, and they have brought many hidden materialist truths to light. The contemporary Indian philosophers owe a lot to these researchers in the field of Indian history and philosophy.

Although Uddalaka's philosophy may be designated as materialism, it cannot be designated as dialectical-materialism. Yet the contemporary Indian philosophers have found many dialectical elements in him and on the basis of these materials they have constructed a materialist philosophy in the historico-materialist line. The first three of such thinkers in India are M.N.Roy, S.A.Dange and Muzaffar Ahmed. These three may be regarded as the pioneer thinkers in the Uddalakian line.

In 1920 four journals appeared in the Indian scene. They were **Vanguard**, **The Masses of India**, **The Socialist** and **Janavani**. The first two were edited by M.N.Roy, the third one by S.A. Dange and the fourth by Muzaffar Ahmed. But the writings in these journals were not philosophical in the restricted sense of the term. No systematic writing could be seen in these journals. They simply reflect the disorder and tumult of the Indian thinking of that time.

The Uddalakian perspective took the concrete shape in contemporary India when S.A. Dange's serious historico-philosophical book **India from Primitive Communism to Slavery** appeared. In the same period another thought-provoking book **India's Struggles for Freedom** by Hirendranath Mukerjee appeared. Both of these books, however, might not be regarded as truly philosophical, for in both of them only the historical perspective was specially emphasised. For a true philosophical book in the Uddalakian perspective we had to wait upto 1959 in which year appeared Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's epoch making and celebrated book **Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism**.

In the above book Chattopadhyaya treats his subject as a trained philosopher. Unlike the orthodox interpreters he has not avoided historical considerations. He has fully and very competently shown the philosophical implications of historical considerations.

Debiprasad has not rested with this book alone. He has further advanced with a host of books written in the same perspective. Of these mention may be made of **Indian Philosophy: A Popular Introduction** (1964), **Indian Atheism** (1969), **What Is Living and What Is Dead in Indian Philosophy** (1976) and **Science and Society in Ancient India** (1977). If we read all these celebrated books we must entertain a feeling that he is at present without peer among Indian philosophers taking the side of the Uddalakian perspective. His **Lokayata** can be classified under the head 'Classics'. He can be ranked with

George Thomson who has shown the real historical developments of Greek philosophy.

Debiprasad's main interest is to show Lokayata as the highest school of Indian philosophy. He is opposed to the Yajnavalkian perspective which shows the Advaita Vedanta to be the highest school of Indian philosophy. In so doing he is specially interested in presenting a scientific world view in which Uddalaka was interested. His outlook is not fragmented, rather well-knit and, therefore, has become viable to contest the Yajnavalkian perspective. He tries to give a full materialist picture of Indian philosophy beginning with the hylozoism of Uddalaka. As Uddalaka live in the iron age, his philosophy must be bound to be gross. Chattopadhyaya has tried to transform this crude materialism of Uddalaka to a refined one.

Chattopadhyaya follows the line of Walter Ruben who has been trying to explore the possibility of application of the fundamentals of dialectico-materialism on Indian philosophy. We have a general understanding that Indian philosophy is of Vedic origin. Chattopadhyaya, like Ruben, has removed this misunderstanding and has pointed out adequately that it is largely of non-Vedic origin. The non-Vedic origin is mainly the tribal origin, and in tribalism Isvaravada or theism plays no role.

For his data Chattopadhyaya fully relies on the findings of S.N. Dasgupta who has interpreted, unlike Radhakrishnan etc., Indian philosophy impartially. Like Radhakrishnan Dasgupta has not read his mind into the aspects of the history of Indian philosophy. That he is interested in Dasgupta's writings Chattopadhyaya personally told me when I met him in Andhra University waltair.

Chattopadhyaya constructs his philosophy on important physical data. His account is quite historical and approach is objective and scientific befitting the contemporary age. He uses the relevant scientific methods and relies on scientific knowledge. He is interested in finding out the true significance of Indian philosophy in the history of India. In doing so he applies the dialectical method and avoids the static conceptions of metaphysics prevalent in the Yajnavalkyan perspective.

Another important thinker following the Uddalakian perspective is D.D. Kosambi. His publication of **Myth and Reality** has ushered a new era in Indian thought, particularly in the field of cultural history. Although archaeologically slanted this book has followed the historico-materialist line thereby depicting correctly the cultural history of India. His second historically important book **The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India** allows us to understand certain aspects of Indian philosophy in the materialist line. Although Kosambi's philosophical view is rather fragmented yet philosophers like D.P. Chattopadhyaya has received ample help from the research undertaken by the former in India's cultural field. He is as responsible as Chattopadhyaya to lay the foundations of scientific philosophy in India. His dialectical and historical materialist approach has enabled Chattopadhyaya to relieve himself of the mechanistic materialism and take a dialectical line.

Many other thinkers, both in India and in the West, siding with the Uddalakian perspective have flooded the contemporary Indian philosophy with materialist ideas. To mention some of them are: Dale Riepe, Bishnu Dey, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Susobhan Sarkar, Randhir Singh, P.C. Joshi, Ahsok Sen, Ajit Kumar Biswas, Satyendra Nath Mazumdar, S.G. Sardesai, Rahul Sankrityayan, Ram Bilas Sarmah, Bhahananda Datta etc. Although most of them are not professional philosophers yet their researches have contributed a lot to understand Indian history and philosophy in its true historical context. They have released Indian philosophy from the suffocating situation of Yajnavalkyan perspective.

The Yajnavalkyan perspective in Indian philosophy is largely scholastic and scholasticism is a characteristic of feudalism. Uddalaka's philosophy starts with the cohesive social groups, while Yajnavalkya's starts with the society torn apart by agrarian relations of production.

The contemporary Indian philosophers following the Yajnavalkyan perspective want to revive the Yajnavalkyan tradition with mythopoetic constructions. In sharp contrast to this the philosophers following Uddalakian perspective base their theories on anthropological and archaeological findings.

The Yajnavalkyan perspective is religious and it tries to link the same with economic processes. With this religious approach this perspective reduces the material world to illusion or maya. Such an approach has vitiated the scientific understanding of the development of Indian philosophy. It has spoken in favour of erection of temples which have become the banks for priests. Thus it has allowed philosophy to diverge or drift from reality. It has spread subjectivism threatening the Uddalakian perspective. As a result of the most outstanding influence of the Yajnavalkyan perspective the contemporary Indian scene is mostly vitiated by subjectivism, phenomenology, psycho-analysis, linguistic and analytic philosophy, theology, spiritualism, conservatism, dogmatism, reactionism, scepticism, agnosticism etc. It has been trying to mar the progressive materialism, a contribution of the Uddalakian perspective.

We feel that a philosophical development cannot be studied without linking it with the socio-economic system in which it arises. Philosophy cannot be studied in its separation from other parts of reality. The Uddalakian tradition holds fast to these beliefs. It admits that philosophy corresponds to reality. It therefore, holds that a pure and unrelated philosophy is unthinkable.

The foundation of scientific philosophy laid down by Uddalaka in India has been carried on by his followers up till now. The historico-philosophical analysis of this perspective has enabled the philosophers to lead philosophy on the scientific line. It has enabled the current of materialism to survive.

Yajnavalkya again tried to negate Uddalaka's materialism by introducing metaphysics and idealism. The contemporary Indian idealists have furthered the cause of metaphysics and idealism placing them on a strong foot-hold. But fortunately enough the contemporary Uddalakians have been able to negate this idealism by introducing dialectical materialism with a strong

edifice built on the materials supplied from Marxism. This Uddalakian movement has enabled the Indian materialists to systematise materialist outlook. This movement has transformed metaphysics to dialectics and idealism to materialism.

The Uddalakian perspective lays more emphasis on sensuous human activity or social practice than on pure reason as emphasised by the Yajnavalkyan perspective. It finds meaninglessness in sheer mental labour cut off from manual labour. It relieves philosophy of false consciousness and enables it to depart from the mystification of reality. It is the Uddalakian tradition that has cured us of the false consciousness of the Yajnavalkyan one.

The Uddalakian philosophers are intent on changing the world. They abhor in simply formulating static concepts of philosophy. They have no time to engage in such a futile pastime. They regard philosophy to be a complex subject comprising within its scope economics, sociology, culture, history and politics. To them to philosophise is not a personal task but a social one. They believe in the evolutionary process and look to every newness. They believe that philosophy should bear the stamp of championship of what is new. With a positivistic attitude they hold that this life is the only life without any future import involved in it.

A present materialist is bound to be dialectical. The contemporary philosophers following the materialist line, therefore, follow the dialectical method. They have ample knowledge of the theoretical foundations of historical materialism. They are however not content only with having knowledge of those foundations or principles but to apply them to the study of the history and culture of India. They, therefore, **do not** pursue philosophy as an end in itself but to achieve something **concretely**. They need philosophy to guide them in changing the social system so as to **usher** a new age of classless society.

An idealistically **superimposed** philosophy having no bearing a real life is meaning-less to these types of **philosophers**. Philosophy to them is not a queen or a goddess to be adored or worshipped, but a hand-maid of humanity. It is a tool in the hands of philosophers to achieve the goal of human equanimity in all respects. We need it for the good of humanity. So they feel, the Uddalakian perspective alone will be able to direct man to advance to a future where peace, happiness and equanimity will rule, where a heaven-like situation will prevail in this very earth itself thereby making man the makers of their own destiny.

Kant on Dreaming and Knowing

Archna Barua

Kant has shown the question of how synthetic a priori judgements possible to be the fundamental question of philosophy, since a priori cognition alone represents that purely rational knowledge, which in contrast to the knowledge gained from experience, is able to penetrate to what is fundamental. That which is fundamental, proceeds from reason alone, and with this contention, the rationalists, Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato agreed on one point: "Philosophical wisdom is not to be found in the opinion of the multitudes."1

The exponents of rationalism, right from Plato to Leibniz, sought to construct philosophical systems on the model of what they took to be mathematics. For them, mathematics proceeds from certain self-evident ideas guaranteed by 'Reason' in its purity and deducing conclusions from them. So too, they thought, philosophy should emulate the mathematical procedure. For them, 'idea' is what is involved in the different rational activities.

For Descartes, the ideas guaranteed by reason are so certain that they can not be mistaken for dreams, hallucinations, etc. As knowledge of the external world consists in direct perception of ideas, the knowledge of the 'inner' is not in need of the 'outer'. For Locke and Berkeley, to have an idea is to be aware of it, 'to think about it'. Thus 'thinking' is 'perceiving an idea'. From this, there is an easy jump in Berkeley's case, 'unperceived' means 'unthinkable', because 'existence' is 'perception'.

Leibniz makes a distinction between perception and apperception, but he too considers knowledge an interplay of ideas. The intellectual ideas are confused. Between perception and apperception, there is not much difference. They do not differ in kind, because in Leibniz, the rationalist philosopher, perception really boils down to conception and apperception is but relatively clearer conception.

Kant replaces the mythical 'idea' with the category, which is nothing but a way of thinking, i.e., of judging. This is certainly an improvement upon the previous theories, because unlike the mythical 'idea', which any ghost-seer can enjoy in his private world. (For Plato, the presentations are falsifications, for Leibniz, these are imperfect; only angels have distinct ideas), Kant does not identify concept in the language of the intuition. That a concept is to be explained through judgements is something like saying the concept is like a rule. The ineffective rules cease to be rules. The concepts are to be employed in judgements. Apart from its application in judgements, a concept has no

meaning. Thus there is an interdependence between sensibility and understanding (though they differ in kind). The understanding imposes rules and uses the concepts, and this activity is exhibited in its making a judgement about the sense data supplied by intuition.

Thus Kant is explicating the formal requirements of empirical knowledge by showing that knowledge can only be generated by means of judgements. The judgmental world affords the way out of the subjective world. Unlike his predecessors from the rationalist and the empiricist traditions, Kant separates the two: perception and apperception, seeing and thinking. The two differ in kind, not in degree. The grammar of 'seeing' is determined by the forms of sensation. Space and time as forms of sensuous intuition supplies the grammar of sensing. The categories supply the epistemological grammar of judging.

It follows that a statement to be meaningful, it must have its implications. It must have its empirical cash value. It must be exhibited either in sense datum, which the forms of sensibility constructs and gives the private sense datum a public form, or, it must have an ideal implication, an intuition to be constructed as in mathematics.

For both Plato and Leibniz, the external things are illusions. For Plato and Leibniz, the world in our sense experience is an appearance, it is a 'mock Sun' in comparison to the real Sun, the 'idea'. Kant also regards the world as an appearance, not because it is less real, but to know anything about the world one should always use the empirical concepts. This appearance is not contrasted (and is shown inferior) to some unextended thing. For Descartes, Plato and Leibniz, the 'Cogito', the inner, the 'private' is the secure foundation for the outer. For Kant, the private needs the public, the inner needs the outer. The concept can be used to interpret sense data, to understand and to think about them. The implication, the need to have empirical cash value, do not require some images; a concept is but a rule for the phenomena. The object to be meaningful must be schematized in experience, must be related to some form of possible experience.

Metaphysics can not construct its concepts in intuition, a lack which according to Kant is made up in mathematics in virtue of which mathematics can legitimately lay down synthetic a priori judgements. Kant would say that a dream world not is a world of knowledge not because of its non-constructibility in intuition, but because of its privacy. For Kant, the private needs the public. The dream world is cancelled because it does not conform to the standards and to the framework of public 'objectivity' with which, for Kant, assessment of truth and falsity takes place. The dream world is subject to cancellation because the public world rejects it. But it is at least a matter of rejection, which the metaphysical world is not and this iota of virtue it has, because it is conceived in the pattern of the public world. That the dream world, or for that matter any world of fancy is at all possible is because we have a public world. If the sceptic says that our world is a dream, then Kant's reply would be two-fold: First, a dream which everybody dreams is no dream. Secondly, we imagine another world only on condition that we actually know this world. According to

Kant's arguments in Strawson's words, "empirical self-consciousness is only possible through an immediate awareness of objects in space."²

For Kant, the private needs the public, the inner needs the outer. The concept can be used to interpret sense-data. The dream world can not be schematized, though we can experience the images, we do not categorise them. To categorise the dream world would be to bring it under the transcendental unity of apperception. In that case, the dream would be accompanied by the 'I think' mode of awareness. In that case it ceases to be a dream and becomes knowledge. Knowledge is not dream: knowledge is not the experience of images. The objects of knowledge is constrained by time-space. Even in mathematics, knowledge is constrained by time-space. Mathematical construction yields objects intuited a priori. Even in mathematics the object is constructed. It is a symbol to be 'seen'. To Kant, a mathematical judgement is necessary not because its opposite is inconceivable. That would be the rationalist explanation of mathematical necessity. A mathematical judgement for him is necessary because it is intuitively impossible. Our intuition is constructed in such a way that we can not exhibit the opposite of say, ' $2+2=4$ '.

With all Kant's criticism of rationalism, the rationalists did intend to uphold objectivity in knowledge on the ground of 'Lumen Naturalis', i.e., "The Pure Light of Reason". They thought that Reason can build up a self-guaranteed system. This credit must be given to them, where Kant scores an advantage over Rationalism is the point the entire system may be doubted. And here, a student of Science that Kant was, he appeals to (i) intuition and (ii) the notion of knowledge as synthetic which brings him closer to the Empiricists as against the Rationalists. In fact his entire theory of mathematics, which sets him as much against the Rationalists as against the empiricists was that, in so far as mathematics is constructive, it is not rational and so far as the construction is symbolic, it is not empirical either. As we can not exhibit the opposite of ' $2+2=4$ ', we can not construct it otherwise. The exhibition in time-space, not the ability to form images, makes mathematics a kind of knowledge. It is not an imagination or a dream but knowledge proper.

To be knowable, it must be categorised. The noumena is humanly unknowable. To have images is to be like dreaming, it would be like living in the world of phantoms. Though the metaphysical postulates have regulative use, they are not understandings. The metaphysical postulates, the idea of god, of an immortal soul, etc., are such that we do not have any form of direct intellectual access to them which lie beyond the realm of sensation generated appearance. They are generated out of the practical application of pure reason, out of the striving of the rational beings to realise the supreme good. Space and time order of reason order our expectation that knowledge will form one organised whole. Though these ideas of reason are regulative, they are not understanding. "The heuristic schematization thus confronts the familiar kantian distinction between constitutive and regulative employments of ideas. Objects that can not be brought under the categories can not be "realized" objects; they can not be theoretically understood.

But some of them the idea of God for example, can have respectable theoretical and practical employments in a regulative manner. To satisfy the theoretical need for system, God as first cause is conditionally required. To satisfy the practical need for moral law, the idea of God is unconditionally required, for here we are involved with what must be in the sense what ought to be. In all of this, no object, God is constituted, because God is not capturable within the categorical framework; the idea of God can not be schematized. But the idea of God is both theoretically and practically useful, and in its pragmatic employment is indeed indispensable"³

For Kant, the pure ego is an activity. Its unity is not ready made, it depends upon its actual unification of the manifold. Reason, for Kant, is not an independent Platonic form, reason can not be divorced from the actual operation of thinking. Reason is 'Logos' and 'Eros'. Reason has its needs and the need of reason is to seek completion of knowledge. In this manner, Kant's 'Constructive Idealism' differs a great deal from the 'Problematic Idealism' of Descartes and from the 'Dogmatic Idealism' of Berkeley. As against the former, Kant insisted that the assertion of the Cogito must go together with the assertion of the external world. While, as against the latter, Kant insisted that the denial of the extra mental world would lead to the corresponding denial of the mental world. As an eminent scholar observes: "Kant's Refutation of Idealism was written as a refutation of Cartesian Scepticism or 'Problematic idealism'. This sort of Skeptic denies that we can have immediate experience of objects in Space. The existence of anything distinct from the mind can be established only by inference, which opens such existence claims to doubt."⁴ Kant, like Hume, would say that all our inner representations are fleeting and offer nothing permanent. He needs to find a "Permanent distinct from them."* As the perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me, "Kant's case against the skeptic depends upon his ability to demonstrate that we have immediate perception and direct knowledge of things around us in space."⁵

As for Kant, the unity of the Ego is not ready made, it is an activity. Kant insists that we generate objective knowledge during this synthesis. By synthesising the many, reason reconstitutes itself. Reason has becoming of its own. Kant would avoid Phenomenalism at the deeper level by insisting that we do not construct objects during synthesis. According to Allison, one does not construct objects during synthesis, but one generates objective knowledge. "As we subject our fleeting representations to the a priori rules provided by the categories. Allison tells us, we come to conceive of "a distinct, objective, temporal order in and through these representations."⁷ Kant's demand for data, for publicly available objects of inquiry shows how Kant struggled to mark the limits of the humanly knowable. Kant differs from Descartes and Berkeley on the one hand and also from Leibniz on the other hand, as Leibniz appealed to some form of access to the super-sensible. 'Kant accepts a Leibniz "restored and corrected."** As observation goes. "Metaphysical explanation that for Leibniz captures the basically real features of the universe by resolute attention of pure thought, becomes for Kant a set of demands of reason in its effort to regulate, to methodize, human inquiry."⁷

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The Concept of Freedom In the Philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas

Vijaya Kumari Valappil

The problem of human freedom has been one of the oldest issues in the history of philosophy. It must be so, for, reality in a world where both freedom and restraints are equally real for him. He can neither transcend the unalterable laws of nature, nor deny his own feeling of being free to choose and act. No wonder, then that the exact nature of human freedom has been a subject of enquiry for thinkers of all ages.

What is freedom? Is man really free? And, if he is free, what exactly should we mean by his freedom? These similar other questions relating to the concept of freedom have been asked from time to time. Perhaps, freedom is so obvious to us that no reasoning is required to establish its reality. But, on the otherhand, one may argue that the universal law of causation is an irrefutable principle which leaves no room for genuine freedom in any accepted sense of the term. However, it is undeniable that, somehow or other, we assume an amount of freedom in our everyday life and in our mutual relationship with others. We assume ourselves to be free to make decisions on many issues of our life. All our contacts with out fellow men also seem to be permeated with the ideas of freedom.

The concept of freedom is a basic assumption behind all humanistic philosophies of man. In face of alternative courses of action, it may be always denoted whether man has a variable margin of freedom of choice or is he entirely subjected to the material, biological and social pressures like a toy tossed about by impersonal forces. Problem of freedom, therefore, is a central question in any philosophy of man.

It can be seen that the expression 'Freedom' is a slippery word with overlapping meanings and ambiguities in common usage. In the ordinary conversation, it may mean the liberty of man in his socio-political set up. In this sense, it does not seem to pose serious problems except with regard to the rights and duties of the individual. But, a close look at the whole question of human freedom in its various ethical, psychological and philosophical aspects would

make it obvious that the concept is associated with innumerable and at times insurmountable problems. Psychologists and the moral philosophers have special interest in the apparent conflict between freedom of choice and the usual scientific assumption that all things including human behaviour are subject to law and necessity. The moral philosophers is interested in free will as a postulate of the moral life.

The theologian has an interest in the question of freedom because of its implication for God's omniscience and omnipotence. Problems relating to freedom, therefore, springs from a number of different sources such as theology, psychology, ethics, physical science and metaphysical theories. These problems and their implications have been discussed by thinkers from time to time. Hence it seems necessary for us to have a brief look at some of the important views on freedom laid down by the ancient philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas so as to understand and appreciate the various complex issues which are inseparably associated with the subject.

The concept of freedom began to acquire importance by the time of the Greek Sophists. The Sophists' philosophical position regarding freedom was the simple denial of all intrinsic limitations upon the pursuit of voluntary aims. It seems that they did not even think of it as an attribute of human will. Moral conventions and social structures, for them, were conveniences of life which could be made the instruments for the master minds who knew how to get outside them and to manipulate them in order to achieve their own goals.

In opposition to this doctrine, Socrates and Plato directed their attention towards an inwardly disciplined life. In their view, the real struggle consisted not in fighting one's neighbours, but in the inner war between reason and passion for supremacy. Socrates said that everyman always chooses which seems to him best, that no man sets as the object of his choice something that seems evil or bad to him.

In the works of Plato, no theoretical discussion appears on the concept of freedom. In Plato's view, reason is the highest part of the soul. Its essential function is to command. Thus, Plato identified reason with the will in man. The individual is wise in whom reason rules over the lower aspects of the soul. According to him, a man is truly free, when the rational part of his soul governs the lower part of his being, that is, the feelings and passions. One could be enslaved by his feelings and passions if they occupy the dominant position in his being. As he says, "A man who has master of himself would presumably be also subject, and the subject would be master; for all these terms apply to the same person." Plato further held that a person in whom reason reigned and who possessed knowledge was incapable of doing evil. For, he thought that no man who knew what is good could possibly choose anything else. Wrong doing or the pursuit of evil must always be either involuntary or the result of ignorances. In any case, it is a state in which man cannot be regarded as really free.

One could possibly see an element of determinism in this ethical intellectualism which is central to Platonism. For, according to Plato, man's voluntary actions are invariably determined by an apparent good. Hence, all their actions are determined by what is looked upon as good. Philosophers who have been convinced by this teaching have, nevertheless, insisted that it enhances rather than debases man's freedom. Freedom is precisely the determination of the will by what is good. To have it determined by anything other than the highest good is to render the man to be less than perfectly free. Plato, therefore, described the wicked tyrant to be a person enslaved by evil.

After Plato, Aristotle introduced several refinements into his doctrines. He was of the opinion that the passions are to be trained and made partners and fellow imitators of right intentions. He agreed with the view that the essential freedom was the freedom of thoughtfulness to find the right goal and means. Particular and practical choice was to be seen as general reason finding expression under given circumstances. Aristotle held that man need not invent principles of good life, as they were already laid down in the nature of things.

As a man incurs responsibility only for his voluntary actions, Aristotle undertakes an ethical and psychological inquiry into the voluntary actions. He attributes freedom to the faculties of reason and will as their natural possession. According to him, free choice on the part of man involves the co-ordinated functioning of the faculties of reason and will. An act is unwilled if its moving principle is outside the person, that is, if the act is done under compulsion or if it can be explained by reference to the person's ignorance. For Aristotle, all actions are voluntary, if "the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do."² But when the moving principle is outside him or "when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing"³, the act is considered as involuntary.

In Book III of The Nichomachean Ethics, We are told that something is chosen if it is decided upon by deliberation. "Choice," says Aristotle, "is deliberate desire of things in our own power."⁴ He considers choice as the efficient cause for the origin of conduct. Obviously, without the necessary understanding and reason on the onehand, and moral character on the other, there can be no such thing as choice. And the capacity to originate action by choice is one of the defining characteristics of human beings, according to Aristotle.

Anthony Kenny points out that, according to Aristotle, there is no choice without moral character, consequently, he says, "only a small subclass of free human actions are chosen as part of worked out plan of life."⁵ Most

² Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross, (Oxford: University Press, 1980) Bk III, Ch. 1,

³ The Nichomachean Ethics, Bk III, Ch. 1, 1110a 10(-b2) (110 2-24) pp. 49-50.

⁴ ibid, B. II, Ch III, 1112a 11-3; p.55.

deliberate human actions are not executions of overall plans of life nor impulsive motions on the prick of desire.

Aristotle rejected the theory of ethical determinism of Plato, mostly because it was in conflict with what he took to be the evident fact of incontinence. He was convinced that at times, a man's desire or appetites came in conflict with his reason, because he could desire something had even while knowing that it is bad.

Plato and Aristotle did not seem to have considered the problems of human freedom and responsibility from a possible conception of world as a mechanism governed entirely by inviolable laws.

But later, with the development of Christian theology, there arose the concept of a perfectly good, omniscient, omnipotent God. The entire world and everything in it have been shown as absolutely dependent upon him for their existence and maintenance. The idea of an all-knowing, all powerful God opened upon the possibilities for deterministic theories which were developed by a number of religious thinkers into extensive systems.

However, the imposition of certain moral obligations on man by Christianity made it also necessary to consider Man's will to be free. For, if man had no freewill, then God could not legitimate, make demands upon his and punish when the demands were not satisfied. Hence, it became necessary to find a reconciliation between God's omnipotence and man's freewill.

St Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas were two important thinkers who tried to solve the problem. While recognizing the freedom of will, St. Augustine maintained that the grace of God is an unavoidable pre-requisite for the will to be in the right order. He argues that the will is motivated by the love of God. It is the grace of God which enables man to find his delight in Him. Hence, the will which is deprived of the grace of God seek for happiness in the wrong objects and fail to discover it. Freewill is the ability to choose and since men do choose throughout their life, all men have free will regardless of their state of grace. But, this freewill is not really useful without the grace of God. One man is given grace, he has the ability to use his freedom to realize his divine destiny. Moreover, Augustine argued that, the fact that God knows beforehand how man will choose doesnot negate the freedom of the will. For, to know what a man will do, is not to constrain him to do it. Augustine defines virtue as the proper employment of our freedom. Through the exercise of his natural freedom with the help God's grace, man acquires virtue. Hence, according to Augustine, the genuine freedom is the freedom of being able to will as one ought to will.

Happiness as an agent necessarily moves our will as a final course, but it is the will which is efficient cause of its own act. According to Aquinas, causal initiative remains in this act of willing the end, to the same extent that it remains in the will's act of choice with respect to means. He sees the will as

⁵ Anthony Kenny, *Will, Freedom and Power*, (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1975), P. 18.

uncoercible by its very nature. However, as the will's act of choice and the bodily action that executes the choice are parts of aspects of a single action as a whole, adverse circumstances can impare or diminish a man's freedom of self-determination.

Aquinas states that it is God who as the cause of the act of free decision works in man as an agent. Thus, man has in his will a power of self-determination which is itself the active cause of his free decisions.

Hence, Aquinas refers to will as the active principle or self-moving power which is able to cause its own acts. If it is viewed in relation to God as Supreme or ultimate cause, the will is only on secondary or created cause and when it is considered in its own way, the will moves as approximate agent. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, reason presents the alternatives without which choice is impossible. Choice eventuates from the interaction of the faculties of reason and will. Reason proposes and will disposes in all matters subject to choice.

Looking from the point of view of theology, the existence of the world and all the events in it are due to God's creative act. Since all events including human actions find their ultimate cause in God who is omnipotent and omniscient. This view is known as theological determinism. But the omniscience of God, for many religious thinkers seemed to imply the inevitability of every thing that happens. The philosophical arguments involved in this kind of determinism rests on the idea that all truths are eternally known to God. For, an omniscient being must know everything. Hence, we find St. Augustine, holding the view that all actions of men, both good and evil, are known to God in advance. It follows that they are predetermined, and predestined to lead a specific kind of life. Needless to say that under such circumstances, man can have no freedom in any genuine sense of the term.

However, the deterministic view based on God's nature has never been uncontested even in religious circles. It has been argued against the position that according to the revelation, God has created man in his images and bestowed on him the gift of freedom so that man may voluntarily choose to love and serve Him. The theological indeterminists are of the view that since God's full exercise of his omnipotence and omniscience in the case of men, his love service and obedience would be made meaningless. We should believe that God shared his power with human beings by granting them a will that is completely free. They do not rule out the possibility of the environment and heredity influencing man's behaviour deny that they do not determine him. Hence, in the final analysis, they find human will to free and man to be responsible for all his actions.

Salient features of Devatma's Philosophy

Harshvardhan P.D. Singh

AT the very outset, it may be stated here that there have been many socio-religious movements in the last decade of the last century and in the beginning of this century. These movements were meant to revitalise Hinduism, which became prey to many mal-practices. Instead of presenting a detailed study of these socio-religious movements, it would suffice to point out that Brahmo-Samaj, Prathva-Samaja, Arya-Samaj, Ramkrishna-Mission and Math, Theosophical society, Dev-Samaj and the Divine Life Society of India are important among these movements. They played important part in reforming and revitalising Hinduism. So, it is obvious that Deva-Samaj is one among such movements and Devatma is the founder of this Samaj.

Before discussing briefly and critically salient features of his philosophy, it would be better to present some biographical account. Here, it would be better to quote Prof. S.P. Kanak-"Devatma's first name as given by his parents, was Sheo Narayan Agnihotri. He was born to Sri Pandit Rameshwar Agnihotri and Shrimati Mohun Kunwar on the 20th December 1850, at Akbarpur in district Kanpur of the Uttar Pradesh of India. His family were descendents from Kanyakubj Brahmins who are mentioned as among the highest gotras in the scale of caste in the classic Ramayan by the famous poet Balmiki. His grand ancestors lived in a town called Rewari, in district Fatehpur, which was established by one of them, Shri Rev by name. He performed a sacrificial ritual (Yajna) on such a grand scale that the family acquired the surname of Agnihotri."¹

So it is obvious that he was born and brought-up in the atmosphere of spiritualism and religious spirit. He spent his childhood and boyhood at Akbarpur. He was very humble and respected his parents and teachers. He showed extra-ordinary sense of sympathy and fellow feeling right from the beginning. Prof. S.P. Kanak observes thus "His feeling of compassion expressed itself in a new case. One day he was passing through a bazar at Roorkee when he saw a cow being auctioned. He found a butcher among the bidders. He was determined to save the cow from the butcher's knife. He outbid the butcher, took the cow home and tended it with care."²

So, he was spiritually oriented right from the beginning. In course of time in 1868, he met his Guru, who was known as Rishjee. He was very much

impressed by him. Devatma left his service in 1882 when he was only 32 years old, and devoted his full time to the cause of suffering humanity. It is said that at first he was associated with Brahmo-Samaj, but this did not satisfy him and finally he setup Deva-samaj on the 16th February, 1887. So far the motive behind Dava-Samaj was concerned prof. S.P. Kanai has rightly observed thus:-

"There was no consideration for him except the consideration that the opinion was true and the conduct was right. He identified himself with true opinion and right conduct and instead of swimming with the current. He was not only a saint, he was a hero, he was a saint-hero."³

So, gradually he became an acknowledged reformer of Hindu-Society and stood for moral and spiritual regeneration. Now, coming to his philosophy, it may be mentioned that his goal was intellectual freedom and moral betterment. Principal P.V. Kanai has also remarked thus:-

"The unique movement of Dev-Samaj stands for (i) intellectual freedom and (ii) Moral and spiritual freedom and evolution."⁴

So after making there general observations, now it may be desirable to study specifically important feature of his philosophy. Here, it may be mentioned at the very out set that, though, he was not a technical philosopher, yet he was a creative and constructive thinker. He was a practical philosopher like Buddha, Swami Vivekananda and such others. So, he is a philosopher according to Indian traditions, which regards philosophy not merely as a way of thought, but as a way of life, also. Although he is a practical philosopher, yet he discusses philosophical problems quite systematically and technically. He also discusses problems of knowledge and his approach in this respect is Similar to that of logical positivism. In other words, he lays, stress on perception and verification. He seems to be influenced by Marx and others. Prof. Baxi has rightly observed thus:-

"Devatma's century also belonged to marx, Darwin, Wundt, Comte, Fechner and William James. The nineteenth century witnessed unprecedented breakthrough in psychology, biology and Sociology Devatma shared the commitment to science inspired by Ram Mohan Row (1772 -1833); Devendranath Tagore (1817-1905) and Keshab Chandra Sen (1838-1884)."⁵

So positivism is an important feature of his philosophy He is also conspicuous for his bio-psychological approach. Now, instead of discussing this further, it may be in the fitness of things to point out, that in consonance with his positivistic approach he rejects the reality of super-empirical objects. Here we may quote following lines:-

"Devatma rightly rejects God or Brahman or Soul as a substantial entity. He totally rejects the whole of transcendent of mental world. (8:50) Nature for him is autonomous. He accepts evolutionism against the mythology of creation. Devatma finds natural explanation adequate. According to him, there are no miracles. 'Nature is one, unlimited, uncreated, self existent whole of embodied existence' (8:49)".⁶

So it is seen that he is apposed to transcendentalism. In other words, he does not believe in ontological idealism. Likewise, he is apposed to theism. But he is also not a materialist. Really speaking, he is a naturalist. Nature and the laws of nature alone are realities according to him. So positivism and naturalism are the key notes of his philosophy. Here, we again may quote Prof. S.P. Kanal, who has appropriately remarked thus:-

"The domination of scientific temper determined his metaphysics. He rejected all transcendental Metaphysics with the vigour of a logical positivist and one of his grounds for rejection it is the same, the absence of the possibility of verification".⁷

So, it is naturally evident that he rejects the reality of soul, God and such other trans-empirical realities. Really speaking, he formulates his own unique conception of Soul. Prof. K.L. Vohra has also observed thus:-

"Devatma rejects all traditional views of soul, e.g. that it is an amge of Brahman; that it belongs to the world of ideas; that it has transcendental character or that it knows to change, decay, disintegration or death; or that it is eternal and unborn. To Devatma soul has an altogether different connotation. It has a date of birth, is under the universal laws, of change and therefore knows decay and death as also growth and development. The organised life-force having various powers, inhabiting the living human body, is called the human Soul.

Human soul is like millions of other living and non-living existences of Nature, and is also a part of nature and is wholly and solely dependent on Nature and is controlled by the immutable laws of nature."

So, there is something like naturalistic and psychological conception of the soul. Really speaking, naturalism finds very important place in his philosophy. He seems to be greatly influenced by science and such other developments. But his naturalism, should not be equated with western theory of naturalism. He simply means that nature and laws of nature are realities. He tries to explain everything in terms of laws of nature. Likewise, he does not grant reality to God. It may be mentioned here that though he believed in reality of God previously, but subsequently he becomes naturalist and atheist on the basis of positivism;

Then so far his moral philosophy" concerned, it is seen that he attaches, considerable importance to spiritual and moral values. This is really something unique in his philosophy. This is because that although he is a naturalist and an atheist, yet he champions the cause of higher spiritual life. Like Charvaka, he does not advocate hedonism. Rather, he is apposed to hedonism, egoism and such other allied approaches. He repeatedly lays stress on cultivation of virtues and higher values of life. This is clear from, his various utterances, which he makes in his Deva-Sastra". Prof. S.P.Kanal has also remarked thus:-

"Dev-Atma is the first thinker to put forward the thesis of the causal relation between existence and value. In Buddhism and Hinduism causal

relationship is affirmed between values and existence. Both Buddhism and Hinduism assert that evil-doing produces re-birth and misery. A vicious man, according to them, is condemned to re-birth in this empirical world where, he gets conditions of miserable existence. Devatma holds with Hinduism and Buddhism that vicious life is condemned to life of avoidable but terrible miseries here and hereafter. But he goes further than this and holds that vicious life vitiates the constructive power of the Soul. He takes vices as diseases, as forces that sap and strangle life-force to death. Vicious karma is not only causative of misery but also of soul's death."

So instead of presenting a detailed discussion of his ethical philosophy, it may be just mentioned here that he has studied in detail different rights duties, and virtues concerning different persons, in his book, 'Deva-Shastra, IVth part, which has been published by Devasamaj, Moga. He seems to be influenced by ancient Indian ethical idealism in various ways. In fact, he stands for ethical idealism or moralism in the spiritualistic sense of the term, that is why, he lays stress on cultivation of higher feelings of altruism, sympathy, disinterested service etc. In fact, he also holds that the highest goal of life consist in self-perfection. So, his ethical theory has remarkable similarity with western theory of perfectionism.

Then coming to his views concerning religion, it is seen that he stands for scientific approach to religion. This is quite natural because he advocates positivism and naturalism. There is no God according to him. So, his religion is religion without God. In this respect, his approach is similar to that of Buddha and such others. But though, he does not believe in God, yet there is note of spiritualism, in his religious philosophy. He tries to be scientific and spiritualistic. Infact, his approach to religion is humanistic and moralistic. Besides this, as indicated earlier, he has tried to reform and revitalise Hinduism through his religious views. So there is a note of reformation also so far his approach to religion is concerned Principal P.V. Kanak has high lighted his scientific approach to religion as follow:-

"The teaching of Dev Dharma the one science grounded universal system of Religion for all mankind are embodied in the Dev shastra-the sacred scripture of the Deva-samaj, there teachings have revolutionised completely the entire religious philosophies of the world. Before the advent of Deva Dharma, the humanity had not been able to Shake of the fascination of imagination, speculation or so called mysticism in the domain of religion. Theology as the basis of religious has always been known to set its face fiercely against all science and reason specially when it threatened to encroach upon the preserves of the so called 'God-oven' or 'God revealed' ideas about cosmology, origin of man, psychology & C, several inquisitions and machines of fortunes were invented to crush the spirit of science and break the morale of the lovers of scientific knowledge."

In this back ground, really, he had tried to formulate his views of religion. Instead of making more detailed observations in this context, it would suffice to point out that he has attached considerable importance to moral and

spiritual values in the domain of religion and has advocated something like synthetic scientific and universalistic approach, he decries sectarian approach to religion and advocates unity of religions in his own way. He really stands for religion in the real and universalistic sense of the term. He seems to have studied different religions of the world and holds that of his Devadharma is an unique contribution in the domain of religion. Here we may quote Prof. S.P. Kanal, who has rightly said thus-

"Devdharma does not hold that the highest religious life is a closed relation between disciple and the Dev-Atma. The relation with Dev-Atma is one of the dimensions of religious life which shrinks to a relation with one being, even though it may exhibit the highest value. It is true that this disciple -Dev Atma relation has top priority, but it has for the very reason that it opens out the greatest possibility of religious life in social and sub-social relations. The religious life must be an all comprehending life of altruism for all the four kingdom."

So it is obvious that Devatma's approach is quite liberal and catholic. He really tried to bring about reformation in the sphere religion as well.

Thus, we have tried to study briefly and critically important contributions and salient features of Devatma Philosophy. One may find Lacunas here and there, but it has to be remembered that Devatma was not a technical philosopher. So, we should try to ignore his inconsistencies if there are we should try to appreciate his constructive approach and contributions. It is really leartching to see that Devatma, though a socio-religious reformer has come forward with his positivistic, naturalistic, humanistic moralistic and scientific approaches in his own way. Really speaking, his views are quite interesting and illuminating. They should be sympathetically appreciated. After all, it has to be borne in the mind that he was neither a technical philosopher nor a technical scientist. In this background, we should try to appreciate his contributions sympathetically, but not blindly .

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8

British Utilitarianism: A Brief Survey

M Shafiqul Alam

This paper mainly deals with the brief exposition of British utilitarianism. While reflecting on the inner aspect of the theory, a trace will be given on its origin and growth. The limitation of the study is that it will exclusively concentrate on the philosophical doctrine of some of the selected prominent British thinkers who worked in line with utilitarian principle, emphasizing on the theory of maximization of pleasure or happiness for the benefits of the large number of people involved.

Utilitarianism may generally be considered as an ethical theory which holds that the object of good conduct is the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The concept of greatest good first appeared in 1672 as a formula for moral standard in Richard Cumberland's book entitled *De Legibus Nature*,¹ where its authority is derived from God. This treatise is the first statement by an English writer of the utilitarian principle. It was written keeping in view of refuting Hobbes's ideas. In his view of the nature of man, Cumberland stands in the closest and most obvious relation to Grotius and Hobbes. His relation to Grotius was of substantial agreement and to Hobbes that of opposition. Grotius insisted upon the social and rational nature of man. Hobbes has regarded the instinct of self-preservation as the fundamental spring of human action.² However, this theory as social weapon for reforms found its first eloquent and consumerate expression in the writings of English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) in 1789, when his renowned book entitled *An Introduction to the Principles and Morals* was published. Later it was predominantly developed in the hands of James Mill (1773-1836) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).

British utilitarianism got its elementary shape and early nourishment in the hands of Bentham. He is regarded as the pioneer of this ethical theory. He

¹ The whole title of this ethical treatise was *De Legibus Nature* (The Law of Nature): *disquisitio philosophica in qua earum forma, summa capita, ordo, promulgatio, et obligatio e rerum cum narura investigantur; qum etiam philosophiae Hobbianaee, cum moralis tum civilis, considerantur et refutantur*. Please see, Earnest Albee, *A History of English Utilitarianism* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), P. 30.

² CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar
Ablee, *History of English Utilitarianism*, 1962. pp. 21, 36.

begins his theory by saying that nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. To obtain the greatest portion of happiness for himself is the object of every rational being. Every man is nearer to himself than he can be to any other man. So, man himself must necessarily be his own first concern.³ According to him, the interest of a person will usually be primary to himself. The first principle of Bentham's philosophy is:- that happiness, which is meant by the terms pleasure and exemption, from pain, is only desirable in itself. All other things are desirable solely as means to that end. The production of the greatest happiness is the only purpose of all human thought and action. Thus, pleasure and pain are the sole agencies by which the conduct of human mankind is in fact governed.⁴

Bentham considered the dictum 'the principle of utility' as the foundation of his theory. By the principle of utility he meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which approves to have an augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question.⁵ For human conduct Bentham takes psychological hedonism as the governing principle; pain and pleasure as the 'sovereign masters' of mankind. From this he derives his ethical theory commonly known as utilitarianism, according to which the only end of human conduct is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.⁶ This 'greatest number' concept has been referred to community by Bentham. The community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals. It is a fictitious body, composed of the individuals who are considered as its members. The interest of the community is, then, what? For Bentham, it is the sum of the interests of the several members with whom the community is formed.⁷ In other words, a thing is said to promote the interest of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of one's pleasures. Similarly, any action having diminishing tendency of one's pain may also be constituted as an interest.⁸

Bentham defended his ethical formula 'principle of utility' by two kinds of proofs. One be called the direct proof, the other, indirect proof. The first kind of proof is deductive in nature in which the conclusion is the principle itself. Thus this kind of proof argues directly for the principle. In an indirect proof the

³ James Martineau, *Principles of Ethical Theory* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, vol. 2, 1885), pp. 284-85.

⁴ Harison Ross, *Bentham* (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p.97.

⁵ Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (New York: Hafner Publishing Company Inc., 1948), p.2.

⁶ D.W.Hamlyn, *A History of Western Philosophy* (London: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 276.

⁷ R.P.Anschutz, *The Philosophy of J.S. Mill* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 13.

⁸ Oliver A. Johnson, *Ethics: Selections from Classical and Contemporary Writers* (California: Holt and Rinehart and Winston Inc., 4th edition, 1978), p.253.

principle. Bentham himself confessed that there are no direct proofs for his principle.⁹ He simply proposes the principle of utility as the ultimate or basic ethical standard. For him, there is only one basic principle and this cannot be deduced from a more basic ethical principle. The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong, of course, may all be reduced to another kind of principle which he called the principle of sympathy and antipathy.¹⁰ He maintains that what is good is pleasure or happiness and what is bad is pain. He uses these words as synonymous. So one state of affairs is better than another if it involves a greater balance of pleasure over pain and consequently pain over pleasure.¹¹

In his ethical principles, Bentham makes pleasure and pain of highest importance. He identifies pleasure with happiness and pain with evil. He gives an almost mathematical explanation of pleasure, claiming that it can be measured according to the purity, intensity, extent, duration, certainty, and nearness. Moreover, he maintains that we can add to these criteria by realizing that if one pleasure is succeeded by other pleasures, we have a valid guide of an action.¹²

By this way, Bentham tries to establish his utilitarian theory. But it has been criticized with numerous interpretations by many thinkers, like Anthony Quinton and David Lyons. Quinton advances the following principle to Bentham: "the rightness of an action is determined by its contribution to the happiness of everyone affected by it".¹³ In the quoted passage "By the principle of utility is meant whose interest is in question" Bentham does not evaluate the action in terms of the happiness of the persons who are affected by it. He rather talks about the party whose interest is in question. To look for an answer of this question Quinton depends on two passages. First, "an action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility greater than any it has to diminish it".¹⁴ Secondly, "the interests of the community then is what? the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it".¹⁵

⁹ James Cornman, Keith Leherer and George S. Papas,

¹⁰ W.T.Jones, Frederick Sontag, Morton O. Beckner, and Robert J. Fogelin, eds., *Approaches To Ethics* (New York: MacGraw-Hill Book Company, 3rd ed., 1962), p. 255.

¹¹ Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., new ed., 8th imp., 1961,}, 741.

¹² Frederick Mayer, *Modern Philosophy* (New Delhi: Eurasia Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1976), p. 416.

¹³ W.D.Hudson, *Utilitarian Ethics in New Studies in Ethics* (London: Macmillan Publishing Company Inc., vol. 2, 1974), p.3. Please see also, Binod Kumar Agarwala, "Bentham's Principle of Utility" *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. xiv, no. 2, April-June, 1987, p.121.

¹⁴ Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1948, p. 3.

¹⁵ CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

15ibid.

David Lyons put forward another interpretation on Bentham's principle of utility, arguing that he has a dual standard, with the community interest the criterion of right and wrong in public or political affairs on personal interest the proper standard for 'private ethics'. He further argues that Bentham has a still more basic principle, "which could be glossed as the idea that government should serve the interest of those who are governed".¹⁶

Bentham divides ethics into the 'art of self-government', or 'private ethics' on the one hand and 'the art of government' on the other. Bentham has not categorically says that the art of government is the art of directing others actions towards their own happiness. So, Lyons' conclusion from his passages that "we are virtually told that the art of government is the art of 'directing' person towards their own happiness"¹⁷ is quite misleading.

It may be concluded that both the interpretations offered by Quinton and Lyons are erroneous in trying to build up a formula for the determination of the persons whose interest is to be considered in Bentham's principle of utility. That is to say, both the interpretations go wrong in their attempt to specify who the persons are and whose interest is in question.

In Bentham's writing, it is argued independently of the principle of utility and the definition of public ethics that the proper end of government action should be the happiness of the community. The argument starts with the statement "the right and proper end of government in every political community is the greatest happiness of all the individuals of which it is composed".¹⁸

The above passages indicates that Bentham has independent arguments to show that 'the party whose interest is in question' in the context of government action is the 'community'. It is to be remembered that these arguments are not based on the principle of utility or the definition of public ethics.

Like principle of utility, Bentham's proofs, which he put forward in favour of his theory, has been vigorously criticized by David Hume.¹⁹ He makes straightforward logical point here that Bentham's direct proof which is based on deductive principle is not logically deducible. Of course, Bentham himself confessed that there is no direct proof of his principle. But Hume denies the proposal of such principle of utility as the ultimate ethical standard. In fact, no ultimate ethical principle can be deduced from ethical premises. Here, we may

¹⁶ David Lyons, *In the Interest of the Government: A study in Bentham's Philosophy and Law* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 7.

¹⁷ Lyons, *In the Interest of the Government*, 1973, p.31 and also quoted in Agarwala, "Bentham's Principle of Utility", 1987, pp. 125-26.

¹⁸ John Bowring, *The Works of Jeremy Bentham* (Edinburgh: Wm Tait, 1838-43, rept., in New York: Russell and Russell, vol. ix, 1962), p. 5.

¹⁹ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 469.

conclude that Bentham is right at least in the context that there is no direct proof of the principle of utility.

Anyway, Bentham's version is only one particular version of the ethical theory of British utilitarianism. There are other versions as proposed by James Mill and J.S. Mill, who followed Bentham in their thoughts and ideas. James mill expounded utilitarian doctrine in a very concise form which spread into endless ramifications in Bentham's hand. He becomes the main follower of Bentham's ideology. The special characteristics of British utilitarianism in the period of its greatest activity has been thus more affected by James Mill than by any other thinker. The most important influence in his life is the friendship with Bentham. He accepted and propagated Bentham's principles and entirely dropped his own theology. In the early years of his London life, Mill has been only rationalist. He has by this time becomes what can now be called an agnostic. He thinks 'dogmatic atheism' absurd, says J.S. Mill.²⁰

Like Bentham, James Mill considered pleasure the only good and pain the only evil. But like Epicures he valued moderate pleasure most. He thinks intellectual enjoyments to be the best and temperance the chief virtue. The intense has been with him a bye-word of scornful disapprobation: says his son, who added that he objected to the modern stress laid upon feeling. Like the whole utilitarian school, he is utterly opposed to every form of romanticism. He thinks that politics could be governed by reason, and expected men's opinions to be determined by the weight of evidence. If opposing sides in a controversy are presented with equal skill, there is moral certainty. So, he holds that the greater number will be judged to be right. His outlook has been limited by the poverty of his emotional nature, but within his limitations he has the merits of industry, disinterestedness, and rationality.²¹

J.S. Mill carried on a somewhat soft form of Benthamite utilitarian doctrine. Like Bentham, he tried consciously to free ethics from intuition. While Bentham in his ethical theory portrayed people as selfish beings. Mill is chiefly concerned with man's finer qualities, such as, fellow-feeling, a sense of beauty and dignity. Pointing to the qualitative aspect of pleasure, Mill modified the views of Bentham. His theory presupposes a developed capacity of sympathy or fellow-feeling in man which will, impelled him to promote the good of others and deter him from doing any injustice.²²

Mill wrote that the creed which accepts utility or the greatest happiness principle as the foundation of morals, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness, it is intended pleasure and the absent of pain. By unhappiness, pain and privation of pleasure.²³

²⁰ Leslie Stephen, *The English Utilitarians* (London: Duckworth and Company, vol. 2, rept., 1912), pp. 1, 7 and 88.

²¹ Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, 1961, p. 743.

²² Husne Ara Alam, "J.S. Mill's Utilitarianism and Social Progress", *The Dhaka university Studies*, December, 1976, p. 34.

The sole contribution of J.S. Mill lies perhaps in his clear formulation of ethical and political standards. Like Bentham, Mill accepted the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number, and depended vigorously on the principle of utilitarianism. But as against Bentham, he emphasized the qualitative distinction of various pleasures. Mill holds that mental pleasures are higher than physical pleasures. In fact, he enthusiastically says that he would rather be a dissatisfied Socrates than a complacent fool.

Incidentally, Mill believes that men are naturally social. The gregarious drive is not artificial but innate. Bentham, on the other hand, stressed on man's basic selfishness. Yet Mill's conclusion is individualistic, for he believes that the individual is not sacrificed to the group since he is an end in himself. He claims that the function of the government should promote the happiness of the individual. It can be mentioned here that Mill has rejected outright all theories of political absolutism.²⁴

In ethics Mill attempts to defend utilitarian theory of Bentham. He emphasizes happiness rather than pleasure as the supreme good to be maximized. Many commentators think that Mill has shifted the strategy of utilitarianism from considering the consequences of individual actions to considering the consequences of practices. For example, the practice of free speech leads to good consequences even if every individual act of free speech does not. If these commentators are right, Mill is an early rule utilitarian. This new identification concludes Mill's discussion of the proof for utilitarianism.²⁵

Although Mill departs from Bentham's conception that all the significant differences among pleasures are qualitative, he accepts in principle his doctrines regarding the basic rule of pleasures and pains in morality. The theories of egoistic psychological hedonism and universal ethical hedonism as expounded by Bentham are very important in the history of British utilitarianism. According to the former, the sole motive of an action is an individual's desire for happiness. Latter emphasis on the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'. Psychological hedonism is descriptive, universal ethical hedonism is normative in nature. It is a principle by which actions are evaluated in terms of their consequences.²⁶

Most of the opponents of the greatest happiness theory have attacked utilitarianism on the ground that it is based on a principle of sacrificing one's good for the sake of others than the attainment of his own pleasure. Let us trace the challenges, against utilitarianism. Among those critics who have recently

²³ John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., rept. from Fraser's Magazine, 1877), p.6.

²⁴ Mayer, *Modern Philosophy*, 1976, p. 421.

²⁵ Harison hall and Norman E. Bowie, *The Tradition of Philosophy* (California: Wadworth Publishing Co., 1986), p. 424.

²⁶ Ehtiel Albert, Theodore C. Denise and Sheldon P. Peterfreund, *Great Traditions in Ethics* (California: Wadworth Publishing Co., 5th ed., 1984), p. 221.

challenged Mill's theory, David Lyons is perhaps the most persuasive and illuminating figure. In his essay *Mill's Theory of Morality*, published in *Nous* (1976) Lyons proposes that although Mill makes general happiness or utility the test of conduct, in that actions are ranked and preferred in accordance with their expediency, he is not committed thereby to regard of an act that fails to maximize the aggregate happiness as morally wrong.²⁷

Before Lyons, Mill's arguments have been attacked, most notably by G.E. Moore in his famous work *Principia Ethica* (1903), on the grounds that something's being desired does not entail that it is desirable. From the mere statement of psychological fact that people do actually desire happiness for its own sake, one can not, it is said, deduce conclusion that happiness is desirable. It is logically possible that people in fact desire something which is not really desirable. The argument is not, it is claimed, a valid proof.²⁸

G.E. Moore examines Mill's utilitarianism of quoting many passages from Mill's utilitarianism to show that Mill has committed the naturalistic fallacy. One such passage he quotes is that "happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end; all other things being desirable as means to that end".²⁹ Mill, according to Moore, goes a step further when he uses the words 'desirable' or desirable as an end 'as absolutely equivalent to the words 'good' as an end'. He further asserts that " 'desirable' does not mean 'able to be desired' as 'visible' means 'able to be seen'. The desirable means simply what ought to be desired or deserved to be desired."³⁰

Henry Sidgwick takes note as criticism on Mill's utilitarianism. According to him, the manner, however, in which Mill, in short *treatise on Utilitarianism* (1861), endeavours to induce the individual to take general happiness as his ultimate end, is somewhat complicated and perplexing.³¹

British utilitarianism is mainly based on two principles which are generally called 'the greatest happiness principle' and the 'equity principle'. The former is to the effect that the greatest possible amount of general happiness is the supreme good. According to latter, in assessing the general happiness, everybody is to be counted for one and nobody for more than one. Both these principles have been adversely criticized by opponents of British utilitarianism, on the grounds that they run counter to the consciences of plain men.³²

²⁷ Harlan Miller and Williams H. Williams eds., *Limits of Utilitarianism* (Minneapolis Minn: University Press, 1982), p. 5.

²⁸ Richard Norman, *The Moral philosophers: an Introduction to Ethics* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, rept., 1988), pp. 135-36.

²⁹ G.E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968), P.59.

³⁰ Quoted in M.A. Hamid, *G.E. Moore: A Study of His Ethics* (New Delhi: Mittal publications, 1989), p.81.

³¹ Henry Sidgwick, *Outlines of the History of Ethics* (London: Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1954), p. 245.

Another charge has been levelled in D.H. Hodgson's *Consequences of Utilitarianism* (Oxford, 1967) and also by G.J. Warnock in *The Object of Morality* (London, 1971). The essence of these criticism, in a nutshell, is that the utilitarian account of the obligation to keep promises takes the point out of promising. As Hodgson observes, "promising should be pointless unless expected an act which had been promised more than he would have expected an act, if it had not been promised but merely mentioned as a possibility".³³

Mill's account of utilitarianism may be summarized in five statements: i) pleasure is the only thing that is desirable; ii) the only proof that a thing is desirable is the fact that people do actually desire it; iii) each person's own pleasure or happiness is a good to that person, so the general happiness is a good to every body; iv) men do desire other objects, but they desire them as a means to pleasure and 'pleasure can be added to one another'; and v) if one of two pleasures is to be preferred by those who are competently acquainted with both, we are justified in saying that this preferred pleasure is superior in quality.³⁴

Henry Sidgwick is also interested with the ethical explanations. He discusses utilitarianism in the following way:

By utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct.³⁵

Utilitarianism as an ethical theory is often defined as the doctrine that the rightness of action is to be judged by their consequences. Utilitarianism has two varieties i.e., act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. When we say that an action is right, we may mean that an individual action is right, or we may mean that a class of actions is right. Act-utilitarianism judges rightness in terms of the consequences of individual acts. Rule-utilitarianism is a view which emphasizes on the centrality of rules in morality. According to this theory, the question is not which action has the greatest utility, but which rule has.³⁶

Thus both the varieties are contrasting to each other. Act-utilitarianism emphasizes on the rightness or wrongness of an action judging the consequences whether good or bad. On the other, rule-utilitarianism is the view

³² W.D. Hudson, *Modern Moral Philosophy* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., rept., 1991), p. 389.

³³ Hodgson, D.H., *Consequences of Utilitarianism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), P. 40.

³⁴ William Lillie, *An Introduction to Ethics* (London: University Paperbacks, 1948), P. 167.

³⁵ Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (London: Macmillan Publishing Company, 7th ed., 1967), P. 411.

³⁶ Malvin Rader, *Ethics to the Human Good* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), p. 168.

that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by goodness or badness of the consequences of a rule that every one should perform the action in like circumstances.³⁷

As compared with act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism will be much closer to traditional morality in maintaining that promises should be kept, subject only to rather rare exceptions. An act-utilitarian always asks the question: 'would this one act of possible promise breaking increase or decrease social utility?' In contrast, a rule-utilitarian has to ask: 'What particular moral rule for promise-keeping would maximize social utility?'.³⁸

There are two sub-varieties of rule-utilitarianism according to whether one construes 'rule' here as 'actual rule' or 'possible rule'. With the former, we get a view like that of S.E. Toulmin.³⁹ and with the latter, one like Immanuel Kant's.⁴⁰ That is, if it is permissible to interpret Kant's principle: 'An act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' as 'Act only on that maxim which you as a humane and benevolent person would like to see established as universal law'. Of course Kant, would resist this appeal to human feeling, but it seems necessary in order to interpret the doctrine in a plausible way.⁴¹

Utilitarianism of all varieties holds that right actions are useful actions, good as means; that rightness is in fact a kind of efficiency, but restricted to efficiency for good ends. The only reason for an act to be right, is its utility, its usefulness for producing results which are good in themselves.⁴²

It may be recalled now that the ultimate standard of rightness or wrongness is depended on utility, which says quite strictly, that moral end to be sought in all we do is the greatest possible balance of good over evil. 'utility' is a state of satisfaction and 'not a state of feeling'. Utilitarianism is actually a state of social moral theory. Let us agree with Richard Moral Hare⁴³ that in our moral thinking we are guided, in addition to the two logical requirements of universalizability and prescriptively, by our moral intuition about good and evil, which intuition is utilitarianism, meaning welfare of all men, the desirability of which we can never dispute.

³⁷ J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism For & Against* (Cambridge: University Press, rept., 1990), p. 9.

³⁸ Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams eds. *Utilitarianism and beyond* (Cambridge: University Press, 1982), p. 59.

³⁹ Stephen Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, 1950.

⁴⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. from the German in the *Moral Law* by H.J. Paton, London: Hutcheson, 1948.

⁴¹ Smart and Williams, *Utilitarianism For & Against*, 1990, p. 9.

⁴² D.D. Raphael, *Moral Thinking*, (Oxford: University Press, 1982), P. 35.

⁴³ CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

R.M. Hare, *Moral Thinking*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

The utilitarian propositions, at least many of them, can be seen to be much more intelligible than they appear to be. Indeed, many of the criticisms commonly charge against them are found baseless, if the theory is understood as holding the pleasure principle i./e., utility principle, as the evaluative first principle of moral judgement.

In the conclusion it may be asked, what are the significant achievement of British utilitarianism? In the first place, it liberalizes the English concept of government by divorcing politics from any standard of absolutism. The movement produces better social legislation by inspiring the reform bill of 1832; by instigating fundamental advances in factory legislation, and by advancing the cause of women suffrage.

In the second place, the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number has beneficial results in the study of ethics. Instead of supernatural standards, social criteria now becomes extremely important. This change of emphasis makes room for a more liberal attitude in the study of socio-ethico-political problems of the present days.

In the third place, British utilitarianism expanded the English concept of liberty. To be sure, J.S.Mill's concept of liberty is negative since it stands for absence of restraint and fails to provide for definite economic opportunities. Nevertheless, it constitutes an advance in politics, for it contains a dynamic concept of legislation and expresses the essence of the democratic gospel in its faith in the individual.

At the same time, British utilitarians are conscious of the basic difficulties of democracy. Representative government can not be developed satisfactorily, according to J.S.Mill, without experts and without the continued interest of the citizens in the affairs of the government.

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9

The Philosophical Confederation of Man and Religion

*S. Sreeramurthy, **

Here an attempt has been made to understand and to expose the real nature and philosophy of religion which would be very useful for the progress of man not in a materialistic way but for setting up values and norms. In addition, man is benefitted with the approved facts in real life. It is also described how religion is playing an active role in shaping man in favour of society and stabilizing life to sustain values.

Man cannot live by bread alone but he has a mind which needs food for thought is a conceptual confederation as a concrete as well as concert council which is accountable for shaping man with idealistic process. But we need to generalise the ideas in favour of man and his associates. Among the invisible forces in the life of man which are playing an active role, religion is one; based on adopted principles, but man should be in a position to make it as an approved fact. For that, man necessarily has to lead a stabilized and systematized life in society. In fact, religion is a concept to construct the ideas in a systematic way to reform man and his behaviour in order to manifest his nature as a man. Matthew Arnold projected the idea in such a way who said the "Religion is nothing but morality touched with emotion"¹. So religion is incomplete without morality, unification of thought and action to prove one's own personality.

Religion is a kinetic force in man's life and existence as it can drive man and can change the nature and behaviour of people. In the words of Dr. Ambedkar, "Religion is an influence force suffused through the life of each individual moulding his character, determining his actions and reactions, his like and dislike"². It is the stabilizing agent which will regulate human action and their way of approach in guiding their life style to promote the humanistic tendency and cultivate ethical values in society.

Man can not live without cooperation and mutual understanding. If we look into the animal kingdom they live and lead a more cooperative life than that of man. For example ants are a living example of unity. In this connection, S.B.Sen says, 'If the mutual co-operation and sacrifice for the good of the

society are the tests of civilization. We can say that the white ant and the ant are in this respect superior to man. In the same way Hobhouse confined it as a social factor to unify man and his thoughts. He said that "the element of religion is common to all forms of society, and it is to be regarded not so much as a distinct basis of social union, but rather from this point of view as an element involved in the social consciousness itself and as a factor strengthening its hold upon the minds of men"³. It is a leading principle of social unification for the promotion of uniformed ideas for social fabric.

Sri Ramakrishna believes in man as the embodiment of God, as his result is particularly depend upon his action and attitude towards man and material or creatures. The man should not hurt anybody physically or psychologically as he has no right to do so in any manner because he cannot create the human being but can humanity. He says that man should unite with man first to unite himself with God, symbolisms the service of man towards the man. It is worthwhile to quote the words of George Herbert about religion to make use of its values to improve the quality of man. He says, "Religion is not a dogma, nor an emotion, but service".

Religion played an active role in shaping the man as human by injecting manliness as his intrinsic quality. It guides him to behave properly in society but not to hurt anybody. Swami Vivekananda emphasised that religion and its need and existence in a practical way of approach in all ways but not of its outlook or appearance. To quote him "You must bear in mind that religion does not consist in talk, or doctrines, or books, but in realisation: it is not learning but being"⁴. As per his views mere words and praises cannot create any credible returns to man and his existence, but make the views of religion in a practical way and systematized approach for the betterment of the human generation.

Sri Ramakrishna stressed the need of change and application of new methods in all matters for the sake of universal understanding and to suppress the acceleration to mutual conflicts and hatred. It symbolisms the universal outlook as said by Ramakrishna as he thought that change is necessary for everything. He says if anything has its own rigid rules in amalgamating the new values and approaches, it will not survive so long. In the view of Swami Vivekananda, any concept or theory should be useful for something or to somebody otherwise it is useless, but we must be in a position to make use of it properly and accurately in intime for a reliable manner.

Further more Sri Ramakrishna directs his disciples and said that religion should be the practice to evolve some higher scale of thinking in the mind of man in all sections of the people. He showed the way and moulded the mind of his disciples to the ability to get the real fruits and prospects from a religion which will inspire the human mentality to develop their personality and a way of thinking and living. The self of the earth is the man of true religion in all the times as he behaves as a man of ideas and ideals to propose the humanistic outlook in the mind of man without caring for their life and liberty. Selbie disclosed the real nature of religion in such a way who said that "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, i.e.,

things set a part and forbidden beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community".⁵

Sri Ramakrishna stressed on the need of religion for a better understanding among the individuals in society. He said that we should not hate people as every man is the embodiment of God. To improve the quality in the mind of man the quality of religion is needed to make people digest and assimilate the actual values of religion and the practical values of man to perform his role in society as a good citizen. To quote Schlepp "The goal of man generally speaking is to achieve the manhood of the humanity in which men, instead of standing in each other way, will aid each other in the process of becoming daily more truly human".⁶

So we can say that religion is the effective media to propose a new system of approach at a grand level of thinking. The charity and sociability will be developed in man because of the teachings of religion.

Religion is the ultimate concern of human life to improve the quality of man to look into the progress of humanity in the light of humanism and understanding among individuals. For that, Dr Ambedkar delineated that "man cannot live by bread alone. He had a mind which needs food for thought"⁷. Sri Ramakrishna always proposed the need of religion for the construction of the new values with the qualified and refined individuals. Here qualified means the state of humanistic outlook and altruistic manner. Swami Vivekananda aptly said that "Religion is the idea which raises the brute unto man, and man unto God"⁸. Sri Ramakrishna always stressed the need of exchange and adaptation of the world. He believed in religious values of his own and other which will strengthen the dignity and integrity of all sections of people.

The aim of religion is to give some importance to the religions of the world as he regarded, it as the factor to improve values and understanding among people for better living. To quote him, "Religious precepts often prove useless as long as one is immersed in worldliness. Allow a man a certain time for the enjoyment of things of the world. When his attachment to the world has somewhat lessened, then comes the time for fruitful religious instructions. Till then all such instructions will only be lost upon him"⁹. It shows the practical value of religion and develop the determination to propagate the hidden quality of religion, towards man and his action towards the society. So, the goal of religion is not something external to the worshipper; it means inner change and integration of the total personality to establish the proper relations among individuals.

In the sequence of human understanding man will be manifested with magnificent manliness for the life process not only for himself but for the society. If we imply the real formation of religion. It is a reservoir to supply all the highest qualities as a quantity for man to accommodate himself as a man with the reflection of moral values and ethical out look. In fact, religion is not only a message for the mass but a massage which keeps man and society away from all sorts of travails and turmoils. In practical orientation religion magnifies the humanistic outlook and Philanthropic tendency in the mind of man to stabilise society for an able set up of human relations. So, religion is

inseparable from man though the progress of human civilization in all its connections.

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Advaita concept of Upamana

B.C. Obula Reddy,

The Advaitins and the Bhatta Mimamsikas accept Upamana as a separate means of valid knowledge but explain it in a different way from the Naiyayikas.

Upamana or comparison is the instrumental cause of the act of comparison (two or more things with one another from similarity). The act of comparison is the knowledge of the relation which exists between a name and a thing named. The cause of this is a knowledge of similarity. The recollection of the extension of the signification of a word by analogy is a step involved in the operation. As for instance, a man not knowing what is signified by the word gavaya (Bosgavacus), and having heard from a forest man that 'a gavaya is like a cow' resorts to a forest, where having collected the meaning of the sentence told to him, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then arises this act of comparison in his mind, that, this is what is meant by the word gavaya.

Here by a process of agreement and difference, the knowledge of that likeness of a cow which exists in gayal is the instrument, and the knowledge of that likeness of gayal which exists in a cow is the result¹.

The first judgement is the result of perception while the second is got through the meditation of the perceptual knowledge and is the result of Upamana. The mental processes involved here are: first, there is a perception of similarity, secondly there is the remembrance of the cow at home and lastly there is the judgement that the cow seen in the past is like the gavaya for it is like my cow." The Vedantin concluding judgement is: "My cow is like this gavaya". The Vedantin argues that it is natural to make the statement: "This gavaya is like my cow," based on a perception of similarity, but from this alone we can never arise at the conclusion that "My cow is like this animal, so it is a gavaya". This judgement is one which is derived by the perception of similarity applied through memory to what has already been perceived in the past.

So, from the perceived likeness of the gavaya to the cow we next know that the cow is like the gavaya, although the cow is not now perceived by us. This latter knowledge of the likeness of the unperceived cow to the perceived gavaya is due to Upamana or comparison. It cannot be due to perception, since its locus, namely, the cow is not now perceived, but only remembered. It is no doubt conditioned by the perception of likeness in the gavaya. But when from this perceptual knowledge of likeness we pass to the knowledge that the cow,

not now perceived, is like the gavaya, it is no longer perception. In inference the paksa or the minor term is an object of perception and the linga or the middle term is present in the paksa. In the alleged inference of the cow's likeness to the gavaya the paksa, i.e. the cow cannot be an object of perception, and the linga i.e. the likeness of the gavaya would be present not in the Paksa 'cow', but in the gavaya. Further, when from the one likeness we know the other, we are not conscious of any inferring, but of comparison. Introspection tells us that the actual process of reasoning involved in the second knowledge of likeness is not inferential. Similarly when we perceive a horse and know it to be unlike the cow, our knowledge of the unlikeness is perceptual. But when from this we conclude that the cow, not now perceived, is unlike the horse, we depend, not now perceived, is unlike the horse, we depend, not on perception and inference, but on Upamana or comparison. Thus the Vedantist admit that there is perceptual element in Upamana. But they go further and prove that the reasoning about likeness and unlikeness, based on some perception, cannot be fully explained by perception or inference. Nor it is remembrance for the consciousness of similarity is felt directly, it has no reference to the past experience. It constitutes an independent source of valid knowledge (Pramana), to which they give the name of Upamana or comparison.

It is necessary to note, however, that the Vedanta goes further that the knowledge of the similarity of the remembered cow to the gavaya, which, according to the later is sufficient unto itself and is an example of Upamiti as a complete process, is really not so. For this knowledge, in the view of Vedanta, is characterised by a certain dynamism, and, in consequence, inevitable leads to its correlate consisting in the knowledge of the similarity of the perceived gavaya to the remembered cow. In this the Vedanta is perhaps trying to bring to light the whole truth about Upamiti by means of emphasizing that this kind of knowledge is indeed the knowledge of the relation of mutual similarity between two similar objects. But then, mutuality in this case of a logical character, signifying mutual implication and does not admit being construed, as is contoured by the Vedanta, in terms of the relation between cause (Karna) and effect (Phala).¹

In advaita ashrams comparison is being explained when a violator, etc., where a villager has been told by a dweller of the forest that what is denoted by the words, gayal resembles a cow, and afterwards he sees in a forest etc. A gayal, the similarity to a cow that is noticed in it is the instrument of comparison. Then there is a recollection of that meaning of the sentence. 'What is denoted by the word 'gayal' resembles a cow, 'Which has already been known. This is what is called the operation (vyapara). After that he has the knowledge that the gayal is the import of the word gayal. This is comparison. Comparison does not consist in the notion. This (particular individual) is the import of the word gayal for them the denotative function (Sakti) of the world will not be apprehended with regard to another 'gayal'.

But it may be said that comparison (Upamana) is the cognition of an object as characterised by likeness of another, e.g. of likeness to the cow as produced by the recollection of a comparing collection. This is an auxiliary

condition. Thus a person ignorant of the meaning of the word 'gayaya' first learns from a forester that 'gavaya' means an animal resembling a cow. There after when later on he comes across in a forest an animal looking like a cow, he recollects the previous advice of the forester that 'gavaya' is an animal like a cow. There on the knowledge dawnson him 'That animal (resembling the cow) must be what is meant by the word gavaya? At this knowledge is not caused by perception and the rest, the process (which generates the knowledge) is regarded as an independent source of knowledge called Upamana or comparison.

A systematic record of the Advaita account of Upamana is given by Anandapurna Munindra also called Anandapurna Vidyasagara in his Nyayachandrika and also by Dharmaraja Adhvaryer in his Vedanta paribhasa. The present discussion is based upon these treatises on Advaita Vedanta. Anandapurna defines Upamiti as the knowledge of similarity which the object situated at a distance bears to that present near the observer.¹ While explaining the psychological process in Upamana, Anandapurna stated that the resultant knowledge through Upamana² refers to the cow qualified by the similarity to gavaya. Dharmaraja Adhvaryu defines Upamana as the instrument (Karana) of Upamiti which in turn is the resultant knowledge in the form of similarity.³ Anandapurna explains the position with the help of the following example containing the psychological process involved in Upamana when a person perceives a cow in the village and comes across a gavaya in the forest, he comes to understand that the object perceived is like the cow. After this, he reaches the ascertainment that my cow is like the object perceived and thus, arises the knowledge of cow as qualified by its similarity to the gavaya. Here, the means of Upamiti is the knowledge (perception) of the gavaya, the resultant knowledge is that of the cow as qualified by its similarity to the gavaya and the object of knowledge is the cow qualified by its similarity to gavaya.²

According to Dharmaraja Adhvaryu, however, the instrumentality is the knowledge of the similarity which the gavaya bears to the cow and the resultant knowledge is the knowledge of similarity which the cow bears to the gavaya.³ The difference regarding the nature of resultant knowledge is prompted by the alternatives suggested by Kumarila Bhatta that the resultant knowledge refers to the similarity or the object qualified by similarity.¹ Anandapurna accepts the former only. The psychological process involves four steps. First of all there is the knowledge or perception of points of similarity in the gavaya. Secondly, though the similarity is revived the memory of the cow seen earlier in the village. Thirdly, there arises the knowledge that the perceptible gavaya is like the cow and finally there is the consequent cognition that the cow seen earlier is similar to the gavaya seen at present, or, in other words, the cow seen earlier is qualified by the similarity to the gavaya seen at present.

A critical survey into Hare's views on fanaticism

Prabhakar Bhattacharyya

Prof. R.M.Hare, in many of his writings, has discussed on fanaticism. In his well-known books *Freedom and Reason* (1963) and *Moral Thinking* (1981), we find elaborate discussion on fanaticism. Section I of this paper is a precise representation of the views expressed mainly in the aforesaid two books. In the section II I have made an evaluation of Hare's views and also have tried to draw some conclusions.

Hare has devoted a few pages of *Moral Thinking* for classification of fanatics. Most of the fanatics are inhabitants of the real world, however, he also mentions a kind of fanatics who do not exist in the real world, but for arguments sake alone he acknowledges the possibility of that kind of fanatics. The first type of fanatics comprises 'impure' fanatics. These fanatics lack the power of analysis which is required for the critical assessment of an action. However, there may be 'impure' fanatics, who possess the power of analysis but who do not assess moral actions critically. Most of the fanatics are of the 'impure' kind. Their existence hardly posit any threat to the theory of liberalism. The second type of fanatics comprises the 'pure' fanatics. Hare has divided these fanatics into two sub-classes. The first sub-class of pure fanatics comprises persons who are able and willing to think critically about moral issues, but the conclusion at which they arrive are such that the ideals they uphold go against the liberal principle of toleration. These fanatics do now believe in the utilitarian principle of 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. They do not compromise with anyone's interest not even that of his own. The second sub-class contains fanatics whose conclusions do not contradict with the above-mentioned utilitarian principle. This kind of fanatics is recognized only for arguments sake they do not exist in the real world.¹

Fanaticism originates from excessive trust in intuitive principles and lack of power or unwillingness to think critically on moral issues². Whatever is taught to children in the name of moral education often sow the seed of racial, religious and political fanaticism. It is the short-sightedness of such educators that is responsible for this. Some educational institutions, however, teach something which protect the interests of these institutions in the long run. But teaching with such narrow perspective cannot be beneficial to the society at large.

Not all moral principles that people claim to know through intuition are bad. There are some principles which are supportable even after a considerable amount of critical thought³. The principles of non-violence, truthfulness etc. are taught to children in an oversimplified form at the early state of education, while at a higher stage exceptions to the practice of these principles are taught. A true citizen should know the implications of violence and truthfulness warfare or in revolution.

A pacifist is one who believes in the principle of non-violence without enough justification. A non-pacifist, too may remain content without the requisite justification for the principle in which he believes. The conflict between the pacifist and the non-pacifist cannot be resolved by reference to intuition. To resolve this dispute one has to find out which principle overrides the other in a particular situation. But to analyse the situation, critical thought is required⁴. A point that may be noted here is that it is not the content of a principle, but the attitude that one has towards it that breeds fanaticism⁵.

It is not fanatical to get moral principles through intuitions. Neither is it fanatical not to think critically in times of excessive mental pressure or relative ignorance inasmuch as in that case there is a chance for mistake. There are people who do not think critically in fear of not being able to do that well; this may be regrettable, though not unpardonable. Fanatics are those who try to keep their firm convictions beyond the reach of critical thought. They do not think critically even when they have enough time and adequate information. A point that may be noted here is that fanatics are not amoralist: to the fanatics moral principles are such that they should not, rather need not be brought in question⁷.

Whenever fanatics try to implement their ideals in society they cause suffering to the members of society. If a fanatic place himself in the position of a sufferer either he will maintain that an ideal which causes tremendous sufferings should not be implemented or he will have to maintain that the ideal should be implemented although it causes suffering inasmuch as the social importance of the ideal overrides the suffering. In the former case, the fanatic subsides from his fanatical stand and in the latter case the man need not be fanatic because similar conclusion can be arrived at through critical thought. This is the dilemma of fanaticism⁸.

The word 'ought' is more appropriate than the word 'good' in the context of an ideal. We should not confuse the concepts of duty, obligation etc. with those of goodness, perfection etc. Secondly, arguments providing scope for considering other man's interest should not be confused with arguments of purely ideological character. Fanatics are usually idealists and in a sense they may be said to be perfectionists. But the goal of fanatics is not human perfection. Fanatics are in search of some absolute ideal⁹. Without giving due respect to the interest of other people one cannot be said to seek human perfection.

Sometimes it is held that to have an ideal is to have an interest in the success in the implementation of that ideal. Fanatics think like this. To keep their interest they ignore the interest of other people and as a result clash and violence become inevitable. Fanatics often accuse liberals for not having any

ideal. But this charge is baseless. The principle of tolerance is a part of the ideal of the liberals. To a fanatic, ideals are more important than human beings, but for a liberal both human beings and their ideals are equally important. Liberals respect their own ideals and to respect own ideals liberals implement their ideals in their own lives; they even expect their ideal to get universal acceptance. But a liberal does not try to mobilize public opinion in his favour by propaganda or by threat. Liberals separate the concept of 'good man' from the concept of 'good society'¹¹. For them, a good society is one where everyone's interest is given due respect. Liberals never claim that their ideal is the best possible one; they only claim that their ideal is the best among the ideals known to them. Liberals, unlike fanatics, are in favour of a diversity of ideals because different ideals may be appreciated by people of different tastes and attitudes.

To save society from the course of fanaticism we need the following things:-

1. Philosophers should clarify the concepts related to moral actions.
2. Social scientists, journalists and historians should submit to the people necessary facts about the issues which fan the flame of fanaticism.
3. Literatures should channelize the faculty of emotion of people to the right path¹².

The above three methods may also be used by the fanatics. They may confuse people by using moral words wrongly interpreted, by professional moral philosophers. Fanatics may also employ professional social scientists, historians and journalists. Books in favour of fanatic ideals may also be written by professional writers. In spite of all above mentioned circumstances, fanaticism cannot win if there is true freedom of expression. The evil effort of hiding or distorting facts cannot succeed it. Freedom of expression is allowed. If there is no censorship, writers can picture the sufferings caused by the application of fanaticism. But the most important thing is that the influential part of society should not be misled by fanaticism.¹⁴

Fanatics are very few in number. If we can resist them from influencing the people, they cannot do much harm to society. Fanatics spread their influence by concealing truth and by propagating untruth. They try to evoke imagination in favour of their view by shrewd application of mass-media. However, the basic precondition of success of fanaticism lies in confused thinking. The success of fanaticism can be arrested by removing confusion in thought.¹⁵

II

Hare's classification of fanatics in two classes, 'pure' and 'impure' is from the perspective of moral action only. We all know that moral action is that action for which the agent is responsible. But all actions that are the effects of fanaticism are not strictly moral actions of the agent who is at the spell of fanaticism. Here we should distinguish between the desired goal of an action and the consequent effect of an action.¹⁶ The effect of an action does not end up with the achievement or with the failure in achieving the desired goal. The chain of actions and reactions goes on resulting in effects on which fanatics

may have no control at all. So the fanatics cannot legitimately be held responsible for those effects of action.

The criterion of classification is based on the ability and willingness to think critically. Hare has over emphasized on the rational element in human beings. In one place he says that it is the attitude that makes a man fanatic¹⁷. But attitude is not formed by rationality alone. Non-rational elements such as, love, fraternity etc. may make a man fanatic. However, in this case, ignoring rational element results in fanatic impulses. Love and fraternity may also make a man liberal in the truest sense of the term. Rationality only supply support in favour of not being fanatic. But this belief is implanted in life only through courage and love which are undoubtedly non-rational elements. However there may be philosophical debate concerning the factors in the complex value of love, courage etc. with which we are not concerned.

There is certainly a difference in maintaining an attitude and in acting on the basis of an attitude. There is a gap between being potentially fanatic and acting fanatically. Again one may hypocritically act fanatically to show that he is in the group of fanatics who often outnumber the liberals. A politician may gain quick popularity by hypocritically appealing to the potential fanatic impulse of the common mass.

Hare ignores one aspect of fanaticism. This aspect is most prominent in the form of 'Hero-worship'. The fanatic does not care for what is said, i.e., he does not question the logical consequence and relevance of the words preached to him. He only looks for who says. If a fanatic likes a person, he unquestioningly follows the latter person¹⁸. This person-centric fanaticism is found in 'hero'-worship'. Not only mental immaturity. Physical weakness may also provoke the tendency of hero-worship and consequent surrender. Courage, which alone can guarantee acting on the principle of liberalism can only remain where there is a true balance of mental vigour and physical strength. Physical strength of the agent is not absolutely directly necessary in case of group behaviour.

The majority of the population is potentially (though not actually, as Hare says) capable of being fanatic and has some superstitions or other the attitude to which he is fanatic. When a large number of people share a common superstition, the fanatic attitude to that become a social problem. Sati (burning of widow in the funeral pyre of her husband), untauchibility etc. are examples of superstitions which were followed fanatically in India even in the last century. The fanatic impulse in common man is being used through ages. In public administration fanaticism plays a major role. The State authority, in a totalitarian society (e.g. in a theocratic state) utilises all the three means mentioned by Hare. The spread of fanatic ideals is the most effective measure that can give stability to a totalitarian regime. To check the spread of counter-fanaticism the authority imposes restrictions on expression of opinions.

It seems to me that Hare is right in saying that freedom of expression is the greatest enemy of fanaticism, but I would add further that although freedom of expression is an essential condition for checking the spread of fanaticism, it is not a sufficient condition. Even in societies (for example in western liberal societies) where people enjoy considerable amount of freedom of

expression fanatic ideas might be spread by people with vested interests. Mill also expressed similar doubt in his famous book 'on Liberty'.¹⁹

According to Hare, critical thought can check the growth of fanaticism when latter centres around moral issues. It may be noted here that to Hare the word 'critical thought' stands for a particular level of moral reasoning. For Hare, there are three levels of moral reasoning: the intuitive, the critical and the meta-ethical one. Moral conflicts cannot be resolved at the intuitive level. They can be resolved at the critical level alone. Meta-ethical level is concerned with the meaning of moral words and the logic of moral reasoning²⁰. When people find themselves in a moral conflict they seek readymade solution which they find in a fanatically preached doctrines.

The dilemma of fanaticism, as Hare sees it, presupposes the acceptance of utilitarianism and humanitarianism. Utilitarianism as a theory is not without defects. However, discussion of the faults of the aforesaid theory falls beyond the scope of this paper. Humanitarianism is opposite of totalitarianism. Consistent theories can also be formed in favour of totalitarian views. Treating man as man, which is the spirit of humanitarianism, is a new movement. In ancient times, even in the last century, a large number of people were deprived of civic rights. The existence of slaves and serfs tarnish the glory of Greek and Roman civilizations, if seen from the humanitarian perspective. Even now-a-days in theocratic countries men who do not adhere to the official ideology are deprived of some important rights. Hence, like utilitarianism, there are points to be raised about the possibility of practising absolute humanitarianism in the real world. The dilemma of fanaticism of Hare remains so long as one believes in utilitarianism and humanitarianism. Otherwise, it no more remains a dilemma.

To save our civilization from the evils of fanaticism that right to have correct information must be guaranteed. Censorship and official propaganda should be restricted to the least possible extent. Men must be taught to respect the rights of others and to feel for others. Fraternity must be developed. Art, literature and festivals may contribute to the expansion of sympathetic outlook in the macro level. In the micro level, spiritual upliftment, (not in the sense of religious orthodoxy) can guarantee immunity from the threat of fanaticism. If we ignore the development of the inner man, no macro level measure to suppress and to control fanaticism will be fruitful in the long run. Let me close the discussion with an appeal to the good conscience for taking immediate measures to eradicate the evils of fanaticism, be it in the micro or in the macro level.

The concept of truth in Gandhian Philosophy

S. Radha

Truth is the first and foremost principle in Gandhian Philosophy. Even Non-violence is given only a second place. Gandhi is prepared even to sacrifice Non-violence for the sake of Truth. It was, as he himself confesses, in the course of his pursuit of Truth that he discovered Non-violence. "As a Jain muni once rightly said, I was not so much a votary of ahimsa as I was of truth, and I put the latter in the first place and the former in the second."¹ The very title of his Autobiography is "The Story of My Experiments with Truth" and not "My Experiments with Non-Violence." This again shows that his foremost interest was in Truth to which he dedicated his whole life.

The Indian word equivalent to 'Truth' is 'Satya.' 'Satya' is a Sanskrit word derived from the root word 'Sat' which means 'being' or 'existence.' Thus the word 'Sat' which means 'being' or 'existence'. Thus the word 'Truth' means 'that which exists'. It is this existential meaning that is generally emphasized in the religious tradition of India.

Truth is an important cardinal virtue in Hindu tradition. It is as old as the Vedas. But Gandhiji says that "truth and non-violence are as old as the hills."² When Lord Curzon contended that truth was a Western Concept, Gandhi in a rejoinder quoted some of the Upanishads to prove that it is not purely a Western concept. There is a place for it in ancient Indian thought also. To illustrate, "Truth alone prevails and not untruth. Truth is the pathway which learned men tread, It is by this path that the sages, satiated in their desires, have obtained salvation in Him who is the infinite ocean of Truth."³ Gandhiji quotes various other Upanishads to show that truth is the highest. "Speech rests on truth; everything rests on truth. Therefore they call truth the highest."⁴ Thus the conception of Truth as the highest is not anything new. What is novel is the way in which Gandhi interprets it.

Gandhi makes a distinction between absolute truth and relative truths. Absolute truth is the sovereign principle which incorporates within itself numerous other principles. It is the eternal principle which is beyond the reach of perception and thought, beyond time and history. In other words, it is something indescribable. Gandhi identifies Absolute Truth with God. "For me," says Gandhi "truth is the sovereign principle, which includes numerous other principles. This truth is not only truthfulness in word, but truthfulness in thought also, and not only the relative truth of our conception, but the Absolute

Truth, the Eternal Principle, that is God."⁵ He confesses that however much we may try, Absolute Truth is incapable of full realization. "It is impossible for us to realise perfect Truth so long as we are imprisoned in the mortal frame. We cannot, through the instrumentality of this ephemeral body, see face to face Truth which is eternal."⁶ Absolute Truth is presupposed by all the relative truths. These latter can be understood only in the light of the former. Gandhi has formulated several ashram vows of which truth is one. This truth as a vow is only a relative truth and not an absolute one. The relative truth is in fact truth as perceived by finite individuals in relation to ideas and circumstances. So long as the absolute truth remains unrealised our only guide is relative truth as we conceive it.

After distinguishing Absolute Truth from the relative, Gandhi passes on to the next question: what is the nature of the path leading to Truth? His reply is that the path towards Truth is straight, narrow and perilous. To quote his own words, "I know the path. It is straight and narrow. It is like the edge of the sword."⁷ As regards the essential qualification required for a seeker after truth, Gandhi says that he must be a man of utter humility. "The seeker after truth should be humbler than the dust. The world crushes the dust under its feet, but the seeker after Truth should so humble himself that even the dust could crush him. Only then, and not till then, will he have a glimpse of truth."⁸ He must also be a man free from lust, anger, greed, infatuation, pride, falsehood and such other vices mentioned in traditional Indian Ethics. He must also take care to cultivate truth not only in his action but also in his thought and speech. In other words, only a morally strong man can see the truth. Truth, no doubt, is self-evident. But it is surrounded by cobwebs of ignorance. If these cobwebs are removed, truth shines clearly. The cobwebs can be removed only by self-analysis and self-purification. Careful observation and the right use of reason were the methods used by Gandhi for the discovery of truth.

Gandhi identifies Truth with Reality. Truth is not conformity of knowledge with reality as the correspondence theory of truth would make us believe; it is reality itself. The highest Reality, which, according to Gandhi, is God is nothing but Absolute Truth. The summum bonum of our life is self-realization or God-realization which is nothing other than truth-realization. And Truth, as conceived by Gandhi, has a diversity of meanings. It is a criterion of moral and ethical conduct, a source of epistemological ideas, and at the same time a metaphysical statement about Reality.

Gandhi's search in life began with God whom he tried to know more and more. As a result of this investigation he came to the conclusion that 'God is Truth.' At first he took the idea of God from the world's existing religions and he entertained no doubt about His existence. Further Confirmation about the reality of God came from the mystics of all religions. The Upanisadic seers, the Neo-Platonic mystics, the Christian mystics and the Sufis of Islam bore testimony to the authentic existence of God. Tolstoy's book "The kingdom of God is within You" also influenced Gandhi in shaping his idea of God. It is by taking this inner view of God that Gandhi began to describe God as Truth. But soon his contact with the agnostics and atheists among his co-workers in the political field led him to cast serious doubt about the reliability of the traditional notion of God. He found that his atheistic friends while rejecting God did not do

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so in the case of Truth. Reason could reject everything but not truth. So Gandhi changed his emphasis from "God is Truth" to "Truth is God." This change did not precipitate a crisis in his life as it was only an extension and added confirmation of his earlier faith in God. It gave him a larger view of God acceptable to theists and atheists alike. Sectarian and narrow ideas of God have generally created more mischief and hatred in the world than sincere and honest atheism. Inter-religious rivalry has led even to devastating wars. Moreover, there is no uniformity in the idea of God among the peoples of the world. Even the atheists, the humanists and the naturalists may have their own deities of adoration in the sense of the highest object of value but they may not use the word 'God' for such objects. Even the rational atheism of the atheist if it is the outcome of an honest and sincere search for truth is acceptable to Gandhi. Moreover, a genuine rational doubt may sometimes be a sound means for the generations of firm and unflinching faith.

Gandhi's conception of God was very comprehensive. To his God was the all pervasive reality, immanent in man as well as in the world which he has created and manifested. God is not only immanent but also transcendent. He is neither exhausted nor fully expressed by His creation. To Gandhi God is so inexhaustible that He is everything. "To me," he says "God is Truth and Love; God is ethics and morality; God is fearlessness. God is the source of Light and Life and yet He is above and beyond all these. God is conscience."⁹ This account of God, though apparently incoherent, brings out fully and adequately the nature of God. God is Truth means He is not a personal being, but a principle. Though a principle, it is not abstract, but concrete and real. It is on ontological reality. This reality functions as a law of love in the world.

Like the Seers of the Upanishads Gandhi brings out the contrast between God, the Absolute Reality and the phenomenal world of nature and man, the relative reality. While the former is perfect, the latter is imperfect. The former, again is infinite and the latter finite. But the Phenomenal world is not illusory as Sankara, the great Advaita Philosopher says. The world, no doubt, is changing at every moment but underlying these changes there is something which persists and therefore it is real to that extent. Moreover, the phenomenal world partakes of God's divinity and therefore it must be real.

Gandhi also, like the seers of the Upanishads, characterises God as Sat-chit-Ananda. But he gives his own interpretation to it. He says that where there is Truth, there is also knowledge which is true. That is why, the word chit or knowledge is associated with the name of God. And where there is true knowledge, there is also bliss (ananda). Thus God is sat (Truth), Chit (knowledge) and Ananda (Bliss).

God, according to Gandhi, is an idea, a principle. He is not a personal being. He is without form and attributes. But common man, whose interests are uppermost in Gandhi's mind, is unable to worship, much less to understand, such a God. So, as a concession to human frailty Gandhi admits the necessity of recognizing God with form. Yet he gives a higher place to the formless aspect of God. In this respect, as in many other respects, he follows the Bhagavad Gita which also speaks of the two aspects of the supreme—the personal and the

The concept of truth in Gandhian Philosophy

impersonal. Like the Gita Gandhi has never lost sight of the higher truth of the impersonal God over the personal.

Gandhi's emphasis on the impersonal aspect of God is sometimes so great that he even comes to regard Him as "as unalterable law" as Buddha did in the past. It is generally believed that Buddha was an agnostic who refused to believe in God. But Gandhi does not subscribe to this belief. His contention is that Buddha did believe in God which he called Dharma, the moral government of the universe. The unalterable law about which Gandhi speaks is nothing but the Buddhist Dharma which is the very nature of things as they are and which holds all.

Though Gandhi was not an academic philosopher he was well acquainted with the classical proofs for the existence of God as a result of his study of theological literature especially Christian. In his collection of articles on Hinduism called "Hindu Dharma" there are brief statements of almost all the arguments on the existence of God. The causal argument is presented in the following form: "If we exist, if our parents and their parents have existed, then it is proper to believe in the parent of the whole creation."¹⁰ The cosmological and the teleological arguments are found united together in the following passage: "There is an orderliness in the universe, there is an unalterable law governing everything and every being that exists or lives. It is not a blind law; for no blind law can govern the conduct of living beings. That Law then which governs all life in God. Law and Law-giver are one."¹¹ The moral argument is implicit in Gandhi's conception of conscience as the voice of God, the inner call of duty the direct intimation of the divine in man to which he often turned whenever any momentous decisions were taken. The authoritarian and the historical proofs are seen together in such testimony as to be found in the experience of an unbroken line of prophets and sages in all countries and climes." Finally he joins millions and millions of his fellowmen in testifying the authentic existence of God: "I am one of the millions of wise men who believe in Him."¹⁴

But these arguments, primarily based on the intellect, may carry conviction but will not enable us to see God face to face. For that we have to depend on our own direct intuitive experience of God. Such intuitions convince us of the real existence of God. "There is," says Gandhi, "an indefinable mysterious power that pervades everything I feel it, though I do not see it. It is this unseen Power which makes itself felt and yet defies all proof, because it is so unlike all that I perceive through my senses. It transcends the senses."¹⁵ Thus Gandhi recommends the pragmatic test also to verify the existence of God. "He who would in his own person test the fact of God's presence can do so by a living faith. And since faith itself cannot be proved by extraneous evidence, the safest course is to believe in the moral government of the world and therefore in the supremacy of the moral law, the law of Truth and Love."¹⁶

According to Gandhi, ahimsa is the one and only means for attaining Truth "Ahimsa is not the goal. Truth is the goal. But we have no means of realizing truth in human relationships except through the practice of ahimsa."¹⁷ Again, "Truth is the only religion and ahimsa is the only way of its realization."¹⁸

Ahimsa in the wider sense means love, according to Gandhi. If truth requires ahimsa for its realization it necessarily follows that it requires love as well. Gandhi firmly believes that truth is incapable of attainment through love. But love also ceases to be genuine love without truth. In the words of Gandhi, "without truth there is no love; without truth, it may be affection as for one's country to the injury of others; or infatuation, as of a youngman for a girl; or love may be unreasoning and blind; as of ignorant parents for their children."¹⁹

Truthfulness in speech and action becomes natural to a man who loves his fellow beings. Loving a person genuinely and deceiving him by words or actions are incompatible. Thus like truth and non-violence, truth and love are inseparable in Gandhian Philosophy. That is why Gandhi, like the Indian Moralists, asks us to speak not only the truth but to speak what is good and pleasant as well. To speak the truth bluntly will not bring any good either to the speaker or the person spoken to. So the speaker, if he has any love for the person to whom he speaks, must speak only what is good or beneficial to him. Further, truth even if it is beneficial to the person spoken to should be spoken in a pleasant way. Truth speaking thus becomes a veritable art to be assiduously cultivated.

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13

*Nagarjuna's notion of self as sunyata as contained in his Maha Prajnaparamita Sastra**

G. Vdeaparan,

Nagarjuna, the Teacher of the Great Way (Mahayana) regards Sunyata as the most felicitous means of conveying the truth of non-clinging (anupalambha-yoga) and the undivided being (advayadharma) in all their different aspects. He treats it as the principle of comprehensive understanding that reveals perfect wisdom and universal compassion as the two inalienable aspects of integrated life.

I

Nagarjuna uses Sunyata in two senses. Firstly, he uses it in the sense of criticism or dialectic of non-clinging that unveils the conditioned origination (Pratityasamutpada) which everything is in its mundane reality. Secondly, he uses it in the sense of the undivided and indeterminate being (dharma-dhatu) which everything is in its ultimate nature. He applies Sunyata in its two senses to all the concepts and conventional entities, and unfolds the truth of their mundane as well as transmundane nature. Similarly, he applies it to the concept of "Self" and shows dependent origination and unconditioned being as the truth of its mundane and ultimate nature, respectively.

Nagarjuna distinguishes between two kinds of self, viz., the false and the real. The former belongs to the world of the determinate while the latter to the indeterminate. The false self refers to the complex of personality made up of the five skandhas, namely, form (rupa), sensation (vedana), perception (sanjna), impulse (samskara) and consciousness (vijñana), and the six-senses and their graspings or the twelve sense fields (ayatana), namely the eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and flavours, the body and tangibles, and the mind and ideas or thought, and lastly, the eighteen elements (dhatu) comprising six sense faculties, the six sense objects and the corresponding six sense consciousness. The determinate self is merely a composite entity of conditioned events; it is not anything substantial, individual, permanent and non-relational; it stands for an organism causally born and subject to arising and perishing. Just as a cart is a compound entity (samskṛta) composed of the wheel, the shaft, etc. so also the self is a compound entity over and above or independent of its components (P. 138). It is the body-mind

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devoid of self-hood; it does not have a self-being of its own (svabhava-Sunyata) (p. 220). The real self, according to Nagarjuna, is the unconditioned being which has self-being (Svabhava) as its inmost nature and does not depend on anything to come into existence (PP. 98 & 171). Nagarjuna is of the view that just as there is the essence of gold in the yellow stone, and the essence of silver in the white stone, there is the essence of Nirvana or the self-being within the heart of everything in the world. Nagarjuna calls this self-being real self which could be realized through the power of wisdom and skill and by the cultivation of moral life and contemplation.

As all waters return to the great ocean, just in the same way, all determinate entities, including the determinate self, return ultimately to its real self. Just as the calf bleats and comes to rest only when it meets its mother, just in the same way, the false self finds peace only when it gets back to and established in its self-nature. It attains its self-being when it rightly comprehends the determinate nature of its own being. The conditioned self is itself in its ultimate nature the unconditioned self. The false self and the real self are not totally unrelated (P. 264).

The real self is the undivided being which everything "is" in its ultimate nature. It is the universal being which is underived and uncompound (asamskṛta). The real self is like the moon in the sky, while the false is like its image in the water. Nagarjuna calls the real self dharmadhatu which is the ultimate reality of the false-self and all the concepts and conventional entities. In dharmadhatu, "dharma" stands for Nirvana, "dhatu" stands for "the essential, intrinsic, inmost nature, the fundamental, ultimate essence" (p. 261.).

Nagarjuna equates dharmadhatu with Svabhava-sunyata. Svabhava sunyata, being indeterminate, transcendent, and non-conceptual, constitutes the ground of all determinate existence. It is the universal reality which includes everything without distinction. Nagarjuna calls it samata which means the essential sameness of all things in their true nature. That is, indeterminateness (Sunyata) is the essential nature of everything determinate, including the false self (P.270). Svabhava-sunyata is not something to be affirmed. Seizing the Svabhava-sunyata of the self is to turn it into something determinate. Svabhava-sunyata is free from all determinations. Nagarjuna calls it prapanca sunyata which means that it is beyond the world of mental and verbal conceptualization (P. 271). So he conveys it by means of such examples as island and akasa.

II

Nagarjuna holds that the ignorant not only reduce the indeterminate (real) self to the determinate (false) but mistake the latter for the former. They treat the self in its mundane reality itself as an absolute, independent and a substantial entity. They wrongly apply the sense of unconditionedness to the self in its mundane nature. In this they commit the error of misplaced absoluteness of ascribing permanent existence (Eternalism or Sasvatavada) to the conditioned self. Nagarjuna calls it the error of Satkaya drsti which is the root of all errors. To mistake the determinate for the indeterminate is an extreme view (drsti) in which an incomplete and a conditioned entity (kaya) which is merely a nama, rupa and laksana, is imagined to be absolute and unconditioned

(sat) (P. 102). Satkaya drsti manifests itself mainly in two forms: 1) firstly, it is expressed when the "I", the individual self, the body-mind complex of oneself and that of the others (not-I) are treated as being separate, independent and ultimate; 2) secondly, it manifests in the form in which the whole of experience is split into the "I" and the "not-I" which again is split into many different 'Objects'. That is, Satkaya drsti can be seen in its complete form when everything in the world, including Nirvana, the indeterminate being is imagined to be absolutely exclusive, divided and independent from the mundane. Satkaya drsti in regard to Nirvana takes place when there is a division of the undivided being into the "I" and Nirvana, the realizer and the realised, the subject and object, when, in fact, they are one and the same in their ultimacy (P. 103).

However, the svabhava-sunyata of the false self should not be mistaken for its total non-existence. Nagarjuna contends that the self in its determinate nature is the reflection of the real self which is transcendental and indeterminate in its nature. The "self" or the "I" in the world of the determinate owes its existence to the real self 'immanent' in it. Just as the image of the real moon in the sky appears in the water, so also the mundane self is the image of the real self reflecting in the minds of the individuals (P.99). So the false self, though non-substantial, is not a non-entity purely illusory like the second-head or the third hand of a person. To mistake the dependent nature of the determinate and condition self for its absolute non-existence is to commit the error of misplaced absoluteness of ascribing total non-existence (annihilationism or Uchedavada) to it.

Nagarjuna maintains that the existence of the conditioned self in its component form is real to the extent it serves the purpose of our mundane existence. Just as (the reality of) milk, which is not anything in itself but only a complex of colour, smell, taste and touch, so also the conditioned self is real as it is produced by its causes and conditions (P.138). To hold that there are only causes and conditions and non "self" is to commit again the error of misplaced absoluteness of totally denying its existence. Failure to recognise the existence of the self even as a conditioned entity is perversion or ignorance. Ascribing total non-existence (annihilationism) to the conditioned self is as fallacious as ascribing absolute existence (eternalism) to it.

Nagarjuna holds that there is nothing wrong in treating the conditioned self as a 'reality' without ascribing indeterminateness. There is no harm in living through the conditioned self without clinging to it as being unconditioned. Indeed, the life of every being is constituted by the conditioned self which is relative and divided. The determinate self, which is fixed, acts as the centre of the world of experience. It analyzes, differentiates and unifies the events of the empirical life. In fact, the world of convention would be reduced to a mass of confusion in the absence of self in its fixedness. It is through this self only that an individual brings forth his or her hidden potencies to manifestation. Nagarjuna holds that everyone, common man as well as the bodhisattva, including the Buddha lives through the self which is determinate. Everyone has a particular and specific self in which one is interested. That is, the determinate self is not the same for all but differs from person to person. It

is through this self that people organise their lives and work for their growth and fulfillment (P. 101).

Nagarjuna also holds that one can use the term "I" or "self" or "mine" without mistaking it for something substantial. One can use the name or concept of the "self" rightly in the sense of neither affirming nor denying its existence absolutely. One can apply the word "self" even in regard to the things that are really devoid of selfhood but always without entertaining the notion of a real I-substance.

Nagarjuna maintains that the wise and the disciples of the Buddha too speak in terms of self but strictly for practical purposes. Being well aware of the truth in the teaching of "non-I" and being well established in the truth of the things, they use the name "self" without pride or perversion of mistaking it either for absolute existence or total non-existence. They use it unerringly in the sense of recognising it only as a derived name and a relative concept. They understand it as Sunya not in the sense of its total non-existent but the absence of self-being. Their affirmation or denial of the being of the self is not extreme, since it is without clinging. They abandon the exclusive views about the self and fare on the Middle way which Nagarjuna calls Prajnaparamita (P.104). Thus the Middle way, according to Nagarjuna, consists in not denying the determinate self as totally non-existence and in not mistaking it for the real self which is essentially indeterminate in its nature.

III

Thus it can be said that the notion of self, according to Nagarjuna, has two orders of being: 1) the conditioned; 2) the unconditioned. It has a particularizing as well as a universalizing tendency. It can work as much for liberation as for bondage. Understood in its true sense, the self brings about liberation. The wise understand the conditioned as conditioned and unconditioned as unconditioned while the ignorant mistake one for the other. The wise, with the power of their pure wisdom, distinguish between the false and real sense of self and thus live their lives free from suffering (P. 106). But the ignorant, living through the false sense of self, suffer like the silk-worm that emits silk from within itself and gets caught in it. They become a prey to the factors of bondage, namely, 1) afflictions (Klesas) comprising desire, passion, greed, anger, jealousy, hatred, envy, violence, and 2) the extreme views (drstis) of blindly believing in the limitlessness of the determinate conceptual systems and falling a prey to the dogmatism of seizing the partial and the fragmentary as absolute and complete. They choose from out of the presented only the aspects of their interest and deny the rest; they claim completeness for the former and neglect the latter; thus they swing between the extremes by holding existence and non-existence as the absolute characters of things (P. 107).

Nagarjuna says that depending upon the listeners' powers of understanding, the Buddha taught the truth of the self mainly through two theories: 1) the existence of the self; 2) the non-existence of the self. He taught the former to the wise who could understand (the truth of) the condition self as merely a derived name and the latter to the common people who could not understand it so. At times, he also taught through "neither existence nor non-existence" of the self. However, the Buddha taught mostly through the

non-existence of the self in order to help people to get rid of their perversion of Satkaya drsti (p.105).

Nagarjuna warns that the misunderstanding of the sunyata nature of the self is fatal like grasping the snake at its tail. Holding to the negativism of treating the conditioned self and the world as evanescent, and the person, upon the death of the body, as not moving on to another body, one may take to the life of indulgence, cling to the objects of desire, commit sinful deeds and mistake his way of life for the best possible one. This Nagarjuna calls the false view of drsti-paramarsa. Or, holding to the eternalism of treating the conditioned self and the world as eternal, and the person, upon the death of the body, as moving on to another body, one may take to the life of self-torture of observing moral precepts and painful penances in order to cultivate the way of ultimate liberation from bodily existence. This Nagarjuna calls the false view of Silavrata paramarsa. Or, seeing that the extremes of eternalism and negativism as wrong, one may mistake life and the world for a mere chance and hold the view that things just happen without any cause or condition. This Nagarjuna calls mithya-drsti (P. 109). Thus, the misunderstanding of the Sunyata nature of the self is at the root of all suffering in life.

Thus the only reality that remains, according to Nagarjuna, is the undivided, indeterminate self which is the essence or the ultimate nature of everything. This he calls the real self, the self-being which is beyond all views (drstis). One has to realize it through true wisdom which is prajnaparamita. The false self is the result of ignorance. Just as the image of the moon appears only in stagnant water, so also it is only in the individual who is stupefied by ignorance that there exists the false self, the sense of ego, along with its consequent factors of bondage. It ceases to appear when the ignorance is dispelled by true wisdom just as the image of the moon in the still sheet of water gets disturbed when the water is beaten by a staff (P.99).

Nagarjuna contends that the false and the real selves are not entirely divided and different. The latter is not a rock-bottom reality hiding behind the appearance of the former. For him, the false self is all that there is. It is empty (Sunya). It does not conceal anything except Sunyata. That is, Sunyata is true as much of the mundane self as of the transmundane one. Sunyata as the truth of the mundane self implies that it is of the nature of change or relativity which in turn implies that all things are undivided, indistinct and one. Thus the realization of the Sunyata nature of the mundane self directs the mind to its ground, namely, the indeterminate dharma, the ground of everything in its ultimacy. So, it is the right understanding of the mundane that reveals the transmundane. The separateness between them is not ultimate. The mundane itself is transmundane when our tendency to misconstrue and misconceive is removed. The false self, when truly 'seen', enters the status of the true self, the unborn dharma (P. 225).

IV

To conclude, the basic import of Nagarjuna's notion of Sunyata in general and in regard to the nature of self in particular is that the true nature of things ever remains unaltered by our subjective fancies. That is, the mundane (self) cannot be mistaken for the transmundane; it cannot be rejected as totally

non-existent; nor can it be treated as the only truth of the things. So also, the transmundane (self) can neither be reduced to the mundane nor be denied as absolutely illusory. Their true nature cannot be modified by our thinking. The mundane is always conditioned while the transmundane is always unconditioned; one cannot be mistaken for the other. At the same time, they are not absolutely unrelated. Sunyata is revealed to be their true and inalienable nature when the ignorance of their absolute division is dispelled.

As already mentioned the Sunyata nature of the self is not the view about the self. Self as Sunyata is beyond all views; it cannot be seized either as existent or as non-existent, either as real or as unreal, either as permanent or impermanent, either as eternal or as evanescent. Just as the flame cannot be touched from any of the four sides, so also the undivided being is beyond the four kotis, namely, "is", "is not", "both is and is not" and "neither is nor is not". It is not anything specific that can be classified. Getting at it, one does not find in it anything that can be clung to; it is incomprehensible to our faculty of knowing; it is the cessation of all our misconceived propensities and their attendant perversions; It marks 'a complete recovery from the malady of manifoldness'. Therefore, Nagarjuna calls it Prapancopasama. It is not only beyond all our conceptions about it but also remains unaffected by them.

*K. Venkata Ramanan, Nagarjuna's Philosophy as presented in The Maha Prajnaparamita Sastra, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1975.

Sphotavada

*Jai Singh**

Bhartrhari regards anything less than a sentence as unmeaningful and develops what is known as the theory of sphota or explosion. The term sphota is derived from the root 'sphut' which means 'to burst'. Nagesa and Bhattojiksita define 'sphota' as that from which the meaning bursts or shines forth. It is an entity which is manifested by the sounds. In Patanjali's Mahabhasya, 'sphota' is clearly mentioned.

According to the grammarian like Bhartrhari, a sentence (sabda) cannot be divided into parts. Though we say that divide a sentence into words. It is not the sentence that we divide. It is but the sound that are distinguished. But words or sound-patterns are not sentences (sabda). Sounds are merely the qualities of sabda.¹ The division of a sentence into words is artificial, though we do it for practical reasons. A sentence is not made of parts, though as sound pattern, it can be divided into parts.²

According to the most Indian philosophers a word presents its meaning directly and not through sphota (a latent unitary medium of expression), as the Grammarians hold. In the view of the Grammarians a word consisting of letters and syllables cannot directly convey its significance.

Corresponding to each word there is a sphota (a latent unitary medium of expression), which underlies the constituent letters and has no components parts. It is this unitary, unchanging sphota latent in the word, which being evoked as the letters and syllables are successively uttered or heard, produces the cognition of its meaning.³ The term sphota literally means 'that from which breaks forth (the meaning of a word when uttered)'. It is due to the invariability of sphota (the latent unitary medium of expression) that the differences in the pronunciation of a particular word by different persons cause no variation in its meaning. Sphota can be defined in the words of Professor S.Radhakrishnan as "the indivisible unitary factor latent in every word as the vehicle of its significance".⁴

The upholders of the theory of sphota recognise one ultimate sphota, which is infinite, eternal, and self-existent. Each particular sphota latent in a word or a sentence is but an apparent variation of the universal, immutable sphota. So, sphota is essentially one and is identical with Brahman. Thus, the advocates of the sphota theory conceive imperishable Brahman, without beginning, and without end, as the eternal principle of sound (sabda-tattva), which means the essence of all letters, words, sentences, and their meanings,⁵ and may be linked to Plato's absolute idea.

The Yoga Philosophy accepts the doctrine of sphota. Sphota is something indescribable which eternally exists apart from the letters forming any word and is inseparably connected with the word, for it reveals itself on the utterance of that word. In this sense, the meaning of a sentence is also revealed from the collective sense of the words used. So the eternal sense of a word is always different from the letters which constitute that word. Vacaspati explains sphota by saying that each of the letters has the potentiality of manifesting endless meanings, but none of them can do it individually; it is only when their sounds are produced in succession by one effort of speech that these individual letters by their own particular contiguity or distance from one another can manifest a complete word called sphota. Thus owing to the variation of contiguity or distance, and by the intervention of another alphabet sound, they may manifest any meaning or word. The sphota is, therefore, a particular modification of the buddhi, whereas the alphabet sounds have their temporary origin in the organ of speech lasting there only so long as they are uttered, and lasting in the sense of hearing only so long as each one of them is heard. Alphabet-sounds themselves are of endless potentiality and can manifest and word-sphotas according to their particular combinations and recombinations.

(1) The alphabet-sound which are perceived in the source of hearing, (2) the whole word or sabda manifested in a buddhi and (3) the corresponding objects existing in the external world denoted by the sabda all these three, though altogether distinct from one another, appear to be unified on account of the sanketa of sign, so that the alphabet sounds, the word sphota and the thing can never be distinguished from one another. Though there is no actual unity of words and their objects, it is only imagined to be so by beginningless tradition. This sanketa or convention is defined as the manifestation of memory of the nature of mutual confused identification of words and their meanings.⁷

The sphota doctrine can be explained in simpler terms in the following manner: first, a vocal sound is produced in the mouth of the speaker; the sound then moves in aerial waves until it reaches the ear drum of the hearer, by coming in contact with which it produces the audible sound called dhvani. This sound is the stage of pure varnas (letters) which is called nada. The third stage of sabda is that in which the varnas 'g', 'au' and 'h', as in the case of the word 'gauh' are taken together and the complete word-form is an attribute of the mind and not of the sense of hearing; for the sense of hearing only receives the varna-sounds as they are produced one by one. But each varna vanishes as it is generated, as the sense of hearing has no power to hold them together and comprehend the varnas in a collective form in a definite order. The ideation of the complete word is called sphota. It differs from the varna-sounds which die the moment they are generated. All significance belongs to this sphota form and it is believed that the varna-sounds pronounced or heard in a particular order serve to give rise to such ideational word-images which possess denotation and connotation and are thus called sphota. There are essentially different in nature from the varna-sounds generated in the sense of hearing which are momentary and can never be brought together to form one single whole as the complete word form.⁸

The ancient grammarians accept the sphota as essential element in speech, but they differ about the real nature of sphota and its relation with dhvani.

According to Patanjali, sphota is the permanent element in word but dhvani is the ephemeral element and an attribute of the former.⁹ Sphota is produced first and dhvani afterwards. According to Bhartrhari, both sound and dhvani are produced simultaneously. Sphota is like the flame and dhvani is like the light.¹⁰ The third view refers to sphota as a class and dhvani as its member.¹¹ Bhattojiksita and Negesa ascribe this view to Bhartrhari himself. But some scholars object to this contention. Bhartrhari observes that words or sentences can be considered under two aspects, i.e., sound pattern and meaning-bearing symbols.¹² The first is the external facet of language, second is the internal facet. First is called dhvani and the second sphota. Sphota being an internal aspect, in directly attached to the meaning. It is partless and integral linguistic symbol.¹³ A word has double power. As consciousness or light reveals 'itself and other objects' so every word has the power to reveal itself and the external things symbolized by it.¹⁴

The word or sentence located in the minds and taken as an integral symbol is revealed by the sounds produced in a definite order. Each sound helps the manifestation of the sphota. Bhartrhari holds that with the perception of sound, word is apprehended by the mind.¹⁵

Mandana Misra compares the apprehension of sphota with the evaluation of a jewel. One may apprehend sphota through the various stages of the perception of sound.¹⁶ So, the perception of the last sound of a word aided by impression left by other sounds helps us to grasp the sphota.

Nagesa makes it clear that the justification for the existence of sphota and for its unity is the realization that this is one word or sentence.¹⁷ In the Sarvadarsanasamgraha and Sphotasiddhi, sphota is said to be the result of direct perception.¹⁸ Jayanta also mentions the grammarians' view that sphota is grasped through direct auditory perception.

The grammarians describe eight types of sphota. (1) Varnasphota, (2) Padasphota, (3) Vakyasphota, (4) Akhandapadasphota, (5) Akandavakyasphota. (6) Varnajatisphota, (7) Padajatisphota, (8) Vakyajatisphota. Bhartrhari seems to hold that akhandavakyasphota is the real sphota. As regards Varnasphota, Patanjali states that from one point of view, sound may be considered to have meaning since roots, suffixes and particles consisting in a single sound have meaning. Nagesa comes to the conclusion that the analysis of sentence into words and of words into sound is the sole occupation of grammarians.

AN APPRAISAL

In argument with grammarian, Patanjali subscribes to the sphota-doctrine, rejected by other Indian philosophers like the Samkhyaikas. Naiyayikas, Mimamasakas and Vedantins. Sabara has supported the idea of varnasphota and padasphota. Kumarila refutes sphotavada and establishes the theory of varnavada on the grounds that if we do not accept existence of a word, the technique of substitution will not work; we cannot verify the meaning of a particular word in a sentence; ~~Smriti cannot be regarded stronger than a sentence~~.
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subordinate sentences will have no place in language; and the rules of sentences construction based on word meaning will have no basis.¹⁹ Jayanta also refutes the hypothesis of sphota on these lines.²⁰

The Naiyayikas hold that whatever is significant is a word²¹ and we become cognisant of its signification when we hear the last letter of the word. On hearing the last letter 'W', we recollect the previous ones, C.O. and grasp the whole word by the mind; and we cognise the object by means of the conventional association between the word and the object.²² According to Mimamsa a word is the aggregate of sounds which are eternal.²³ The Vedantins say that we perceive sounds in succession but they are synthesized into one whole by the intellect.

In the opinion of the grammarians, the above mentioned Nyaya-view is defective since we cannot have the memory of all preceding sounds, and hence this meaning can not be a means to our knowledge of the thing signified by the word. Further the grammarians reject the Vedanta-view by contending, that the Vedantins are not themselves clear as to how these successive experiences of sound can be simultaneously present before the same intellect. Instead, the grammarians maintain that sphota is the sound-essence which is eternal and common to all utterances. When a particular is uttered, its sphota or unitary principle is manifested and that directly presents the meaning of the word.

Neither intuition non non-intuition proves word to be of the nature of sphota.²⁴ 'Sphota' is discarded by the Samkhyas. The followers of Yoga believe in 'sphota'. They say that apart from the letters occurring in a word, there is the expression itself. Just as a jar means the whole jar and also the parts which form the jar, the conch shaped neck, the base, the ornamental sides and so forth, so does the word 'jar' mean the letters j-ar- as well as the entire expression 'jar'. The Samkhya opposes such a distinction, and believes that the letters placed in a particular order are enough to convey the sense. The sphota possesses either cognisance or non-cognisance. If the former, it is redundant, because the letters in the word convey the sense, and if the latter, the expression is powerless to convey the meaning, and so is useless.

If sphota is the tenet of existence effect, it is proving what is already proved.²⁵ The idea is that if some one insists that the sphota gives meaning of the word, as a lamp lights up the place where a jar is kept and reveals it, it does not mean that the sphota has given sense to the word. In fact, the sense is already there, just as the jar already exists, it is not made by the lamp.

Samkara rejects the theory as unsatisfactory and unnecessary.²⁶ It is unsatisfactory, because it is liable to the very objection which it proposes to obviate. According to this theory, the letters of a word cannot convey its meaning, because the successive letter-sounds cannot be apprehended as a whole. At the same time, it holds that sphota, being evoked by the successive letter-sounds, yields the meaning of the word. In case the sound-series be incapable of manifesting the meaning of the word, they must also be incapable of manifesting sphota. If they can manifest sphota, why should they not be able to manifest the meaning of the word? Thus, the hypothesis of sphota is redundant. It denies the obvious and proposes the dubious.

Samkara points out that though the letter-sounds of a word are successively perceived, yet the synthesizing power of buddhi (intellect) apprehends the entire sound-series as a single act of cognition. The letter-sounds being thus grasped as a whole yield the meaning of the word. It is evident from experience that when we turn our eyes to a group of trees we apprehend the whole group as a unit, even though we do not see all the trees at a time. Similarly, an army passing before the eyes is grasped as a whole, although the entire body is not looked on simultaneously. The same thing happens when we watch a line of ants. These are facts of common experience and need no special theory for explanation. Therefore, the postulation of sphota to explain the verbal-series is untenable.

In spite of their differences in regard to several questions relating to word, the Mimamsakas, the Naiyayikas, and the Vedantins, all agree in attacking the doctrine of sphota advocated by the grammarians and Yoga-Philosophers. The grammarians like Panini believe sabda to be the primal energy of the world;²⁷ sphota is what bursts forth. Bhattoji Diksita views sphota as that by means of which ignorance is destroyed.²⁸ Bhartrhari in his Vakyapadiya establishes the different varieties of sphota, i.e., varna-sphota, padasphota or vakya-sphota.

Both Badarayana and Samkara contend that the world comes from the word and not from sphota. Thibaut says, the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constituent letters. For the Vaiyakarnas' and Yoginis' doctrine of sphota, we have a number of parallels, e.g., the Logos of St. John, 1.1., the 'Let there be light' doctrine of the old Testament, the Kun (let it be done), in Arabic philosophy, the Vak in the Rgveda, the Anahata Nada in Kabir and 'Dhvani' of Alankarikas. In fact, sabda can be said to be the only substance in the Spinozistic sense.

The doctrine of sphota has not been appreciated by modern linguists perhaps on account of its unnecessary mystification. George Thibaut states that sphota is a "grammatical fiction."³⁰ Prof. S.K.De takes sphota as somewhat mystical conception.³¹ Prof. K.K.Raja says that confusion about the real nature of sphota is due to misunderstanding of the Sanskrit word 'sabda' as sound.³²

In agreement with the Naiyayikas, Mimamsakas and Vedantins, the Samkhya rejects the theory of sphota, and believe that the letters placed in a particular order are enough to convey the sense, and hence there is no need for the concept of sphota.

The Yoga is the only school of Indian philosophy which subscribes to the Grammarians concept of sphota along with its metaphysical implications. The comprehension of the meaning of a word or sentence in the form of a flash indicates that the theory of sphota has an iora of truth. Likewise, sphotavadins' view that the eternal principle of sound (Sabda Brahma) manifests itself into the form of worldly phenomena through ideas and words also has an element of truth, as is evident from the example of the creation of worldly objects in which the psychical or mental creation precedes the physical creation. For example, the physical creation of a piece of furniture presupposes a prior idea about that object is carpenter's mind.

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Editorial

World Philosophy Methodology for Considering World Philosophy

Archie J. Bahm

What is It?

World philosophy is philosophy. What is philosophy? First, philosophy is love wisdom. To love wisdom involves a desire to understand the nature of things. Understanding the nature of things includes understanding of the nature of existence, its universal characteristics and kinds, the nature of knowledge, truth, and certainty, and the nature of human values and how to optimize them. A main method for pursuit of understanding is to examine critically the presuppositions and conclusions of philosophies that have been proposed already.

Why Needed?

1. Many people claim to have a true world philosophy. These claims are evidence of the desirability of having a world philosophy. But many of these involve contradictions, within themselves and with others. Since contradictory, they cannot all be true. Thus need for a true world philosophy continues.

2. Conflicting philosophies cause problems. In fact, many of the world's most serious problems involve conflicting philosophical presuppositions. The costs of wars resulting from religious conflicts are so tremendous that they appear as the greatest evils that humankind has perpetrated on itself, historically and today.

3. We cannot solve new problems with old solutions. Too many world philosophies originated when people were ignorant of much that is known today. When such ignorance is embedded in accepted world philosophy, it inhibits achieving more adequate knowledge.

4. We cannot solve global problems with regional solutions. Western, Indian, and Chinese civilizations embody conflicting presuppositions that need synthesis to achieve peace.

5. We cannot solve comprehensive world problems with partial knowledge. Many active proponents of solutions to world problems are specialists emphasizing specialize knowledge and suffering from the limitations of such specialization. World philosophy incorporating contributions from all of the sciences is needed.

Proposed Ideals

I propose that, when an agency is established to consider proposals for world philosophy, its purpose should be to examine ideas that may be candidates for inclusion. Acceptability of these ideas may be arranged in four levels:

I. Essentials. All ideas needed for understanding human nature, including optimizing human happiness.

II. Cultural claims. All claims of cultural traditions should be recognized as candidates for inclusion as essentials, when not demonstrably contradictory or false, for experimental testing.

III. Museums. Recognize as worthy of memory, even cherished memory, ideas, institutions, and customs constituting human history. Questions will continue regarding which should be prevented from becoming "extinct species."

IV. Freedoms. Recognize the right of particular cultures to have their "individual differences" respected appropriately. No limit should be placed on cultural creations unless harmfulness to human welfare can be demonstrated.

I. Essentials

Ideally, world philosophy should include some minimum of ideas believed to explain the nature of existence, including human existence. I summarize these as ideas about self, society, and the universe, and their origin, nature and future.

Although a summary of such ideas should favour ideas that have popular appeal, an adequate world philosophy should include ideas about the nature of existence, knowledge, values, and society. It should include contributions from all of the general sciences.

II. Cultural Claims

Most cultures have proclaimed a world philosophy most adequate in terms of their cultural conceptions. All have some truth in them, not only as insights into existence and values based on experience but also as expressions of human needs for ideals, which are also facts of human experience.

Cultural ideals that have served a people for ages should receive consideration unless their falsities (all cultures embody some falsities) are demonstrated to be harmful to human beings.

Cultural claims should be examined objectively, that is, both to see whether they also appeal to persons in other cultures when introduced to them, and whether they contain falsities (contradictions or inadequacies in terms of present knowledge) making them unacceptable universally. Each claim may be tested experimentally to determine whether it is a benefit or a harm to human beings, while considering it as a candidate for essentials.

III. Museums

Human history is replete with human achievements, each amazing in its ingenuity in meeting human needs at particular times and places. A world citizen will recognize all of them as human accomplishments and as integral part of "Our World."

People trying to improve their cultures make mistakes. The history of science is a history of abandoned theories (because regarded as false). We can benefit from appreciating our history, especially if we learn from historical mistakes and do not repeat them.

World philosophy will recognize the need for world culture. A world culture will include not only good, true, and useful ideas but also recognize that the ideals of each culture can make contributions to world culture in ways that enrich it, as well as impoverish it if its falsities are included. Appreciating various cultures as contributing to human culture promotes concern for preventing many from becoming extinct.

IV. Freedoms

World philosophy will involve recognition that much philosophy is not world philosophy. Individual differences in personal philosophies should be respected as well as differences in biological and physiological natures. Cultural differences should be respected unless they prove harmful. Acclaiming some optimum of individual and group cultural freedoms should be an essential in world philosophy.

How Achieve It?

Suggested Agencies

1. Unesco Division of Philosophy and Ethics. Already established with United Nations Organizations authorization, having budget, offices, and personnel, and a primary concern with philosophy.

Present offices in Unesco buildings at 7, place de Fontenoy, 1 rue Miollis, 75015 Paris, France. S. Lazarus is the present Director.

2. International Federation of Philosophical Societies. FISP. The Steering Committee may be authorized to establish a special committee to pursue the project.

Unresolved issues could be scheduled for discussion in World Congress of Philosophy sessions.

Present Secretary-General is Prof. Ioanna Kucuradi, Department of Philosophy, Hacettepe University, Betepe, Ankara, Turkey.

3. The United Nations University. The University Council, which sets principles and policies, is an agency of the United Nations Organization. Subjects for research specified in its Charter include: "Universal human values related to the improvement of the quality of life."

It has just moved into its own new building, at 53-70 Jinggumae 5-chome, Shibuyau-ku, Tokyo 150, Japan.

It has already sponsored a completed multi-volume "Socio-philosophical issues.

4. World Society of Responsible Philosophers. If no official agency is able and willing to undertake a continuing project concerned with achieving world philosophy, an independent society organized by persons interested in committing themselves to cooperating responsibly may be organized.

(I suggested such a society in 1976 (Xth World Congress of Philosophy, Varna, Bulgaria), but I did not have time or money to pursue the project. Now, if no other agency agrees to undertake the project, perhaps it is time to me to act. I am located in the Department of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131-1151, U.S.A. Phone: 505-242-9983, FAX: 505-839-4950, E-mail: abjahm@carina.unm.edu.)

A primary problem for whoever undertakes this project is how to prevent special interests from biasing the general aims of philosophy. One general aim of world philosophy is appropriate recognition of the contributions of all special interests to it.

1

Sri Aurobindo & Sri Sathya Sai Baba on Sruti (= Vedas)

Purusottama Bilimoria

Sri Aurobindo approached the Vedas in a rather unique way. He was not concerned with adducing historical and scientific evidence for the truths of Sruti, but preferred to place the Vedic truths in their proper psychological and mystical contexts. His own leaning towards mysticism and spiritual evolutionism led him to hold the chief current of the Vedas in the same light. Aurobindo chose to ignore the concerns and findings of Orientalists and Indian thinkers of like persuasion. Aurobindo's first point was that modern day research on the Vedas has relied largely on the commentaries and didactic exegesis of Sayana which Max Muller championed and defended in his interpretations. It is understandable, according to Sri Aurobindo, that the Vedas have been interpreted in ritualistic and naturalistic categories since Sayana. Even Yaska, the author of the famous Nirukta who was before Sayana, found, what he called 'Triple Meaning' in some of the Vedas especially in the Rg Veda -namely, **adhibhautika** or external worship and ritualistic sense, the **adhidaivika**, the cosmogonical, and **adhyatmic** or the spiritual, yielding knowledge of the **self**, or man's inner being. According to Sri Aurobindo the fault then does not lie entirely with the Orientalist or with the ubiquitous 'orientalism', but with some within the tradition itself. Reflecting on this Sri Aurobindo remarks on the consequences we are faced with as regards the attitude we adopt towards the Vedas:

'Either the Veda is what Sayana says it is, then we have to leave it behind for ever as the document of a mythology and ritual which have no longer any living truth or force for thinking minds, or it is what the Europeans scholars say it is, and then we have to put it away among the relics of the past as an antique record of semi barbarous worship, or else it is indeed Veda, a book of divine knowledge, and it becomes of supreme importance to know and to hear its message'. Sri Aurobindo's own view is that the Vedas are the true epitome of knowledge, gained and bequeathed by the seers of old 'who were not bards or poets of common clay but inspired singers who poured out in living vocables the highest experiences and realization of the soul'. In his '**The Secret of the Veda**', Aurobindo gives a lengthy account of his method and interpretation as against those of Sayana and the European scholars.

Not only then is the source of the Veda transcendental, but so also its reference or 'significance', for it reveals to many secrets about the cosmos, about 'his destiny and about life as a whole. Aurobindo explains that in his deep and earnest search the seer participates in the 'revelation' carved in his heart through the power of the *mantra* he recites and contemplates on for its significance. He finds the evidence of this in some of the *rks* (hymns) of the Vedas, such as this:

He who knows not the Veda's eternal Syllable, that highest point on which dwell all the Gods. What has he to do with the Veda? Only those who know it sit here in peaceful assembly.

Rv. 1, 164, 39

In the **Secret of the Veda** Aurobindo argues that "the real sense of the Vedas lies in the symbolic expression of the struggle between the spiritual powers of Light and Darkness, between Truth and False Belief, Knowledge and Ignorance". Sri Aurobindo then attempts to resurrect the insights of the early seers on a new footing by making the insights relevant to the quest of the modern man as well in his progressive march, or evolution, towards realisation of the Highest. He claims to have derived his message of a 'life divine' and his theory of the three stages of evolution, from Matter, to Mind, to the Conscient, from the Vedas. The merits of this claim is of course disputable, as he owes this theory more to Samkhya-yoga than to Sruti. However, Aurobindo's erudity and lengthy expositions on various facets of ancient Hindu teachings have aroused considerable interest, mostly among the intelligentsia in India, and lately abroad as well, and the sagely example his own recluse existence left behind, has added credibility to the ancient lores and utterances of the *rsis* or seer-sages.

Sri Sathya Sai Baba on Sruti.

Sri Sathya Sai Baba is perhaps the most enigmatic and the yet most influential teacher in India today. His followers number among the largest in India, with a large silent following overseas. Encountering the teacher and some of his activities, can be quite confusing, as he appears on the one hand to be the most traditionalist among traditionalist, and on the other, the most modern among moderns (his architecture, for example)- quite apart from the 'miracles' and miraculous healing phenomenon that one might notice off-chance. A man of small-built, yet his presence hovers with a sense of magnitude and dignity; he commands tremendous respect and silence, yet is capable of breaking the heavy atmosphere in a split-second with his child-like smile and the soft southern accent that comes out fluently in any one of the many languages he appears to be able to converse in (Swahili included). He attended school only apparently for a few years before declaring his mission, and yet can interrupt a professor of English, a renown physicist, a highly learned Brahman scholar or his Telugu translator to correct him or her on the precise word or phrase that best expresses his statement. He quotes freely from the scriptures, from the Vedas as well, but mostly from the Bhagavata.

Upanishads, **Bhagavad-gita** and other Smṛti (seconda literature. Increasingly though, his published talks and writings appear to be focusing on the Vedas and the Vedic lore, with a note of lament over this forgotten chapter in Indian history and its heritage. It has been observed however that his approach to any subject varies with the predisposition of his audience, and so it becomes difficult to tell when his statement are meant to be general, and when particular. However, a bit of hard work and persistence enabled me to procure more specific responses to my queries which led me to believe that Sathya Sai Baba is more serious about Sruti and the fate of the Vedas than he publicly lets on.

Sai Baba responds in the following way to the question: Is there a reliable English translation of the Vedas?

"The Vedas comes from certain fundamental sounds and their variations. The slightest modification of the sound changes the meaning of what is said. No written language is able to represent all the Vedic sounds. It is impossible to write many of the words. The Vedas are God's breath and can be transmitted from person to person only by voice. In all of India there are only a handful of people who can recite the Vedas correctly. Some attempts have been made in recent years to write the Vedas and print them in books. The effort is wasted".

Accordingly, instead of setting up another Vaidika Samsodhana Mandala like B.G. Tilak's pioneering effort in the early part of this century), Sathya Sai Baba established an institution for the reviving and fostering of the traditional method of disseminating the Vedas. Students eager and qualified for the task sit with their "Vaidic" preceptors to "hear" the **mantras** and **svaras** with a view to memorising, understanding and repeating them in the manner prescribed, and corrected by the Baba. The pandits from the institution also preside over the '**yajnas**' or sacrificial rites officiated on certain auspicious occasions in the **ashram** of the teacher. The **yajnas** are done completely in the traditional style apparently with no flaws. Vedic recitation is a common occurrence in the early hours of the morning in the precincts and before any large gathering or function. Sometimes attempt is made to explain what some old pandit may have incantated; but often it is just a formal rite. The revival of the elaborate **yajna** performances and regular Vedic recitation is defended by Sai Baba in these words:

"symbolically, the Vedas themselves help the Light of Wisdom to shine. The Vedas are Embodiment of Truth. Recitation of the Vedas purifies the environment and strengthens the will to become Truth. This is symbolically conveyed by the various ceremonial rites which are part of this sacrifice of **yajna**. But the Seers who declared the **mantras** and the Vedas which prescribe the rituals, and those who faithfully celebrate the **yajna**, are not foolish at all" And he adds, "The sages and the seers of yore prescribed these **yajnas**, prompted by universal compassion, in order that they may result in the welfare of mankind. Thus all beings benefit from the persistence of the Hindus in observing the teachings of the **rishis**".

Elsewhere he tells us.

"Knowing, knowledge is Veda. That is to say, man can know from the Vedas, the Code of Right Activity and the Body of Right Knowledge. The Vedas teach man his duties from birth to death. They describe his rights and duties, obligations and responsibilities in all stages of life as a student, householder, recluse and monk". 166 And he adds here, "The stream of Indian culture always emphasised the authority of the Vedas as the supreme authority for deciding the values of human living".

The Smṛti literature, we are told as usual, are secondary and supportive authority. There is decidedly a turn towards the Vedas for a sense of identity of the Renascent India (in the *nava-yuga*) and for a resourceful well to draw upon the many inspirations and directives needed in the new march. But the Vedas also have a more universal message and application beyond their historical association with India. Thus, we are urged: "It must be realised that the Vedas are very important for man and that they cover the entire range of knowledge. They are the sources and spring of Bharathiya culture. They are the recordings of visions and divine experiences their source is not one definite person". And since they are timeless and authorless, they are worthy of acceptance by all, and "no one can afford to neglect or deny their value".

Unlike Sruti, Smṛitis, we are told, came later and are best described as expositions on the themes set in Sruti. They were composed with the view to prescribing rights and duties relevant to the particular social, cultural, climatic contexts and as other circumstantial conditions demand adjustments and alterations. And these adjustments are apparently "a part of the Design. The people have to be shown the path to spiritual progress, under the altered circumstances and so, the Smṛithi that suits the new era has to be declared as binding."

Sathya Sai Baba labours a little on the transcendental origins of Sruti, as he tells us:

"No one has understood correctly the beginning of the Veda or its end. So, it is hailed as **Anadi** (Beginningless) and Sanathana (Eternal). Since the first and the last of the Veda are not known, it is also known as Nitya, Everlasting. The intelligence of humans is tainted but since the Veda has no trace of taint, it is concluded that it cannot be a human product. So the Veda is also characterised as Apauruseya (Trans-personal)".

This indeed is a rough shot at presenting the ancient argument for the *apauruseyatva* or 'non-personhood origination' of Sruti. As one reads on, one will not fail to notice how the Advaita, Nyaya and the Grammarian Bhartrhari's arguments for the supremacy of the Vedas on the ground of their transcendental origination, are integrated in what appears to be a fairly eclectic and non-partisan approach to the value of the Vedas. It is the same paradox of traditionalism and eclecticism that marks the ubiquitous talk about the unity of mankind and his knowledge, the oneness of all religious tradition and the common goal of all self-authenticating religious revelations. The

traditionalism though is not rigid and sectarian as, say was Sankara's (there is also a lot of **bhakti** there); nor, on the other hand, is the eclecticism, so **avant-grade**, modernistic and Western-gazing as, say, was Ram Mohan Roy's, such as to render it superficial and shallow. Both elements are enhanced in the innumerable schools, colleges and now universities and futuristic academies set up for experimenting with the sort of education Tagore, Aurobindo and Gandhiji hand visioned but not achieved in their times. Macaula would surely turn in his grave, and Coomaraswamy, an ardent critic of India's educational establishment, would be laughing. There are other facets of this so-called 'Sai-Revolution' spreading across India supposedly originating from a religious-base (Professed to be a Vedic-base) that are at once intriguing and puzzling to a modern student of religion but which we cannot go into here such as the approach to medicine, psychology, psychiatry, yoga and so forth. There is even more promised, for India and for the world; the afro-haired, red-robed holy man declares:

Bharath (India) is entitled to be the Guru of the world. Here is no mean history. This is the land of Krishna, where the Vedas and the Upanishads saw the light, where Sankaracharya established monasteries for the propagation of the Sanathana Dharma. This land will be saved, for, it has a mission to perform, which no other can fulfill". (In the meanwhile **bhajans** (chanting) to all the major Gods and Goddesses of Vaisnava, Saiva, Sakta, Ganapataya origins go on.)

We notice here that "Bharata" is used in place of the more secular 'India', and 'Sanatana Dharma' in place of the more current 'Hinduism'; further that the land is the locus of Sruti (for which 'Vedas and Upanishads' are used), as well as of the **avatars** (though here Krsna alone is mentioned,) and the importance of Sankara is related to his establishing monasteries rather than to his popularisation of Advaita. What then have we come across here? A fundamentalist return to the eight and tenth century religions? Or a revival that sweeps through and incorporates much of what has gone on in the 19th century "Renaissance"-though seen here as a "Renescence" and enters the twenty-first century with a more traditional torch to guide it thither? Or, is this purely a sectarian self-glorifying movement, plotted by a clever magician who identifies himself as an "Avatar", set out to beguile a religiously frustrated race that continues to be haunted by two ghosts: those of **tradition** and **modernity**?

My own observations and studies lead me to suggest that, given the momentum and forever generated since the 19th century romantic flirtations with the more-traditional teachings and authority, a more mature expression in our times (or in time a little ahead of us) is but inevitable, and that this expression is manifesting itself to a considerable degree in Sri Sathya Sai Baba's teaching and movement. But his is not the only case in this regard. There are others who seem to be on a similar route, and whom we shall merely mention: such as Swami Sivananda (late), Swami, Chinmayananda, Baba Muktananda, Swami Saccidananda (now in California), Sri Sri Ananda Mai Ma and handful others. But it is not surprising that the first four named here

have paid handsome tributes to Sathya Sai Baba and hold him in high awe and esteem. But have we any assurance that this apparent seriousness with Sruti is not once again a passing fad that will soon wear off, and create the sort of vacuum Renou grieved about in his early days of Vedic studies? Can we hope then that even if India does not become the 'Guru' of the world, it might soon become its own Master, and preserve and utilise the rich heritage that haunts it in short, is there a destiny for Sruti in India? Time, the silent witness (saksi) can alone tell.

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2

The Relationship Between Personality Traits and Creativity of Physically Handicapped Settled Persons And Students Studying In Senior Higher Secondary Classes In Rajasthan.

Shobha Golwalkar, Manju Bala and Leela Gurnani.*

Introduction

According to the U.N. Survey more than 500 million people in the world today can not take full part in the ordinary activities of the daily life. they suffer from physical, mental, emotional or sensory impairments.

History reminds us the handicapped heroes who reached the height of human glory in human destiny by combating their handicaps. Milton, the poet, was blind, ustad Isa, the architect of one of the greatest monuments in the world, the Taj Mahal, was also blind, Taimur, the warrior, was a lame, Nepolion, also a warrior, was a dwarf. It is necessary to know about their personality and their creative abilities would help to suggest measures for developing this trait among them.

The Sample

The sample of the present study consisted of 500 physically handicapped persons. Among which 250 will be the students working in senior secondary govt. schools of Rajasthan. And 250 will be the settled persons with minimum graduation degree and range between 25 to 40. Only orthopedically handicapped students will be the subject of this study.

Factors and tools

On the basis of survey of previous researches and relevant literature to study the following two factors for physically handicapped students and physically handicapped settled persons.

A. Personality

B. Creativity

Relationship and comparison of both the groups on the above mentioned factors was studied.

A. Personality

Personality was assessed by 16 PF test by R.B.Cattell. Form A and B both were used. The test consist of 187 items in each form, and entire scale consist of 16 independent first order factors. Raw scores obtained were converted into sten scores. Both the groups were assessed on 16 factors of the test.

B. Creativity

For mesurement of creativity standard tool by Dr. Baqer Mehdi-Thinking creativity with words and Thinking creativity with figures was used. In this test creativity tasks pertaining to four factors, viz. fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration have been used. More over the traits used in the test were considered to be the most important ones and it was felt that taken together they give a fairly valid information about the creative potential of the individual.

Method and Approach

Descriptive survey method was employed in the study. As the purpose of the present investigation was to explore, compare and find relationship between Personality and creativity of physically handicapped students and settled physically handicapped persons, the use of this method was considered appropriate. For finding the relationship coefficient of correlation was computed.

Findings

The main findings of the study were based on a sample of 500 physically handicapped persons of Rajasthan.

The two groups were studied on Two variables namely-Personality and Creativity. First the relationship was studied then both the groups were compared on the above mentioned variables.

Correlation between personality factors of physically handicapped settled persons and physically handicapped students:-

Table No. 1

	Settled		Students		'r'
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
A	7.36	1.33	4.66	1.18	-0.73
B	7.08	1.31	3.08	1.33	-0.83
C	8.19	1.09	4.33	1.1	-0.84

E	7.96	1.08	4.43	1.32	-0.83
F	7.47	1.05	3.76	1.21	-0.85
G	8.56	1.11	4.07	1.5	-0.86
H	8.42	1.04	4.74	1.89	-0.89
I	4.29	1.22	6.95	1.23	0.74
L	6.83	1.38	5.94	1.3	-0.32
M	3.8	1.33	7.08	1.42	0.77
N	7.26	1.2	6.53	1.33	-0.28
O	7.4	1.17	6.54	1.3	-0.33
Q1	7.26	1.22	6.45	1.42	-0.29
Q2	7.28	1.21	6.36	1.42	-0.33
Q3	7.7	1.18	4.93	1.49	-0.72
Q4	7.81	1.15	4.46	1.31	-0.81

Table no 1 reveals that except factors I and M the correlation between settled and unsettled physically handicapped persons was negative. Settled persons possess high mean sten scores for all the factors except factors I, L and M. It shows that settled persons were outgoing, more intelligent, emotionally stable, assertive, happy go lucky, conscientious, venturesome, controlled and tense. On the other hand students were reserved, less intelligent, affected by feelings, humble, sober, expedient, shy, undisciplined and relaxed.

For factors I and M there was high degree positive correlation between settled and students which means that settled persons were tough minded, realistic and practical while students were tender minded, dependent and imaginative.

For factor N, O, Q1 and Q2 both the group show average type of response.

It was clear from table no. 2 that fluency factor of creativity was showing relationship with factor C, E, F, G, O, Q3 and Q4. Although the direction of relationship was negative with all factors. As physically handicapped person become more fluent. They were become more emotionally stable, assertive, happy go lucky, conscientious, controlled and tense.

Flexibility factor of creativity was not showing any relationship with personality factor except factor O. The direction of this relationship was negative. As the physically handicapped persons become less apprehensive, depressive, they become more flexible. Factor flexibility grows independent without showing relationship with personality factors.

Correlation between Personality factors and creativity of physically handicapped persons

Table No. 2

Creativity Personality	Fluency	Flexibility	Originality	Elaboration	Total Creativity
A	-0.04	-0.01	-.2777**	-.2855**	-.2489**
B	-0.09	-0.07	-.3152**	-.3338**	-.2773**
C	-.1345*	-0.03	-.3546**	-.3672**	-.3146**
E	-.1158*	-0.03	-.3106**	-.3227**	-.2976**
F	-.1192*	-0.05	-.3099**	-.3539**	-.2850**
G	-.1178*	-0.05	-.3709**	-.3968**	-.3045**
H	-0.08	-0.02	-.3527**	-.3665**	-.2979**
I	0.06	0.02	.2617**	-.2392**	.1902**
L	-0.06	0.01	-.1163*	-0.09	-0.07
M	0.1	0.05	.2483**	.2918**	-.2560**
N	0.02	0.06	-.1116*	-.1218*	-0.08
O	-.1195*	-.1247*	-.1304*	-.1879*	-.1886**
Q1	-0.03	-0.00	-.1260*	-.1237*	-.1116*
Q2	-0.02	0.04	-0.05	0	-0.01
Q3	-.1281*	-0.05	-.2747**	-.3200**	-.2771**
Q4	-.1103*	-0.06	-.3240**	-.3549**	-.3050**

*- 0.01 level of significance

** - 0.001 level of significance

Originality factor of creativity was showing marked correlation with all the personality traits except factor Q2. The direction of this relationship was negative except with factor I and M. By this we can say that as physically handicapped person were becoming more reserved, more intelligent, emotionally stable, assertive, venturesome, suspicious, shrewd, experimenting, controlled and tense, they were become less original in their thinking.

Elaboration factor of creativity was showing marked relationship with all the personality factors except factor L and Q2. The direction of the relationship was negative for all the factors. As physically handicapped persons

were able to elaborate things more effectively they were become assertive, outgoing, emotionally stable, sober, conscientious, venturesome and tense.

Total creativity is showing relationship with personality factors except factor L, N and Q2 and except factor I the direction of relationship was negative with all the factors. As physically handicapped persons were becoming tender minded, dependent, over protected and sensitive. They were become more creative.

3

The Religious Significance Of Psychical Studies

By Robert Crookall,

The address delivered by the Rev. John Crowle smith at the C.F.P.S. Conference at the Vicarage Long Melford, Suffolk, on July 17th, 1958, which was published in typescript along with the lectures given at the C.F.P.S. Annual Conference, September 15-17th, 1958, raises matters that are of the first importance to all members of the Fellowship. I venture to offer answers to the questions posed, though well aware that laymen often rush in boldly where theologians fear to tread.

First, I consider that all thinking Christians will agree that psychical phenomena are definitely not "the basis of religion". They do help many of us towards an intelligent approach to religion. We worship God not only as Love, and as Beauty, but also as Truth. On the one hand, on man who wishes to be "holy" (integrated) can neglect any aspect of religion. On the other hand, we must seek the Kingdom of God first and foremost.

Secondly, the contention that the possession of psychical faculties is the little, if indeed any, value or significance (from the point of view of religion) "unless it is accompanied by moral and religious qualities" is also agreed by all Christians. Psychical abilities, like intellectual abilities, may be valuable aids in our search for God and in the service of our fellows. But, as St. Paul pointed out, they can both be a hindrance if exercised in the absence of "charity". Many Spiritualists have equated the psychical to the spiritual. They would not have done so if, as in certain early religious Schools, the psychical faculties had been developed within a religious framework.

Thirdly, Christians will undoubtedly be unanimous in holding that healing by means of "spirits", i.e., by discarnate souls, differs essentially from the Spiritual Healing that was exercised so often and so effectively by our Lord. It does not, of course, follow that spirit-healing may not be called for and may not be effective where orthodox medical treatments have failed: our prayers to God, including those for healing, may not, be answered by way of "ministering angels".

Fourthly, it is the fact that "much" psychic writing refers to God only "in a casual and distant manner", that "it is in touch with the spirits but not primarily in touch with the Living God", that, on the one hand, it tends to ignore sin, evil, penitence, Godly fear and the Atonement, and, on the other hand, tends to relate "salvation" (i.e., "holiness", wholeness, perfection, with release from the power of sin) to knowledge, rather than to grace, faith and

love.
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love. The Fellowship, I suggest, realises that there is good reason, for these manifestly false attitudes: "much" of the psychic communications that are received come from relatively low "levels" in the "next world", i.e., from discarnate souls who have newly "passed over" or who, having died long ago, have failed to advance. Relatively unadvanced souls find it easy to attune themselves to sensitive mortals they therefore "come through" much more easily and much more often than advanced souls (between whom and mortals there is "a great gulf fixed"). Now these facile communicators have little, if any, more wisdom than ordinary folk on earth: "The dead know not anything!" declared the Preacher; They have no brains!" commented Joad. It is a mistake to regard the average communicator as the soul of honour and the fountain of wisdom. Death causes no mental, moral or spiritual change-it merely means that we are minus the physical body.

As G. N. M. Tyrrell, a former President of the S.P.R., pointed out (Grades of Significance, Rider), an entirely different situation obtains with advanced souls in the hereafter: he insisted that the communications which reach us from relatively high "levels" of the "next world" are "wholly and unequivocally Christian". Examples of such "messages" are to found in "The Deeper Issues Series published by J.M. Watkins (Christ in You, The Coming Light, etc.); The Silent Voice (G. Bell, 1935), etc.

Fifthly, Mr. Crowlesmith states: "The idea that the soul of man is naturally immortal is not Christian. It is Platonic, not Biblical". Yet we note that Dr. W.R. Matthews (The Hope of Immortality, Student Christian Movement, 1936, p. 54), said: "The Church has taught that the human soul is by nature immortal, but it has also taught that eternal life is the gift of God and comes by grace". He proceeded to reconcile these two views. Many differences of this kind are apparent rather than real: they depend upon the definition of the terms employed.

Sixthly, Christians agree that "religion does not depend upon proof of survival". It depends upon experience of God and His Son. Nevertheless, those who lack faith and experience may encounter circumstances in which specific evidence for survival is helpful. We have no warrant to legislate for everybody.

Seventhly, "Knowledge" may be a factor in "salvation", subsidiary to grace, faith and love. This is not the intellectual knowledge which is worshipped by the modern world, but inspiration, intuition and insight, "the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world". Christians, unlike many Spiritualists, draw a clear distinction between knowledge of psychic facts (and the exercise of psychical abilities) and the inspiration of Spiritual Truths (and the consequent fulfillment of the second greatest Commandment- "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"). Psychic facts are most interesting and valuable: nevertheless St. Paul showed "a more excellent way", the Way in which Love is the central activity. The Scriptures are replete with Spiritual Truths- "The Kingdom of God is within you"; "He that believeth on Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live "God is love"; "I am come that they might have life, and that more abundantly"; "It is better to give than to receive"; "Unless a corn of wheat fall to the ground and die, it bringeth forth no fruit....". "I am the

Way, the Truth and the Life; no man cometh to the Father save by Me", etc., etc.

Psychic facts (and intellectual truths) have no necessary expression in service to God and man: Spiritual Truths are in an entirely different category; they express the true nature of man and his true relationship to God.

Although psychism is not religion, it is, so to speak, a half-way house between materialism and religion. many materialistic souls who despairingly cry, "How can these things be?" are helped towards Spiritual Truths via psychical facts. If, for instance, a "spirit" can and does know our "inmost thoughts", investigators can credit the statement (I Chron., xxvii, 9), "The Lord understandeth the thought", if, by telepathy, clairvoyance, etc., psychics prove to the enquirer that the soul of man is independent of space, he can understand something of the omnipresence of God (Ps. cxxxix, 7, etc.); if by the same means, psychics demonstrates that man can transcend time, the enquirer can realise something of the meaning of the profound words "Before Abraham was, I AM!", if investigators find that some portion of the total man is creative (in the production of "materialisations"), they glimpse something of the significance of the words "God created man in his own image".

The C.F.P.S. owes a deep debt to Mr. Crowle smith for drawing it attention to so many matters of the first importance to its healthy development. "Unless the Lord build a house, they labour in vain that build it".

4

*Mystical Philosophy of Jaisi**Swami M.L. Puri*

Mysticism is the central point of Jaisi's philosophy. It gives me great pleasure in presenting this paper before this august body of Indian and Foreign scholars because when we examine the various types of mysticism, we find striking similarities among these modes of mysticism. I would like to concentrate on the mystical philosophy of Jaisi. Jaisi was an illu mined personality among the medieval mystics. It is reported that he wrote approximately twenty five books, out of these, there are only seven books of Jaisi available in the published form. The presentation of Jaisi's thought on mystical level is beneficial to engulf the disparities between the thought of Hindus and that of Muslims. The contribution of Jaisi, in the field of Indian culture, philosophy and religion through the medium of his poetry reached its zenith in his system. The contribution would be beneficial for the coming generation to reap the fruits of his knowledge.

Mysticism is not the legacy of any particular religion. On the contrary, it is common to all religions. Not only it is common, but also in my opinion, the core of every religion. This does not mean that every religion has the same type of mysticism. The mysticism of one religion differs from the mysticism of another religion in many respects. And even within the same religion there may be different shades of mysticism.

Jaisi was thorough going mystic, He based his philosophy on the principles of Quran and Hadith (tradition of Muhammad). But the exposition of these principles he claimed, is the result of his intuitive experience. We cannot exclude rationalism or ilm-ul-kalam (the sciences of dialect or Muslim scholastic philosophy), from his system as he often uses it for the explanation of his position. The basis for Jaisi is to know himself so that he may know the reality and thus verify the tradition of the prophet and the classical tenet of Sufism, "Men Arafa Nafsahu Faqad Arafa Rabbahu." (One who cognises his own self, Certainly cognises God.) In order to achieve his goal, he made the classical text of his own writings revealing the influence of Indian culture and philosophy as well as the religion in keeping with the views of the Quran and the Hadith (Tradition), the main root of Jaisi Sufism. Sufism is deeply rooted in the Quran and the Hadith (Tradition). It is saturated by the companions of the prophet Muhammad through their deeds. Later on came the stage of codification- And the great personalities such as Hasan Basari, Dhul Non Mishri, Bayazid Bistami, Junaid Baghdadadi, Mansur Hallaj and so many others put forward their own doctrines. But credit goes to Imam Ghazzali who collected the scattered pearls of Sufi doctrines and presented them in a

systematic manner as a Sufi system and made it in harmony with Islamic Tradition. After Imam Ghazzali it was Ibn Arabi (165-1240 A.D.) who introduced the doctrine of 'wahadatul Wajud' and dyed sufism into pantheistic colour. This is in brief, the history of Sufism before its flourishing in India. No doubt, a few Muslim saints and scholars came to India before the 13th century but the systematic missionary work of Sufism could not be started before Khwaja Mui-Uddin Chisti Ajmeri (popularly known as Khwaja Gharib Nawaz), who travelling the middle East countries reached India during the reign of Prathvi Raj and settled at Ajmer. He started the missionary work and initiated many disciples. He appointed Shaikh Qutbuddin Kaki a Murid and Khalifa of the Shaikh as his successor, who settled at Delhi, and started the work of preaching and guidance. For the expansion of the order (Silsilah), he trained a number of disciples and Khalifahs, among whom Baba Farid, also known as Fariduddin Ganj-I-Shakar (1175 - 1265 A.D.) was the outstanding settled at Pakpattan (Pakistan). His monastery (Khanqah) was open to all irrespective of caste and creed, rich and poor, officials and Non-officials, old and young. He also initiated into the order a number of Murids and Khalifahs among whom Shaikh Nizamuddin Aulia (1238 - 1325 A.D.) was like a full moon. He was appointed by Shaikh as his successor, settled at Giyaspur (present Nizamuddin, Delhi) and threw open the doors of his Khanqah for the people. A stream of visitors flowed the Khanqah every day with enormous futuh (gifts or presents unasked for). But this affluence left the Shaikh unaffected. He despised riches and worldly goods.

Shaikh Nizamuddin appointed his Khalifah Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiraque -i- Delhi as his successor and with him the central system of chistiti order came to an end, and developed statewise in two distinctive branches of Kalpi and other of Jayasa. Jaisi was initiated by Shaikh Muinuddin in this great Chishti order which was a reputed order of Sufism.

Almost all the Sufis preached the conception of personal God. They were unanimous in presenting the unity of God (Tauhid). God, according to them is one having number of attributes. Apart from chisti order, the Suharardi, Firdousi, Naqshbandi, Sattari and Qudri orders tried their best, in their own way, to serve the humanity.

Jaisi preached the doctrine of Personal God like other Sufis, having number of attributes among them Jamal (Beauty), Jalal (Majesty) and Kamal (perfection) are the main attributes. And the world has been regarded by him as the manifestation of God's attributes. His mysticism is reported to be in keeping with the views propounded by Ibn Arabi, but in my opinion, it is unique type of Reflectionism. Similarly, Jaisi's doctrine is different from monism or qualified Monism propounded by Shanker and Ramanujal. The fact is the Jaisi put-forwarded his own views in accordance with Quran and Hadith (traditions), though he was influenced by these thinkers in writing his famous treatise 'Akharawat' written On Islamic Principles describing a personal God's conception as-

"Eka e dusari Nahi, Bahar Bhitari Bhji ley.

Khanda duina Samanya, Muhammad Kiran De Wali.
CC-0. In Public Domain. Digitized by eGangotri, Haridwar

No doubt, it is a concept of tauhid (Unity of God). But he writes again in another place in the same treatise as-

"Gagari Sahas pachas Jokoi pani Bhari dhare.

Suraj dipe Akash Mohammed Sab Main Dikhiye"

These above lines are not indicating towards the concept of Non dualism of vedant, because in the system of vedanta the Reflection is the process to understand the doctrine of Non dualism but due to the fallacies of the reflectionism they (vedantins) again adopted the space theory (Avakshedavad). So both the views are refuted by Jaisi's system as there is no reflectionism and space theory (Avakshedavad) in him. But in Jaisi's system, Adam was the representative of God on this earth (God created man in his own image). So the reflection theory is there but it is unlike the vedantic concept of Reflectionism. So after the Careful examination of Jaisi's concept of God and world as well as of Vedant, we come to the conclusion that it is a unique type 'Reflectionism'. It is itself a doctrine not merely a process to understand an other doctrine as we see in vedant. Ultimately Jaisi was no more monotheistic thinker upto the writing of his reputed long narrated treatise in the poetic form known as "Kanhawat". Here Jaisi reached the theory of incarnation in his views as quite in keeping with the doctrine propounded by a great Sufi Mansur Hallaj in which he wrote that God is absolutely a divine personality (Lahut). Man is thought a God's representative on the earth (nasut). But whenever He takes incarnation it is a combination of both Lahut (divine) and Nasut (Human) in one personality (Hullul) incarnation. On the same thinking Jaisi, also preached the doctrine of incarnation in his book 'Kanhawat' which is said to be written in the reign of Humanyun (at about 1545 A.D.) in which Jaisi acknowledged the full influence of Hindu Puranic doctrine of incarnation and he regarded Lord Krishna as one of the ten incarnations of Bhagwan Vishnu as the text of 'Kanhawat' runs in the following way-

"Hari Anant Hari Katha Ananta.

Gavahin Ved Bhagwata Santa."

The same present verse written by Jaisi in his 'Kanhawat' is borrowed by Tulsi Dass for his reputed epic 'Ramacharita Manas', which can be said the crown of Hindi literature. No literary exposition is possibly complete without the references to "Ramacharit Manas" as the English literature is nor possible without the reference to Bible.

Nothing can be indicated in connection with the essence of God because indication is rather related to human senses, imagination or intellect, and the domain of all these things cannot estimate God. God possesses attributes but attributes are over and above the being of God. Such a concept of God is the basis of Jaisi's Sufism.

Jaisi said a great emphasis on Gnosis (Marifat). He was of the opinion that intellect is helpless in cognising God. God can be cognised only through Gnosis. And Gnosis is possible only through self-knowledge. He was of the opinion that Gnosis is the essence of man's soul, salvation and immortality of man lies in its attainment. This Gnosis is attained by the purification of the heart from human infirmities. This purification leads to love of God and love

begets complete vision. The heart (Qulb) of the individual is Just like a mirror. The mystic perceives the majesty, magnificence and the beauty of God is his own heart. Thus the perfection of Gnosis is based on the purification of the heart. For this purification Jaisi gave the device in his "Akharawat".

He writes -

"Jehi kar pasa Anfas; kar Hiye fiqr Samalke.

Papat ruhe Har Sansa; Muhammad Nirmer Hoi tab."

The above device prescribed by Jaisi is considerably sufficient to cleanse the heart.

The love of God is the core of Sufism. And all the Sufis are unanimous that the highest end of man, in this mortal world, is the love of God.

Jaisi says that the creation has been made only for the love of God. He discussed in great details. The love of God, the highest aspect of love, such as Sabr (Patience), dealt in 'Akharawat,' Rida (submission to God) and Tawwakul (trust in God). He also explained Ishq (prem) the firmness of the love.

Jaisi very much emphasised on the love of God. He says that this game of love is hard to play nevertheless, one who plays this game firmly, attains the highest end (bliss) of here and hereafter (becomes perfect). He says one who transcends the love of God will never return again in this mortal world, which is only possible by the process of fana (the self annihilation), for which he wrote in 'Akharawat' as following :

"Muhammad Jiyatahi Jo mare.

So Barah Sidha Appar."

This love of God cannot be described in the human speech. For the attainment of this love, it being said in the Hadith (Tradition) as-" The love of God and love of things other than God cannot go side by side."

Every Sufi prescribes a path of sincerity and mortification for the love of God. They say that the love of God and love of things other than God cannot go side by side. Therefore Jaisi emphasises the self purification through penitence, Muraqaba (absorption in God), dhikr (remembrance of God) and fana (self-annihilation).

In this treatise 'Akharawat' Jaisi emphasised on the dhikr (remembrance of God). There are two types of dhikr one dhikr-i-Jali (repetition of God's name loudly) and the other dhikr-i-Khafi (remembrance of God's silently).

Another device prescribed by Jaisi in his 'Akharawat' is Habs-i-Dam (Controlling the breaths). the fourth stage of Ashthanga Yoga. Fana (self-annihilation) can easily be attained by the practice of the device of sultanul Azkar, which can really be said the king of all dhikr, because of its significance the perception of reality is possible very soon by using this device.

The Sufis laid and exclusive emphasis on moral values. They preached their devotees to adorn themselves with the virtues of God, such as sincerity, love, tolerance, fellow feeling, mercy, justice etc. Shaikh Mumtazuddin says that the characteristics such as purification of heart, fear and love of God, absorption

in the love of God, charity, like the charity of river, kindness, like the kindness of the sun; and humility, like the humility of earth are indispensable for the Sufis. Jaisi was a thorough going mystic and adorned all these virtues to attain the nearness of God. The nearness of God is not in the terms of time and space but in Godly virtues. There is also a Hadith (traditions of prophet Muhammad) as "adorn yourself with the virtues of Allah (God) for Hid Unsiyat (nearness).

There is an exclusive emphasis on sacred relation of Pir (director) and Murid (disciple) in Sufism. Every order of Sufism is based on Bai (initiations). A Murid has to be very cautious in the selection of a Pir, because without the guidance of a Pir, it is very difficult to traverse the thorny path of Sufism. So Jaisi was also initiated by Muinuddin, who was greatly praised by him. In his every treatise written on Mathnavi style.

Among the believers of God, the seeker of God has been assigned the highest place. Here a mystic attains the secrets of 'nearness' and the splendour of the vision of God because these people raise themselves above the inspiration and lose themselves in God. Jaisi described all these ideas in his writings. After a careful examination of Jaisi's thought, we can conclude that the seven stages described by him to traverse the path of Sufism are as follows: (1) curiosity (2) Significance of ideal, (3) The efforts (4) Obstacles, (5) Appearance, (6) Intuitions and (7) Eternal union.

Service to humanity was taken as a part of mystic disciple. The saint of the Chishti, Suharawardy and Firdousi orders invested their lives in serving humanity at large. Ameer Khushrau a sincere disciple of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya is reported to be advised by his shaikh, "No all knowledge of learned is as useful equivalent as to reform the people and detached service to men." Prayer, fastings and voluntary worships are good as far as they go, but they are not as useful as making others happy. In the same way, Jaisi also wrote in his 'Padamavat' Jaisi allegorically used the mystical thought in his poetic lines as follows:

"Tan chittore Man Raja Kena, Hiya Singhal Budhi padaminin chinah.

Guru Suwa Jehi panth dikhawa, vin guru Jagat ko Nirgun pawa.

Nagmati Yeh duniya dhandha,, Bancha Soi Na raha yehi chit Bandha.

Raghav dut soi Satanu. Maya Allauddin sultanu.

Prem Katha Yeh bhanti Bicharu.

Bujhi leo Jo bujhe Barho."

Symbolism:

A contemporary Indian Philosopher K.C. Bhattacharya wrote, "All philosophy is a systematic symbolism." The statement is quite apt and appropriate in the context of Jaisi's symbolism because after a careful examination and analysis of Jaisi's poetry, we can conclude that poetry and philosophy in Jaisi's writings are supplementary to each other and cannot be separated especially regarding Jaisi's description of the ultimate truth, soul, relationship between body and soul purpose of the creation etc. through his poetic out put, he lost himself in using symbols to search after truth.

Jaisi has used symbolism in the following ways -

1. Symbols relating to ultimate reality or end. In sufi literature heroine is always regards as the symbol of ultimate reality, the same has been done by Jaisi in his 'Padamavat' and hero as a devotee to achieve the goal. But with the Influence, Jaisi also used the symbolism of hero as the ultimate reality which can be traced in 'Kaharanama' where heroin is very much conscious to reach (or achieve the end, the Purusa).

2. Symbols relating to spiritual discipline-In 'Pedamavat' hero Ratansena is the symbol of disciple.

Hira Mani Parrot is the symbol of a director (Pir) to guide-The Journey to simghaldweep is the symbol; for the Journey of the [path of righteousness.. Putting on the dress of Yogin abandonment of house etc. are the symbol of penance, which is compulsory in the path of righteousness. The sea is the symbol of love. Forest mountains, devils and other hardships are the symbol of obstacles in the path of sufism.

Jaisi used the sun and the Moon as the classical and Traditional uses, of hero and heroine in both his 'Padamavat' and Chitra-Rekha'. In Jaisi's poetry, of 'Kaharanama', Chitra-Rekha' especially 'Padamavat'-symbolism, allegory and metaphorical expressions mingled in a one single system of mysticism.

In conclusion, we can way that 'the poetry of Jaisi is neither a completely allegory, nor a symbolic expression or a expressions of folding two meanings of a thing. But it is a unique type of long narated poetry of love (Ishq-I-Majazi (human love) and Ishq-I-Haquui (divine love) Comprising the pous worldly love which reached the zenith of spirituality, to attain the cherished end of the man is the summons Bonum of life lies here and hereafter.

5

Some Salient Points Regarding Swami Shyam's Commentary on the Bhagavad Gita

Rhonda Himes

Swami Shyam has disclosed a unique interpretation of the Gita which is based upon a symbolic analysis of its personages, stories and concepts. As a scholar I was amazed and delighted to discover that the Sanskrit terminology and religious mythology of the Gita, and its mother scripture the Mahabharat, contain the hidden message of the Gita, but that until Swami Shyam's philosophic contribution neither academics nor rishi(s) sages) had uncovered it. In his introduction to the Gita Swamiji has explained that viewing the scripture only as a history, literary work or religious dogma misses its salient offering to mankind. For the Gita is a precise chemistry. When a capable man, as is symbolized by Arjun, uses the formula it offers in an experiment on his own human consciousness, the very atomic¹ formation, speed and quality of his thinking will be transformed into the universal awareness symbolized by Krishna, the hero of the epic.

Swami Shyam has explained that the war portrayed in the Gita is not external, but rather is the eternal battle between knowledge and ignorance which is fought in man's mind. Here the one hundred Kaurav(s)² are the army of negative mental waves. Duryodhan,³ the ego or material consciousness in man, heads the forces of adharm, the mental waves based on the sense of duality. This internal army is pitted against the side headed by the Pandav(s),⁴ or the powers of Oneness (dharm). When Arjun, who directs the forces of dharm, sides with the Kaurav mentality he becomes the atom of consciousness (anu) which is the enemy (ari) of his own Highest Self. In order to inspire him to battle Krishn, who is symbolic of the guru,⁵ churns Arjun's consciousness through the various contradictory teachings until the butter and light of enlightenment is produced.⁶ Then Arjun may use his own Gandiv bow, the gyan- dip or the light of knowledge which is symbolic of spiritual practice (sadhana), to destroy, with its fire of knowledge, the forces of ignorance in his own mind. Arjun, as the power of fire, with his four brothers together represent the five tattw(s) which make up man.⁷ They are wedded to Draupadi,⁸ who is symbolic of shakti (life-energy). When a man's shakti is united to the Absolute (Krishna), he is able to surmount all the obstacles which face him.

Through his remarkable revelation Swami Shyam has unlocked the mysterious depth of the Gita's teachings as an alchemical symbol to transform man's consciousness. In the process he has resolved many controversial questions which often emerge out of the traditional literal interpretations of the text. For example, how could Krishna advocate war and the murder of one's relations and teachers, and how could the Hindu Gita advocate polygamy in the form of the marriage of the five Pandav(s) to Draupadi? Noting my use of his Sanskrit spelling, you will also find that Swami Shyam has offered a further challenge to the academic community in the form of his transliteration of Sanskrit. In his highly convincing argument, he maintains that the modern standardization of Sanskrit in English has broken with the ancient yogic science which regards philosophic words as sound formulas (mantr-s) designed to transform man's consciousness into the actual meanings of the words used. Thus, for example, if a man repeats the word jnana rather than gyan, it will bring him agitation rather than knowledge.⁹ Swami Shyam's revelation on the Gita is largely rooted in novel view of the etymology of Sanskrit. An open-minded research into the dictionary and mythology confirms his radical insights.

In his lucid, simple and effective style Swami Shyam brings to light many of the ambiguous areas of the Gita which have had negative repercussions for Indian society. His brilliant analysis of varn (class), swadharm (duty), and yagy (sacrifice) as descriptions of mental states and how they should be applied to the realization of the Self definitively dispels the idea of the Gita as an authoritative text advocating the caste system and Karm Kand rituals.¹⁰ Similarly, his analysis of non-doership (nishkarta) and 'disinterested' action (nishkam karm yog) as teachings for maintaining the Vision of Oneness during action removes the scriptural basis for the apathy, escapism, fatalism and lack of relative precision which people have often attributed to the Gita due to misinterpretations of its teachings on karm yog.¹¹

Swami Shyam has made the Gita a clear and practical device free of the mystical and cultish associations it is often given. As such Swamiji has laid great importance on the practical techniques which the Gita offers. While most commentators speak of three strands of the Gita, namely bhakti, gyan and karm, thereby entirely overlooking the sixth chapter and numerous shlok(s) (verses) on meditation, Swami Shyam has brought dhyān (meditation) to the foreground of the scripture. Meditation is a palpable device beyond the surface level studying and theorizing of the intellect and is designed to give mān the direct experience of the Self (Atma). Swamiji has released the practice of dhyān from the anachronistic use of a deerskin and removed the frustrating misinterpretation which advocates that a thinking human being should forcibly control and eliminate his thought and sense activity during the meditation practice. In his commentary meditation becomes an unmystical, unambiguous and universal formula to produce Self Realization (jivanmukti).¹²

While original in his perception, Swami Shyam has only uncovered what was always lying hidden in the Gita. In the process he has removed the grounds for interpretations which have marred the collective growth of

consciousness of humanity. For he has nullified the scriptural authority for such current practices and attitudes as the caste system, ritualism, and terrorism, fatalism and apathy, brainwashing and mind control, and mysticism and cultism. Positively speaking he has offered the Gita as a clear, simple and inspiring teaching, practising which a man may improve himself and thereby his world. As such Swami Shyam's commentary on the Bhagavad Gita deserves the immediate attention of scholars, Indologists, and spiritual aspirants alike.

Footnotes

1. The expression "atom of thought" or "consciousness" is frequently used by Swami Shyam. It describes the actual structure of man's perceptive vehicle, as was discovered by yogic scientists and designated by the word *kala*.

2. The Kaurav(s) are also called the Kuru(s). Here *ku* means bad, sinful, or, according to Vedant, dualistic; *ru* means to cry or scream. The Kaurav(s) thus represent man's internal negative mental experience based on duality.

3. In Duryodhan, *dur* means bad, or again dualistic, *ya* is restraining or abandoning, *o* is remembrance, and *dhan* is plus, or the prosperity or fullness of God. Thus Duryodhan is the duality in man which restrains the remembrance of God. Swami Shyam explains that Duryodhan is symbolic of the material consciousness which values the army (form) over Krishna (the Absolute) and which is bound to fail man in the end, as is symbolized by Duryodhan's and his army's destruction and defeat. His forces are of *adharm*: *a* = not, *dhar* = possessing, and *ma* = Brahm (Oneness).

4. The word Pandav is similar to the word Pranav or Aum, the Absolute. Here the scholar must be cautious that in the science of mantr (sound formula) words of similar sound and frequency may have equivalent meaning. Thus an empirical parameter (manogyan) of literal exactness should not be reductionistically applied to the realm of mystical experience (*sakshatkar*).

5. Krishna is symbolic of guru consciousness or God, which attracts (*krish*) the mind to it.

6. Swami Shyam has explained that the nature of all of life is the simultaneous coexistence of opposites. Man's mind is by nature contradictory. By using contradiction the guru releases man's consciousness from one angle of vision where it is stuck, in a dialectical mode, until it can embrace the Whole, which includes all angles of perception. In this way the Gita is a perfect Upanishad (*up* = near, *ni* = down, and *shad* = sit) where the guru evolves a would-be guru through the process of contradiction in dialogue. Once again, the academic should not make the reductionistic misapplication of the law of contradiction to a teaching methodology where paradox is one of the primary tools of intellectual expansion.

7. Yudishthir is symbolic of the *akash* (space): Here *yu* means to unite, *dhi* to hold, and *sth* is like *sthir*, the immovable or eternal, which is the description of space (*akash*). Bhim is the son of Vayu, or air, and thus symbolizes that element. Arjun received his Gita instruction from Agni, the god of

fire, and is symbolic of fire. Nakul stands for the sound ha which represents water, and he is thus the water tattw. Sehedev is the dev or god of seha or earth. All five together thus symbolize the elements (tattw-s) making up one man.

8. In Draupadi, da means to give, ra is speed, au is to address, and padi is to enter into. As the one who addresses, enters into and gives speed, she is symbolic of shakti, or life-energy. Her name also means a descendant of Drupad, where dru means to fuse, and pad is a part or portion. Draupadi, as shakti, thus fuses the five tattw(s) to one another and to the Absolute. This symbolic meaning is further high-lighted in her other name, Panchali. Here panch means five, that is the five tattw(s), and ali is a bridge or continuous line, which makes Draupadi the connection between the tattw(s) and the Absolute. Her famous meditation on Krishna and its miraculous results when being assaulted in the assembly is symbolic of the union of man's consciousness with the Absolute which surmounts all obstacles.

9. As an example, in will easily be mispronounced whereas gy closely approximates the letter, while adding a final 'a' to the terminal consonant will bring man's energy downwards when, according to yogic science, it is meant to ascend to the head where realization takes place. See Gita pgs. 24-26.

10. See varn -Gita pgs. 73 -74, 80- 81, 215-216, swadharm - Gita pgs. 73-74, 217, and yagy -Gita pgs. 28, 67-69, 84 -86. Note in swadharm, swa can mean either the individual or cosmic self and accordingly lead to vastly different interpretations.

11. See Gita pgs. 53 -59, 82, 92 -93. Note that nishkam and Nishkarta, meaning without desire or action, symbolizes the formless Self.

12. See Gita pgs. 97, 101 -107.

6

Contemplative Silence: Its Supreme Value And Significance In Life

Rajendra Prasad Acharya,

Contemplative silence (otherwise called mental silence or inward silence and the like) is a higher state of being transcending the psycho-physical sphere of the normal human life. It is not a negative state of blank apathy, of sterile passivity and quiescence but a negative and intensely dynamic state - a profound and pregnant stillness. In such a state the tension and turmoil of the normal human mind is stilled and over-come and its conscious and unconscious activities are brought to a cessation. It is a state of quiet passiveness when the human mind is receptive and responsive to the influx of higher Divine Consciousness. About this silence Mahayogi Sri Aurobindo's observation is subtle and illuminating:

"But for the knowledge of the Self it is necessary to have the power of a complete intellectual passivity, the power of dismissing all thought, the power of the mind to think not at all which the Gita in one passage enjoins. This is a hard saying for the occidental mind to which thought is the highest thing and which will be apt to mistake the power of the mind not to think, its complete silence for the incapacity of thought. But this power of silence is a capacity and not an incapacity, a power and not a weakness. It is a profound and pregnant stillness. Only when the mind is thus entirely still, like clear, motionless and level water, in a perfect purity and peace of the whole being and the soul transcends thought, can the Self which exceeds and originates all activities and becomings, the Silence from which all words are born, the Absolute of which all relativities are partial reflections manifest itself in the pure essence of our being. In a complete silence only is the Silence heard; in a pure peace only is its Being revealed. Therefore to us the name of that is the Silence and the Peace".¹ The 'Dark Night of the Soul' emphasized by the celebrated Christian mystic St. John of the Cross as the supreme way to 'Divine union with God' and which has found an almost classic expression in the following memorable lines of T.S. Eliot is but an out come of a sustained state of contemplative stillness and serenity.

'Descend lower, descend only

Into the world of perpetual solitude,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar
World not world, but that which is not world,

*Internal darkness, deprivation
 And destitution of all property,
 Desiccation of the world of sense,
 Evacuation of the world of fancy,
 Inoperancy of the world of spirit; ²*

And again 'I said to my soul, be still, and let the dark come upon you which shall be the darkness of God.' ³

About this silence another great mystic Meister Eckhart says "The best and utmost of attainment in this life is to remain still and let God act and speak in thee. When the powers have all been withdrawn from their bodily forms and functions, then is this Word spoken. Thus he says: "In the midst of the silence the secret word was spoken to me.' The more completely thou art able to in draw thy facilities and to forget those things and their images which thou hast taken in, the more, that is to say, thou forgettest the creature, the nearer thou art to this and the more susceptible thou art to it." ⁴

And again: "In this silence, this quiet, the Word is heard. There is no better method of approaching this word than in silence, in quiet: we hear it and know it aright in unknowing. To one who knows naught it is clearly revealed." ⁵

Another great Christian mystic the Blessed John Ruysbroeck calls it the "Dark Silence'.

The Divine Spirit, the Supreme Reality is often conceived in terms of silence. "The Self is silence" (Santoyam atma') so says Bahya to his pupil Vaskali. And the Upanishad speaks of Him as' without parts, actionless, tranquil, uncontaminable, spotless' 'nishkalam nishkriyam santam, nirabadyam niranjanam'.⁶ Speaking of Brahman or the Absolute Reality, Samkara says in the Kena Upanishad Pada Bhasya:- 'Santamanantam ekam advaitan bhumarabyam nityam brahma' ⁷ 'Brahman which is quiescent, endless, one and non dual? The observation of St. Augustine is also highly significant in this context: "God is not even to be called ineffable, because to say this is to make an assertion about Him. It is a pure silence, a soundless void." To Mahayogi Sri Aurobindo the Supreme Being it 'the Silence and the Peace' ⁸ to the philosophic poet T.S. Eliot 'the still point of the turning world.'⁹ Hence coptemplative or meditative silence cannot but be regarded as the surest and unmistakably the most effectives means of realizing and attaining Him. 'Jnana prasadena visuddha sattvastatastu tam pasyate nishkalam dhyayamanah'¹⁰ 'He whose mind is pure and serene can by meditation attain a vision of the Indivisible'.

'The heart of light, it is pregnantly said' is the silence'. For it is in moments of contemplative calm that the human soul has a profound and penetrating insight into the heart of Reality, an intimate and authentic, though, fleeting glimpse of the Eternity. So says Sri Aurobindo

*'Our souls can visit in great lonely hours
 Still regions of imperishable Light,*

*All-seeing eagle-peaks of silent Power
And moon-flame oceans of swift fathomless Bliss
And calm immensities of spirit Space.¹¹*

and thus says, Wordsworth in the same strain:

'Hence, in a season of calm weather Though inland far we be, Our souls have sight of that immortal sea which brought us hither:¹²

*And again 'that serene and blessed mood,
In which the affections gently lead us on, -
until, the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
of harmony, and the deep power, of joy,
We see into the life of things.'¹³*

In fact, all the profound and sublime imaginative visions and experiences of great poets and seers, the intuitive spiritual visions, realizations and revelations of mystics, saints and prophets have occurred in such moments of reflective or contemplative silence.

Down the ages, countless sages and saints, poets and philosophers, visionaries and mystics have borne eloquent and unmistakable testimony to the supreme value and significance of such silence in their lives and exalted and glorified it in unique and memorable expressions of their own. The great philosopher William James offers a vivid and glowing account of it in following memorable words.

"I had a long drive to my loadings. My mind was calm and peaceful. I was in a state of quiet, even passive enjoyment, not actually thinking, but letting ideas, images, and emotions flow of themselves, as it were, through my mind. All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself wrapped in a flame-coloured cloud. For an instant I thought of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that great city; the next instant I knew that that fire was in myself. Directly afterwards there came upon me a sense of exultation, of immense joyousness, accompanied or immediately followed by an intellectual illumination quite impossible to describe. Among other things, I did not merely come to believe, I saw that the universe is not composed of dead matter, but is, on the contrary, a living presence: I became conscious in myself of eternal life"¹⁴

Describing again of such a moment of hallowed contemplative calm, William James Writes:

'I remember the night, and almost the very spot on the hillside, where my soul opened out, as it were, into the Infinite, and there was a rushing

together of the two worlds, the inner and the outer. It was deep calling unto deep-the deep that my own struggle had opened up within being answered by the unfathomable deep without, reaching beyond the stars. I stood alone with Him who had made me, and all the beauty of the world, and love, and sorrow, and even temptation. I did not seek Him, but felt the perfect union of my spirit with His. The ordinary sense of things around me faded. For the moment nothing but an ineffable joy and exaltation remained. It is impossible fully to describe the experience. It was like the effect of some great orchestra when all the separate notes have melted into one swelling harmony that leaves the listener conscious of nothing save that his soul is being wafted upwards, and almost bursting with its own emotion. The perfect stillness of the night was thrilled by a more solemn silence. The darkness held a presence that was all the more felt because it was not seen. I could not any more have doubted that He was there than that I was. Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possible, the less real of the two.

My highest faith in God and truest idea of Him were then born in me. I have stood upon the Mount of Vision since, and felt the Eternal round about me. But never since has there come quite the same stirring of the heart. Then, if ever, I believe, I stood face to face with God, and was born anew of His spirit."

¹⁵ Another great mystic Simone Weil describes how on some occasions the utterance of the words 'Our Father' in prayer could transport her to a state of sublime contemplative silence and offer her vivid glimpses of Infinity:-

"At times the very first words tear my thoughts from my body and transport it to a place outside space where there is neither perspective nor point of view. The infinity of the ordinary expanses of perception is replaced by an infinity to the second or sometimes the third degree. At the same time, filling every part of this infinity of infinity, there is a silence, a silence which is not an absence of sound but which is the object of a positive sensation, more positive than that of sound. Noises, if there are any, only reach me after crossing the silence.

Sometimes, also, during this recitation or at other moments, Christ is present with me in person, but his presence is infinitely more real, more moving, more clear than on the first occasion he took possession of me".¹⁶ About this silence, Mr. H.G. Wells writes 'At times in the silence of the night and in rare, lonely moments I come upon a sort of communion of myself and something which is not myself. These moments happen and they are supreme fact in my religious life. They are the crown of my religious experience'.¹⁷

* William Wordsworth, the greatest of English Romantics and the mystic poet par excellence has paid glowing tributes to the power and glory of contemplative calm in many magnificent and memorable passages, a few of which are quoted below.

*'Oft in these moments such a holy calm
 Would overspread my soul, that bodily eyes*

Were utterly forgotten, and what I saw
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Appeared like something in myself, a dream,
 A prospect in the mind.¹⁸
 'at that time,
 of manners put to school I took small note,
 And all my deeper passions lay elsewhere.
 Far better had it been to exalt the mind By solitary study, to uphold
 Intense desire through meditative peace:¹⁹
 'More frequently from the same source I drew
 A pleasure quiet and profound, a sense of permanent and universal sway,
 And paramount belief; there, recognized
 A type; for finite natures, of the one
 Supreme Existence, the surpassing life
 Which-to the boundaries of space and time,
 Of melancholy Space and doleful time,
 Superior, and incapable of change,
 Nor touched by welterings of passion is,
 And hath the name of, God. Transcendent peace
 And Silence did await upon these thoughts
 That were a frequent comfort to my youth.'²⁰
 'Oh! next to such enjoyment of our youth,
 In my esteem, next to such dear delight,
 Was that of wandering on from day to day
 Where I could meditate in peace, and cull
 Knowledge that step by step might lead me on
 To wisdom;'²¹

The immense power, value and significance of silence receives ample recognition even in such a simple and oft-quoted proverb: 'Speech is silver but silence is golden'. And if this be true of ordinary form of silence, how profoundly more significant and inestimably more precious must be the supreme form of silence the contemplative silence constituting the height and depth of silence. That this contemplative silence has a crucial relevance and significance in human life, and more so in our contemporary life has received strong affirmation and acknowledgement from Dr. Arnold Toynbee, one of the profoundly original and creative thinkers and the greatest philosopher historian of our century. In an illuminating article entitled 'India and the West' he has very cogently maintained that India's supreme and unique contribution to the heritage of human wisdom is its recognition and cultivation of the ideal of contemplation, while the secular and materialist West is passionately devoted to the ideal of action. The celebrated poet Mr. T.S. Eliot, profoundly steeped in

Oriental mysticism and Absolute Monism of Vedanta Philosophy, the Absolute Idealism of Bradley as well as in the Christian mystic tradition made the most memorable and pregnant statement in this context:

*'The endless cycle of idea and action
Endless invention, endless experiment
Brings knowledge of motion but not of stillness
Knowledge of speech but not of silence'*²²

It is most deplorable that the materialist ethos of modern civilization with its cult of secular activism and pragmatic, utilitarian attitude to life finds little or no place for this ideal of contemplative 'Silence. While in the ancient and traditional philosophy of life the Supreme place was assigned to meditative silence or contemplation, the orientation of modern materialist philosophy of life is towards action ceaseless and restless action, to the complete exclusion of the ideal of contemplative silence.

The progress obsessed and technology dominated life of modern man is full of activity -either physical, mental or intellectual. We act, and act -restlessly and relentlessly like a machine -a lifeless, mindless and willess automaton. In the highly industrialized and technological contemporary human society, life is a weary round of dreary and endless activity. Modern man can not or would not free himself from the blind rush of hectic and febrile activity, to contemplate the meaning and purpose of human life or explore and penetrate the ultimate mysteries of life and universe. Being grossly and overwhelmingly preoccupied with action, his mind is so much afflicted with its distractions that he loses the joy, peace and serenity in life, in as much as there is no brief spell of contemplative silence to accompany and enrich his normal daily life of action. 'Variety is the very spice of life that gives life all its flavour; so writes the English poet William Cowper.

*'What is this life
if full of care*

We have no time to stand and stare. So writes the great American poet W.H. Davies, striking an identical note.

Contemplative silence is an integrating and harmonising force in human life. In such a state, when an individual is vouchsafed flashes of intuitive insight and spiritual illumination can he discover the ultimate meaning of creation and the eternal verities of life. Thus does Wordsworth speak of:

*'that blessed mood,
In which the burthen of the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened'*²³

It is only in such a state of contemplative calm that one can appreciate the profound meaning and purpose of human life and destiny and realise the gracious harmony, beauty and majesty of the Divine creation, cherished and upheld by a Supreme Cosmic Intelligence and Being. Then he can share the thought of the poet H.W. Longfellow

'Life is serious, life is earnest

*And grave is not its goal?'*²⁴

Then only will the life of man and the entire cosmos cease to appear as being in blind and meaningless flux and reveal a sublime beauty and grace. And he can say with the poet Keats,

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty" -that is all

*Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know'*²⁵

Amidst the sickhurry, tension and distraction of his daily life not only has the modern man little or no time for such moments of contemplative silence, he is also, more often than not temperamentally disinclined to cherish such silence and cultivate it whenever he has any opportunity to do so. He is morbidly afraid of solitude, of being alone with himself and recoils in antipathy or revulsion from it. Here one is reminded of the exquisite line of the poet Andrew Marwell,

'Society is all but rude,

*To this delicious solitude'*²⁶

Since the rough and tumble of the daily life allows no interlude of reflective or meditative silence, man has belittled or disregarded the enlightened philosophic injunction 'Know thyself' atmanam viddhi. Under the influence of avidya (nescience) which has been further accentuated by the hedonistic philosophy of the modern materialistic society, man has identified his self (Atman) with non-Self (anatman) that is, has erroneously identified his real Self with the empirical, superficial self comprising of the body, mind and senses. Thus he fails even to accept, let alone, follow in letter and spirit, the ideal of conquering his lower self by controlling and sublimating its passions, cravings and urges by the exercise of the rational freewill. The noble ideals of self discovery, self restraint and self conquest which alone can ensure man's ascent to higher realms of moral and spiritual being can flourish only in the climate of contemplative silence. It is this contemplative silence that alone can confer on human life a true serenity of spirit, a hallowed and blissful tranquillity of mind and without it the modern man in spite of worldly pleasures and sense-enjoyments is afflicted with soul-paralysing despair, and inexpressible anguish of spirit.

"Absolute serenity of spirit", rightly observes Dr, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, "is the highest goal of human endeavour". and contemplative silence can alone bring it about. Hence in order to cure the grave malady of modern human life with its symptoms of soul -sickening despair, that haunting sense of futility, emptiness and meaninglessness in life, it is the imperative duty of every conscientious individual to strike a harmonious balance in his life

between the ideal of activity and that of contemplative silence and serenity. Then only his life would be one of harmony and integral perfection a purposive and meaningful whole.

The supreme touchstone of the glory and greatness of human civilization is, in the ultimate analysis, not technological progress or material prosperity and affluence but attainment in individual life, of moral elevation and spiritual realization leading to the harmonious and integral development of human nature and moral and spiritual fulfillment and perfection of human life. This moral and spiritual maturity and perfection of man can be achieved if his life ceases to be occupied entirely and exclusively by the worldly action with its prime objectives of material self aggrandizement and physical and sensual gratification and finds place in it for the ideal of contemplative stillness or the 'wise passiveness' to quote the pregnant civilization which at present displays a meretricious and sterile glamour of material progress would achieve true and enduring progress and perfection through man's ascent to higher realms of moral and spiritual being and mankind would find the lasting peace and serenity which it so passionately seeks but lacks so lamentably.

On The Justifiability Of Sex Roles

Koyeli Ghosh-Dastidar

In spite of the emergence of contemporary feminism there continues to be a widespread belief regarding the appropriateness of a sexual division of labour and the legitimacy of sex roles. There was indeed a time when learning to play sex roles was a part of growing up, and hardly anyone asked whether sex roles are Justifiable or not. Children learned to play the prescribed sex roles that prepared them for their adult lives. But now the patterns of life for people of all ages are changing and the question of the legitimacy of sex roles is increasingly drawing the attention of social scientists, anthropologists, psychologists and the like. In this paper I will try to analyse the meaning of sex roles, trace the development of sex-role stereotypes, and examine the various arguments, both for and against, the legitimacy of sex roles. I will proceed to show that sex roles are wrong not because they restrict human freedom, but because they tend to promote the idea that women should be subordinated to men.

Let us first try to understand what we mean by sex roles. But before we analyse the meaning of the concept of sex roles, let us find out what is central to the concept of a role. The concept of role, as I have argued elsewhere¹, is basically a 'type' or a class concept, that is to say, the idea of a type an individual is expected to exhibit is central to the concept of role. The concept of role denotes and brings together a number of individuals in virtue of their common 'properties', but the number of individuals performing this or that role may vary considerably. There are roles which may be performed by many people at one and the same time, 'mothers' or 'fathers', for example, while some roles are performed by only a single individual at any one time, as in the case of 'unique' roles, like 'sovereign'. The concept of role always refers to what are called 'achievement' properties², that is to say, dispositional properties that are considered as responses to normative demands. The concept of role has to be distinguished from the concept of class. A class can refer both to 'achievement' properties and to 'contingent' properties or properties that an individual cannot control, like inherited physiological characteristics, personality traits etc. The role concept, may, indeed, refer to 'contingent' properties, but only in so far as they are conjoined with behavioural properties. Another characteristic that distinguishes the role concept from class concept is that the kind of behaviour denoted by the role concept always refers to behaviour both in regard to others and in regard to how others behave towards the role-player. The concept of role

also refers to 'purposive' and 'constant' behaviour, that is to say, behaviour that other role-players can reckon with, and on the basis of which they themselves will act purposively. Acting in response to the behaviour of others can be a characteristic of class concepts as well. What is peculiar to the role concept is that the conformity it demands is basically a normative conformity in the sense that the role-player's behaviour is determined by social norms. It is for this reason that 'role' has to be seen as a concept that is basically normative. So a person's role is a set of actions that he is expected to perform by following certain rules.

I turn now to consider what sex roles are. Generally speaking sex roles mean certain patterns of behaviour for members of the two sexes, patterns that are prescribed by the social group to which the individual belongs. "A culturally defined sex role reflects those behaviours and attitudes that are generally agreed upon within a culture as being either masculine or feminine"³. Society expects men and women to develop different psychological characteristics and to behave accordingly. Development of sex roles also means development of different systems of reward and punishment for encouraging and enforcing the appropriate behaviour. The patterns of behaviour to be prescribed for members of the two sexes in a society are determined by the values upheld by that society. If a society places high value on status symbols and believes that men are better equipped, both physically and mentally, than women, for earning the money essential for attaining the status symbols, that society will expect men to be wage earners, while woman will be expected to carry out those tasks that will make the lives of the male wage earners free from all sorts of obstacles.⁴

The prescribed sex roles develop into stereotypes in course of time. The sex role stereotypes include specific concepts regarding approved appearance, approved patterns of behaviour, approved speech, approved ways of expressing emotions and feelings, approved ways of earning a livelihood, and so on. When sex roles develop into stereotypes, they tend to act as standards with reference to which the appropriateness of the behaviour of an individual is judged, not only by other members of the society, but also by the individual himself. The sex role stereotypes are based on a number of beliefs that lay stress on differences between the two sexes.⁵ Some of these claims regarding differences between the two sexes are based on facts, while others are controversial. Physical and physiological differences undoubtedly exist between a man and a woman. But the claim that men and women are different so far as intellectual capacity, emotionality, health and achievement are concerned, is now being increasingly questioned. A close correlation was supposed to have existed between the size of brain and the level of intelligence, and because man had larger brains than females, they were supposed to be more intelligent. Physical disturbances accompanying menstruation were regarded as causing emotional disturbances in women, while men were considered as having greater emotional stability than women. It was also believed that woman were more prone to illnesses than men. Regarding achievement, too, it was assumed that men's contributions to culture were far greater than women's because of the superior strength and intellectual capacities of the former.

Beliefs about superior and inferior sex roles thus gradually developed. While belief in the superiority of female roles can be found in some tribes, it is the male role that has been regarded as the superior role in most human societies. Since men contributed more to the welfare of the social group, particularly at a time when daily activities centred around fishing, hunting, fighting, or even clearing forests and cultivating large tracts of land, their role was considered to be superior to the role of women. As Simone de Beauvoir has aptly put it. "In times when heavy clubs were brandished and wild beasts held at bay, woman's physical weakness did constitute a glaring inferiority: if the instrument required strength slightly beyond that at woman's disposal, it was enough to make her appear utterly powerless".⁶

Sex-role stereotypes, as we have pointed out above, have developed gradually: they were not built up overnight. Neither were they restricted to one or two spheres; they have gradually spread to almost all the important spheres of a person's life. Clothing, hair style and patterns for grooming are different for men and women. A girl's play materials are different from a boy's. Even some school subjects are regarded as more appropriate for one sex than for the other. Boys are taught woodwork and carpentry, while girls needlework and knitting. As regards emotions, men are expected to show greater control than women. The effect of sex-role stereotypes is most conspicuous so far as personality traits are concerned. The ideal woman is one who is docile, passive and compliant while the ideal man is one who has an active, dominant and aggressive personality. Stereotypes are also at work when the question of vocations arises. While boys are expected to seek jobs in industry, business and commerce, girls are encouraged to take up teaching, nursing, hairdressing, and other jobs relating to domestic service.

The sex-role stereotypes that we have discussed above have started undergoing some changes since the turn of the present century, although belief in a sexual division of labour is widely prevalent, and sex discrimination in subtle forms continues to be at work. There are many reasons for these changes.⁷ A shift from a rural setting to an urban setting means that skills will be considered to be more important than strength, and since the difference between men and women regarding skills is far less than regarding strength, belief in the superiority of male roles will decline to some extent. The intelligence testing movement has undermined the belief that men are intellectually superior, and researches on the roles of heredity and environment tend to suggest that differences between the sexes can be traced more to training than heredity. The fact that women can be as successful academics as men, when they get equal educational opportunities, has also brought about changes in the stereotypes. Equal vocational opportunities, too, have enabled women to enter the world of industry, business and commerce, a world that was hitherto known as a 'man's world'. Health and mortality statistics have revealed that the belief that women are more prone to illnesses than men is false, and that their longevity as a group is higher than that of men. And, finally, women's achievements in different cultural fields have also undermined the belief in the inferiority of female sex roles.

Let us now consider the arguments put forward in favour of sex roles. The argument that is frequently given for justifying the existence of sex roles is the argument from inevitability.⁸ The main point of this argument is that sex roles are inevitable because of the innate psychological differences that exist between men and women. Since psychological differences between the sexes are inevitable, differences in behaviour will be inevitable in which case society will be bound to enforce sex-appropriate roles. But granted that behavioural differences and role differences are inevitable, it does not follow that society must enforce sex roles, because if sex differences are natural and inevitable, the question of enforcing them through sanctions would not arise. "The anxiety of mankind to interfere in behalf of nature, for fear lest nature should not succeed in effecting its purpose, is an altogether unnecessary solicitude".⁹

Another way of justifying the existence of sex roles is to say that since there are natural psychological differences between the sexes, both men and women will be happier in certain roles than in others, and the roles that tend to promote happiness will vary according to sex. Hence individuals should be encouraged to choose sex-appropriate roles that would enable them to get the maximum happiness. This argument would be valid only if we could compare the existing system of sex roles with a system lacking in sex roles and show that the loss of happiness resulting from wrong role choices in the existing system of sex roles is less than the loss that would result from wrong choices in a system that does not prescribe sex roles. But since we are incapable of making this comparison in our present state of knowledge, it cannot be proved that overall well-being is greater with sex roles than without them.

There is another argument which tries to establish the legitimacy of sex roles. This is the argument from efficiency. It is said that since men and women have natural differences in their capacities to perform specific tasks, efficiency demands that these tasks be assigned to that sex which can perform them best. This argument is valid provided we accept that efficiency for the society we are concerned with has some value. But this conclusion is only *prima facie*. Efficiency by itself cannot prove that there should be sex roles. To justify the existence of sex roles, efficiency, along with other reasons in favour of sex roles, would have to be weighed against reasons for holding that sex roles should not exist. "The reasons against sex roles are very strong. They are couched in terms of individual rights in terms of liberty, justice, equality of opportunity. Efficiency by itself does not outweigh these moral values."¹⁰

The last argument in favour of sex roles that we will consider in this paper is based on the claim that there are hormonal differences between men and women. Steven Goldberg¹¹ has argued that a study of male anatomy shows that males have hormonal systems which make them more aggressive than females. This is what he calls the 'aggression advantage'. Male roles, Goldberg argues, are considered to be superior not because they are performed by men; rather, men perform these roles because of the advantage they enjoy for their aggressiveness. Goldberg believes that this aggression advantage manifests itself not so much in the primitive societies which he calls collectivist and relatively homogeneous, as in the complex democratic relatively individualistic societies.

The common explanation that feminists offer for the fact that posts like those of the corporation president, the union leader, the governor etc. are nearly always filled by men is that women are not allowed to compete with men for gaining these posts, that 'girls are socialized away from competing with boys in general.

Goldberg wants us to ask why women are so socialized, and the answer that he offers is that if women are not so socialized away from competing with men, failure and unhappiness will be the lot of most women. Some women, he admits, might be aggressive like men, and thus succeed in the competition, but the majority would fail and be compelled to lead frustrating lives. It is with a view to avoiding such frustrating situations that society encourages women to develop alternative set of criteria for success in maternal and nurturance roles.

Jane English¹² has raised a valid objection to Goldberg's stand with regard to sex roles. Her objection runs as follows. We all know that the height of a human being is determined primarily by his/her hormones and genes, and it is also a fact that tall people dominate over short people in nearly all human societies, so that exceptions amounting even to ten per cent of the population, would not make any difference. But can this be a valid reason for conditioning children who are short to accept the fact that tall people would always dominate, and that they should never therefore try to gain positions of authority and power? Similarly, even if men have aggression advantage, that does not mean that women should be encouraged to avoid competing with men and to remain subordinate to them.

The line of argument taken up by those who think that sex roles should be abolished is as follows. Sex roles are considered to be wrong because they violate an individual's rights- the rights to equality, justice and liberty. It is true, the argument runs, that there are physical and physiological differences between the two sexes, but the psychological differences, be they natural or socially induced, between them, are not universal. So even if women are more passive and more emotional than men on the average, or less capable on the average of abstract thought than men, denying some roles systematically to all women simply because many women cannot perform them, is not morally justifiable, because it violates the principle of equality. According to the principle of equality, every human being should be judged simply on the basis of individual merit and not on the basis of the 'average' make-up of the sexual group to which the person belongs.

Our discussions so far suggest that sex roles do restrict an individual's freedom and opportunity. But the question is can their legitimacy be questioned solely on that ground? All roles restrict our freedom in some way or other, and yet they are essential to our freedom.¹³ A role, as we have pointed out in the beginning of this paper, is a normative concept. A behaviour pattern or a function cannot be a role unless there are expectations or standards regarding it. A role is characterised more by expectations and standards than by what the role-player actually does. To say that there are expectations and standards with regard to roles means that society will devise systems of reward and punishment for enforcing the roles, and thus roles would restrict freedom. But this

restriction of freedom is not peculiar to sex roles. Roles other than sex roles, too, restrict freedom. There are roles that one can perform only if one has the requisite qualifications, and a role may be such that a person performing that role is prevented from performing another. "One cannot simultaneously take a vow of silence and be on a debating team, have two nine-to-five jobs, be a boxer and a concert pianist, nor be a member of a city council and live in another city."¹⁴

Those who believe that sex roles should be abolished might still argue that since sex roles are not freely chosen, sanctions imposed on those who violate sex roles are not fair. This argument overlooks the fact that there are many social roles, which like sex roles, are not freely chosen. Ignorance, economic necessity, social pressures may often compel us to perform certain roles, although the roles themselves are rewarding, desirable and not unjust. So it seems that it is wrong to speak of sex roles as unjust simply because they are not freely chosen. Men, too, are forced to learn their masculine roles, but one hears very little about any injustice being done to them on this account.

It appears therefore that it is not freedom of choice but the effects that sex roles have on those who perform them that is the crucial point while discussing the problem of sex roles. If sex roles are wrong, they are so because they tend to encourage and perpetuate women's subordination to men and try to justify a sexual division of labour. Sex roles are wrong because "women are one-third of the world's formal labour force, and do four-fifths of all 'informal' work, but receive only 10 per cent of the world's income and own less than 1 per cent of the world's property."¹⁵ Subordination of women to men is a characteristic to be found not only in the traditional models of sex roles, but also in the modern versions of sex roles. The modern versions assign specific roles to both sexes, but recognise the fact that both can perform other tasks as well. In the modern versions of sex roles women are not directly subordinated to men, but they are still evaluated in the light of their relationships to men. Society allows women to become scientists, athletes or to take part in hazardous adventures so long as these tasks do not cause hindrance to their roles as wives and mothers or diminish their attractiveness in the eyes of men. In other words women are regarded as competent to do many things and allowed to carry out these tasks provided performances of their primary roles do not suffer. Performances of the primary roles naturally leaves women with much less time to devote themselves to other roles, and thus a hierarchy is indirectly created where women are subordinated to men.

Sex roles are therefore wrong in so far as they tend to perpetuate women's subordination to men. But this does not mean that they are necessarily wrong, and there are two ways of showing why we consider them to be of some value. First, sex roles are roles nevertheless, and roles, as we have pointed out earlier, are essential to our freedom, although they restrict our freedom to some extent. Roles tell us what to expect when we make decisions. We would not expect specific behaviour patterns from individuals if there were no roles, and without such expectations we would not be able to assess an individual's present actions as part of his future actions.¹⁶ Moreover, it is because there are roles,

that we can gain advantage by specially training ourselves to perform some specific roles. Indeed it is not only difficult to think of a human society without roles, but it is also possible to raise doubts about the desirability of such a society. Secondly, sex roles do have some purpose to serve just as other roles do. In the rapidly changing world of today, political and economic roles may go through many reforms, but sex roles, although they too have changed in some respects, can still continue to give some stability to human society, by helping an individual to gain self-identity.

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8

Level Of Stress In Working And Nonworking Women And The Contribution Of Yoga In Reducing It.

KUMUDINI SHARMA*

INTRODUCTION

The modern world is said to be a world of achievement is also a world of stress. In the simplest and most general sense, stress occurs when there are demands on the person which tax or exceed his adjustive resources. Stress is nonspecific response of the body to any demand. One finds stress everywhere, whether it be the family, society, economic organization or any other business organization (Has Seyle, 1983).

It is because of the dramatic changes that have taken place in society over the last few decades that work and life stress have become more immediate focal points of interest.

Although, stress research have been suffering with conceptual (BEEHR, NEWMAN, 1978), methodological (KAHN, 1981) and focus (IVANCEVICH, MATTERSON, 1980) Problems, work-related stress is becoming increasingly a prominent field of research in recent years (ARSENAULT & DOLAN 1983).

Earlier, stress originally meant a kind of hardship, strains, adversity or affliction. Only during the 18th and 19th Century, stress was used to denote as "Force, pressure, strain or strong effort". By the currently followed definition-"Psychological stress is a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing/exceeding his/her resources and indangering his/her well-being (Lazarus, 1984).

It has been found that women worked very hard but never received an outright outcome. Occupational Stress is an extremely difficult construct to define in simple words. It is the stress on, the job which occurs in the person (JERROLD & GREENBERG).

The role of women in society is radically changing (HALL & HALL, 1980). Vast number of women are beginning to work full time and to aspire to climb the same organizational ladders as their male counterparts (HENNING & JARDIN 1978). Women work very hard and as a whole experience more daily stress, marital dissatisfaction and aging worries (STAINES et al, 1978).

HALL & HALL, 1980 feels that most working women are expected without much support from their husband to fulfil the roles of both the home maker and career person simultaneously.

Yoga as a facilitator of Health. The term health as used here includes both physical and mental well-being and yogic technique are directed towards this.

Ramamurthi (1977) has conducted experiments on Yogis under states of relaxation. He has noted changes in the brain which had a beneficial effect on neural activity. These changes also affected the functioning of organs like the general biochemistry of the body as well as the endocrine system thereby indicating that yogic practices influence the entire body. He has concluded that these practices help in keeping the persons health. In the early stage of a disease. Yogic practices help the body to recover its balance of function.

Vahia (1982) has suggested that mental health Professionals should take note of Patanjali's treatise on yoga as it represents a new conceptual mode of Health by him is reported to be useful in the treatment of anxiety states, reactive depression and psychological disorders.

Bhardwaj, Upadhyaya and Gaur (1979) have examined the effects of transcendental meditation (TM).

I. Sharma and Agnihotri (1982a) have investigated the effect of controlled breathing in 20 anxiety patients. After 6 weeks of practise there was a definite reduction in anxiety in 10 patients.

There have been studies on hypertensive subjects to examine the efficacy of yogic techniques. The different yogic technique used include Shavasana, Pranayama, Bhinyangasana and Shalabhasana (R.H. Singh, Shetliwar & Udupa 1978). Shavasana (Datey, 1978) yogic relaxation, meditation and breathing exercise. (Ramamurthi, Vishwanathan & Kumar 1979) an integrated approach of yoga therapy. (Nagarathna & Nagendra, 1981b).

Udupa (1979), while discussion of the management of stress disorders, has recommended the use of ancient indian methods, especially the practice of yoga, as an adjunct to existing therapeutic requires.

HYPOTHESIS

There is a significant difference in the stress levels of working and non-working women.

There is a positive effect of Yoga in overcoming stress.

MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY

Tools

The tools employed in the study are Presumptive stressful life events scale constructed by Dr. Gurmeet Singh, Dr. Dalbir Kaur and Harsharan Kaur which was used to measure, the degree of stress level in working and non-working women. The PSLE scale consists of 51 items. High score indicates high stress.

Personal information schedule prepared by the investigator for the purpose of studying contribution of yoga in overcoming stress. The schedule is of 3 point scale.

Population and Sampling

In the present investigation, an attempt is made to select an adequate, unbiased and representative sample. As the present research Focuses on the study of contribution of Yoga in overcoming stress with regards to significant difference in the stress levels of working and non-working women. A total sample of thirty six women were selected from different recognized yoga institutes of Bhopal. These women were divided into two groups-Eighteen working and Eighteen non-working women.

Procedure

The participants were drawn according to a 2x2 factorial design. There were two groups of women-working and non-working and two forms of inventories were administered on the two groups.

TABLE

The table gives a general idea of the plan of the present investigation.

No. of samples	Groups	No. of Inventories
	Working Women	1. Presumptive stressful life event scale.

36	&	
	Non-Working Women	2. Personal information schedule prepared by the investigator

RESULT

TABLE NO. 1- LEVEL OF STRESS

	Mean	S.D.	't' Score
Working women	41.8	6.4	
Non working women	38.5	6.2	5.5**

**p,0.01

TABLE NO. 2 - CONTRIBUTION OF YOGA

Group	Mean	S.D.	't' score
Working women	33.3	5.7	
Non working women	30.2	5.4	3.03**

** P<0.01

Table No. 1 shows that there is a significant difference in the level of stress in working and non-working women. Indicating that working women have high level of stress ($m=41.8$) than non working women ($M=38.5$).

Similarly, the significance of difference in working and non-working women in Table No. 2 i.e. the Contribution of Yoga in overcoming stress, is also very large and prominent. The effect of yoga (positive) is seen more in Working Women ($M=33.3$) than Non-Working Women ($M=30.2$) and in general, there is a positive effect of Yoga in overcoming stress.

DISCUSSION

In the present study, an effort was made to study the level of stress among working and non-working women and to study the contribution of yoga in overcoming stress. No emphasis was as such given to the age factor in the sample.

The sample included women at different job levels and belonging to different socio-economic group. They were therefore selected randomly.

The result supported the hypothesis that there is a significant of difference in the stress levels of working and non-working women. On the basis of the result, it can be inferred that working women are more prone to stress than non-working women.

(Staines et al, 1978) have also supported the findings that working women, as a whole, experience more daily stress, marital dissatisfaction and aging worries than non-working women.

Maximum stress areas in the PSLE scale of working and non-working women were more or less the same such as change in residence, going on a pleasure trip. Self or family member unemployed etc. Whereas areas high in Stress such as marital conflict, over dowry, conflict with in-laws were associated more with non-working women, working women experienced more stress in areas related to "Trouble at work with colleagues superior or subordinates", 'change in work condition or transfer, appearing for examination or interview, family conflict etc. Working women feel that stress in them is more because the number of demands made on them exceeds the time and energy they have to deal with them. They have to fulfil a dual role. They experience large number of problems in adjusting with their spouse and family demands, their career and rearing of children (Miller 1969).

The questionnaire comprised of items requiring the subjects to express their considered views on the efficient of yoga in relieving stress on based on their own experiences.

Evans et al (1983) also found that the role of Indian family structure is directly affecting the amount of stress experienced by women.

The results regarding the contribution of yoga in overcoming stress also supported the hypothesis that there is a positive effect of yoga in overcoming stress.

Items such as 'Is there tranquility and peace in your mental state'. 'Has yoga helped in overcoming depression', have been given maximum marks supported by items "Do you feel that yoga has helped in improving the resistance of the body.

I. Sharma and Agnihotri (1982a) investigated the effect of controlled breathing in 20 anxiety patients. After 6 weeks of practice there was a definite reduction in anxiety in 10 patients.

Ramamurthi (1977) conducted experiments on yogis under states of relaxation, concentration and meditation. He has noted changes in the brain which had a beneficial effect on neural activity.

Level Of Stress In Working And Nonworking Women And ----

Since stress invariably leads to psychosomatic disorders, some women had high blood pressure, diabetes and asthma. However with regular exercises, they felt they have undergone tremendous improvement in their physical state.

Yogic procedures have been recommended for calming the disquiet mind (Bhattacharya 1982), Shavasana for inducing relaxation (Bhole 1981), Yoga therapy in cardiovascular ailmentry (Swamy Karmanandasaraswati, 1982, Dharamkeerti 1982), Self control of anxiety and stress (Swamy Anjyathisaraswathi 1982) and (Daraswathi 1982) in alleviating tension, high blood pressure, headache, depression and stress.

Result also show that effect of Yoga is more on working women than non-working women.

Udupa (1979), while discussing the management of stress disorders, has recommended the use of ancient Indian methods, especially the Practice of yoga, as an adjunct to existing therapeutic regimes.

9

"Ethical Problems In Medical Practice-An Indian Perspective"

Satrughna Behera

The social codes of ethics in India have its own distinctive moral epithets reflecting its way of life, culture and civilization. Modern civilization can be universally characterised as scientific civilization. As the scientific effects permeating every part of human life, new problems, new questions and new thoughts have accompanied and led to social and ethical controversies in several parts of the world, ultimately leading to the 'purpose and direction of science' in relation to human life and its preservation. In this paper an attempts is made to highlight the crucial ethical issues in medical practice in India. In the present time, from ethical point of view there are three/issues which have far reaching effects on society and have cropped up in the medical practice viz. 1. Abortion 2. Pre-natal tests (Amniocentesis) and 3. Euthanasia (mercy-killing).

1. ABORTION.

Abortion may be defined as "Any interruption of human pregnancy prior to 28th week."1 Ever since the abortion was legalized in U.S.A. in Jan. 22, 1973 by the ruling of the Supreme Court in the famous case of Roe Vs Wade, asserting the right of woman on the abortion matter. This issue has been a boiling matter' in every part of the world and led to the division of the society into pro and anti-abortionists.

The status of the foetus, the rights of the woman, and society's role in defining and prescribing those rights are the three areas most in need of careful analysis in this complex and emotional issue. The court held that a woman may, in consultation with her physician elect to have an abortion and neither her parents nor her boy friend or husband had the rights to alter it. It implies that court saw the abortion as a woman's private decision. But the question is, can it be? when she is living in the society enjoying its benefits? Of course, when the life of the woman was in danger due to the foetus, it may be proper to have an abortion. Court also stipulated that before 3 months, the state shall not interfere and below 6 months, if the woman wants an abortion, state may provide better clinical facilities for her safety. But after 6 months of pregnancy, state may intervene to protect the life of the foetus, for the larger interests of the society as the foetus was accorded all the rights of a human being, normally entitled to.

Another aspect of the problem is; the two recent medical developments such as 'genetic testing' and 'prenatal diagnostic techniques' have further complicated and bewildered minds. The choice of sex, has led to the increase of abortion in certain regions where a particular sex has a good social value.

(I will explain it in Indian context)

Table:

ABORTION RATES (Per 1000 woman aged 15 to 44)²

West Germany	-7.3	Italy	-19
Canada	-10.3	Israel	-21.9
Britain	-12.3	U.S.A.	27.4
France	-14.9	Singapore	28.1
Australia	-15.2	China	61.5
Poland	-16.2	Romania	90.9

U.S.S.R. 181.0

The above table explicitly demonstrates the fact that industrialization and economic prosperity accompanying correspondingly the rate of abortion. In 'blockwise', the eastern block represents higher rate of abortion where as western block slightly lower rate.

Coming to the Indian context, we have not only modern ethical problems with abortion but also it has to be viewed from the social and economic angles. It (abortion) may not go directly against our social codes nevertheless our 'intense feelings' for the life of foetus has to be taken into consideration. We are in a society whose feeling is that "the more the children, the more we become wealthier". But this belief diabolically opposed and retarded our economic development due to boom in population explosion, at the rate of 2.5% per year, thus adversely effecting the planners dreams and our confidence. In India after legalisation of abortion, the rate of growth has been increasing. But you may question the abortion itself, But as the moral values differ from country to country and society to society in Indian context I feel, the abortion is justified not only on the basis of the rights of the woman, but also on the basis of the larger stakes of our country. When we are not able to provide the basic amenities like food, clothes, shelter and education to our people, do we have the right to question abortion? Let us concentrate on the rights of the living beings here rather than the unborns. So the logical fallout is that larger society goals determine what is ethical and non-ethical rather than a single individual.

But the legal validity of abortion was struck down recently 1989 July, by the federal court (U.S.A.) in the case of "Webster Vs reproductive rights",³ stating that a state could refuse funds to abortion clinics which reverses the landmark judgement of 1973, that legalized abortion. The anti-abortion lobbies

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

become active with this impetus and strengthened their movements in almost all the countries, specially industrialised nations.

Many of the most profound writers on the ethics of abortion, for example Joel Feinberg, Michael Tooley, Mary Anne Warren, H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and L.W. Sumner suggest that whether or not abortion is morally permissible stands or falls on the value and rights of human beings, especially on the status of the foetus and moral rights of a woman.⁴ One Example they cite is that due to abortion, annually 2,00,000 women die world wide due to "backroom butchery"⁵ not only this abortion has been cited as an unlawful in most Asian nations but also a violation of prevailing religious tenets. The anti-abortionists have become a forceful minority in all the European states, whose influences can be seen in political forums also.

'Intense feelings' of both pro and anti-abortionists in the abortion debate seem to be more acute. There are both positive and negative implications in each side. Accordingly, it is surprising that supporters of either side embrace the moral generalizations that support the conclusions they preanalytically favour, and reject with disdain the moral generalizations of their opponents as being subject to inescapable negative consequences. What makes us 'restless' about this is, that we are morally uncertain about the value and rights of human beings and lack of clarity about the moral status of the foetus. Not only this, our changing attitudes crippled our moral reasoning, there by driving us into 'moral dilemmas'.

2. PRE-NATAL TESTS (AMNIOCENTESIS):

Amniocentesis has become centre of controversy once again, bringing into question the doctors duty, Woman's rights and the value of foetus and the role of society. This genetic test enables the woman to know about the sex of the foetus and any disease if it is carrying. In the latter case, the woman may elect to have an abortion if the chances of foetus living are remote after birth or most dangerous to the life of the woman. But here, in the former the woman may discriminate after knowing the sex of the foetus to have or not to have the abortion, bringing into sharp focus the physicians duty into questions. Because by letting the woman to know about the sex of the foetus (thereby abortion is decided) is the physician not going against the oath of Hippocrates? What is the ethical status of the physician in doing so? Can he discriminate on the basis of the sex? Or for that matter anybody? As the physician primary task was 'to give' not 'to take life', is he performing his 'duty'? We may decide individual cases, on the basis of utilitarian point of view but shall we allow the doctor to do that?

What are the rights the woman had in abortion after a selection of a particular sex? What are the rights do the foetus possess? What role the society has to play in this impasse? Do we had the right to deny the life to the foetus? - these are most sensitive questions which need to be given serious thought, and their relevance to the present and future generation. But as I stated clearly earlier, what is morally valid or invalid, depends on the society. But it does not rule out the possibility of individual decisions basing on utilitarian point. May be the morality if it was on the basis of the sex of foetus particularly in Indian

society, where male has got some "good social value" over a female. This reflects the society's attitude in general, and its behaviour in particular to the question of amniocentesis. But assigning special value to a particular sex is a hazardous thing to happen, because in the long run the social plane will be unbalanced and thus leading to the crisis of Indian society.

In a society like India where people hesitate to discuss even simple matters relating to sex and its problems, we hardly could expect them to debate, discuss and ponder over the morality of abortion and amniocentesis. They feel sex as a secret of the nature itself. The recent controversy raised by the prenatal tests in Bombay and subsequent protests by woman organisations, has forced the government to ban these tests in Maharashtra. But whether we agree to it (either to abortion or amniocentesis) or not, the female infanticide has been practised in India, through generations in certain states- eg. Rajasthan, Gujarat, M.P., U.P. & Bihar. How can we interpret it? From the utilitarian point of view it may be acceptable, is it or can it be really morally acceptable?

It seems that whole moral problem arises when we generalise it, from individual cases to all the cases, from a particular society to the whole society. It is impossible, I think, to find a 'categorical imperative of Kant' to apply for every society and in every time. Because even that imperative, if such exists, cannot be non-temporal one.

3. EUTHANASIA (MERCY-KILLING):

Another important issue in medical practice, of course a very little importance to India, is euthanasia. It may be defined as "at-least one person causes or helps to cause the death of one who desires death or, in the case of an incompetent person, makes a substituted decision, either to cause death directly or to withdraw something that sustains life".⁶

Although practised in some societies at various times and places, euthanasia historically has been condemned wholesale in nations with judio-christian roots. Discussion about it was very recent and that too due to the medical developments which have created unintended results of prolonging pain and suffering. As long as a patient can be maintained in a condition that allows him or her to sustain an essential appreciation of life, and the capability to make his or her own decisions, the issue of euthanasia usually does not emerge. It is a matter of judgement and weariness and odds when a patient clearly foresees a long process of deterioration ahead, inevitably leading to death. For family members and health care professionals this can produce severe conflict for each person involved. Specifically, with a physician a conflict arises between the instinctive and trained impulse to save life on the one hand, and a wish to relieve or prevent unnecessary suffering on the other hand.

What happens when a patient wants to take her/his own life or refuses life-prolonging treatment? When the death is foregone conclusion? What happens when the patient is not physically well and really does have a physical condition that he or she considers burdensome? Should we allow the patient to dictate his/her own death?

The experts in euthanasia classified it into various types, i.e. voluntary and non-voluntary and active and passive euthanasia, which may help us to decide or come to an understanding about the morality of a particular euthanasia.

Voluntary decisions about death are those in which a competent and mature persona requests or gives a formal consent to take a particular course of treatment or non-treatment. It expresses a person's conscious consent. Prof. Glanville Williams⁷ has argued that the patient should have complete liberty, including the right to have his or her life terminated. But equally forceful counter arguments are spearheaded by Prof. Yale Kamisar⁸ that question the "liberty" of the individual in doing so. He also advances "slippery slope argument" to counter it. On the contrary, non-voluntary decisions about death include situations in which a person is incompetent to make choices for himself or herself because of age, mental impairment, or even unconsciousness.

In non-voluntary euthanasia the moral questions concern who should be empowered to decide for an incompetent patient, and on what basis? But what about the infants who are born with deadly diseases like AIDS etc? who shall take the decision? the doctor? the parents? or the state? In euthanasia the actions of the empowered should be conducive to the society as well as to the patient. We should adopt the right means, even it may end up with unexpected results.

To conclude: it may be pointed out that any scientific activity which involves value judgement has to be weighed by the standards of any given society, keeping in view the individual interests which should be compatible with the interests of the society. The burst of scientific technology should make man comfortable, not sad, synthesis life rather than fragment it. This technological focus proves that the health of the people is a great social concern and to study them in a socio-epidemiological context would involve fighting so many social odds and simultaneously evolution of timely innovative techniques. In fact, application of scientific measures in medical practices would be necessary in support of 'changing moral considerations' remain in the same early stage of human progress. Traces of such tribes still inhabit some of the hill regions of India, with no fixed dwellings, existing on jungle products and worshipping wicked demons. The tenth book of Rig-veda and the whole of the Atharva-veda suggest a type of religious practice based on fear and associated with the spirits of dark.

The assumption of "many ways to God" in the Hindu system leads people to worship God in various forms, names and deeds. Fear of thunder is to be removed by praying to the heroic Prince Arjuna. God Anjaneya, the disciple of Rama (in the epic of Ramayana), is the God associated with the relief of fears and phobias. He is named for his brave and courageous acts. The worship of God Anjaneya through chanting religious stanzas is believed to prevent the development of fears and gives courage. Lord Vinayaka is worshipped at the initiation of any act so that it can be achieved or completed successfully without interruption. Prayers are offered to the Goddess Saraswathi for learning and education and to Goddess Lakshmi for the acquisition of wealth and welfare.

It is a practice of rural India to associate fears and phobias with super-natural spirits. People suffering from phobias seek various mystical methods to get cured. One of the practices is to wear ornaments which are believed to have mystical powers to remove the fear. These practices differ from region to region. The nails of tigers and the have of elephants are fixed in the ornaments worn by people as they are believed to give courage and strength to the users. Vedic chants and prayers, written on metal sheets and made into ornaments and blessed by priests, are used to keep evil spirits away. Various rituals are followed on the advice of leaders who are believed to have the power to cure phobias. The superstitious beliefs also lead to fears such as of bad omen, fear of illness and fear of the influence of evil spirits etc.

The belief in incarnation in Hinduism has given rise to many fears of God. Non-adherence to he religious and moral life is believed to result in rebirth as a lower animal, or is punished by various methods in Hell. The changes in the spiritual life of Hindus in emphasis reflect individual temperament, social conditions and the changing intellectual environment but the same persistent idea reappears in different forms. It is growing like and organism undergoing from time to time transformation as a whole. It has carried within it much of it's early possessions.

Though Hindu religion teaches man to be free from fear, some of the religious practices in rural places are based on fear; tradition and superstition. The marks of genuine religion are 'abhaya' or freedom from fear, expressing itself in harmony, balance, perfect agreement between body and soul, between the hands and the brain and 'ahimsa' or love. Freedom from fear is attained by 'gnana' or wisdom. Religion is the conquest of fear. Man needs a religion of freedom which stimulated faith not fear.

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10

Tremendous Scientific Appeal in Kimilsinguism for the Eternal Happiness of Mankind

*Dr. Hans K. Kapil**

Antecedents to Politico Economic Forces:

In the modern crisis-torn world, Kimilsinguism or Juche philosophy holds the greatest scientific appeal for the maximum and everlasting happiness of mankind. Actually, the modern world-particularly the so-called free Western world is full of severe strifes in different spheres of life denoting marked negations and self-contradictions. A brief critical analysis of the roots of the so-called free world clearly reveals that it is based basically on the edifice of capitalism, imperialism and heartless exploitation of the poor or weaker working masses of the human society.

The so-called free societies of the Western World have built up their apparent and hollow progress or material prosperity on the bones and the blood of the working people. In support of its politico-economy philosophy, these societies boldly declared the dictum of the 'survival of the fittest' and thus easily, paved the way for capitalism to carry on its brute and naked aggression against the vast poor and the deprived for ever till, of course, this system faced its own near self-burial and of course till the time of emergence of socialist order in the early part of the present century.

The Emergence of Marxism and Leninism:

Due to the basic inherent weaknesses and self-defeating policies of capitalist order, in one form or the other, this politico-economic system dug its own grave in the forms of out-throat competition, periodic economic depressions, political self-aggrandisement or rise of extreme nationalism. As an anti-thesis of this out-dated socio-economic system socialism emerged as a new socio-economic force based on the philosophical ideas of Marks and

Angels. This new socio-economic order, obviously held a very great fascination for the intellectuals and provided an incessant motivating force to the political thinkers and leaders of the time. Lenin gave a historical direction to this new socialist ideology and brought the force of the proletariat to the fore-front in his political ideology. He also quite rightly envisaged the rule of the proletariat in the new world order and quite logically predicted that the proletariat class would be able, in course of time, to establish its political and economic supremacy over the prevailing self-decadent capitalist system. He also prophesized in a way that since the proletariat movement is the real historical movement and logically has thus no anti-thesis inherent in its growth, it will ultimately require no police or military to defend it against any other new emerging force.

In the U.S.S.R., under the great and dynamic leadership of Marshall Stalin, Bulganin, Krusoheva, the Marxist Leninism based socialist system greatly thrived and touched new and unique heights of economic political scientific and technological achievements. However, in recent years the great statesmanship of President Gorbachev sensed some political and economic suffocations in it by the people of U.S.S.R. Ultimately in 1991 the Lenin's conception of socialist system underwent a process of rethinking and revaluating for the intellectuals and political leaders.

Juche Philosophy as the most Perfectly conceived of Social System

On the basis of foregoing discussion of some main socio-economic systems, it is clear here that each one of them has tended to fall, obviously for one weakness or the other. In this background, it becomes quite logical and relevant to briefly present here the great merits or strengths of Juche philosophy. Although this new vital socio-economic system derives some of its preliminary ideas from Leninism and Marxism, but then, in its theoretical conception and wide application, it is quite different and distinct from it. In fact, Kimilsungism or Juche philosophy has some very deep psychological and scientific foundations and is in great perfect tune and harmony with the most basic needs of human personality and the scientific rigour.

Irrefutable Sound Grounds for the Tremendous Scientific Appeal of Juche Ideology:

There are numerous basic and applied grounds which justify the tremendous scientific appeal for the Juche Idea. Its more basic postulate that man, as the most highly developed material being, is motivated by chajusong, Creativity and consciousness has actually given utmost dignity and status to man. Conversely, other past world philosophers never gave such an elevated

high status to man. Locke, the British philosopher for an instance branded 'man' as 'egoistic' and 'selfish'

Juche philosophy in claiming chajusong as the basic attribute of man has actually propounded a great and powerful revolution for man to strive and struggle for his freedom and give up his shackles of slavery and other bondages like fatalism, fanaticism, fundamentalism and a false way of life fostered by flunkyism. In this way Juche idea has not only highly motivated the individual to regain his position as a free man but this has also directly inspired weaker and slave nations to fight for their freedom and wage a war on foreign domination and even imperialism. Korea, under the revolutionary banner of Juche, waged such a decisive war in early part of 1930's and 40's against the Japanese imperialism. Some African subjugated countries are also doing the same on the ideological inspiration of Juche revolutionary idea.

The second greatest contribution of Juche lies in the fact that it has postulated man as being naturally propelled by the attribute of creativity. This attribute of man, as ascribed by Juche, not only reflects the most basic nature of man but it has elevated and glorified the nature of man. This attribute has not only helped man to rise above himself but has also motivate him to transform nature to his best interests and thus be the master of his destiny. The attribute of Creativity in man, in fact, has aroused the noblest sentiment in man for construction, innovation and further revolution. on the other hand, when man's basic nature is described as 'selfish and egoistic', that philosophical stand or doctrine obviously degrades man and drives him to lead a life of self-indulgence and self-destruction, as it is common to most people in the so-called advanced and apparently progressive western free societies:

The Third most outstanding contribution of Juche philosophy is there in postulating that man has the basic attribute of consciousness or of being led by an ideology. According to this logic, man's life, without consciousness or ideology, is the life of a brute or of a solitary person without a worthwhile purpose. In this way man basically needs an ideology to regulate his life in a meaningful way and in a particular constructive direction. And in this regard what can be a greater or better ideology than the revolutionary ideology of Juche which seeks to make and mature him as the master of his destiny and the central figure in the Universe.

Besides propounding these supreme three basic attributes about human nature for its elevation and glorification, the revolutionary Juche ideology has successfully paved the way for achieving this victorious and glorious ideal through socio-cultural and technological revolutions. The social man, or the man led by a social ideology, when he passes successfully through these revolutions under the revolutionary banner of Juche or the guidance of the

Great Leader and Dear Leader, he moves forward spirally towards the achievement of his utmost dignity and glory in a systematic and progressive manner. In fact, when the 'social man' carries forward the processes of socio-cultural and technical revolutions, he by his efforts under the banner of Juche, not only serves the cause of revolution but also simultaneously serves his own interest as well. In this way, the 'social man' and the different revolutions become interlinked in a symbiotic manner. The progress of each revolution improves the dignity and prosperity of the social man and the social man in its turn tends to improve the onward march of revolution which in its turn improves the lot of the 'social man'. This is a continuous and ceaseless process in which both the social man and the revolutionary path march forward towards better and happier way of life for mankind.

This is actually a process in which both the individual and the society remain throughout functional and creative almost in a semi-autonomous and spontaneous manner on the eternal path of peace and progress for mankind. Herein lies the incessant vitality and victory of Juche revolutionary ideology and in this great Juche process lies the tremendous or terrific scientific appeal of the Juche philosophy.

11

*Freedom And Causality**Kant's Newtonian Inspiration**R.P. Singh*

The importance of freedom in the scheme of human thinking is as essential as the establishment of causal laws operating in natural things and events. Kant, with respect to his philosophical system, has made significant contribution in developing the concepts of freedom and causality. I am required to elaborate two questions : (1) Does freedom and causality stand apart? (2) Is human freedom a reflection of causality in nature ? The answer to the first question in affirmative involves dualism; while, answer to the second question in affirmative rejects dualism and implies monism. Descartes and Kant, among others, advocate a dualism between freedom and causality, whereas, Spinoza, Hegel and Einstein are the chief exponents of freedom as the recognition of an appreciation of causal necessity in nature.

In this paper, I shall basically dwell upon Kant's concepts of freedom and causality. On causality, I shall develop in what way and to what extent Kant's position is essentially Newtonian in its inspiration. I shall also evaluate Kant-Newton scientific legacy in terms of relativity theory and quantum mechanics.

Kant's initial position on freedom and causality involves dualism. Though it has been Kant's philosophical preoccupation, it comes out explicitly in the third antinomy of the Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason. The antinomy, of course, goes as follows :

Thesis "Causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearance of the world can one and all be derived. To explain appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.

Antithesis : There is no freedom everything in the world taken place solely in accordance with the laws of nature.¹

In the thesis, nature is taken as the unity of all objects of possible experience and is determined as a whole by laws. These are the laws of causality which decisively explain the existence of an effect as the consequence of the existence of a cause. Every event in the world of nature is caused by a

¹ Kant, *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by N.K. Smith (London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1973) A444/B472, A445/B473, p.409.

preceding event, and that in turn by another preceding event and so on. In order to avoid infinite regress, there must be a first cause which is not further caused by anything else. This, Kant says, is free-causality or freedom. Kant has taken objects in a two-fold sense, namely as appearance and as thing in itself. The schematised category of causality is applicable to appearance of things and not to thing in itself, so that one can not know, one can yet think freedom (Ibid. BXXVIII). Kant therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith (Ibid., BXXX).

What is central to Kant's doctrine of freedom is the notion of 'spontaneity' (spontaneität or selbsttätigkeit). It characterizes both the cognitive acts and acts required for free-will. In the cognitive act "the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding".² It consists of form of intuition (space and time) the concepts or categories, which are not static forms, but forms of operation that exist only in the act of apprehending and comprehending sensible intuitions. The forms of intuition synthesize the manifold of sensibility into spatio-temporal order, by virtue of the categories the result of the spatio-temporal order are brought to universal and necessary relations of cause and substance, reciprocity, and so on. And this entire complex is unified in the transcendental apperception which relates all experience to the 'thinking ego', thereby giving the experience the continuity of being 'my experience'.

Kant's transcendental consciousness is the true spectator. It transcends the validity of Knowledge and has no objective co-referent which could be logically claimed to be its 'expression' or 'reflection' (Ibid., B 156, B 430).

The formulation of scientific knowledge in terms of possibility, validity and limit. Kant is essentially following Newton 'whom Kant revered',³ though Kant does not mention Newton at all. Kant's commitment in the first critique is to show how synthetic a priori judgment is possible, and in the first two sections of the critique, Kant is concerned with Newtonian physics. Kant, however, does not commit himself in the Transcendental Aesthetic either to Leibniz's view that space and time are relative or to Newton's view that space and time are absolute. But Kant certainly makes a number of extremely Newtonian observations. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of object' (A24/B338). We cannot...remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances' (A31/B46). 'Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude' (A25/B39). The original representation of time, must therefore be given as unlimited (A32/B48). Despite these similarities, Kant is not willing to embrace Newton and he declares space and time as 'mind-dependent' (A42/B59).

Curiously, in several pre-critical works, Kant has decidedly drawn Newtonian conclusions. In 1768, in a paper "Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation of Regions in Space", Kant says, "...the determinations of space are not consequences of the situations of the parts of matter relative to each other; rather are the latter consequences of the former. It

² Ibid., A51, p. 93.

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³ Korner, S., Kant, Penguin Books, 1960, p. 33.

is also clear that in the constitution of bodies differences, and real differences at that, can be found, and these differences are connected purely with absolute and original space for it is only through it that the relation of physical things is possible".⁴ But in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, in which we see the first signs of the critical philosophy, he rejects space as 'an absolute and boundless receptacle of possible things' (Ibid., p.39).

The Prolegomena of 1783, Kant's transcendental idealist solution as against Newton's realist solution, of the problem comes out. "Those who can not yet rid themselves of the notion that space and item are actual qualities inherent in things in themselves may exercise their acumen on (the problem of incongruous counterparts). When they have in vain attempted its solution and are free from prejudices at least for a few moments, they will suspect that the degradation of space and time to more forms of our sensuous intuition may perhaps be well founded".⁵ Kant emphasizes on there being a perceiver, with the human faculty of sensibility, whose form on intuition are space and time. Despite these difference, Kant's basic aim has been to justify Newtonian physics between two contending schools of thought, namely, the radical scepticism of Hume and the ambitious rationalism of Descartes, et al. To justify Newtonian physics, Kant wanted to show that mathematics and physics yield synthetic apriori knowledge of the world, whereas metaphysics does not. Thus the general topics of the three Analogies-substance, causality and reciprocity-correspond to Newtonian concepts of matter, force and reaction.

Kant's general project in the first critique regarding the necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge are precisely the basic presuppositions of Euclidean geometry, simple arithmetics and Newtonian physics. Our knowledge of the world, Kant would agree, must be such as obeys the theorems of arithmetic, is Euclidean and Newtonian.

Newton's absolutistic mechanistic frame consistently adheres to Cartesian-Galilean tradition. Newton was basically interested in explaining all phenomena in nature in terms of matter, force and reaction. Newton defines matter only through its effects on our senses and he defines density-only as mass per unit volume. He draws a distinction between mass and weight. Mass, being a measure of the body's resistance of acceleration, undergoes a change in its state of motion or rest. This is its inertia of bodies, mass is also a measure of its response to a given gravitational field. It seems Kant was greatly under the influence of Newton's concept of matter. In the first Analogy, Kant tells us that there must be a permanent substance, and from his discussion of the analogy in the first critique and from his definition of matter in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* 1776, it is quite clear that he conceived the scientific notion of substance as matter. In the latter work, Kant defines matter as "the mobile in so far as it fills a space, has moving power and can become an object of experience".⁶ Kant's second Analogy concerning the law of causality

⁴ Wilkerson, T.F., *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976, p. 39).

⁵ Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. L.W. Beck (Bobs-Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 1950) p.285.

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presupposes his first analogy. But before we come to that, let us further develop Newton's concept of matter and causality.

Galileo was the first to have introduced the important distinction between primary and secondary qualities in the material things. It was incorporated by Descartes, Newton and Locke. Following Galileo, Newton draws a distinction between primary qualities, such as extension and inertia, which lend themselves to mathematical measurement and formulations, and the secondary qualities, such as colour, taste, etc., which are sensations induced by the primary qualities. Newton's aim was to explain physical reality in terms of cause-effect relationship and as Einstein points out, "...We have to realize that before Newton there existed no self-contained system of physical causality which was somehow capable of representing any of the deeper features of the empirical world...Actual results of a kind to support the belief in the existence of a complete chain of physical causation hardly existed before Newton".⁷

Newton's basic philosophical preoccupation was to answer the question: is there a rule by which one can calculate the movement of the heavenly bodies in our planetary system completely. When the state of motion of all these bodies at one moment is known? Galileo had raised this question and had made significant progress towards a knowledge of the law of motion. His discovery of the law of inertia and the law of bodies falling freely in the gravitational field of the earth, that is, a mass which is unaffected by other masses moves uniformly and in a straight line, made an everlasting impact on Newton's law of motion. Galileo's conclusion, that the vertical speed of a free body in the gravitational field increases uniformly with time, was also accepted by Newton. But these are very general laws of motion, whereas, Newton was preoccupied with the specificity of the law of motion. This was the requirement for a causal concept of motion... "Newton conceived the idea the force operating on a mass was determined by the position of all masses situated at sufficiently small distance from the mass in question. It was not till this connection was established that a completely causal concept of motion was achieved".⁸ Kant, in the Second Analogy, develops a similar position stating 'Wherever there is action-and therefore activity and force - there is also substance, and it is in substance that the relation of cause and effect in appearances must be sought'. Kant's third Analogy states that 'all substances in so far as they are perceived as coexistent in space are in thorough going interaction'. Kant means that every material thing is in constant interaction with each other though they seem to be co-existent. This is what Newton's law of motion has already developed in detail. However, for Newton, the whole burden of philosophy was to arrive at the First Cause of the System of the World. Like Galileo, Newton was also a convinced theist. With his awareness of the limitations of scientific knowledge, Newton frequently refers to God as the First Cause. This might have a reference to Cartesian dualism or Locke's dualism, and perhaps, more pronouncedly, of Kant's attempt to vindicate God of religion without giving up the basic

⁶ Korner, S, Kant, Penguin Books, p.85.

⁷ Einstein, Albert, Ideas and Opinions (New Delhi, Rupa & Co., 1989) p. 254.

Freedom, for Kant, is self-caused and have certain laws. These laws can not but be self-imposed. Here Kant brings out the notion of will and gives a turning point to is concept of freedom. Freedom terminates into the will in order to become practical and transforms itself into empirical consequences. This means that freedom of will is central to Kant's treatment of the ought statements - as the matrix of categorical imperatives. Freedom, being self-caused, is different from causality in nature; in other words, freedom and causality fall so widely apart that there is no meeting transition between them. To say, as Kant does, we are members of two worlds-noumenon and phenomenon. The transcendental self in us transcends our bodily limitations and hence we are free, but as embodied being, we are subject to laws of nature where Newtonian physics holds away.

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Kant Critique of pure Reason, trans. N.K. Sengupta

Mach's criticism of concepts that try to go beyond their empirical role influenced Einstein. Einstein had started his scientific career greatly under the influences of Mach. Eventually, however, he realized that Mach's outlook undermined the very foundation of physical sciences by denying the reality of external world, or by claiming that our subjective sensations were the building blocks of nature. In 'Maxwell's Influence on the Evolution of the Idea of physical Reality' (1931), Einstein says, "The belief in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural sciences".¹⁰ What is so remarkable here is that Newton's concept of matter and Kant's thing in itself did formulate a proposition slightly closer to Einstein's view. Compared to Mach's rejection of matter. But Einstein's theory of Relativity (1905) rejects Newton's concepts of absolute space and time, and leads to the concept of a four dimensional space-time continuum. The special theory, which is limited to the description of events as they appear to observers in a state of uniform motion relative to one another, is developed from two axioms: (1) the laws of natural phenomena are the same for all observers (2) the speed of light is the same for all observers irrespective of their own speed. Einstein also departs from Newton's two separate concepts of matter and energy, and two laws of conservation. In relativity, we come across only one concept, that of mass-energy. Newton's mechanics turns out to be invalid if the velocity of moving bodies approach that of light. Against Newtonian mechanics, the validity of the theory of relativity has been amply confirmed in modern physics.

The system of quantum mechanics, evolved from quantum theory that grew up around Planck's introduction into physics of the concept of the discontinuity of energy during first half of 20th century, has replaced Newtonian mechanics. Max Plank (1901) devised a quantum theory according to which the heat radiation from a black body is quantized, is not continuous, i.e. emitted in discrete quanta of energy, the magnitudes of which are given by the product of the frequency of radiation and universal constant. Niels Bohr was first (1913) to apply Planck's of quantum theory to the problem of atomic structure, to the movement of planetary electrons. Bohr's atomic aimed at explaining both observed and observable, radiation or radio-active particles from outside. Heisenberg's quantum mechanics (1925) was on what could be observed. Quantum mechanics was refined by Sommer Field to take into account the elliptical orbits of electrons. More recently quantum mechanics has been developed in a specialized form, known as wave mechanics, which is more versatile and involves fewer arbitrary assumptions than the original theory.

Einstein praises quantum physics towards the emergence of which his own contribution is rightly rated very high. He marvels at 'the splendid agreement between it and experimental findings.

The philosophical implications of quantum theory are being debated and discussed among the scientists and philosophers for the last sixty years or so. Besides Enistein, other scientists who have taken active part in the discussion are Neils Bohr, Heisenberg, Eddington and others. Most of them are strongly inclined to interpret the new physics, comprising the relativity theory

¹⁰ Holton, G.C. *The Path of Physics: The Nature of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973) p. 241.

and the quantum mechanics, as consistent and conducive to spiritualism and religion.

To bring the paper to a close, I can state that Kant's position on freedom and causality involves a dualism with no meeting transition. On causality which involves other concepts like matter, force, activity, space and time, Kant's Newtonian inspiration is irrefutable. Though Newton's physics has been superseded in relativity theory and quantum mechanics, yet its historic significance can not be undermined. Kant, though a Newtonian, has his own way of solving the problems of freedom and causality.

12

EXISTENTIALISM

Based on my Book "Karl Jaspers and Existentialism"

Sonal K. Amin

Kierkegaard, (1813-1855) the Dane, is the father of Existentialism. Heidegger, Sartre and Nietzsche represent the atheistic and Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel and Kierkegaard the theistic aspect of Existentialism.

The technical foundations of Existentialism were laid during the two Wars. But its echo can be heard in past thought; in Hebrew philosophy, Greek philosophy and Christian thought.

Existentialism is not a well-knit school of thought. It is just a coming together of people holding similar views. All the Existentialists agree that Existence precedes essence meaning thereby, that man first of all exists and only afterwards he thinks. This is a reversal of the stand taken by Descartes, the father of Modern Philosophy; that 'I think therefore I am', Cogito Ergo Sum. By Existence is meant a brute fact that simply is, Essence denotes the definition of a thing. It tells us what a thing is.

In our understanding of man, when we say 'Existence precedes essence' it means that to begin with man is nothing. He is just an existence. Later on he makes himself by taking decisions and making choices.

In the case of an article of manufacture e.g. a paper knife, its essence precedes its existence. By the essence of a paper knife is meant the procedure by which it is made and the purpose for which it is produced. When we consider a paper knife, we know that it has been made by some one who has in his mind a conception of it, including what it would be used for and how it would be made. Thus even before it is made, the paper knife is already conceived as having a definite purpose and as being the product of a definite process.

The traditional concept of man looks upon him as having a "human nature". A nature that is found in every man. Each man was looked upon as a particular example of a universal man. In short, they all possess the same essence which precedes their concrete or historic existence.

This concept of human nature tends to describe man in the same way as we have described a paper knife. Both are a product of a creator. Just as the artisan had a conception of the knife before its creation so also God, the 'Supernal artisan' has a conception of man before his creation.

It is because of this that Sartre rejects God. If there is no God, there cannot be any fixed human nature or essence, because there is no God to have a conception of it. The fact which Sartre is emphasising here is that first and foremost man simply is and that later on he makes himself what he wills.

The most important consequence of placing existence before essence in human nature is that not only man makes himself but that he becomes responsible for what he makes himself. The entire responsibility for man's existence is placed "Squarely upon his own shoulders". A stone cannot be responsible for what it is because its nature is fixed. If man's essential nature was already given and fixed the question of responsibility would not have arisen. I cannot be responsible for what I have not done.

Existentialism is a philosophy of man. It studies man not as a collection or as a social whole studied by social scientists e.g. the psychologists, sociologists etc., nor of man as a species to be analysed by the biologist and anthropologist, nor of man as an ideal entity as viewed by metaphysicians and theologians. Existentialism considers man as a living individual, that breathes and thinks, that has the tremendous freedom of moral choice, that faces despair, anxiety and dies.

Existentialism values human personality above God, the world and the soul. God does not make man, man chooses to give value to God. Society is for man, man is not for society. Social norms which interfere with the growth of man are to be disregarded. Existentialist writers and artists are to be disregarded. Existentialist writers and artists have fought tooth and nail for this freedom of expression.

It objects to the classical philosophical definition of man as a rational animal. It emphasises the limitation of reason. Reason fails to grasp the "human situation". It cannot cope with the contingent, the particular and the transcendent.

The effective aspect of man, his feelings and emotions are ignored in a rational evaluation of him. Existentialism has been described as a revolt of feelings and passion against reflective contemplation. As against reason, priority is given to subjectivism, intuitionism and romanticism.

It is the philosophy of the concrete. It consists in a return to veritable reality. We, instead of observing our life as it is try to force it, in order to gain clarity, into the categories of academic psychology. We thus sacrifice verity for clarity. The existentialist, on the other hand tries to reproduce the flux and reflux of inner life before it has been polluted by intelligence.

Existentialism is a reaction against both materialism and idealism. Materialism looks upon matter and mechanical laws as the fundamental reality. Consciousness becomes a by-product, an epiphenomenon of matter. The status of man becomes insignificant. He is just a cog in this huge machine. All events in nature are mechanical or determined governed by cause and effect. man is also determined by physical and psychological causes. There are no free actions.

A commitment to this view will no doubt mean a life of ease and comfort. But the quality of life will deteriorate. There will be a sense of purposelessness in life. The question after all what is all this for? will remain unanswered, resulting in an inner vacuity boredom and restlessness of spirit.

Idealism maintains that not matter but consciousness is basically real. Man as a bearer of this consciousness occupies a central place in reality. But this man is not the individual man but a man in general. man is not satisfied with what he is but tries to realize some higher aim, some ideal.

The position of man is no doubt superior to that given to him in naturalism. It is in man that both consciousness and the ideal are realized but here the emphasis is on man-in general not man as a particular being. Besides man is not the ultimate reality. Man is just a medium for the manifestation of reason. He has no real freedom. His freedom merely means the acceptance of the necessity of the ideal. Further, like naturalism it does not recognize the limitation of reason, idealism falsifies our sense of death and evil. The experience of death is an undeniable fact. In identifying man with the ideal, idealism places him above death. Evil disappears in the final scheme of things. The absolute is all good. Evil is just an appearance. It is there only from our limited point of view.

Existentialism believes that man is a free, self-creating, self-transcending individual. Man can make himself what he wants to. He has infinite options before him and by taking decisions he actualizes himself. By a process of self transcendence man overcomes his past decisions i.e. goes beyond them. His past actions are his but because of his freedom he can give a new direction to his life his present decision.

Existentialists are individualists. Man has to fight for his existence, his survival in this world. He is surrounded by an adverse environment in which he is met by constant frustration. It is upto him to achieve victory and rise above his situation. The Existentialists are totally against any form of authority, be it the state or the church.

Existentialism is against Scientific Philosophy. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution a tremendous change was brought about in the life of man. Science was becoming the new God. Philosophy was to be a handmaid of science. Science no doubt constitutes our situation but Jaspers is against the imperialism of scientism. Human freedom, uncertainty and risk cannot be ignored. Man cannot be reduced to a fixed, knowable, determined object.

Existentialism is born out of despair. Today's competitive world, industrialization, over population, cause various kinds of tensions and meaninglessness in life. Man is weighed down by a sense of guilt at his inability to fulfill his moral duty and responsibility. His awesome freedom creates dread in him. The Existentialists are keenly aware of human suffering and want philosophy to come to terms with it.

It was Kierkegaard who gave the clarion call for all Existentialists: 'Subjectivity is Truth'. By subjectivity is meant the individual's own experience

of pain, conflict, guilt etc., which usually are a result of moral choices. These situations are called 'boundary situations'.

Existentialists are against system building. Philosophy has been speculating for a long time on the nature of God, the soul, world, space and time etc. Existentialism regards these topics as meaningless when compared to man and his situation or man-in the-world. What is of primary importance is the human situation. Indeed Existentialism comes as a breath of fresh air against the old fashioned system builders, and has been effective in making an anthropocentric appeal.

13

The Concept Of Nirvana In Buddhism

(With special reference to Sutta Nipata)

R.K. Deswal

"Nirvana is Bliss Supreme" Dhammapad

I. INTRODUCTION

According to the teaching of Buddha, all beings are subject to decay and death. All things and beings in the world are impermanent. Meditators come to perceive the transitory nature of the world and the rising and vanishing away of everything in it. They realise that everything is subject to dukkha (unhappiness). The rising and vanishing away themselves are unhappiness. Since everything is impermanent and subject to unhappiness, we see no possibility of finding permanent ego. These three things transitory nature of existence, dukkha or unhappiness and sub-stancelessness or non-ego are taught by the Buddha and are known as the three characteristic signs of the universe. Meditation upon these three characteristics leads to the development of wisdom true knowledge.

In fact, Buddhism has throughout its long history concentrated on devising a great number of techniques of meditation which serve to promote the spiritual development of its followers and aim at opening their eyes to see the truth of life. The Buddhist scriptures are well-provided with references to the meditations. It is recorded that the Buddha realized the diverse mental endowments and innate tendencies of those who looked to him for final emancipation, and recommended them various methods under systems Samatha and Vipassana. These methods have been increasingly developed, as it became necessary to extend the opportunity of training in both systems to a greater variety of mental developments. These methods were later modified, enlarged and grouped together in different ways forming different schemes of mental training, according to their psychological effect and value in including higher states of consciousness, and also with regard to their suitability for various individual characters. Meditation leads to Nirvana which is the main theme of the present paper.

II DEFINITION OF NIRVANA

The Pali word **Nibbana** is synonymous of Nirvana. Etymologically Pali word Nibbana (Sanskrit-Nirvana) is composed of 'Ni' and 'Vana'. 'Ni' is a negative particle. 'Vana' means weaving or craving. This craving serves as a cord to connect one life with another.

"It is called Nibbana in that it is a departure (Ni) from that craving which is called Vana, lusting".¹ As long as one is bound up by craving or attachment one accumulates fresh **Kammic** activities which must materialise in one form or the other in the eternal cycle of birth and death. When all forms of craving are eradicated then reproductive **Kammic** forces cease to operate, and one attains Nibbana (Nirvana), escaping the cycle of birth and death. The Buddhist conception of Deliverance is escape from the ever-recurring cycle of life and death and not merely an escape from sin and hell.

Nirvana is also explained as the extinction of the fire of lust (Lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha).

"The whole world is in flames", says the Buddha. "By what fire is it kindled". By the fire of lust, hatred and delusion; by the fire of birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair is it kindled."

Nirvana, in one sense, may be interpreted as the extinction of these flames. But one must not thereby infer that Nirvana is nothing but the extinction of these flames.² The means should be differentiated from the end. Here the extinction of the flames is the means of attaining Nirvana.

III. NATURE OF NIRVANA IN SUTTA NIPTA

Sutta-Nipata is very ancient teaching of Buddha which belongs to the **Khuddhaka Nikaya** (collection of short treatises) of the **suttapitaka**. In the early Buddhist texts like **Sutta-Nipata**, Nirvana is described as something which has to be achieved by means of practical training and intellectual efforts. The different passage of the following six versions of Nirvana.

(a) Nirvana as absolute annihilation of attachment, hatred and ignorance:

Firstly Nirvana is described as something which can be attained in one's own life by means of abandonment of all desires and passions. For instance while defining a Muni in the **Munisutta**. Lord Buddha says: "Having considered the causes (of sin, and) killed the seed, let him not give way to desire for it. Such a Muni who sees the end of birth and destruction of desire (i.e., nibbana) after leaving reasoning behind, does not enter the number (of living beings).³ Nirvana in **Sutta Nipata**, has been described as the non-attachment to all worldly ties, material possessions and the destruction of all dharmas. The true monk that endeavours for liberation should not engage himself in any **Rhinoceros Sutta**, Buddha instructs: "Having torn the ties, having broken the net as a fish in the water, being like a fire not returning to the burnt place, let one wander alone like a rhinoceros."⁴

Similarly in the **Mahavagga**, Buddha addressing Bharadvaja says that a person who has destroyed all philosophical view, all attachment, such a one deserves the oblation. "He to whom all dharmas of every description, after he has penetrated them, are destroyed, are perished, (and therefore) exist not, he who is calm, liberated in the destruction of attachment (i.e., Nibbana) Tathagata deserves the oblation."⁵ It is also said in several passages of the text, that the complete cessation of **Tenha** or the extinction of desire is known as Nirvana which liberates the monk from the phenomenal flux. **Sutta Nipata** repeatedly insists on the freedom and bliss which is, ensured when one conquers desires. For instance in the "**Udayamanava Puccha**" when Udaya enquires Buddha, what is the bound of the world and what is meant by Nirvana, Buddha replies that destruction of craving is Nirvana. "The world is bound by pleasure, reasoning is its practice; by the leaving of desire Nibbana is said to be."⁶

(b) Freedom from Aggregates (Anupadhisesa or parinirvana):

There are also passages in **Sutta Nipata** which maintain the idea that Nirvana is the highest purity which is nothing but freedom from five aggregates or panca skandhas. For example, in the **Kalaha vivada sutta** of '**Atthakavagga**', Buddha taught that Nirvana is the destruction of attachment to the five aggregates: "Thus some (who are considered) wise in this world say that the principal (thing) is the purification of the Yakkha; but some of them say samaya (annihilation), the expert say (that the highest purity lies) in anupadisesa (none of the five attributes remaining)"⁷. The venerable Mettagu in the **Parayana Vagga** also admits delightfully that Sambuddha Sakyamuni has expounded him the nature of Nirvana as freedom from upadhi.⁸

(c) Empirical view of Nirvana, observing the middle way and avoiding the extremes:

This phase of Nirvana, enunciated in **Sutta Nipata** is the empirical view as developed in the West by the early Greek thinkers like Luccipus and Democritus which is meant that one should keep himself indifferent to pleasure and pain, guarding himself in the middle path by moderate living, avoiding extremes, This can be illustrated by the following passage of **Khaggavisana Sutta**: "Cultivating in the due time kindness, equanimity, compassion, deliverance and rejoicing with others, unobstructed by the whole world, let one wander alone like a rhinoceros."⁹ Likewise in the **Metta Sutta** of '**Uragavagga**' Buddha instructs his disciple to cultivate peaceful mind and good will towards all beings. Further in the Suttas known as "**Jara Sutta**", **Attadanda Sutta** of '**Atthaka vagga**' and **Kappamanva puccha** of '**Parayana vagga**' efforts are made to positively speak about Nirvana by means of different metaphors. In the **Attadanda Sutta**, the state of nirvana is compared to form ground of Truth:

"The Muni who without deviating from truth stands fast on the firm ground (of Nibbana, being) a noble one he, having forsaken everything, is indeed called calm."¹⁰

(d) Ethical and Metaphysical conceptions of Nirvana:

The two fold conception of Nirvana, i.e., Ethical and Metaphysical is also emphasized in **Sutta Nipata**. The former is purely an ethical state to be reached in one's own life span by means of ethical practices which are suggested in the text by means of negation and affirmation. Nirvana is conceived as the highest purity or the highest good which can be achieved by the destruction of attachment, hatred and delusion, (raga, (dvesa), moha) impurities (asavas), affliction (kilesas) and desire for existence (bhava). For instance, the **Vesettha sutta** of **Mahavagga** suggests this negative aspect, of Nirvana as ethical perfection: "The man who, after cutting the strap (i.e., enmity), the thong (i.e., attachment) and the rope (i.e., scepticism) with all that pertains to it, has destroyed (all) obstacles (i.e., ignorance), the enlightened (Buddha), him I call a Brahman.¹¹

The positive aspect of Nirvana as ethical perfection too is denoted in the text by various attributes such as 'Highest bliss' (amata), 'Free from fear' (akutobhaya), 'Tranquil', (Santa), 'Imperishable' (accuta).

The verses of **Sutta Nipata** such as 21, 72, 1073, 1075, suggest the ineffable, metaphysical, non-mundane character of Nirvana which lies beyond all categorization and conceptualization. The **arhant** or an enlightened being, i.e., Buddha is 'Catuskoti Vinirmukta' and just as the whereabouts of the burnt fire is not known so too nothing can be affirmed or denied about the existence of enlightened being. For instance, when the venerable Upasiva asked the Bhagavat whether the released or delivered saint, after disappearing from here continues to exist or not, Buddha Sakyamuni answering him says: "For him who has disappeared there is no form, O Upasiva: - so said Bhagavat, that by which they say he is, exists for him no longer, when all things (dharma) have been cut off, all (kinds of) disputes are also cut off."¹²

The doctrine of Nirvana as taught by Lord Buddha in **Sutta Nipata** lies in the middle way between the two extremes of 'Utter annihilationsism' and 'Eternalism' and that is why in order to avoid the misconceptions the whole use of both the expressions. Both the positive and negative descriptions of Nirvana are only conventional in expression and suggestive and evocative in meaning, but not descriptive in strict sense. While the supermundane and non-conceptual character of Nirvana is suggested by negative descriptions, the positive expression of it serves only in checking those who inclined towards the nihilistic standpoint, but should not be taken as mundane attributes. Dr. Kasinath Upadhyaya brings into light the importance of both negativistic and positivistic descriptions of Nirvana, by pointing out the merits of both aspects. He holds that whereas the negative descriptions help us to eliminate all that 'is inapplicable to and in-commensurate with Nibbana' the positivistic definitions intend to emphasize Nirvana as a "definite goal capable of attainment, and is truly desirable."¹³

In **Sutta Nipata** Buddha stresses the futility of all speculations, rites, rituals philosophies, which contain the partial truth and hence are denied as useless means of attaining the goal. He compares the human condition to the unceasing wheel of existence (Bhava) and the suffering (Dukkha) which is the result of the unceasing wheel of existence (Bhava).

cakra), The non-dual character of Nirvana is indicated by identifying it with absolute truth as Buddha asserts in the XII sutta of **Atthakavagga**: "Truth is one without a second" (Ekam hi saccam, Na Duttiamatthi). Besides, we find Nirvana variously described in the text as a state "which is free from grief" (**Kasibharadvaja Sutta**), 'as the best' (**Cunda Sutta**), as 'exceedingly pure' (**Nalaka Sutta**), as the 'highest blessing' (**Mahamangala Sutta**), as the 'Immortal peace' (**Vijja Sutta**).

CONCLUSION

In brief, it can be said that the concept of Nirvana in Buddhism particularly in Sutta Nipata shows the true metaphysique of Buddha which has a strong logical, ethical and metaphysical basis. The true nature of Nirvana can be grasped only when one transcends logical argumentation, philosophy and non-philosophy. The truth of trans-rational character of Nirvana can be understood when one directly experiences it. As Dr. Kasinath Upadhyaya rightly incommunicable supramundane state of reality which one can only realize directly and personally."14

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14

*Berkeley : A Precursor Of Phenomenalism**Shambhu Datta Jha*

Empiricism has been one of the predominant doctrines of Philosophy. Western Philosophical thought in its journey from the very ancient times to the present day has passed through various movements such as Materialism, Idealism, dualism, rationalism, empiricism, realism, Pragmatism, logical positivism, linguistic analysis, existentialism, etc. There is no denying the fact that most of these movements are empirical in some way or the other. The recent movement of logical positivism is empirical out and out and one of the very pre-dominant characteristic of this movement is phenomenalist and it has given rise to a very influential theory known as phenomenism. This theory is empirical to the very core of it.

Phenomenalism is a wide-spread view upheld by many philosophers. As the name suggests, phenomenism favours the phenomena or the appearances or the 'given' as against the noumena or the reality or what transcends the 'given'. It is opposed to any concept of the trans-empirical or the transcendental. A phenomenon is what is directly and immediately given to our senses. In modern language it is known as *sensedatum*. When we look at a thing, what we immediately and non inferentially experience are certain shape size, colour, taste, smell, etc. There are sense-data. Some philosophers have called them 'Ideas'. Some 'sensation'. Phenomenalism does not go beyond these sense-data. In its traditional sense phenomenism holds that physical objects are nothing but logical constructions of the sense-data and hence they are completely reducible to those sense-data. In its linguistic sense and as considered by the most contemporary thinkers, it is the doctrine that all statements about material objects can be completely analysed into statements about the sense-data, therefore, to say anything about a physical thing is always to say some thing about certain sense-data. As Ayer has put it; "What is being claimed is simply that the propositions which are ordinarily expressed by sentences which refer to material things could also be expressed by sentences which referred exclusively to sense-data.¹ "Hence every statement about a material thing is equivalent to another statement about sense-data. Of these two languages-the physical object language and the sense-datum language-phenomenalism chooses the latter. Some writers

¹ 1. A. J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, Macmillan and Company Limited, St. Martin's Street, London, 1962, p.232.

like G.L. Warnock and others are of the view that there is virtually no difference between the traditional and the linguistic forms of phenomenalism. The form of the traditional and familiar issues is not changed very much in the linguistic form of phenomenalism. Ontological neutrality is no longer observed even in the linguistic form. The traditional issues appear, to use Warnock's phrase, only 'more fashionably dressed' in it.² However, it is the linguistic form of phenomenalism which has become more popular today.

This doctrine has not come into existence all on a sudden. It has a long history and Berkeley may be taken as one of its early links. As a matter of fact, it was Locke who, by emphasizing sense-experience and taking substance as something 'he-knew-not-what', set the ball of phenomenalism rolling as it were. Berkeley, however, widened its path and prepared the ground for it to take a concrete shape. His rejection of material substance is a very important step in this direction. Locke accepted the material as well as other substances even though these substances were never experienced. But it seemed inconsistent to Berkeley to accept matter. It was a mistake of Locke that he duplicated the world—one world of ideas that we actually perceive and, inaccessibly behind that, a supposed other world of external bodies. According to Locke's own descendant, the so-called Causal Theory of Perception, the objects of direct awareness are sense-data and material things are the causes of their occurrence. Berkeley objects to it and says that if we are directly aware only of sense-data and if material things are distinguished from these as their causes, then it cannot be satisfactorily explained how we could ever come to have knowledge of material things; for we cannot perceive them, if perception is always of sense-data. The next move of Berkeley was, therefore, to maintain that material things must be identified with sense data, for only by so doing we can make our discourse and knowledge of material things intelligible. Hence he maintained that material things are nothing but families or complexes of ideas. And this is equivalent to the phenomenalist thesis that material things are logical constructions of sense-data.

However, the fact that both Berkeley and the phenomenologists agree in regarding material things as logical constructions of sense-data should not lead up to suppose that phenomenalism is idealism. According to Berkeley, the ideas or the sense-data are always actual-actual at least in the mind of God. He felt it both necessary and highly desirable to maintain that if 'the choir of Heaven and furniture of the earth' were to be held to exist continuously, they must be held to exist as ideas in the mind of God. To quote Berkeley himself; "Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz, that all the choir or heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind—that their being is to be perceived or known."³ It is here that phenomenalism differs from Berke-

² 2. G.J. Warnock (ed.), *The Philosophy of Perception*, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, p.2

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³ 3. Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge with other writings*,

ley's idealism. Phenomenalism is not at all idealism. It is realism rather. While in order to explain that unperceived physical objects exist Berkeley takes recourse to the mind of God, phenomenalism brings in possible sense-experiences-sense-experiences that we would have if certain conditions were fulfilled. According to the phenomenalists, physical objects are families of actual and or possible sense-experiences. J.S. Mill, an early phenomenalist, for example, says that matter is the permanent possibility of sensation.⁴ By taking matter as the permanent possibility of sensation he means to say that when ever there is something which we call matter, it is always possible to have sensation from it. When we look at a tree, we are having actual sense-experiences. But if the tree is at a distant place and not within our viewing range, the tree still exists, because it is possible to have tree-experiences. If we would go to the place where the tree is and if our eyes were alright and light sufficient, we would certainly have the tree-experiences. As long as it is possible to have sense-experiences or sense-data, the thing still exists. It is not required that the object be actually perceived. It should be simply perceivable. Neither is God required to perceived the thing. 'It would suffice to say "if a perceiver had been there with the appropriate sense-faculties, then he would have observed it."⁵ Linguistically speaking "the inclusion of possible as well as actual sense-data among the elements of the material things must be taken only to imply a recognition that some of these statements about sense-data will have to be hypothetical."⁶ For example, the statement "The table exists now though unperceived" is translatable into the following hypothetical statement about sense-data: "If someone fulfilled certain perceptual conditions (were in the same room as the table)."⁷ This hypothetical proposition can be true even though the if-clause remains unfulfilled. The task of translating every physical object statement into statement about sense-data in the manner as given above is known as the phenomenalistic programme.

It is thus obvious from the foregoing accounts that besides actual sense-data the phenomenalists take also possible sense-data into account and thereby become realists. This is a very important point of difference between Berkeley and the phenomenalists. In view of this it is extremely difficult to see how Berkeley can be a precursor of phenomenalism.

edited and introduced by G.J. Warnock, The Fontana Library-Philosophy, Collins, London, 1966, p.67.

⁴ 4. J.S. Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1889, p. 233.

⁵ 5. John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, First Indian reprint, Allied Publishers Private Limited, 15, Graham Road, Ballard Estate, Bombay-1, 1971, p.531.

⁶ 6. A.J. Ayer, *The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge*, Macmillan and company Limited, St. Martin's Street, London, 1962, p. 232.

⁷ 7. Lyc's, *First Indian Reprint*, Allied Publishers Private Limited, 15, Graham Road, Ballard Estate, Bombay-1, 1971, p. 543.

Again, Berkeley concedes reality to spiritual substances. According to him, the essence of a thing, as distinguished from that of spirits, consists in being perceived. But the essence of spirits consists in their being percipient of perceiving. He argues that if spirits were, nothing but ideas, then everything would have been reduced to more succession of ideas and no permanence could be established. Thus in order to explain permanence of things, the existence of Spirits must be granted. In the absence of permanent minds no knowledge would be possible. Berkeley also felt that religious and moral values could be safeguarded by believing in the existence of spirits. There are three kinds of spirits, namely, (i) Myself, (ii) other finite spirits like myself, and (iii) the Infinite Spirit or God. We know the spirits by having notion of them. Notions are very much like reflection of Locke but they differ from reflection in scope and nature. Reflection is essentially sensible because there seems to be an internal sense which tells us about the operations of the soul. But notions are intellectual. Reflection is concerned about ideas as well, but the notions have three objects only - spirits, mental operations and relations. The objects of notion, then are mental or spiritual. Thus here it appears that the more Berkeley thought of knowledge, the more he was inclined to emphasize the conceptual element in it and go beyond sense experiences. He seems to have forgotten the implications of his own logic in case of God and soul. If sense-experience does not warrant the existence of matter, it also does not warrant the existence of spirits. Further, his admission of God and soul takes him much away from phenomenalism also because they are transcendental realities whereas phenomenalism is diametrically opposed to any concept of the transcendental.

However, in spite of these differences phenomenalism owes its origin much to Berkeley. As already mentioned, phenomenalism did not emerge suddenly. It was the result of a long process of philosophizing in which a number of philosophers were engaged. Berkeley occupies an important place among those philosophers. Ordinarily phenomenalism stands for total elimination of all substances whatsoever and the very starting point of Berkeley's philosophy consisted in eliminating the material substance. Although he retained spiritual ones, his rejection of matter was no less important. It is contained within itself an implicit prompting for rejecting God and Soul, too, because God and soul deserve to be rejected by law same logic which Berkeley used for rejecting matter. His 'esse est percipere', seems to be a natural and immediate antecedent to the phenomenalist thesis. Although phenomenalism has its own limits and difficulties and it is therefore not possible to carry through the phenomenalist programme, but Berkeley's contribution to the rise of phenomenalism is immense. His 'esse est percipi', emphasis on sense-experience, rejection of matter and a natural reaction to the Causal Theory of Perception-all combined together to make a way for phenomenalism to take its shape.



